From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, Dan Williams <djbw@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 10:21:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aur3SrC49Z7FW6c7@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261103154539.GM274202@nvidia.com>
Tue, Nov 03, 2026 at 04:45:39PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 01:45:19PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 04:43:53PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>> >On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 03:01:29PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> >> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:13PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>> >> >+ type: action
>> >> >+ fd-access: read-write
>> >> >+ availability: dynamic
>> >> >+ optional: true
>> >> >+ request:
>> >> >+ attrs: refresh-request
>> >> >+ reply:
>> >> >+ attrs: change-reply
>> >>
>> >> This differs from what I had in mind: a transport-neutral
>> >> ctlv-attestation-spdm family with SPDM_GET and SPDM_AUTHENTICATE.
>> >
>> >Yes, we should try very hard to keep all the SPDM stuff as transport
>> >neutral as possible.
>> >
>> >> SPDM_GET would report discovery BaseHash, discovered slots and their
>> >> certificate digests, authentication state, and the effective
>> >> authentication slot. SPDM_AUTHENTICATE would take device-generation and
>> >> the selected slot. EVIDENCE_GET would retrieve CERT_CHAIN with
>> >> blob-instance=slot without selecting the authentication slot.
>> >
>> >Do you have a mapping to ARM RMM operations already you can share with
>> >Aneesh?
>>
>> Yes. For SPDM-capable PCIe endpoints, this is the mapping I figured out
>> with LLM, using the existing RMM 2.0-bet3 interface:
>
>Lets talk about this in this thread:
>
>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261103151643.GI274202@nvidia.com/
>
>> sysfs connect (PCI/TSM and kernel SPDM requester):
>> Perform preliminary negotiation and GET_DIGESTS/GET_CERTIFICATE.
>> Retain the discovery snapshot and destroy the temporary requester.
>> Do not create the endpoint PDEV yet.
>
>If we want to do what I called option a, with user space repeat, then
>we need a CTLV command to start the flow, not sysfs.
>
>I have been thinking sysfs should only create the attestation end
>point and not do any RMM operations
Okay, sysfs connect can just associate the TSM and create the
attestation instance. Starting/restarting the protocol would be driven
through CTLV, Is SPDM_GET op the one you have in mind, or something
additional done before it?
>
>> SPDM_GET (attestation provider):
>> Return the retained discovery information and connection state.
>> There is no corresponding RMI discovery command.
>
>> EVIDENCE_GET(CERT_CHAIN, blob-instance=N):
>> Return the retained DER certificate chain for slot N.
>
>I think these two are my #2
>
>> SPDM_AUTHENTICATE(device-generation, slot):
>> Validate the generation and selected slot.
>> RMI_PDEV_CREATE(id_index=slot)
>
>Maybe PDEV_CREATE is in my #1?
For current RMM, PDEV_CREATE fixes the certificate slot through
id_index. For option (a), I would therefore leave it in #3:
START is a no-op; FINISH(slot) creates the PDEV and runs to PDEV_READY.
>
>> RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE until PDEV_NEEDS_KEY
>> -> RMM performs fresh negotiation and retrieves the selected chain
>> -> CCA host driver relays requests over DOE and caches the chain
>> Compare its DER certificates with the selected discovery identity.
>> -> reject a mismatch before supplying the key
>> Extract the leaf key; RMI_PDEV_SET_PUBKEY -> PDEV_HAS_KEY
>> RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE until PDEV_READY
>
>This is my #3
>
>> Prepare the root-port PDEV to READY and configure PCI IDE resources.
>> RMI_PDEV_STREAM_CONNECT
>> RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE on both PDEVs, honoring STREAM_WAIT
>> RMI_PDEV_STREAM_COMPLETE
>> Enable the endpoint IDE stream.
>> Only then publish authenticated state and the new device-generation.
>
>Oh is IDE under the control of the OS for RMM? I hadn't read that far
>ahead. Then it should be done as part of the "ACCEPT" step #5
Yes, the host drives IDE setup through the RMI stream operations;
RMM handles key management. We can move that setup to host
EVIDENCE_ACCEPT, after appraising the session identity.
>
>ie the same place we would do RUN
>
>Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-04 9:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 6:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:21 ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-11-04 14:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 8:03 ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04 9:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-04 9:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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