From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
Daniel Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
"committers@xenproject.org" <committers@xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Revert "evtchn: refuse EVTCHNOP_status for Xen-bound event channels"
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:03:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ccd70c8f-1381-43f7-8be8-edc1dd505ce2@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ba4d87f-48e2-4332-bcd8-ac891cee8917@citrix.com>
On 14.05.2024 11:51, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 14/05/2024 10:25 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 03.04.2024 08:16, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 02.04.2024 19:06, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> The commit makes a claim without any kind of justification.
>>> Well, what does "have no business" leave open?
>>>
>>>> The claim is false, and the commit broke lsevtchn in dom0.
>>> Or alternatively lsevtchn was doing something that was never meant to work
>>> (from Xen's perspective).
>>>
>>>> It is also quite
>>>> obvious from XSM_TARGET that it has broken device model stubdoms too.
>>> Why would that be "obvious"? What business would a stubdom have to look at
>>> Xen's side of an evtchn?
>>>
>>>> Whether to return information about a xen-owned evtchn is a matter of policy,
>>>> and it's not acceptable to short circuit the XSM on the matter.
>>> I can certainly accept this as one possible view point. As in so many cases
>>> I'm afraid I dislike you putting it as if it was the only possible one.
>>>
>>> In summary: The supposed justification you claim is missing in the original
>>> change is imo also missing here then: What business would any entity in the
>>> system have to look at Xen's side of an event channel? Back at the time, 3
>>> people agreed that it's "none".
>> You've never responded to this reply of mine, or its follow-up. You also
>> didn't chime in on the discussion Daniel and I were having. I consider my
>> objections unaddressed, and in fact I continue to consider the change to
>> be wrong. Therefore it was inappropriate for you to commit it; it needs
>> reverting asap. If you're not going to do so, I will.
>
> You tried defending breaking a utility with "well it shouldn't exist then".
>
> You don't have a leg to stand on, and two maintainers of relevant
> subsystems here just got tired of bullshit being presented in place of
> any credible argument for having done the change in the way you did.
Please can you finally get into the habit of not sending rude replies?
> The correct response was "Sorry I broke things. Lets revert this for
> now to unbreak, and I'll see about reworking it to not intentionally
> subvert Xen's security mechanism".
I'm sorry, but I didn't break things. I made things more consistent with
the earlier change, as pointed out before: With your revert,
evtchn_status() is now (again) inconsistent with e.g. evtchn_send(). If
you were serious about this being something that needs leaving to XSM,
you'd have adjusted such further uses of consumer_is_xen() as well. But
you aren't. You're merely insisting on lsevtchn needing to continue to
work in a way it should never have worked, with a patch to improve the
situation already pending.
Just to state a very basic principle here again: Xen-internal event
channels ought to either be fully under XSM control when it comes to
domains attempting to access them (in whichever way), or they should
truly be Xen-internal, with access uniformly prevented. To me the
former option simply makes very little sense.
> As it stands, you're 2-1 outvoted, and wasted any sympathy I may have
> had for the principle of the change based on the absurdity of your
> arguments.
No, pending objections are pending objections. Daniel's responses didn't
eliminate them.
As a separate aspect: I can't assume anymore that it is just coincidence
that you taking such a controversial action is at a time when I'm away.
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-14 10:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-02 17:06 [PATCH] Revert "evtchn: refuse EVTCHNOP_status for Xen-bound event channels" Andrew Cooper
2024-04-03 6:16 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 6:52 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 11:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-04-03 11:54 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 13:31 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-04-04 8:11 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 11:10 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-04-03 12:05 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 13:27 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-04-04 7:57 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-05 5:59 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-14 9:25 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-14 9:51 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-05-14 10:03 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2024-05-14 11:13 ` Julien Grall
2024-05-14 21:35 ` Stefano Stabellini
2024-05-15 7:33 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-16 19:15 ` Oleksii K.
2024-05-17 7:01 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-15 10:49 ` Kelly Choi
2024-05-15 12:59 ` George Dunlap
2024-05-16 6:41 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-17 1:21 ` Stefano Stabellini
2024-05-17 7:04 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-17 20:28 ` Stefano Stabellini
2024-05-21 6:17 ` Jan Beulich
2024-05-22 1:33 ` Stefano Stabellini
2024-05-17 1:22 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-17 7:24 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-03 13:35 ` Daniel P. Smith
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