* [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping
@ 2026-11-18 16:56 Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 18:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-18 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge Hallyn, Paul Moore
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Günther Noack, John Johansen,
KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski, Stephen Smalley, linux-security-module,
kernel-team, Serge Hallyn
cap_mmap_addr() sets PF_SUPERPRIV when commoncap grants CAP_SYS_RAWIO
for a mapping below vm.mmap_min_addr, before the other LSMs' mmap_addr
hooks run. If one of them then denies the mapping (e.g. SELinux's
mmap_zero check), process accounting still reports a use of privileges.
Set the flag in security_mmap_addr() once all hooks allowed the mapping,
as ns_capable() does after security_capable(). commoncap runs first and
denies such a mapping without CAP_SYS_RAWIO, so a successful hook chain
means that the capability was used.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/avxjfHybQBcATFKV@google.com
Fixes: 9c0d90103c7e ("Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++-
security/commoncap.c | 6 +-----
security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1e89bc1fec17..faf118b58ade 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1209,7 +1209,11 @@ static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+ int rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+
+ if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ return rc;
}
static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 9794a594bdd9..36c7b394867d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1471,13 +1471,9 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int ret = 0;
- if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
+ if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
CAP_OPT_NONE);
- /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
- if (ret == 0)
- current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
- }
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 36365fac5801..fd6717de31ad 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2687,7 +2687,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file);
*/
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
+ int rc = call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
+
+ /* commoncap granted CAP_SYS_RAWIO and no LSM denied the mapping. */
+ if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ return rc;
}
/**
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping
2026-11-18 16:56 [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-18 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 18:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-18 17:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module
> cap_mmap_addr() sets PF_SUPERPRIV when commoncap grants CAP_SYS_RAWIO
> for a mapping below vm.mmap_min_addr, before the other LSMs' mmap_addr
> hooks run. If one of them then denies the mapping (e.g. SELinux's
> mmap_zero check), process accounting still reports a use of privileges.
>
> Set the flag in security_mmap_addr() once all hooks allowed the mapping,
> as ns_capable() does after security_capable(). commoncap runs first and
> denies such a mapping without CAP_SYS_RAWIO, so a successful hook chain
> means that the capability was used.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/avxjfHybQBcATFKV@google.com
> Fixes: 9c0d90103c7e ("Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118165603.2573289-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping
2026-11-18 16:56 [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-20 18:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2026-11-20 18:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: Serge Hallyn, Paul Moore, Günther Noack, John Johansen,
KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski, Stephen Smalley, linux-security-module,
kernel-team
On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 05:56:02PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> cap_mmap_addr() sets PF_SUPERPRIV when commoncap grants CAP_SYS_RAWIO
> for a mapping below vm.mmap_min_addr, before the other LSMs' mmap_addr
> hooks run. If one of them then denies the mapping (e.g. SELinux's
> mmap_zero check), process accounting still reports a use of privileges.
>
> Set the flag in security_mmap_addr() once all hooks allowed the mapping,
> as ns_capable() does after security_capable(). commoncap runs first and
> denies such a mapping without CAP_SYS_RAWIO, so a successful hook chain
> means that the capability was used.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Although I have two suggestions that you can take or leave - first, I
think rc == 0 would be nicer than !rc. Second, you could keep the
PF_SUPERPRIV setting in one place by having security_mmap_addr defined
only once in security.h, and having it call do_security_mmap_addr(),
which changes based on whether CONFIG_SECURITY is set. Otherwise I
could see the two spots getting out of sync after some future update.
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/avxjfHybQBcATFKV@google.com
> Fixes: 9c0d90103c7e ("Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 6 +-----
> security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1e89bc1fec17..faf118b58ade 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1209,7 +1209,11 @@ static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>
> static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> {
> - return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
> + int rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
> +
> + if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
> + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 9794a594bdd9..36c7b394867d 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1471,13 +1471,9 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> {
> int ret = 0;
>
> - if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
> + if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
> ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> CAP_OPT_NONE);
> - /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
> - if (ret == 0)
> - current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> - }
> return ret;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 36365fac5801..fd6717de31ad 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2687,7 +2687,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file);
> */
> int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
> + int rc = call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
> +
> + /* commoncap granted CAP_SYS_RAWIO and no LSM denied the mapping. */
> + if (!rc && addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)
> + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> /**
> --
> 2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2026-11-18 16:56 [PATCH v1] lsm: Set PF_SUPERPRIV only when all mmap_addr hooks allow a mapping Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 18:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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