All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
To: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
	 "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:49:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avwUNw2if5GIPA11@archlinux> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <avr31i6M5PqKk_Vf@archlinux>

On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 02:29:01PM +0100, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> > 
> > How would you feel about at least blocking the user from turning off IOMMU
> > (if it's present on the system) via the kernel command line while lockdown
> > was enabled?
> > 
> > Thinking about the case where most distros enable lockdown by default, this
> > will strenghten it's use without much downside that I can see.
> > 
> > At least on a properly configured system that contains an IOMMU it would
> > prevent a user from subverting lockdown with a malicious device during the
> > boot sequence.
> 
> I do agree with you, it could be a great addition. With Lockdown enabled
> as an early LSM (CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY), this might be
> feasible before boot parameter parsing. Lockdown already locks unsafe
> module parameters.
> 
> If I remember correctly on distro's that have a Lockdown patch that
> enables it if secure boot is enabled, it should also be called before
> early param parsing.
> 
> But taking this threat into account also brings other questions.
> i.e, a physical attacker with root access on a system where Lockdown is
> enabled and with a bootchain configured with shim+MOK is able to change
> kernel cmdline, generate a MOK and sign a compromised kernel
> binary. Thus defeating lockdown purpose.
> 
> In order to take the physical attacker into account, a securely
> configured bootchain where the kernel image can't be tampered with and
> where an attacker is not able to inject it owns certificates/hash in
> db/MOK is mandatory so that Lockdown makes sense.

To be perfectly clear, my intention was not to suggest including a
physical attacker in the Lockdown threat model, but rather to provide
examples of how such an attacker could bypass Lockdown through other
exploitation paths.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17  8:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-02 14:00 [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-11  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27   ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28     ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-17  8:49       ` Nicolas Bouchinet [this message]
2026-11-16 19:49     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:46   ` Mario Limonciello

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=avwUNw2if5GIPA11@archlinux \
    --to=nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=superm1@kernel.org \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=xiujianfeng@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.