[PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Bertrand Marquis]

Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
possible vulnerability.

ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
the live TX mapping.

For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
receiver's RX buffer.

The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.

Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
validation and use consume the same snapshot.

Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
---
 xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
@@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 
     /* create a copy of the message header */
     memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
+    /*
+     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
+     * again after this point.
+     */
+    barrier();
 
     src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
     dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
-- 
2.53.0

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Andrew Cooper]

On 18/08/2026 1:16 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
> possible vulnerability.
>
> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
> the live TX mapping.
>
> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
> receiver's RX buffer.
>
> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>
> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>
> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  
>      /* create a copy of the message header */
>      memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
> +    /*
> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
> +     * again after this point.
> +     */
> +    barrier();
>  
>      src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
>      dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);

This does look to be adequate to fix the potential issue, but you should
drop the ACCESS_ONCE(src_ctx->guest_vers) a little lower down.

With a safe copy on the stack, there's no need to further inhibit
optimisations around it.  In fact, it's unclear why e040b94d0fff added
the ACCESS_ONCE() in the first place, seeing as it was already an
on-stack object at the time.

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Bertrand Marquis]

Hi Andrew,

> On 18 Aug 2026, at 14:40, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
> 
> On 18/08/2026 1:16 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>> possible vulnerability.
>> 
>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>> the live TX mapping.
>> 
>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>> receiver's RX buffer.
>> 
>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>> 
>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>> 
>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>> ---
>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>> 
>>     /* create a copy of the message header */
>>     memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>> +    /*
>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>> +     * again after this point.
>> +     */
>> +    barrier();
>> 
>>     src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
>>     dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
> 
> This does look to be adequate to fix the potential issue, but you should
> drop the ACCESS_ONCE(src_ctx->guest_vers) a little lower down.
> 
> With a safe copy on the stack, there's no need to further inhibit
> optimisations around it.  In fact, it's unclear why e040b94d0fff added
> the ACCESS_ONCE() in the first place, seeing as it was already an
> on-stack object at the time.

the ACCESS_ONCE is protecting the access to guest_vers which is not on the stack
but a value on an internal context accessed by all VMs.

You probably mixed src_MSG with src_CTX ?

Cheers
Bertrand

> 
> ~Andrew

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Andrew Cooper]

On 18/08/2026 2:28 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Hi Andrew,
>
>> On 18 Aug 2026, at 14:40, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 18/08/2026 1:16 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>>> possible vulnerability.
>>>
>>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>>> the live TX mapping.
>>>
>>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>>> receiver's RX buffer.
>>>
>>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>>>
>>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>>>
>>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>
>>>     /* create a copy of the message header */
>>>     memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>>> +     * again after this point.
>>> +     */
>>> +    barrier();
>>>
>>>     src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
>>>     dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
>> This does look to be adequate to fix the potential issue, but you should
>> drop the ACCESS_ONCE(src_ctx->guest_vers) a little lower down.
>>
>> With a safe copy on the stack, there's no need to further inhibit
>> optimisations around it.  In fact, it's unclear why e040b94d0fff added
>> the ACCESS_ONCE() in the first place, seeing as it was already an
>> on-stack object at the time.
> the ACCESS_ONCE is protecting the access to guest_vers which is not on the stack
> but a value on an internal context accessed by all VMs.
>
> You probably mixed src_MSG with src_CTX ?

Oh, maybe.  Those really ought to have more distinct names.

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Bertrand Marquis]

Hi Andrew,

> On 18 Aug 2026, at 16:46, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
> 
> On 18/08/2026 2:28 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> Hi Andrew,
>> 
>>> On 18 Aug 2026, at 14:40, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 18/08/2026 1:16 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>>>> possible vulnerability.
>>>> 
>>>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>>>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>>>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>>>> the live TX mapping.
>>>> 
>>>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>>>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>>>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>>>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>>>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>>>> receiver's RX buffer.
>>>> 
>>>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>>>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>>>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>>>> 
>>>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>>>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>>>> 
>>>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>>>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>>> 
>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>> 
>>>>    /* create a copy of the message header */
>>>>    memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>>>> +     * again after this point.
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    barrier();
>>>> 
>>>>    src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
>>>>    dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
>>> This does look to be adequate to fix the potential issue, but you should
>>> drop the ACCESS_ONCE(src_ctx->guest_vers) a little lower down.
>>> 
>>> With a safe copy on the stack, there's no need to further inhibit
>>> optimisations around it.  In fact, it's unclear why e040b94d0fff added
>>> the ACCESS_ONCE() in the first place, seeing as it was already an
>>> on-stack object at the time.
>> the ACCESS_ONCE is protecting the access to guest_vers which is not on the stack
>> but a value on an internal context accessed by all VMs.
>> 
>> You probably mixed src_MSG with src_CTX ?
> Oh, maybe.  Those really ought to have more distinct names.

No worries. 
Would you consider renaming them a requirement for this patch? 
If not, I would prefer to keep this fix focused on adding the barrier and avoid unrelated churn.

Cheers
Bertrand

> 
> ~Andrew

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Andrew Cooper]

On 19/08/2026 7:39 am, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Hi Andrew,
>
>> On 18 Aug 2026, at 16:46, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 18/08/2026 2:28 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>> Hi Andrew,
>>>
>>>> On 18 Aug 2026, at 14:40, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 18/08/2026 1:16 pm, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>>>>> possible vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>>>>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>>>>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>>>>> the live TX mapping.
>>>>>
>>>>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>>>>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>>>>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>>>>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>>>>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>>>>> receiver's RX buffer.
>>>>>
>>>>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>>>>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>>>>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>>>>>
>>>>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>>>>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>>>>>
>>>>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>>>>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>>>
>>>>>    /* create a copy of the message header */
>>>>>    memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>>>>> +     * again after this point.
>>>>> +     */
>>>>> +    barrier();
>>>>>
>>>>>    src_id = src_msg.send_recv_id >> 16;
>>>>>    dst_id = src_msg.send_recv_id & GENMASK(15,0);
>>>> This does look to be adequate to fix the potential issue, but you should
>>>> drop the ACCESS_ONCE(src_ctx->guest_vers) a little lower down.
>>>>
>>>> With a safe copy on the stack, there's no need to further inhibit
>>>> optimisations around it.  In fact, it's unclear why e040b94d0fff added
>>>> the ACCESS_ONCE() in the first place, seeing as it was already an
>>>> on-stack object at the time.
>>> the ACCESS_ONCE is protecting the access to guest_vers which is not on the stack
>>> but a value on an internal context accessed by all VMs.
>>>
>>> You probably mixed src_MSG with src_CTX ?
>> Oh, maybe.  Those really ought to have more distinct names.
> No worries. 
> Would you consider renaming them a requirement for this patch? 
> If not, I would prefer to keep this fix focused on adding the barrier and avoid unrelated churn.

This would be later cleanup.  It definitely shouldn't be part of this fix.

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Orzel, Michal]

On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
> possible vulnerability.
> 
> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
> the live TX mapping.
> 
> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
> receiver's RX buffer.
> 
> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
> 
> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
> 
> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  
>      /* create a copy of the message header */
>      memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
> +    /*
> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
> +     * again after this point.
This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The
comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg.

With that:
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>

~Michal

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Bertrand Marquis]

Hi Michal,

> On 19 Aug 2026, at 09:47, Orzel, Michal <Michal.Orzel@amd.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>> possible vulnerability.
>> 
>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>> the live TX mapping.
>> 
>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>> receiver's RX buffer.
>> 
>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>> 
>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>> 
>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>> ---
>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>> 
>>     /* create a copy of the message header */
>>     memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>> +    /*
>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>> +     * again after this point.
> This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The
> comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg.

Yes, this should be something around:
Ensure validation and use of the message header use the same snapshot.

Do you agree ?

> 
> With that:
> Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
> 

Thanks.

Could that be fixed on commit or do you want me to send a v2 ?

Cheers
Bertrand

> ~Michal
> 

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Orzel, Michal]

On 19-Aug-26 10:01, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Hi Michal,
> 
>> On 19 Aug 2026, at 09:47, Orzel, Michal <Michal.Orzel@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>>> possible vulnerability.
>>>
>>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>>> the live TX mapping.
>>>
>>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>>> receiver's RX buffer.
>>>
>>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>>>
>>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>>>
>>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>
>>>     /* create a copy of the message header */
>>>     memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>>> +     * again after this point.
>> This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The
>> comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg.
> 
> Yes, this should be something around:
> Ensure validation and use of the message header use the same snapshot.
> 
> Do you agree ?
Yes. I'll fix on commit.

~Michal

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads

[Bertrand Marquis]

> On 19 Aug 2026, at 10:09, Orzel, Michal <michal.orzel@amd.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 19-Aug-26 10:01, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> Hi Michal,
>> 
>>> On 19 Aug 2026, at 09:47, Orzel, Michal <Michal.Orzel@amd.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
>>>> possible vulnerability.
>>>> 
>>>> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
>>>> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
>>>> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
>>>> the live TX mapping.
>>>> 
>>>> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
>>>> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
>>>> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
>>>> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
>>>> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
>>>> receiver's RX buffer.
>>>> 
>>>> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
>>>> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
>>>> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
>>>> 
>>>> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
>>>> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
>>>> 
>>>> Link: https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
>>>> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>>> 
>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
>>>> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>> 
>>>>    /* create a copy of the message header */
>>>>    memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
>>>> +     * again after this point.
>>> This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The
>>> comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg.
>> 
>> Yes, this should be something around:
>> Ensure validation and use of the message header use the same snapshot.
>> 
>> Do you agree ?
> Yes. I'll fix on commit.

Thanks :-)

Bertrand

> 
> ~Michal