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From: bugzilla-daemon@kernel.org
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bug 220964] nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm()
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 01:22:30 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-220964-28872-CHHSZu8vB3@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bug-220964-28872@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220964

--- Comment #1 from yosry.ahmed@linux.dev ---
On Sat, Jan 10, 2026 at 08:03:07PM +0000, bugzilla-daemon@kernel.org wrote:
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220964
> 
>             Bug ID: 220964
>            Summary: nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm()
>            Product: Virtualization
>            Version: unspecified
>           Hardware: AMD
>                 OS: Linux
>             Status: NEW
>           Severity: normal
>           Priority: P3
>          Component: kvm
>           Assignee: virtualization_kvm@kernel-bugs.osdl.org
>           Reporter: max@m00nbsd.net
>         Regression: No
> 
> In svm_leave_smm():
> 
>     svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400);
> ...
>     nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
>     nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
>     ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa, vmcb12,
> false);
> 
> map_save.hva and vmcb12 are guest mappings, but there is no sanity check
> performed on the copied control/save areas. It seems that this allows the
> guest
> to modify restricted values (intercepts, EFER, CR4) and gain access to CPU
> features the host may not support or expose.

This was reported by Sean in
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aThIQzni6fC1qdgj@google.com/.

I think the following patch should fix it:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260115011312.3675857-14-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev/.

> 
> nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache() and nested_vmcb_check_controls() ought to
> be combined into one function, same with nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache() and
> nested_vmcb_check_save(), to eliminate the risk that a copy is made without
> sanity check.
> 
> -- 
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      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-01-15  1:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-10 20:03 [Bug 220964] New: nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm() bugzilla-daemon
2026-01-15  1:22 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-01-15  1:22 ` bugzilla-daemon [this message]

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