* [morty 06/15] hostapd: fix WPA2 key replay security bug
2018-06-04 2:48 [morty 00/15] Morty pull request Armin Kuster
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2018-06-04 2:48 ` [morty 05/15] mariadb: Do not use ucontext_* APIs with musl Armin Kuster
@ 2018-06-04 2:48 ` Armin Kuster
2018-06-04 2:48 ` [morty 07/15] wireshark: update to 2.2.5 Armin Kuster
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14 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2018-06-04 2:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akuster808, openembedded-devel
From: Isaac Hermida <isaac.hermida@digi.com>
Note, hostapd and wpa_supplicant use the same sources. This commit uses the same
patch than OpenEmbedded-core commit 1d92cb1a20135cfffff9f94a6633ec0840518738 in
morty branch.
Signed-off-by: Isaac Hermida <isaac.hermida@digi.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 939 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 940 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32fad29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
+The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
+result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
+
+Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-13077
+CVE: CVE-2017-13078
+CVE: CVE-2017-13079
+CVE: CVE-2017-13080
+CVE: CVE-2017-13081
+CVE: CVE-2017-13082
+CVE: CVE-2017-13086
+CVE: CVE-2017-13087
+CVE: CVE-2017-13088
+
+Thanks to Wind River for the backport from upstream master to wpa_supplicant
+2.5.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From 9a4a0f78bb2ad516d4a295fb5d042f8a61bd3f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 10:13:17 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 9 +++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
+ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 2760a3f..b38a64d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1740,6 +1740,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3208,6 +3211,12 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return sm->wpa;
+ }
+
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++ return 0;
++ return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
+
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index fd04f16..3e53461 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index eeaffbf..f8f5dbe 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 57b098f..234d84c 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From d0d1adad8792ae948743031543db8839f83db829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 13:18:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index c08f651..21e13da 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t tk_len;
+ };
+
++struct wpa_gtk {
++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+ * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index a9f255e..eab7151 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -731,6 +740,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -801,6 +813,47 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++ keyidx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++ broadcast_ether_addr,
++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
+
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+@@ -812,30 +865,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ie->igtk) {
+ size_t len;
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+- u16 keyidx;
++
+ len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ return -1;
++
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+- igtk->igtk, len);
+- if (keyidx > 4095) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+- return -1;
+- }
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -2251,7 +2288,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+- int clear_ptk = 1;
++ int clear_keys = 1;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -2277,11 +2314,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ /* Prepare for the next transition */
+ wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+
+- clear_ptk = 0;
++ clear_keys = 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+- if (clear_ptk) {
++ if (clear_keys) {
+ /*
+ * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2291,6 +2328,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2807,6 +2848,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2879,29 +2924,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+- u16 keyidx;
+-
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+- igd.igtk, keylen);
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+- "WNM mode");
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- return -1;
+- }
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 76c0d1a21f0ebf00119e50bc57776d393ee4a30d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:31:46 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index eab7151..e7b5ca8 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -692,14 +692,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+- const u8 *key_rsc)
++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -740,8 +743,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
+- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -800,7 +809,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -815,14 +824,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++ int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+@@ -847,8 +860,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -871,7 +890,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -1520,7 +1539,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ret)
+ goto failed;
+
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
+ wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
+ goto failed;
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2329,8 +2348,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+@@ -2849,8 +2870,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2915,7 +2938,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ "WNM mode");
+@@ -2927,7 +2950,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 27b6123..51753ee 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From dc0d33ee697d016f14d0b6f3330720de2dfa9ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:55:19 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index 21e13da..a04e759 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index e7b5ca8..cb69b67 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *key_rsc;
+ u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
+
+@@ -643,6 +649,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 9831007c38f18cd70a077fccc22c836100867138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 19:45:13 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index b38a64d..c603b1b 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1895,6 +1895,20 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ }
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
++
+
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+@@ -2417,9 +2431,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 7ec70b3c5a5e32f7687999ef21c608524dcf35b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:09:26 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index 722c20a..0878c62 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -690,7 +708,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1153,6 +1171,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1744,6 +1763,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ peer->supp_oper_classes_len);
+ }
+
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++ if (nonce[i])
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
+
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+@@ -1998,7 +2028,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ peer->cipher = cipher;
+
+- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ /*
+ * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2014,6 +2045,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ goto error;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 642f5eadf775b41bf3ddd8ffe77c33e785bda48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:36:56 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index cb69b67..05e5168 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2391,6 +2391,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+ /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ u16 capab;
+
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+
+ buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 51753ee..85cc862 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ int ft_completed;
++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
index ab01235..81b2fb6 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
file://init \
file://hostapd.service \
file://0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch \
+ file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [morty 15/15] dnsmasq: backport CVE fixes from dnsmasq 2.78
2018-06-04 2:48 [morty 00/15] Morty pull request Armin Kuster
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-04 2:48 ` [morty 14/15] wireshark: Update Package to 2.2.12 Armin Kuster
@ 2018-06-04 2:48 ` Armin Kuster
14 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2018-06-04 2:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akuster808, openembedded-devel
From: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
CVE-2017-1449{1-6}
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch | 75 ++++++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch | 37 +++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch | 37 +++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch | 37 +++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch | 48 ++++
.../dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch | 73 ++++++
.../recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb | 7 +
8 files changed, 582 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch
create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e73feb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From e441ac5247cf8252ac8db08d53862af4065d9586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 22:00:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14491, DNS heap buffer overflow.
+
+commit 62cb936cb7ad5f219715515ae7d32dd281a5aa1f upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Further fix to 0549c73b7ea6b22a3c49beb4d432f185a81efcbc
+Handles case when RR name is not a pointer to the question,
+only occurs for some auth-mode replies, therefore not
+detected by fuzzing (?)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc1035.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 78410d6..e5628ba 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1071,32 +1071,35 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+
+ va_start(ap, format); /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
+
+- /* nameoffset (1 or 2) + type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + 0 (2) */
+- CHECK_LIMIT(12);
+-
+ if (nameoffset > 0)
+ {
++ CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+ PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
+- if (name)
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit);
+- if (!p)
+- {
+- va_end(ap);
+- goto truncated;
+- }
+-
++ if (name && !(p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit)))
++ {
++ va_end(ap);
++ goto truncated;
++ }
++
+ if (nameoffset < 0)
+ {
++ CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+ PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+ }
+ else
+- *p++ = 0;
++ {
++ CHECK_LIMIT(1);
++ *p++ = 0;
++ }
+ }
+
++ /* type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + rdlen (2) */
++ CHECK_LIMIT(10);
++
+ PUTSHORT(type, p);
+ PUTSHORT(class, p);
+ PUTLONG(ttl, p); /* TTL */
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0598678
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+From 8644f7c99c5e2fde6b6872a4ab820d3520f44e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:17:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14491 DNS heap buffer overflow.
+
+commit 0549c73b7ea6b22a3c49beb4d432f185a81efcbc upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
+security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
+requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
+a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
+(by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
+even take control of, dnsmasq.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/dnsmasq.h | 2 +-
+ src/dnssec.c | 2 +-
+ src/option.c | 2 +-
+ src/rfc1035.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/rfc2131.c | 4 ++--
+ src/rfc3315.c | 4 ++--
+ src/util.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
+index 1896a64..ed5da36 100644
+--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
+@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ u32 rand32(void);
+ u64 rand64(void);
+ int legal_hostname(char *c);
+ char *canonicalise(char *s, int *nomem);
+-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval);
++unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit);
+ void *safe_malloc(size_t size);
+ void safe_pipe(int *fd, int read_noblock);
+ void *whine_malloc(size_t size);
+diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
+index 3c77c7d..f45c804 100644
+--- a/src/dnssec.c
++++ b/src/dnssec.c
+@@ -2227,7 +2227,7 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL);
+ *p++ = 0;
+ PUTSHORT(type, p);
+ PUTSHORT(class, p);
+diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
+index d8c57d6..0e1c326 100644
+--- a/src/option.c
++++ b/src/option.c
+@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int parse_dhcp_opt(char *errstr, char *arg, int flags)
+ }
+
+ p = newp;
+- end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom);
++ end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom, NULL);
+ *end++ = 0;
+ len = end - p;
+ free(dom);
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 24d08c1..78410d6 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bog
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++
+ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int nameoffset, unsigned char **pp,
+ unsigned long ttl, int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...)
+ {
+@@ -1058,12 +1059,21 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ unsigned short usval;
+ long lval;
+ char *sval;
++#define CHECK_LIMIT(size) \
++ if (limit && p + (size) > (unsigned char*)limit) \
++ { \
++ va_end(ap); \
++ goto truncated; \
++ }
+
+ if (truncp && *truncp)
+ return 0;
+-
++
+ va_start(ap, format); /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
+-
++
++ /* nameoffset (1 or 2) + type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + 0 (2) */
++ CHECK_LIMIT(12);
++
+ if (nameoffset > 0)
+ {
+ PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+@@ -1072,7 +1082,13 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ {
+ char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (name)
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit);
++ if (!p)
++ {
++ va_end(ap);
++ goto truncated;
++ }
++
+ if (nameoffset < 0)
+ {
+ PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
+@@ -1093,6 +1109,7 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ {
+ #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+ case '6':
++ CHECK_LIMIT(IN6ADDRSZ);
+ sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ memcpy(p, sval, IN6ADDRSZ);
+ p += IN6ADDRSZ;
+@@ -1100,36 +1117,47 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ #endif
+
+ case '4':
++ CHECK_LIMIT(INADDRSZ);
+ sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ memcpy(p, sval, INADDRSZ);
+ p += INADDRSZ;
+ break;
+
+ case 'b':
++ CHECK_LIMIT(1);
+ usval = va_arg(ap, int);
+ *p++ = usval;
+ break;
+
+ case 's':
++ CHECK_LIMIT(2);
+ usval = va_arg(ap, int);
+ PUTSHORT(usval, p);
+ break;
+
+ case 'l':
++ CHECK_LIMIT(4);
+ lval = va_arg(ap, long);
+ PUTLONG(lval, p);
+ break;
+
+ case 'd':
+- /* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
+- if (offset)
+- *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *));
+- *p++ = 0;
++ /* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
++ if (offset)
++ *offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *), limit);
++ if (!p)
++ {
++ va_end(ap);
++ goto truncated;
++ }
++ CHECK_LIMIT(1);
++ *p++ = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case 't':
+ usval = va_arg(ap, int);
++ CHECK_LIMIT(usval);
+ sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (usval != 0)
+ memcpy(p, sval, usval);
+@@ -1141,20 +1169,24 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
+ usval = sval ? strlen(sval) : 0;
+ if (usval > 255)
+ usval = 255;
++ CHECK_LIMIT(usval + 1);
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)usval;
+ memcpy(p, sval, usval);
+ p += usval;
+ break;
+ }
+
++#undef CHECK_LIMIT
+ va_end(ap); /* clean up variable argument pointer */
+
+ j = p - sav - 2;
+- PUTSHORT(j, sav); /* Now, store real RDLength */
++ /* this has already been checked against limit before */
++ PUTSHORT(j, sav); /* Now, store real RDLength */
+
+ /* check for overflow of buffer */
+ if (limit && ((unsigned char *)limit - p) < 0)
+ {
++truncated:
+ if (truncp)
+ *truncp = 1;
+ return 0;
+diff --git a/src/rfc2131.c b/src/rfc2131.c
+index b7c167e..0dffd36 100644
+--- a/src/rfc2131.c
++++ b/src/rfc2131.c
+@@ -2419,10 +2419,10 @@ static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
+
+ if (fqdn_flags & 0x04)
+ {
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname, NULL);
+ if (domain)
+ {
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain, NULL);
+ *p++ = 0;
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 3f4d69c..73bdee4 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -1472,10 +1472,10 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct state *state, int do_refresh)
+ if ((p = expand(len + 2)))
+ {
+ *(p++) = state->fqdn_flags;
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname, NULL);
+ if (state->send_domain)
+ {
+- p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain);
++ p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain, NULL);
+ *p = 0;
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 93b24f5..a377e6f 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -218,15 +218,20 @@ char *canonicalise(char *in, int *nomem)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval)
++unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit)
+ {
+ int j;
+
+ while (sval && *sval)
+ {
++ if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
++ return p;
++
+ unsigned char *cp = p++;
+ for (j = 0; *sval && (*sval != '.'); sval++, j++)
+ {
++ if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
++ return p;
+ #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+ if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && *sval == NAME_ESCAPE)
+ *p++ = (*(++sval))-1;
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1994931
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 6a0e7dbac67a8393e4505e593e5c46544c53eae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:47:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14492, DHCPv6 RA heap overflow.
+
+commit 24036ea507862c7b7898b68289c8130f85599c10 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix heap overflow in IPv6 router advertisement code.
+This is a potentially serious security hole, as a
+crafted RA request can overflow a buffer and crash or
+control dnsmasq. Attacker must be on the local network.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/radv.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/radv.c b/src/radv.c
+index 749b666..d09fe0e 100644
+--- a/src/radv.c
++++ b/src/radv.c
+@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ void icmp6_packet(time_t now)
+ /* look for link-layer address option for logging */
+ if (sz >= 16 && packet[8] == ICMP6_OPT_SOURCE_MAC && (packet[9] * 8) + 8 <= sz)
+ {
++ if ((packet[9] * 8 - 2) * 3 - 1 >= MAXDNAME) {
++ return;
++ }
+ print_mac(daemon->namebuff, &packet[10], (packet[9] * 8) - 2);
+ mac = daemon->namebuff;
+ }
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae99cf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From f23f4be3cb72d307806e3d3ca14779f69ac5494c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:52:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14493, DHCPv6 - Stack buffer
+ overflow.
+
+commit 3d4ff1ba8419546490b464418223132529514033 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix stack overflow in DHCPv6 code. An attacker who can send
+a DHCPv6 request to dnsmasq can overflow the stack frame and
+crash or control dnsmasq.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc3315.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 73bdee4..8d18a28 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
+ /* RFC-6939 */
+ if ((opt = opt6_find(opts, end, OPTION6_CLIENT_MAC, 3)))
+ {
++ if (opt6_len(opt) - 2 > DHCP_CHADDR_MAX) {
++ return 0;
++ }
+ state->mac_type = opt6_uint(opt, 0, 2);
+ state->mac_len = opt6_len(opt) - 2;
+ memcpy(&state->mac[0], opt6_ptr(opt, 2), state->mac_len);
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6f0e2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From aba3f8df87d104d599920ea44e96191601638961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:05:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14494, Infoleak handling DHCPv6
+ forwarded requests.
+
+commit 33e3f1029c9ec6c63e430ff51063a6301d4b2262 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix information leak in DHCPv6. A crafted DHCPv6 packet can
+cause dnsmasq to forward memory from outside the packet
+buffer to a DHCPv6 server when acting as a relay.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rfc3315.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
+index 8d18a28..03b3f84 100644
+--- a/src/rfc3315.c
++++ b/src/rfc3315.c
+@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
+
+ for (opt = opts; opt; opt = opt6_next(opt, end))
+ {
++ if (opt6_ptr(opt, 0) + opt6_len(opt) >= end) {
++ return 0;
++ }
+ int o = new_opt6(opt6_type(opt));
+ if (opt6_type(opt) == OPTION6_RELAY_MSG)
+ {
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31014d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From e4ae220ee00dcad20a716432badd3210b442ddb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:16:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14495, OOM in DNS response
+ creation.
+
+commit 51eadb692a5123b9838e5a68ecace3ac579a3a45 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix out-of-memory Dos vulnerability. An attacker which can
+send malicious DNS queries to dnsmasq can trigger memory
+allocations in the add_pseudoheader function
+The allocated memory is never freed which leads to a DoS
+through memory exhaustion. dnsmasq is vulnerable only
+if one of the following option is specified:
+--add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/edns0.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c
+index a2ef0ea..f48c084 100644
+--- a/src/edns0.c
++++ b/src/edns0.c
+@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+ !(p = skip_section(p,
+ ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount),
+ header, plen)))
++ {
++ free(buff);
+ return plen;
++ }
+ if (p + 11 > limit)
+- return plen; /* Too big */
++ {
++ free(buff);
++ return plen; /* Too big */
++ }
+ *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
+ PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
+ PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc50ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq/dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From c25545680679a12d78dd80662ed1bc5d97a38d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 20:11:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Security fix, CVE-2017-14496, Integer underflow in DNS
+ response creation.
+
+commit 897c113fda0886a28a986cc6ba17bb93bd6cb1c7 upstream
+git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
+
+Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the
+add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative
+size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries
+to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely.
+dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is
+specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/edns0.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c
+index c7a101e..a2ef0ea 100644
+--- a/src/edns0.c
++++ b/src/edns0.c
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+ GETSHORT(len, p);
+
+ /* malformed option, delete the whole OPT RR and start again. */
+- if (i + len > rdlen)
++ if (i + 4 + len > rdlen)
+ {
+ rdlen = 0;
+ is_last = 0;
+@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+ ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount),
+ header, plen)))
+ return plen;
++ if (p + 11 > limit)
++ return plen; /* Too big */
+ *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
+ PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
+ PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */
+@@ -204,6 +206,11 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+ /* Copy back any options */
+ if (buff)
+ {
++ if (p + rdlen > limit)
++ {
++ free(buff);
++ return plen; /* Too big */
++ }
+ memcpy(p, buff, rdlen);
+ free(buff);
+ p += rdlen;
+@@ -217,8 +224,12 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
+ /* Add new option */
+ if (optno != 0 && replace != 2)
+ {
++ if (p + 4 > limit)
++ return plen; /* Too big */
+ PUTSHORT(optno, p);
+ PUTSHORT(optlen, p);
++ if (p + optlen > limit)
++ return plen; /* Too big */
+ memcpy(p, opt, optlen);
+ p += optlen;
+ PUTSHORT(p - datap, lenp);
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
index 41573d9..5b68d98 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.76.bb
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ require dnsmasq.inc
SRC_URI += "\
file://lua.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14492.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14493.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14494.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14496.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14495.patch \
+ file://dnsmasq-CVE-2017-14491-02.patch \
"
SRC_URI[dnsmasq-2.76.md5sum] = "6610f8233ca89b15a1bb47c788ffb84f"
--
2.7.4
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