From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
To: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:28:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avr31i6M5PqKk_Vf@archlinux> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a444421f-178b-49be-98b7-d34dfb147604@kernel.org>
Hi Mario,
Thanks for your interrest in Lockdown.
On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 01:27:50PM -0600, Mario Limonciello wrote:
> On 11/11/26 01:30, Xiu Jianfeng wrote:
> > On 11/2/2026 10:00 PM, Mario Limonciello (AMD) wrote:
> > > Lockdown is a kernel LSM that restricts access to sensitive kernel
> > > resources (e.g. /dev/mem, kernel modules, perf, tracing, kprobes,
> > > BPF access to kernel memory). However, without IOMMU, any PCI/PCIe
> > > device can perform DMA to arbitrary physical memory, effectively
> > > bypassing all lockdown protections.
> > >
> > > A malicious or compromised device can:
> > > - Read kernel memory directly (encryption keys, credentials, secrets)
> > > - Write to kernel memory directly (code patches, rootkits, backdoors)
> > > - Circumvent all lockdown LSM checks (which run inside the kernel)
> > >
> >
> > Hi Mario,
> >
> > Thanks for your contribution.
> >
> > Let me first make my position clear: I'm not questioning the motivation
> > behind this series -- "without an IOMMU, PCI/PCIe devices can DMA to
> > arbitrary physical memory" is a real and legitimate concern. What I'd
> > like to raise for discussion is: whether this class of problem should be
> > addressed by lockdown in the first place. I'm honestly doubtful, so I'd
> > very much welcome other people's views.
> >
> > My doubt comes from a mismatch between the threat this series is trying
> > to fix and the threat model lockdown was built around. Lockdown is, by
> > design, a way to protect the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel: it
> > came from the UEFI Secure Boot work, and it only limits the ways
> > software can reach the kernel -- /dev/mem, module loading, kexec, device
> > access via iopl/MSR/ACPI, and so on. The attacker it thinks about is a
> > privileged user (root) on the system. The problem in this series,
> > however, is about a malicious or bad hardware device, whose attack path
> > lives at the bus/hardware layer rather than in the software access paths
> > lockdown protects. To me, that looks like a different threat class with
>
> I do agree with you; this is a different type of threat model that's being
> addressed.
>
> > a different owner.
>
> The problem I see is that in today's day it's incredibly easy to hotplug an
> external PCIe device and not "realize" that it's malicious. For example if
> I leave a dock on my desk and someone inserts malware into it
> I might think it's perfectly fine.
>
> The current mitigation that exists is that in the Linux ecosystem we don't
> turn on PCIe tunneling "automatically" unless the IOMMU is active.
>
> Nominally this happens by way of 'bolt' userspace writing a sysfs file after
> it confirmed IOMMU was enabled both pre-boot and by the kernel.
>
> But come back to me being a user. If I have the IOMMU off already for
> whatever reason I'm used to plugging in the dock and accepting the popup
> asking me to authorize it. Now a malicious device comes along, that's on me
> to know about?
>
> I feel it's not entirely out of the realm of possibility that such a
> malicious device could subvert lockdown (let alone other bad things that can
> happen).
>
> Thus; lockdown is a very convenient tie in to claim security of the system
> against both user and hardware attacks.
>
One other scenario I can imagine without a physical access (but to be
honest I'm not completely sure about me), is for a root attacker to
write malicious firmware blob in `/lib/firmware` and somehow force the
kernel to load it thanks to a `request_firmware` call. It might lead to
an dangerous DMA configuration and then to the attack scenario you
described.
If this scenario works it would need to be handled by Lockdown.
> >
> > It also does not look like a new question. The DMA-from-untrusted-device
> > problem was discussed in detail on linux-kernel back in May–June 2020,
> > in the "RFC Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of
> > 'whitelisted' drivers" thread:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/
> > CACK8Z6E8pjVeC934oFgr=VB3pULx_GyT2NkzAogdRQJ9TKSX9A@mail.gmail.com/
> >
> > The conclusion of that discussion, as I read it, is that device-level
> > DMA threats are handled by the PCI/IOMMU line of defense -- the
> > untrusted-device marking in the PCI core, IOMMU/ACS settings, and
> > driver/device review -- not by lockdown. Interestingly, that thread also
> > shows that "with an IOMMU or without an IOMMU" is not a clean split in
> > either direction: ATS and driver bugs can defeat DMA isolation even with
> > an IOMMU in place, while ACS Translation Blocking can still help on
> > systems without one. So if my reading is correct, "is there an IOMMU?"
> > is not a good test here. It does not really stop the DMA attack this
> > series worries about, and
>
> Thanks for sharing.
>
> > it goes beyond lockdown's original job.
>
> Right.
>
> >
> > Also worth noting: systems without an IOMMU are not rare. Many embedded
> > boards and virtual machines have no IOMMU at all. Lockdown, meanwhile,
> > is often enabled automatically in Secure Boot deployments, On such
> > systems, a panic-on-no-IOMMU check would turn a normal setup into a boot
> > failure.
> >
I do agree with Xiu here, we must be very careful about it and figure
out a solution which would not brick already deployed machines.
> > Given what lockdown is for and the earlier discussion, the problem of a
> > device doing DMA without an IOMMU is probably not a problem for the
> > lockdown LSM to address, and that it belongs with the PCI/IOMMU
> > subsystems and platform policy instead.
> >
> > I would welcome other views on this.
>
> How would you feel about at least blocking the user from turning off IOMMU
> (if it's present on the system) via the kernel command line while lockdown
> was enabled?
>
> Thinking about the case where most distros enable lockdown by default, this
> will strenghten it's use without much downside that I can see.
>
> At least on a properly configured system that contains an IOMMU it would
> prevent a user from subverting lockdown with a malicious device during the
> boot sequence.
I do agree with you, it could be a great addition. With Lockdown enabled
as an early LSM (CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY), this might be
feasible before boot parameter parsing. Lockdown already locks unsafe
module parameters.
If I remember correctly on distro's that have a Lockdown patch that
enables it if secure boot is enabled, it should also be called before
early param parsing.
But taking this threat into account also brings other questions.
i.e, a physical attacker with root access on a system where Lockdown is
enabled and with a bootchain configured with shim+MOK is able to change
kernel cmdline, generate a MOK and sign a compromised kernel
binary. Thus defeating lockdown purpose.
In order to take the physical attacker into account, a securely
configured bootchain where the kernel image can't be tampered with and
where an attacker is not able to inject it owns certificates/hash in
db/MOK is mandatory so that Lockdown makes sense.
Orthogonally, we definitively should work on adding an updated
documentation with Lockdown threat model and more information about what Lockdown locks.
> >
> > > This series adds a two-phase check to prevent booting with lockdown
> > > enabled and IOMMU disabled:
> > >
> > > 1. Early check (in lockdown_lsm_init()): On x86, check the no_iommu
> > > flag, which is set early by the "iommu=off" kernel cmdline option.
> > > If lockdown is active and no_iommu is set, panic with a clear error.
> > >
> > > 2. Late check (late_initcall): On all architectures, check
> > > iommu_is_available() which returns true if any IOMMU driver
> > > registered successfully. This catches cases where:
> > > - IOMMU hardware is absent on the platform
> > > - IOMMU was disabled by driver initialization failure
> > > - IOMMU was not detected (broken firmware, missing ACPI tables)
> > >
> > > This follows the precedent set by s390 UV code which panics when
> > > security cannot be guaranteed ("System security cannot be guaranteed
> > > unless the system panics now").
> > >
> > > This also adds a generic iommu_is_available() API in the IOMMU
> > > subsystem, which is used by the lockdown check. Any IOMMU driver
> > > that successfully registers will automatically call
> > > iommu_set_available() from iommu_device_register().
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org>
> > >
> > > ---
> > > Mario Limonciello (AMD) (2):
> > > iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API
> > > security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU
> > >
> > > drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > include/linux/iommu.h | 14 ++++++++++
> > > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 65
> > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++
> > > 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
> > > ---
> > > base-commit: 6628e7d4c6b25c8d18f1345e3a20d21829aae7e4
> > > change-id: 20261014-lockdown-iommu-08c763d9f91dd
> > >
> > > Best regards,
> > > --
> > > Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
> > >
> > >
> >
>
Best regards,
Nicolas Bouchinet
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 13:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 14:00 [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-11 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27 ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28 ` Nicolas Bouchinet [this message]
2026-11-17 8:49 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-16 19:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:46 ` Mario Limonciello
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