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From: bugzilla-daemon@kernel.org
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bug 220964] New: nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm()
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2026 20:03:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-220964-28872@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/> (raw)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220964

            Bug ID: 220964
           Summary: nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm()
           Product: Virtualization
           Version: unspecified
          Hardware: AMD
                OS: Linux
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P3
         Component: kvm
          Assignee: virtualization_kvm@kernel-bugs.osdl.org
          Reporter: max@m00nbsd.net
        Regression: No

In svm_leave_smm():

    svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400);
...
    nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
    nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
    ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa, vmcb12,
false);

map_save.hva and vmcb12 are guest mappings, but there is no sanity check
performed on the copied control/save areas. It seems that this allows the guest
to modify restricted values (intercepts, EFER, CR4) and gain access to CPU
features the host may not support or expose.

nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache() and nested_vmcb_check_controls() ought to
be combined into one function, same with nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache() and
nested_vmcb_check_save(), to eliminate the risk that a copy is made without
sanity check.

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             reply	other threads:[~2026-01-10 20:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-10 20:03 bugzilla-daemon [this message]
2026-01-15  1:22 ` [Bug 220964] New: nSVM: missing sanity checks in svm_leave_smm() Yosry Ahmed
2026-01-15  1:22 ` [Bug 220964] " bugzilla-daemon

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