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From: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:52:18 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <auGNkhSHpBRd2U_5@chrisdown.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18e2972cb8520c2e.3137322e32382e342e3434.279dd1.0000sendgmr@google.com>

Hi Jeff,

Thanks for the review!

Jeff Xu writes:
>Could we please keep the test coverage for the unsealed [vdso] case and
>avoid unconditionally skipping whenever [vdso] is unsealed?
>
>There are two regressions I'd love for us to still be able to catch:
>
>1. Kernel or config regressions when sealing is expected to be on:

Yeah agreed. With the cleanup it matters even more I think because when sealing 
is set in one place the most likely regression is probably one that unseals 
everything at once.

>2. Regressions in the new `no_mseal_sys_mappings` boot parameter itself:

In v2 I can check /proc/cmdline for no_mseal_sys_mappings to do that.

Lorenzo, I think that also may inform your question about whether checking for 
the disabled case is redundant, right?

>   When booted with `no_mseal_sys_mappings` (or when unsealed), running
>   the assertions in Patch 3 (verifying system mappings have no `sl` flag
>   and that `munmap()` / `mremap()` -- and ideally `mprotect(PROT_READ |
>   PROT_WRITE)` -- on [vdso] succeed) directly verifies that the boot
>   parameter works and doesn't regress.

Sounds good.

>  or keep strict failure as an option (e.g. `./sysmap_is_sealed` fails if
>  unsealed without the boot param, while `run_vmtests.sh` passes a flag
>  like `--allow-disabled` when `CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS` may not be
>  enabled), so CI environments that expect sealing still catch a broken
>  seal.

I like this and I think we can do it without adding some of the complexity that 
Lorenzo was not so happy about:

- Have check_sealed skip as usual when [vdso] isn't sealed and param is not set
- A new test, say expect_sealed, fails in the same case
- run_vmtests runs with -T expect_sealed when CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS=y

That should be pretty minimal. Lorenzo, Jeff, how does that sound?

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28  5:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-27 11:42 [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Chris Down
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:53   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:57       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28  4:30         ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28  5:52           ` Chris Down [this message]
2026-10-28  5:55             ` Chris Down
2026-10-28  6:16               ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28  9:49             ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 12:18   ` Pedro Falcato
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 2/3] mseal sysmap: Allow with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, default off Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:57   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:59       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap Chris Down
2026-10-27 15:03   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:40     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 17:02       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 15:34 ` [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Andrei Vagin

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