* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 20:59 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 8:49 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 02/10] vm_event: Remove "ring" suffix from vm_event_check_ring Petre Pircalabu
` (9 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich,
Alexandru Isaila
Define the type for each of the supported vm_event rings (paging,
monitor and sharing) and replace the ring param field with this type.
Replace XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_ occurrences with their corresponding
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_ counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 1 +
tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c | 6 ++--
tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c | 6 ++--
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 6 ++--
tools/libxc/xc_private.h | 8 ++---
tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c | 58 +++++++++++++++-------------------
xen/common/vm_event.c | 12 ++++----
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 72 +++----------------------------------------
xen/include/public/vm_event.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index 538007a..f3af710 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
#include <xen/xsm/flask_op.h>
#include <xen/kexec.h>
#include <xen/platform.h>
+#include <xen/vm_event.h>
#include "xentoollog.h"
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
index a067706..a88c0cc 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int xc_mem_paging_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
port);
}
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int xc_mem_paging_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
NULL);
}
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int xc_mem_paging_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
NULL);
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c b/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
index d5e135e..1c4a706 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int xc_memshr_ring_enable(xc_interface *xch,
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
port);
}
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int xc_memshr_ring_disable(xc_interface *xch,
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
NULL);
}
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int xc_memshr_domain_resume(xc_interface *xch,
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
NULL);
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
index 4ac823e..f05b53d 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
void *xc_monitor_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, uint32_t *port)
{
- return xc_vm_event_enable(xch, domain_id, HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN,
+ return xc_vm_event_enable(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
port);
}
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int xc_monitor_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
NULL);
}
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ int xc_monitor_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
NULL);
}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_private.h b/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
index adc3b6a..e4f7c3a 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
@@ -412,12 +412,12 @@ int xc_ffs64(uint64_t x);
* vm_event operations. Internal use only.
*/
int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
- unsigned int mode, uint32_t *port);
+ unsigned int type, uint32_t *port);
/*
- * Enables vm_event and returns the mapped ring page indicated by param.
- * param can be HVM_PARAM_PAGING/ACCESS/SHARING_RING_PFN
+ * Enables vm_event and returns the mapped ring page indicated by type.
+ * type can be XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_(PAGING/MONITOR/SHARING)
*/
-void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int param,
+void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
uint32_t *port);
int do_dm_op(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned int nr_bufs, ...);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c b/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
index a97c615..044bf71 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "xc_private.h"
int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
- unsigned int mode, uint32_t *port)
+ unsigned int type, uint32_t *port)
{
DECLARE_DOMCTL;
int rc;
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op;
domctl.domain = domain_id;
domctl.u.vm_event_op.op = op;
- domctl.u.vm_event_op.mode = mode;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.type = type;
rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
if ( !rc && port )
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
return rc;
}
-void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int param,
+void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
uint32_t *port)
{
void *ring_page = NULL;
uint64_t pfn;
xen_pfn_t ring_pfn, mmap_pfn;
- unsigned int op, mode;
+ unsigned int param;
int rc1, rc2, saved_errno;
if ( !port )
@@ -54,6 +54,25 @@ void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int param,
return NULL;
}
+ switch ( type )
+ {
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
+ param = HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN;
+ break;
+
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
+ param = HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN;
+ break;
+
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
+ param = HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
/* Pause the domain for ring page setup */
rc1 = xc_domain_pause(xch, domain_id);
if ( rc1 != 0 )
@@ -94,34 +113,7 @@ void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int param,
goto out;
}
- switch ( param )
- {
- case HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN:
- op = XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE;
- mode = XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING;
- break;
-
- case HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN:
- op = XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE;
- mode = XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR;
- break;
-
- case HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN:
- op = XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE;
- mode = XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING;
- break;
-
- /*
- * This is for the outside chance that the HVM_PARAM is valid but is invalid
- * as far as vm_event goes.
- */
- default:
- errno = EINVAL;
- rc1 = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc1 = xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, op, mode, port);
+ rc1 = xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE, type, port);
if ( rc1 != 0 )
{
PERROR("Failed to enable vm_event\n");
@@ -164,7 +156,7 @@ int xc_vm_event_get_version(xc_interface *xch)
domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op;
domctl.domain = DOMID_INVALID;
domctl.u.vm_event_op.op = XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION;
- domctl.u.vm_event_op.mode = XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.type = XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR;
rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
if ( !rc )
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index e872680..56b506a 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
vm_event_response_t rsp;
/*
- * vm_event_resume() runs in either XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_*, or
+ * vm_event_resume() runs in either XEN_VM_EVENT_* domctls, or
* EVTCHN_send context from the introspection consumer. Both contexts
* are guaranteed not to be the subject of vm_event responses.
* While we could ASSERT(v != current) for each VCPU in d in the loop
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
return 0;
}
- rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, vec->mode, vec->op);
+ rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, vec->type, vec->op);
if ( rc )
return rc;
@@ -607,10 +607,10 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
rc = -ENOSYS;
- switch ( vec->mode )
+ switch ( vec->type )
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
- case XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING:
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
{
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
#endif
- case XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR:
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
{
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
- case XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING:
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
{
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 19486d5..234d8c5 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -769,80 +769,18 @@ struct xen_domctl_gdbsx_domstatus {
* VM event operations
*/
-/* XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op */
-
-/*
- * There are currently three rings available for VM events:
- * sharing, monitor and paging. This hypercall allows one to
- * control these rings (enable/disable), as well as to signal
- * to the hypervisor to pull responses (resume) from the given
- * ring.
+/* XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op.
+ * Use for teardown/setup of helper<->hypervisor interface for paging,
+ * access and sharing.
*/
#define XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE 0
#define XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE 1
#define XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME 2
#define XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION 3
-/*
- * Domain memory paging
- * Page memory in and out.
- * Domctl interface to set up and tear down the
- * pager<->hypervisor interface. Use XENMEM_paging_op*
- * to perform per-page operations.
- *
- * The XEN_VM_EVENT_PAGING_ENABLE domctl returns several
- * non-standard error codes to indicate why paging could not be enabled:
- * ENODEV - host lacks HAP support (EPT/NPT) or HAP is disabled in guest
- * EMLINK - guest has iommu passthrough enabled
- * EXDEV - guest has PoD enabled
- * EBUSY - guest has or had paging enabled, ring buffer still active
- */
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_PAGING 1
-
-/*
- * Monitor helper.
- *
- * As with paging, use the domctl for teardown/setup of the
- * helper<->hypervisor interface.
- *
- * The monitor interface can be used to register for various VM events. For
- * example, there are HVM hypercalls to set the per-page access permissions
- * of every page in a domain. When one of these permissions--independent,
- * read, write, and execute--is violated, the VCPU is paused and a memory event
- * is sent with what happened. The memory event handler can then resume the
- * VCPU and redo the access with a XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME option.
- *
- * See public/vm_event.h for the list of available events that can be
- * subscribed to via the monitor interface.
- *
- * The XEN_VM_EVENT_MONITOR_* domctls returns
- * non-standard error codes to indicate why access could not be enabled:
- * ENODEV - host lacks HAP support (EPT/NPT) or HAP is disabled in guest
- * EBUSY - guest has or had access enabled, ring buffer still active
- *
- */
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR 2
-
-/*
- * Sharing ENOMEM helper.
- *
- * As with paging, use the domctl for teardown/setup of the
- * helper<->hypervisor interface.
- *
- * If setup, this ring is used to communicate failed allocations
- * in the unshare path. XENMEM_sharing_op_resume is used to wake up
- * vcpus that could not unshare.
- *
- * Note that shring can be turned on (as per the domctl below)
- * *without* this ring being setup.
- */
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_SHARING 3
-
-/* Use for teardown/setup of helper<->hypervisor interface for paging,
- * access and sharing.*/
struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op {
uint32_t op; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_* */
- uint32_t mode; /* XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_* */
+ uint32_t type; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_* */
union {
struct {
@@ -1004,7 +942,7 @@ struct xen_domctl_psr_cmt_op {
* Enable/disable monitoring various VM events.
* This domctl configures what events will be reported to helper apps
* via the ring buffer "MONITOR". The ring has to be first enabled
- * with the domctl XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR.
+ * with XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE.
*
* GET_CAPABILITIES can be used to determine which of these features is
* available on a given platform.
diff --git a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
index 959083d..c48bc21 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
@@ -36,6 +36,37 @@
#include "io/ring.h"
/*
+ * There are currently three types of VM events.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Domain memory paging
+ *
+ * Page memory in and out.
+ */
+#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING 1
+
+/*
+ * Monitor.
+ *
+ * The monitor interface can be used to register for various VM events. For
+ * example, there are HVM hypercalls to set the per-page access permissions
+ * of every page in a domain. When one of these permissions--independent,
+ * read, write, and execute--is violated, the VCPU is paused and a memory event
+ * is sent with what happened. The memory event handler can then resume the
+ * VCPU and redo the access with a XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME option.
+ */
+#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR 2
+
+/*
+ * Sharing ENOMEM.
+ *
+ * Used to communicate failed allocations in the unshare path.
+ * XENMEM_sharing_op_resume is used to wake up vcpus that could not unshare.
+ */
+#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING 3
+
+/*
* Memory event flags
*/
--
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 20:59 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 7:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-17 8:49 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila,
Xen-devel
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> index 959083d..c48bc21 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,37 @@
> #include "io/ring.h"
>
> /*
> + * There are currently three types of VM events.
> + */
This is a bit misleading and confusing if someone just looks at the
header. Right now we actually have 14 different VM_EVENT_REASONs
defined. What we have 3 of are the different rings where these events
would be delivered, with paging and sharing having their own ring
separate from the events under the "monitor" label.
> +
> +/*
> + * Domain memory paging
> + *
> + * Page memory in and out.
> + */
> +#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING 1
> +
> +/*
> + * Monitor.
> + *
> + * The monitor interface can be used to register for various VM events. For
> + * example, there are HVM hypercalls to set the per-page access permissions
> + * of every page in a domain. When one of these permissions--independent,
> + * read, write, and execute--is violated, the VCPU is paused and a memory event
> + * is sent with what happened. The memory event handler can then resume the
> + * VCPU and redo the access with a XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME option.
> + */
> +#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR 2
> +
> +/*
> + * Sharing ENOMEM.
> + *
> + * Used to communicate failed allocations in the unshare path.
> + * XENMEM_sharing_op_resume is used to wake up vcpus that could not unshare.
> + */
> +#define XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING 3
> +
> +/*
> * Memory event flags
> */
>
> --
> 2.7.4
_______________________________________________
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type
2019-07-16 20:59 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 7:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 7:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tamas K Lengyel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Xen-devel
On Tue, 2019-07-16 at 14:59 -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> > diff --git a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> > b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> > index 959083d..c48bc21 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
> > @@ -36,6 +36,37 @@
> > #include "io/ring.h"
> >
> > /*
> > + * There are currently three types of VM events.
> > + */
>
> This is a bit misleading and confusing if someone just looks at the
> header. Right now we actually have 14 different VM_EVENT_REASONs
> defined. What we have 3 of are the different rings where these events
> would be delivered, with paging and sharing having their own ring
> separate from the events under the "monitor" label.
>
The reason I replaced "ring" with "type" is because the next patches
introduce a new mechanism for handling requests/responses without using
a ring.
I assumed the following naming convention:
Type - the "subsystem" which generates the vm_event request: monitor,
paging or sharing.
Reason - The reason why the vm_event request was sent (e.g.
VM_EVENT_REASON_MEM_ACCESS)
However, I do understand that it can be misleading without a proper
description so I will update the description.
Many thanks,
Petre
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 20:59 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 8:49 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-17 9:57 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 8:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich
On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> @@ -1004,7 +942,7 @@ struct xen_domctl_psr_cmt_op {
> * Enable/disable monitoring various VM events.
> * This domctl configures what events will be reported to helper apps
> * via the ring buffer "MONITOR". The ring has to be first enabled
> - * with the domctl XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR.
> + * with XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE.
The above comment should also be adjusted.
> *
> * GET_CAPABILITIES can be used to determine which of these features is
> * available on a given platform.
Alex
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type
2019-07-17 8:49 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
@ 2019-07-17 9:57 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 9:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich
On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 11:49 +0300, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
>
> On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> > @@ -1004,7 +942,7 @@ struct xen_domctl_psr_cmt_op {
> > * Enable/disable monitoring various VM events.
> > * This domctl configures what events will be reported to helper
> > apps
> > * via the ring buffer "MONITOR". The ring has to be first
> > enabled
> > - * with the domctl XEN_DOMCTL_VM_EVENT_OP_MONITOR.
> > + * with XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE.
>
> The above comment should also be adjusted.
>
> > *
> > * GET_CAPABILITIES can be used to determine which of these
> > features is
> > * available on a given platform.
>
> Alex
Thank for noticing that. I will correct it on the next patchset
iteration.
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 02/10] vm_event: Remove "ring" suffix from vm_event_check_ring
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-17 9:11 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain Petre Pircalabu
` (8 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini,
Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila, Volodymyr Babchuk,
Roger Pau Monné
Decouple implementation from interface to allow vm_event_check to be
used regardless of the vm_event underlying implementation.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
---
xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c | 2 +-
xen/common/mem_access.c | 2 +-
xen/common/vm_event.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 2 +-
xen/include/xen/vm_event.h | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c
index 3e36202..d54760b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, vaddr_t gla, const struct npfec npfec)
}
/* Otherwise, check if there is a vm_event monitor subscriber */
- if ( !vm_event_check_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor) )
+ if ( !vm_event_check(v->domain->vm_event_monitor) )
{
/* No listener */
if ( p2m->access_required )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
index 0144f92..640352e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla,
gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, 0);
/* Otherwise, check if there is a memory event listener, and send the message along */
- if ( !vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor) || !req_ptr )
+ if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) || !req_ptr )
{
/* No listener */
if ( p2m->access_required )
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla,
return true;
}
}
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor) &&
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) &&
d->arch.monitor.inguest_pagefault_disabled &&
npfec.kind != npfec_kind_with_gla ) /* don't send a mem_event */
{
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c
index 54a94fa..dc2a59a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int mem_paging_memop(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mem_paging_op_t) arg)
goto out;
rc = -ENODEV;
- if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging)) )
+ if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging)) )
goto out;
switch( mpo.op )
diff --git a/xen/common/mem_access.c b/xen/common/mem_access.c
index 010e6f8..51e4e2b 100644
--- a/xen/common/mem_access.c
+++ b/xen/common/mem_access.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ int mem_access_memop(unsigned long cmd,
goto out;
rc = -ENODEV;
- if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor)) )
+ if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor)) )
goto out;
switch ( mao.op )
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index 56b506a..515a917 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int vm_event_disable(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
{
struct vm_event_domain *ved = *p_ved;
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(ved) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(ved) )
{
struct vcpu *v;
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ void vm_event_put_request(struct domain *d,
RING_IDX req_prod;
struct vcpu *curr = current;
- if( !vm_event_check_ring(ved) )
+ if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return;
if ( curr->domain != d )
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
*/
ASSERT(d != current->domain);
- if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check_ring(ved)) )
+ if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check(ved)) )
return -ENODEV;
/* Pull all responses off the ring. */
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- if( !vm_event_check_ring(ved) )
+ if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return;
spin_lock(&ved->lock);
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static int vm_event_wait_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
return rc;
}
-bool vm_event_check_ring(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
return ved && ved->ring_page;
}
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ bool vm_event_check_ring(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
bool allow_sleep)
{
- if ( !vm_event_check_ring(ved) )
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ( (current->domain == d) && allow_sleep )
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
{
/* Destroying the wait queue head means waking up all
* queued vcpus. This will drain the list, allowing
@@ -556,13 +556,13 @@ void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d)
(void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_paging);
}
#endif
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
{
destroy_waitqueue_head(&d->vm_event_monitor->wq);
(void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_monitor);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_share) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
{
destroy_waitqueue_head(&d->vm_event_share->wq);
(void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_share);
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
{
domain_pause(d);
rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_paging);
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_monitor) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
{
domain_pause(d);
rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_monitor);
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_share) )
+ if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
{
domain_pause(d);
rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_share);
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
index e886894..eec7686 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
/* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been
* enabled for this domain */
if ( unlikely(d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled ||
- vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) ||
+ vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) ||
p2m_get_hostp2m(d)->global_logdirty) )
return -EXDEV;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
index 3cc2b20..381be0b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
/* Clean up on domain destruction */
void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d);
-/* Returns whether a ring has been set up */
-bool vm_event_check_ring(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+/* Returns whether the VM event domain has been set up */
+bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
/* Returns 0 on success, -ENOSYS if there is no ring, -EBUSY if there is no
* available space and the caller is a foreign domain. If the guest itself
--
2.7.4
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 02/10] vm_event: Remove "ring" suffix from vm_event_check_ring
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 02/10] vm_event: Remove "ring" suffix from vm_event_check_ring Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-17 9:11 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Jan Beulich,
Volodymyr Babchuk, Roger Pau Monné
On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> Decouple implementation from interface to allow vm_event_check to be
> used regardless of the vm_event underlying implementation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/mem_access.c | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 4 ++--
> xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/mem_access.c | 2 +-
> xen/common/vm_event.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
> xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 2 +-
> xen/include/xen/vm_event.h | 4 ++--
> 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
Alex
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain.
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/10] vm_event: Define VM_EVENT type Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 02/10] vm_event: Remove "ring" suffix from vm_event_check_ring Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:02 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 9:28 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface Petre Pircalabu
` (7 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Jan Beulich,
Alexandru Isaila
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/common/vm_event.c | 2 ++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index 515a917..787c61c 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ static int vm_event_enable(
if ( rc < 0 )
goto err;
+ ved->d = d;
+
rc = prepare_ring_for_helper(d, ring_gfn, &ved->ring_pg_struct,
&ved->ring_page);
if ( rc < 0 )
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 97a3ab5..e3093d3 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -279,6 +279,8 @@ struct vcpu
/* VM event */
struct vm_event_domain
{
+ /* Domain reference */
+ struct domain *d;
spinlock_t lock;
/* The ring has 64 entries */
unsigned char foreign_producers;
--
2.7.4
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain.
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 21:02 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 9:28 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 21:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila,
Xen-devel
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain.
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:02 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 9:28 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-17 9:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Alexandru Isaila,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> @@ -279,6 +279,8 @@ struct vcpu
> /* VM event */
> struct vm_event_domain
> {
> + /* Domain reference */
> + struct domain *d;
> spinlock_t lock;
> /* The ring has 64 entries */
> unsigned char foreign_producers;
This structure should actually move out of here, now that it
has been only pointers which other structures in this header
use. Doing so would simplify the process of getting acks for
changes like this one.
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 03/10] vm_event: Add 'struct domain' backpointer to vm_event_domain Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:04 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:13 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c Petre Pircalabu
` (6 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila,
Roger Pau Monné
Remove the domain reference from calls to vm_event interface function
and use the backpointer from vm_event_domain.
Affected functions:
- __vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep
- vm_event_cancel_slot
- vm_event_put_request
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c | 5 ++---
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 10 +++++-----
xen/common/monitor.c | 4 ++--
xen/common/vm_event.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
xen/include/xen/vm_event.h | 17 +++++++----------
5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
index f16a3f5..9d80389 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
@@ -557,8 +557,7 @@ int mem_sharing_notify_enomem(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
.u.mem_sharing.p2mt = p2m_ram_shared
};
- if ( (rc = __vm_event_claim_slot(d,
- d->vm_event_share, allow_sleep)) < 0 )
+ if ( (rc = __vm_event_claim_slot(d->vm_event_share, allow_sleep)) < 0 )
return rc;
if ( v->domain == d )
@@ -567,7 +566,7 @@ int mem_sharing_notify_enomem(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
vm_event_vcpu_pause(v);
}
- vm_event_put_request(d, d->vm_event_share, &req);
+ vm_event_put_request(d->vm_event_share, &req);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 4c99548..85de64f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_drop_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
* correctness of the guest execution at this point. If this is the only
* page that happens to be paged-out, we'll be okay.. but it's likely the
* guest will crash shortly anyways. */
- int rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d, d->vm_event_paging);
+ int rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d->vm_event_paging);
if ( rc < 0 )
return;
@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_drop_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
/* Evict will fail now, tag this request for pager */
req.u.mem_paging.flags |= MEM_PAGING_EVICT_FAIL;
- vm_event_put_request(d, d->vm_event_paging, &req);
+ vm_event_put_request(d->vm_event_paging, &req);
}
/**
@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_populate(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn_l)
struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
/* We're paging. There should be a ring */
- int rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d, d->vm_event_paging);
+ int rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d->vm_event_paging);
if ( rc == -EOPNOTSUPP )
{
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_populate(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn_l)
{
/* gfn is already on its way back and vcpu is not paused */
out_cancel:
- vm_event_cancel_slot(d, d->vm_event_paging);
+ vm_event_cancel_slot(d->vm_event_paging);
return;
}
@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_populate(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn_l)
req.u.mem_paging.p2mt = p2mt;
req.vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id;
- vm_event_put_request(d, d->vm_event_paging, &req);
+ vm_event_put_request(d->vm_event_paging, &req);
}
/**
diff --git a/xen/common/monitor.c b/xen/common/monitor.c
index d5c9ff1..b8d33c4 100644
--- a/xen/common/monitor.c
+++ b/xen/common/monitor.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int monitor_traps(struct vcpu *v, bool sync, vm_event_request_t *req)
int rc;
struct domain *d = v->domain;
- rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d, d->vm_event_monitor);
+ rc = vm_event_claim_slot(d->vm_event_monitor);
switch ( rc )
{
case 0:
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int monitor_traps(struct vcpu *v, bool sync, vm_event_request_t *req)
}
vm_event_fill_regs(req);
- vm_event_put_request(d, d->vm_event_monitor, req);
+ vm_event_put_request(d->vm_event_monitor, req);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index 787c61c..a235d25 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -119,10 +119,11 @@ static unsigned int vm_event_ring_available(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* but need to be resumed where the ring is capable of processing at least
* one event from them.
*/
-static void vm_event_wake_blocked(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_wake_blocked(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
struct vcpu *v;
unsigned int i, j, k, avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
+ struct domain *d = ved->d;
if ( avail_req == 0 || ved->blocked == 0 )
return;
@@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ static void vm_event_wake_blocked(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* was unable to do so, it is queued on a wait queue. These are woken as
* needed, and take precedence over the blocked vCPUs.
*/
-static void vm_event_wake_queued(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_wake_queued(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
unsigned int avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
@@ -169,12 +170,12 @@ static void vm_event_wake_queued(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* call vm_event_wake() again, ensuring that any blocked vCPUs will get
* unpaused once all the queued vCPUs have made it through.
*/
-void vm_event_wake(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+void vm_event_wake(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
if ( !list_empty(&ved->wq.list) )
- vm_event_wake_queued(d, ved);
+ vm_event_wake_queued(ved);
else
- vm_event_wake_blocked(d, ved);
+ vm_event_wake_blocked(ved);
}
static int vm_event_disable(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
@@ -219,17 +220,16 @@ static int vm_event_disable(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
return 0;
}
-static void vm_event_release_slot(struct domain *d,
- struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_release_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
/* Update the accounting */
- if ( current->domain == d )
+ if ( current->domain == ved->d )
ved->target_producers--;
else
ved->foreign_producers--;
/* Kick any waiters */
- vm_event_wake(d, ved);
+ vm_event_wake(ved);
}
/*
@@ -251,8 +251,7 @@ static void vm_event_mark_and_pause(struct vcpu *v, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* overly full and its continued execution would cause stalling and excessive
* waiting. The vCPU will be automatically unpaused when the ring clears.
*/
-void vm_event_put_request(struct domain *d,
- struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
vm_event_request_t *req)
{
vm_event_front_ring_t *front_ring;
@@ -260,6 +259,7 @@ void vm_event_put_request(struct domain *d,
unsigned int avail_req;
RING_IDX req_prod;
struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ struct domain *d = ved->d;
if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return;
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ void vm_event_put_request(struct domain *d,
RING_PUSH_REQUESTS(front_ring);
/* We've actually *used* our reservation, so release the slot. */
- vm_event_release_slot(d, ved);
+ vm_event_release_slot(ved);
/* Give this vCPU a black eye if necessary, on the way out.
* See the comments above wake_blocked() for more information
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int vm_event_get_response(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
/* Kick any waiters -- since we've just consumed an event,
* there may be additional space available in the ring. */
- vm_event_wake(d, ved);
+ vm_event_wake(ved);
rc = 1;
@@ -433,13 +433,13 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
return 0;
}
-void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return;
spin_lock(&ved->lock);
- vm_event_release_slot(d, ved);
+ vm_event_release_slot(ved);
spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
}
@@ -507,16 +507,15 @@ bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* 0: a spot has been reserved
*
*/
-int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
- bool allow_sleep)
+int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep)
{
if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if ( (current->domain == d) && allow_sleep )
+ if ( (current->domain == ved->d) && allow_sleep )
return vm_event_wait_slot(ved);
else
- return vm_event_grab_slot(ved, current->domain != d);
+ return vm_event_grab_slot(ved, current->domain != ved->d);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
index 381be0b..ff30999 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
@@ -45,23 +45,20 @@ bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
* cancel_slot(), both of which are guaranteed to
* succeed.
*/
-int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
- bool allow_sleep);
-static inline int vm_event_claim_slot(struct domain *d,
- struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep);
+static inline int vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- return __vm_event_claim_slot(d, ved, true);
+ return __vm_event_claim_slot(ved, true);
}
-static inline int vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep(struct domain *d,
- struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static inline int vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- return __vm_event_claim_slot(d, ved, false);
+ return __vm_event_claim_slot(ved, false);
}
-void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
-void vm_event_put_request(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
vm_event_request_t *req);
int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec);
--
2.7.4
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 21:04 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:13 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila, Xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> Remove the domain reference from calls to vm_event interface function
> and use the backpointer from vm_event_domain.
>
> Affected functions:
> - __vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep
> - vm_event_cancel_slot
> - vm_event_put_request
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
_______________________________________________
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:04 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 11:13 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 11:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné
On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> Remove the domain reference from calls to vm_event interface function
> and use the backpointer from vm_event_domain.
>
> Affected functions:
> - __vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot / vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep
> - vm_event_cancel_slot
> - vm_event_put_request
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 04/10] vm_event: Simplify vm_event interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-17 9:31 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 06/10] vm_event: Decouple implementation details from interface Petre Pircalabu
` (5 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Jan Beulich,
Alexandru Isaila
The vm_event_domain members are not accessed outside vm_event.c so it's
better to hide de implementation details.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
---
xen/common/vm_event.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 26 +-------------------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index a235d25..21895c2 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -35,6 +35,32 @@
#define xen_rmb() smp_rmb()
#define xen_wmb() smp_wmb()
+/* VM event */
+struct vm_event_domain
+{
+ /* Domain reference */
+ struct domain *d;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ /* The ring has 64 entries */
+ unsigned char foreign_producers;
+ unsigned char target_producers;
+ /* shared ring page */
+ void *ring_page;
+ struct page_info *ring_pg_struct;
+ /* front-end ring */
+ vm_event_front_ring_t front_ring;
+ /* event channel port (vcpu0 only) */
+ int xen_port;
+ /* vm_event bit for vcpu->pause_flags */
+ int pause_flag;
+ /* list of vcpus waiting for room in the ring */
+ struct waitqueue_head wq;
+ /* the number of vCPUs blocked */
+ unsigned int blocked;
+ /* The last vcpu woken up */
+ unsigned int last_vcpu_wake_up;
+};
+
static int vm_event_enable(
struct domain *d,
struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec,
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index e3093d3..19980d2 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -276,31 +276,7 @@ struct vcpu
#define domain_lock(d) spin_lock_recursive(&(d)->domain_lock)
#define domain_unlock(d) spin_unlock_recursive(&(d)->domain_lock)
-/* VM event */
-struct vm_event_domain
-{
- /* Domain reference */
- struct domain *d;
- spinlock_t lock;
- /* The ring has 64 entries */
- unsigned char foreign_producers;
- unsigned char target_producers;
- /* shared ring page */
- void *ring_page;
- struct page_info *ring_pg_struct;
- /* front-end ring */
- vm_event_front_ring_t front_ring;
- /* event channel port (vcpu0 only) */
- int xen_port;
- /* vm_event bit for vcpu->pause_flags */
- int pause_flag;
- /* list of vcpus waiting for room in the ring */
- struct waitqueue_head wq;
- /* the number of vCPUs blocked */
- unsigned int blocked;
- /* The last vcpu woken up */
- unsigned int last_vcpu_wake_up;
-};
+struct vm_event_domain;
struct evtchn_port_ops;
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-17 9:31 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 12:26 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-17 9:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Alexandru Isaila,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> The vm_event_domain members are not accessed outside vm_event.c so it's
> better to hide de implementation details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
> ---
> xen/common/vm_event.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> xen/include/xen/sched.h | 26 +-------------------------
> 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Ah, here it comes. This would better have been ahead of the other
change (where I did comment).
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c
2019-07-17 9:31 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-17 12:26 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 12:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 09:31 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> > The vm_event_domain members are not accessed outside vm_event.c so
> > it's
> > better to hide de implementation details.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> > Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
> > ---
> > xen/common/vm_event.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > xen/include/xen/sched.h | 26 +-------------------------
> > 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> Ah, here it comes. This would better have been ahead of the other
> change (where I did comment).
>
> Jan
I will reorder the patches in the next iteration.
Many thanks for your comments,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 06/10] vm_event: Decouple implementation details from interface.
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 05/10] vm_event: Move struct vm_event_domain to vm_event.c Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
` (4 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Alexandru Isaila, Tamas K Lengyel,
Razvan Cojocaru
To accommodate a second implementation of the vm_event subsystem, the
current one (ring) should be decoupled from the xen/vm_event.h interface.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/common/vm_event.c | 368 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
xen/include/xen/vm_event.h | 60 +++++++-
2 files changed, 236 insertions(+), 192 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index 21895c2..e6a7a29 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@
#define xen_rmb() smp_rmb()
#define xen_wmb() smp_wmb()
-/* VM event */
-struct vm_event_domain
+#define to_ring(_ved) container_of((_ved), struct vm_event_ring_domain, ved)
+
+/* VM event ring implementation */
+struct vm_event_ring_domain
{
- /* Domain reference */
- struct domain *d;
- spinlock_t lock;
+ /* VM event domain */
+ struct vm_event_domain ved;
/* The ring has 64 entries */
unsigned char foreign_producers;
unsigned char target_producers;
@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ struct vm_event_domain
unsigned int last_vcpu_wake_up;
};
-static int vm_event_enable(
+static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_ring_ops;
+
+static int vm_event_ring_enable(
struct domain *d,
struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec,
struct vm_event_domain **p_ved,
@@ -71,7 +74,7 @@ static int vm_event_enable(
{
int rc;
unsigned long ring_gfn = d->arch.hvm.params[param];
- struct vm_event_domain *ved;
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl;
/*
* Only one connected agent at a time. If the helper crashed, the ring is
@@ -84,28 +87,28 @@ static int vm_event_enable(
if ( ring_gfn == 0 )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ved = xzalloc(struct vm_event_domain);
- if ( !ved )
+ impl = xzalloc(struct vm_event_ring_domain);
+ if ( !impl )
return -ENOMEM;
/* Trivial setup. */
- spin_lock_init(&ved->lock);
- init_waitqueue_head(&ved->wq);
- ved->pause_flag = pause_flag;
+ spin_lock_init(&impl->ved.lock);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&impl->wq);
+ impl->ved.d = d;
+ impl->ved.ops = &vm_event_ring_ops;
+ impl->pause_flag = pause_flag;
rc = vm_event_init_domain(d);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto err;
- ved->d = d;
-
- rc = prepare_ring_for_helper(d, ring_gfn, &ved->ring_pg_struct,
- &ved->ring_page);
+ rc = prepare_ring_for_helper(d, ring_gfn, &impl->ring_pg_struct,
+ &impl->ring_page);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto err;
- FRONT_RING_INIT(&ved->front_ring,
- (vm_event_sring_t *)ved->ring_page,
+ FRONT_RING_INIT(&impl->front_ring,
+ (vm_event_sring_t *)impl->ring_page,
PAGE_SIZE);
rc = alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(d, 0, current->domain->domain_id,
@@ -113,26 +116,26 @@ static int vm_event_enable(
if ( rc < 0 )
goto err;
- ved->xen_port = vec->u.enable.port = rc;
+ impl->xen_port = vec->u.enable.port = rc;
/* Success. Fill in the domain's appropriate ved. */
- *p_ved = ved;
+ *p_ved = &impl->ved;
return 0;
err:
- destroy_ring_for_helper(&ved->ring_page, ved->ring_pg_struct);
- xfree(ved);
+ destroy_ring_for_helper(&impl->ring_page, impl->ring_pg_struct);
+ xfree(impl);
return rc;
}
-static unsigned int vm_event_ring_available(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static unsigned int vm_event_ring_available(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
- int avail_req = RING_FREE_REQUESTS(&ved->front_ring);
+ int avail_req = RING_FREE_REQUESTS(&impl->front_ring);
- avail_req -= ved->target_producers;
- avail_req -= ved->foreign_producers;
+ avail_req -= impl->target_producers;
+ avail_req -= impl->foreign_producers;
BUG_ON(avail_req < 0);
@@ -140,38 +143,38 @@ static unsigned int vm_event_ring_available(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
}
/*
- * vm_event_wake_blocked() will wakeup vcpus waiting for room in the
+ * vm_event_ring_wake_blocked() will wakeup vcpus waiting for room in the
* ring. These vCPUs were paused on their way out after placing an event,
* but need to be resumed where the ring is capable of processing at least
* one event from them.
*/
-static void vm_event_wake_blocked(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_wake_blocked(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
struct vcpu *v;
- unsigned int i, j, k, avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
- struct domain *d = ved->d;
+ unsigned int i, j, k, avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(impl);
+ struct domain *d = impl->ved.d;
- if ( avail_req == 0 || ved->blocked == 0 )
+ if ( avail_req == 0 || impl->blocked == 0 )
return;
/* We remember which vcpu last woke up to avoid scanning always linearly
* from zero and starving higher-numbered vcpus under high load */
- for ( i = ved->last_vcpu_wake_up + 1, j = 0; j < d->max_vcpus; i++, j++ )
+ for ( i = impl->last_vcpu_wake_up + 1, j = 0; j < d->max_vcpus; i++, j++ )
{
k = i % d->max_vcpus;
v = d->vcpu[k];
if ( !v )
continue;
- if ( !ved->blocked || avail_req == 0 )
+ if ( !impl->blocked || avail_req == 0 )
break;
- if ( test_and_clear_bit(ved->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(impl->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
{
vcpu_unpause(v);
avail_req--;
- ved->blocked--;
- ved->last_vcpu_wake_up = k;
+ impl->blocked--;
+ impl->last_vcpu_wake_up = k;
}
}
}
@@ -181,93 +184,90 @@ static void vm_event_wake_blocked(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* was unable to do so, it is queued on a wait queue. These are woken as
* needed, and take precedence over the blocked vCPUs.
*/
-static void vm_event_wake_queued(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_wake_queued(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
- unsigned int avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
+ unsigned int avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(impl);
if ( avail_req > 0 )
- wake_up_nr(&ved->wq, avail_req);
+ wake_up_nr(&impl->wq, avail_req);
}
/*
- * vm_event_wake() will wakeup all vcpus waiting for the ring to
+ * vm_event_ring_wake() will wakeup all vcpus waiting for the ring to
* become available. If we have queued vCPUs, they get top priority. We
* are guaranteed that they will go through code paths that will eventually
- * call vm_event_wake() again, ensuring that any blocked vCPUs will get
+ * call vm_event_ring_wake() again, ensuring that any blocked vCPUs will get
* unpaused once all the queued vCPUs have made it through.
*/
-void vm_event_wake(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_wake(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
- if ( !list_empty(&ved->wq.list) )
- vm_event_wake_queued(ved);
+ if ( !list_empty(&impl->wq.list) )
+ vm_event_ring_wake_queued(impl);
else
- vm_event_wake_blocked(ved);
+ vm_event_ring_wake_blocked(impl);
}
-static int vm_event_disable(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
+static int vm_event_ring_disable(struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
{
- struct vm_event_domain *ved = *p_ved;
-
- if ( vm_event_check(ved) )
- {
- struct vcpu *v;
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct domain *d = (*p_ved)->d;
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(*p_ved);
- spin_lock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
- if ( !list_empty(&ved->wq.list) )
- {
- spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
- return -EBUSY;
- }
+ if ( !list_empty(&impl->wq.list) )
+ {
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
- /* Free domU's event channel and leave the other one unbound */
- free_xen_event_channel(d, ved->xen_port);
+ /* Free domU's event channel and leave the other one unbound */
+ free_xen_event_channel(d, impl->xen_port);
- /* Unblock all vCPUs */
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
+ /* Unblock all vCPUs */
+ for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
+ {
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(impl->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
{
- if ( test_and_clear_bit(ved->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
- {
- vcpu_unpause(v);
- ved->blocked--;
- }
+ vcpu_unpause(v);
+ impl->blocked--;
}
+ }
- destroy_ring_for_helper(&ved->ring_page, ved->ring_pg_struct);
+ destroy_ring_for_helper(&impl->ring_page, impl->ring_pg_struct);
- vm_event_cleanup_domain(d);
+ vm_event_cleanup_domain(d);
- spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
- }
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
- xfree(ved);
+ xfree(impl);
*p_ved = NULL;
-
return 0;
}
-static void vm_event_release_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_release_slot(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
/* Update the accounting */
- if ( current->domain == ved->d )
- ved->target_producers--;
+ if ( current->domain == impl->ved.d )
+ impl->target_producers--;
else
- ved->foreign_producers--;
+ impl->foreign_producers--;
/* Kick any waiters */
- vm_event_wake(ved);
+ vm_event_ring_wake(impl);
}
/*
- * vm_event_mark_and_pause() tags vcpu and put it to sleep.
- * The vcpu will resume execution in vm_event_wake_blocked().
+ * vm_event_ring_mark_and_pause() tags vcpu and put it to sleep.
+ * The vcpu will resume execution in vm_event_ring_wake_blocked().
*/
-static void vm_event_mark_and_pause(struct vcpu *v, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_mark_and_pause(struct vcpu *v,
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
- if ( !test_and_set_bit(ved->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
+ if ( !test_and_set_bit(impl->pause_flag, &v->pause_flags) )
{
vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
- ved->blocked++;
+ impl->blocked++;
}
}
@@ -277,34 +277,31 @@ static void vm_event_mark_and_pause(struct vcpu *v, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* overly full and its continued execution would cause stalling and excessive
* waiting. The vCPU will be automatically unpaused when the ring clears.
*/
-void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
- vm_event_request_t *req)
+static void vm_event_ring_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+ vm_event_request_t *req)
{
vm_event_front_ring_t *front_ring;
int free_req;
unsigned int avail_req;
RING_IDX req_prod;
struct vcpu *curr = current;
- struct domain *d = ved->d;
-
- if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
- return;
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(ved);
- if ( curr->domain != d )
+ if ( curr->domain != ved->d )
{
req->flags |= VM_EVENT_FLAG_FOREIGN;
if ( !(req->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED) )
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "d%dv%d was not paused.\n",
- d->domain_id, req->vcpu_id);
+ ved->d->domain_id, req->vcpu_id);
}
req->version = VM_EVENT_INTERFACE_VERSION;
- spin_lock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
/* Due to the reservations, this step must succeed. */
- front_ring = &ved->front_ring;
+ front_ring = &impl->front_ring;
free_req = RING_FREE_REQUESTS(front_ring);
ASSERT(free_req > 0);
@@ -318,31 +315,31 @@ void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
RING_PUSH_REQUESTS(front_ring);
/* We've actually *used* our reservation, so release the slot. */
- vm_event_release_slot(ved);
+ vm_event_ring_release_slot(impl);
/* Give this vCPU a black eye if necessary, on the way out.
* See the comments above wake_blocked() for more information
* on how this mechanism works to avoid waiting. */
- avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
- if( curr->domain == d && avail_req < d->max_vcpus &&
+ avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(impl);
+ if( curr->domain == ved->d && avail_req < ved->d->max_vcpus &&
!atomic_read(&curr->vm_event_pause_count) )
- vm_event_mark_and_pause(curr, ved);
+ vm_event_ring_mark_and_pause(curr, impl);
- spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
- notify_via_xen_event_channel(d, ved->xen_port);
+ notify_via_xen_event_channel(ved->d, impl->xen_port);
}
-static int vm_event_get_response(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
- vm_event_response_t *rsp)
+static int vm_event_ring_get_response(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl,
+ vm_event_response_t *rsp)
{
vm_event_front_ring_t *front_ring;
RING_IDX rsp_cons;
int rc = 0;
- spin_lock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
- front_ring = &ved->front_ring;
+ front_ring = &impl->front_ring;
rsp_cons = front_ring->rsp_cons;
if ( !RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_RESPONSES(front_ring) )
@@ -358,12 +355,12 @@ static int vm_event_get_response(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
/* Kick any waiters -- since we've just consumed an event,
* there may be additional space available in the ring. */
- vm_event_wake(ved);
+ vm_event_ring_wake(impl);
rc = 1;
out:
- spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
return rc;
}
@@ -376,10 +373,13 @@ static int vm_event_get_response(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved,
* Note: responses are handled the same way regardless of which ring they
* arrive on.
*/
-static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static int vm_event_ring_resume(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
vm_event_response_t rsp;
+ if ( unlikely(!impl || !vm_event_check(&impl->ved)) )
+ return -ENODEV;
+
/*
* vm_event_resume() runs in either XEN_VM_EVENT_* domctls, or
* EVTCHN_send context from the introspection consumer. Both contexts
@@ -388,13 +388,10 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* below, this covers the case where we would need to iterate over all
* of them more succintly.
*/
- ASSERT(d != current->domain);
-
- if ( unlikely(!vm_event_check(ved)) )
- return -ENODEV;
+ ASSERT(impl->ved.d != current->domain);
/* Pull all responses off the ring. */
- while ( vm_event_get_response(d, ved, &rsp) )
+ while ( vm_event_ring_get_response(impl, &rsp) )
{
struct vcpu *v;
@@ -405,7 +402,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
}
/* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
- v = domain_vcpu(d, rsp.vcpu_id);
+ v = domain_vcpu(impl->ved.d, rsp.vcpu_id);
if ( !v )
continue;
@@ -419,7 +416,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
if ( rsp.reason == VM_EVENT_REASON_MEM_PAGING )
- p2m_mem_paging_resume(d, &rsp);
+ p2m_mem_paging_resume(impl->ved.d, &rsp);
#endif
/*
@@ -439,7 +436,7 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* Check in arch-specific handler to avoid bitmask overhead when
* not supported.
*/
- vm_event_toggle_singlestep(d, v, &rsp);
+ vm_event_toggle_singlestep(impl->ved.d, v, &rsp);
/* Check for altp2m switch */
if ( rsp.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_ALTERNATE_P2M )
@@ -459,72 +456,69 @@ static int vm_event_resume(struct domain *d, struct vm_event_domain *ved)
return 0;
}
-void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static void vm_event_ring_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- if( !vm_event_check(ved) )
- return;
-
spin_lock(&ved->lock);
- vm_event_release_slot(ved);
+ vm_event_ring_release_slot(to_ring(ved));
spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
}
-static int vm_event_grab_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, int foreign)
+static int vm_event_ring_grab_slot(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl, int foreign)
{
unsigned int avail_req;
int rc;
- if ( !ved->ring_page )
+ if ( !impl->ring_page )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- spin_lock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
- avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(ved);
+ avail_req = vm_event_ring_available(impl);
rc = -EBUSY;
if ( avail_req == 0 )
goto out;
if ( !foreign )
- ved->target_producers++;
+ impl->target_producers++;
else
- ved->foreign_producers++;
+ impl->foreign_producers++;
rc = 0;
out:
- spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
return rc;
}
/* Simple try_grab wrapper for use in the wait_event() macro. */
-static int vm_event_wait_try_grab(struct vm_event_domain *ved, int *rc)
+static int vm_event_ring_wait_try_grab(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl, int *rc)
{
- *rc = vm_event_grab_slot(ved, 0);
+ *rc = vm_event_ring_grab_slot(impl, 0);
return *rc;
}
-/* Call vm_event_grab_slot() until the ring doesn't exist, or is available. */
-static int vm_event_wait_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+/* Call vm_event_ring_grab_slot() until the ring doesn't exist, or is available. */
+static int vm_event_ring_wait_slot(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
{
int rc = -EBUSY;
- wait_event(ved->wq, vm_event_wait_try_grab(ved, &rc) != -EBUSY);
+ wait_event(impl->wq, vm_event_ring_wait_try_grab(impl, &rc) != -EBUSY);
return rc;
}
-bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+static bool vm_event_ring_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- return ved && ved->ring_page;
+ return to_ring(ved)->ring_page != NULL;
}
/*
* Determines whether or not the current vCPU belongs to the target domain,
* and calls the appropriate wait function. If it is a guest vCPU, then we
- * use vm_event_wait_slot() to reserve a slot. As long as there is a ring,
+ * use vm_event_ring_wait_slot() to reserve a slot. As long as there is a ring,
* this function will always return 0 for a guest. For a non-guest, we check
* for space and return -EBUSY if the ring is not available.
*
@@ -533,36 +527,33 @@ bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
* 0: a spot has been reserved
*
*/
-int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep)
+static int vm_event_ring_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep)
{
- if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
if ( (current->domain == ved->d) && allow_sleep )
- return vm_event_wait_slot(ved);
+ return vm_event_ring_wait_slot(to_ring(ved));
else
- return vm_event_grab_slot(ved, current->domain != ved->d);
+ return vm_event_ring_grab_slot(to_ring(ved), current->domain != ved->d);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
{
- vm_event_resume(v->domain, v->domain->vm_event_paging);
+ vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_paging));
}
#endif
/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
{
- vm_event_resume(v->domain, v->domain->vm_event_monitor);
+ vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
{
- vm_event_resume(v->domain, v->domain->vm_event_share);
+ vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_share));
}
#endif
@@ -571,32 +562,32 @@ void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
- {
- /* Destroying the wait queue head means waking up all
- * queued vcpus. This will drain the list, allowing
- * the disable routine to complete. It will also drop
- * all domain refs the wait-queued vcpus are holding.
- * Finally, because this code path involves previously
- * pausing the domain (domain_kill), unpausing the
- * vcpus causes no harm. */
- destroy_waitqueue_head(&d->vm_event_paging->wq);
- (void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_paging);
- }
+ d->vm_event_paging->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_paging);
#endif
+
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
- {
- destroy_waitqueue_head(&d->vm_event_monitor->wq);
- (void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_monitor);
- }
+ d->vm_event_monitor->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_monitor);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
- {
- destroy_waitqueue_head(&d->vm_event_share->wq);
- (void)vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_share);
- }
+ d->vm_event_share->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_share);
#endif
}
+static void vm_event_ring_cleanup(struct vm_event_domain **_ved)
+{
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(*_ved);
+ /* Destroying the wait queue head means waking up all
+ * queued vcpus. This will drain the list, allowing
+ * the disable routine to complete. It will also drop
+ * all domain refs the wait-queued vcpus are holding.
+ * Finally, because this code path involves previously
+ * pausing the domain (domain_kill), unpausing the
+ * vcpus causes no harm. */
+ destroy_waitqueue_head(&impl->wq);
+ (void)vm_event_ring_disable(_ved);
+}
+
int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
{
int rc;
@@ -666,23 +657,22 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
/* domain_pause() not required here, see XSA-99 */
- rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_paging, _VPF_mem_paging,
+ rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_paging, _VPF_mem_paging,
HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN,
mem_paging_notification);
}
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
- {
- domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_paging);
- domain_unpause(d);
- }
+ if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
+ break;
+ domain_pause(d);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_paging);
+ domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_resume(d, d->vm_event_paging);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_paging));
break;
default:
@@ -704,23 +694,22 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
rc = arch_monitor_init_domain(d);
if ( rc )
break;
- rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_monitor, _VPF_mem_access,
+ rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_monitor, _VPF_mem_access,
HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN,
monitor_notification);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
- {
- domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_monitor);
- arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(d);
- domain_unpause(d);
- }
+ if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
+ break;
+ domain_pause(d);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_monitor);
+ arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(d);
+ domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_resume(d, d->vm_event_monitor);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_monitor));
break;
default:
@@ -749,22 +738,21 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
/* domain_pause() not required here, see XSA-99 */
- rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_share, _VPF_mem_sharing,
+ rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_share, _VPF_mem_sharing,
HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN,
mem_sharing_notification);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
- if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
- {
- domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_disable(d, &d->vm_event_share);
- domain_unpause(d);
- }
+ if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
+ break;
+ domain_pause(d);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_share);
+ domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_resume(d, d->vm_event_share);
+ rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_share));
break;
default:
@@ -816,6 +804,14 @@ void vm_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v)
vcpu_unpause(v);
}
+static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_ring_ops = {
+ .check = vm_event_ring_check,
+ .cleanup = vm_event_ring_cleanup,
+ .claim_slot = vm_event_ring_claim_slot,
+ .cancel_slot = vm_event_ring_cancel_slot,
+ .put_request = vm_event_ring_put_request
+};
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
index ff30999..21a3f50 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
@@ -23,14 +23,43 @@
#ifndef __VM_EVENT_H__
#define __VM_EVENT_H__
-#include <xen/sched.h>
+#include <xen/errno.h>
+#include <xen/spinlock.h>
+#include <xen/types.h>
#include <public/vm_event.h>
+struct domain;
+struct vm_event_domain;
+
+struct vm_event_ops
+{
+ bool (*check)(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+ void (*cleanup)(struct vm_event_domain **_ved);
+ int (*claim_slot)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep);
+ void (*cancel_slot)(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+ void (*put_request)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, vm_event_request_t *req);
+};
+
+struct vm_event_domain
+{
+ /* Domain reference */
+ struct domain *d;
+
+ /* vm_event_ops */
+ const struct vm_event_ops *ops;
+
+ /* vm_event domain lock */
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
/* Clean up on domain destruction */
void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d);
/* Returns whether the VM event domain has been set up */
-bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+static inline bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+{
+ return (ved) && ved->ops->check(ved);
+}
/* Returns 0 on success, -ENOSYS if there is no ring, -EBUSY if there is no
* available space and the caller is a foreign domain. If the guest itself
@@ -45,7 +74,14 @@ bool vm_event_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
* cancel_slot(), both of which are guaranteed to
* succeed.
*/
-int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep);
+static inline int __vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep)
+{
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return ved->ops->claim_slot(ved, allow_sleep);
+}
+
static inline int vm_event_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
return __vm_event_claim_slot(ved, true);
@@ -56,10 +92,22 @@ static inline int vm_event_claim_slot_nosleep(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
return __vm_event_claim_slot(ved, false);
}
-void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+static inline void vm_event_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+{
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
+ return;
-void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
- vm_event_request_t *req);
+ ved->ops->cancel_slot(ved);
+}
+
+static inline void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+ vm_event_request_t *req)
+{
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
+ return;
+
+ ved->ops->put_request(ved, req);
+}
int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec);
--
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 06/10] vm_event: Decouple implementation details from interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:13 ` Tamas K Lengyel
` (2 more replies)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing Petre Pircalabu
` (3 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 3 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich,
Alexandru Isaila, Roger Pau Monné
In high throughput introspection scenarios where lots of monitor
vm_events are generated, the ring buffer can fill up before the monitor
application gets a chance to handle all the requests thus blocking
other vcpus which will have to wait for a slot to become available.
This patch adds support for a different mechanism to handle synchronous
vm_event requests / responses. As each synchronous request pauses the
vcpu until the corresponding response is handled, it can be stored in
a slotted memory buffer (one per vcpu) shared between the hypervisor and
the controlling domain.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 9 +
tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c | 9 +-
tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c | 9 +-
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 23 +-
tools/libxc/xc_private.h | 12 +-
tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c | 100 ++++++-
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 7 +
xen/common/vm_event.c | 595 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 10 +-
xen/include/public/memory.h | 2 +
xen/include/public/vm_event.h | 16 ++
xen/include/xen/vm_event.h | 11 +-
12 files changed, 684 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index f3af710..1293b0f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ enum xc_error_code {
typedef enum xc_error_code xc_error_code;
+struct xenforeignmemory_resource_handle;
/*
* INITIALIZATION FUNCTIONS
@@ -2007,6 +2008,14 @@ int xc_vm_event_get_version(xc_interface *xch);
void *xc_monitor_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, uint32_t *port);
int xc_monitor_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id);
int xc_monitor_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id);
+
+/* Monitor NG interface */
+int xc_monitor_ng_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
+ struct xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres,
+ int *num_channels, void **p_addr);
+int xc_monitor_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
+ struct xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres);
+
/*
* Get a bitmap of supported monitor events in the form
* (1 << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_*).
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
index a88c0cc..978008a 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int xc_mem_paging_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE,
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
- port);
+ 0, port);
}
int xc_mem_paging_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
@@ -57,15 +57,12 @@ int xc_mem_paging_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
- NULL);
+ 0, NULL);
}
int xc_mem_paging_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
- return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING,
- NULL);
+ return xc_vm_event_resume(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING, 0);
}
int xc_mem_paging_nominate(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, uint64_t gfn)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c b/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
index 1c4a706..44d4f23 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_memshr.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int xc_memshr_ring_enable(xc_interface *xch,
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE,
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
- port);
+ 0, port);
}
int xc_memshr_ring_disable(xc_interface *xch,
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int xc_memshr_ring_disable(xc_interface *xch,
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
- NULL);
+ 0, NULL);
}
static int xc_memshr_memop(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
@@ -203,10 +203,7 @@ int xc_memshr_range_share(xc_interface *xch,
int xc_memshr_domain_resume(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid)
{
- return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domid,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING,
- NULL);
+ return xc_vm_event_resume(xch, domid, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING, 0);
}
int xc_memshr_debug_gfn(xc_interface *xch,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
index f05b53d..d8d62c4 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c
@@ -33,15 +33,12 @@ int xc_monitor_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
- NULL);
+ 0, NULL);
}
int xc_monitor_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id)
{
- return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME,
- XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
- NULL);
+ return xc_vm_event_resume(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR, 0);
}
int xc_monitor_get_capabilities(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
@@ -246,6 +243,22 @@ int xc_monitor_emul_unimplemented(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
}
+int xc_monitor_ng_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres,
+ int *num_channels, void **p_addr)
+{
+ return xc_vm_event_ng_enable(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
+ fres, num_channels, p_addr);
+}
+
+
+int xc_monitor_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres)
+{
+ return xc_vm_event_ng_disable(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR,
+ fres);
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_private.h b/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
index e4f7c3a..9cd6069 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_private.h
@@ -412,13 +412,23 @@ int xc_ffs64(uint64_t x);
* vm_event operations. Internal use only.
*/
int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
- unsigned int type, uint32_t *port);
+ unsigned int type, unsigned int flags, uint32_t *port);
+int xc_vm_event_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int type,
+ unsigned int flags);
/*
* Enables vm_event and returns the mapped ring page indicated by type.
* type can be XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_(PAGING/MONITOR/SHARING)
*/
void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
uint32_t *port);
+/*
+ * Enables/Disables vm_event using the new interface.
+ */
+int xc_vm_event_ng_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres,
+ int *num_channels, void **p_addr);
+int xc_vm_event_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres);
int do_dm_op(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, unsigned int nr_bufs, ...);
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c b/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
index 044bf71..d070e64 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_vm_event.c
@@ -22,8 +22,12 @@
#include "xc_private.h"
+#ifndef PFN_UP
+#define PFN_UP(x) (((x) + XC_PAGE_SIZE-1) >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT)
+#endif /* PFN_UP */
+
int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
- unsigned int type, uint32_t *port)
+ unsigned int type, unsigned int flags, uint32_t *port)
{
DECLARE_DOMCTL;
int rc;
@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@ int xc_vm_event_control(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, unsigned int op,
domctl.domain = domain_id;
domctl.u.vm_event_op.op = op;
domctl.u.vm_event_op.type = type;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.flags = flags;
rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
if ( !rc && port )
@@ -113,7 +118,7 @@ void *xc_vm_event_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
goto out;
}
- rc1 = xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE, type, port);
+ rc1 = xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE, type, 0, port);
if ( rc1 != 0 )
{
PERROR("Failed to enable vm_event\n");
@@ -164,6 +169,97 @@ int xc_vm_event_get_version(xc_interface *xch)
return rc;
}
+int xc_vm_event_resume(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
+ unsigned int type, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ DECLARE_DOMCTL;
+
+ domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op;
+ domctl.domain = domain_id;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.op = XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.type = type;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.flags = flags;
+ domctl.u.vm_event_op.u.resume.vcpu_id = 0;
+
+ return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
+}
+
+int xc_vm_event_ng_enable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres,
+ int *num_channels, void **p_addr)
+{
+ int rc1, rc2;
+ xc_dominfo_t info;
+ unsigned long nr_frames;
+
+ if ( !fres || !num_channels || ! p_addr )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Get the numbers of vcpus */
+ if ( xc_domain_getinfo(xch, domain_id, 1, &info) != 1 ||
+ info.domid != domain_id )
+ {
+ PERROR("xc_domain_getinfo failed.\n");
+ return -ESRCH;
+ }
+
+ *num_channels = info.max_vcpu_id + 1;
+
+ rc1 = xc_domain_pause(xch, domain_id);
+ if ( rc1 )
+ {
+ PERROR("Unable to pause domain\n");
+ return rc1;
+ }
+
+ rc1 = xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE,
+ type, XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP, NULL);
+ if ( rc1 )
+ {
+ PERROR("Failed to enable vm_event\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nr_frames = PFN_UP(*num_channels * sizeof(struct vm_event_slot));
+
+ *fres = xenforeignmemory_map_resource(xch->fmem, domain_id,
+ XENMEM_resource_vm_event,
+ XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR, 0,
+ nr_frames, p_addr,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ if ( !*fres )
+ {
+ xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
+ type, XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP, NULL);
+ ERROR("Failed to map vm_event resource");
+ rc1 = -errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rc2 = xc_domain_unpause(xch, domain_id);
+ if ( rc1 || rc2 )
+ {
+ if ( rc2 )
+ PERROR("Unable to pause domain\n");
+
+ if ( rc1 == 0 )
+ rc1 = rc2;
+ }
+
+ return rc1;
+}
+
+int xc_vm_event_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres)
+{
+ xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(xch->fmem, *fres);
+ *fres = NULL;
+
+ return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
+ type, XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP, NULL);
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index df2c013..768df4f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
#include <xen/efi.h>
#include <xen/grant_table.h>
#include <xen/hypercall.h>
+#include <xen/vm_event.h>
#include <asm/paging.h>
#include <asm/shadow.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -4555,6 +4556,12 @@ int arch_acquire_resource(struct domain *d, unsigned int type,
}
#endif
+ case XENMEM_resource_vm_event:
+ rc = vm_event_ng_get_frames(d, id, frame, nr_frames, mfn_list);
+ if ( !rc )
+ *flags |= XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned;
+ break;
+
default:
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
index e6a7a29..3f9be97 100644
--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <xen/wait.h>
#include <xen/vm_event.h>
#include <xen/mem_access.h>
+#include <xen/vmap.h>
#include <asm/p2m.h>
#include <asm/monitor.h>
#include <asm/vm_event.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,78 @@
#define xen_rmb() smp_rmb()
#define xen_wmb() smp_wmb()
+static int vm_event_ring_pfn_param(uint32_t type)
+{
+ switch( type )
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
+ return HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN;
+#endif
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
+ return HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
+ return HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN;
+#endif
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_pause_flag(uint32_t type)
+{
+ switch( type )
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
+ return _VPF_mem_paging;
+#endif
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
+ return _VPF_mem_access;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
+ return _VPF_mem_sharing;
+#endif
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
+#endif
+static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
+static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
+#endif
+
+static xen_event_channel_notification_t vm_event_notification_fn(uint32_t type)
+{
+ switch( type )
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
+ return mem_paging_notification;
+#endif
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
+ return monitor_notification;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
+ return mem_sharing_notification;
+#endif
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * VM event ring implementation;
+ */
+
#define to_ring(_ved) container_of((_ved), struct vm_event_ring_domain, ved)
/* VM event ring implementation */
@@ -67,12 +140,12 @@ static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_ring_ops;
static int vm_event_ring_enable(
struct domain *d,
struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec,
- struct vm_event_domain **p_ved,
- int pause_flag,
- int param,
- xen_event_channel_notification_t notification_fn)
+ struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
{
int rc;
+ int param = vm_event_ring_pfn_param(vec->type);
+ int pause_flag = vm_event_pause_flag(vec->type);
+ xen_event_channel_notification_t fn = vm_event_notification_fn(vec->type);
unsigned long ring_gfn = d->arch.hvm.params[param];
struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl;
@@ -111,8 +184,7 @@ static int vm_event_ring_enable(
(vm_event_sring_t *)impl->ring_page,
PAGE_SIZE);
- rc = alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(d, 0, current->domain->domain_id,
- notification_fn);
+ rc = alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(d, 0, current->domain->domain_id, fn);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto err;
@@ -242,6 +314,7 @@ static int vm_event_ring_disable(struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
xfree(impl);
*p_ved = NULL;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -365,6 +438,51 @@ static int vm_event_ring_get_response(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl,
return rc;
}
+static void vm_event_handle_response(struct domain *d, struct vcpu *v,
+ vm_event_response_t *rsp)
+{
+ /* Check flags which apply only when the vCPU is paused */
+ if ( atomic_read(&v->vm_event_pause_count) )
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+ if ( rsp->reason == VM_EVENT_REASON_MEM_PAGING )
+ p2m_mem_paging_resume(d, rsp);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Check emulation flags in the arch-specific handler only, as it
+ * has to set arch-specific flags when supported, and to avoid
+ * bitmask overhead when it isn't supported.
+ */
+ vm_event_emulate_check(v, rsp);
+
+ /*
+ * Check in arch-specific handler to avoid bitmask overhead when
+ * not supported.
+ */
+ vm_event_register_write_resume(v, rsp);
+
+ /*
+ * Check in arch-specific handler to avoid bitmask overhead when
+ * not supported.
+ */
+ vm_event_toggle_singlestep(d, v, rsp);
+
+ /* Check for altp2m switch */
+ if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_ALTERNATE_P2M )
+ p2m_altp2m_check(v, rsp->altp2m_idx);
+
+ if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_REGISTERS )
+ vm_event_set_registers(v, rsp);
+
+ if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_GET_NEXT_INTERRUPT )
+ vm_event_monitor_next_interrupt(v);
+
+ if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
+ vm_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Pull all responses from the given ring and unpause the corresponding vCPU
* if required. Based on the response type, here we can also call custom
@@ -373,22 +491,20 @@ static int vm_event_ring_get_response(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl,
* Note: responses are handled the same way regardless of which ring they
* arrive on.
*/
-static int vm_event_ring_resume(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
+static int vm_event_ring_resume(struct vm_event_domain *ved, struct vcpu *v)
{
vm_event_response_t rsp;
-
- if ( unlikely(!impl || !vm_event_check(&impl->ved)) )
- return -ENODEV;
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(ved);
/*
- * vm_event_resume() runs in either XEN_VM_EVENT_* domctls, or
+ * vm_event_ring_resume() runs in either XEN_VM_EVENT_* domctls, or
* EVTCHN_send context from the introspection consumer. Both contexts
* are guaranteed not to be the subject of vm_event responses.
* While we could ASSERT(v != current) for each VCPU in d in the loop
* below, this covers the case where we would need to iterate over all
* of them more succintly.
*/
- ASSERT(impl->ved.d != current->domain);
+ ASSERT(ved->d != current->domain);
/* Pull all responses off the ring. */
while ( vm_event_ring_get_response(impl, &rsp) )
@@ -402,7 +518,7 @@ static int vm_event_ring_resume(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
}
/* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
- v = domain_vcpu(impl->ved.d, rsp.vcpu_id);
+ v = domain_vcpu(ved->d, rsp.vcpu_id);
if ( !v )
continue;
@@ -410,47 +526,7 @@ static int vm_event_ring_resume(struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl)
* In some cases the response type needs extra handling, so here
* we call the appropriate handlers.
*/
-
- /* Check flags which apply only when the vCPU is paused */
- if ( atomic_read(&v->vm_event_pause_count) )
- {
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
- if ( rsp.reason == VM_EVENT_REASON_MEM_PAGING )
- p2m_mem_paging_resume(impl->ved.d, &rsp);
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Check emulation flags in the arch-specific handler only, as it
- * has to set arch-specific flags when supported, and to avoid
- * bitmask overhead when it isn't supported.
- */
- vm_event_emulate_check(v, &rsp);
-
- /*
- * Check in arch-specific handler to avoid bitmask overhead when
- * not supported.
- */
- vm_event_register_write_resume(v, &rsp);
-
- /*
- * Check in arch-specific handler to avoid bitmask overhead when
- * not supported.
- */
- vm_event_toggle_singlestep(impl->ved.d, v, &rsp);
-
- /* Check for altp2m switch */
- if ( rsp.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_ALTERNATE_P2M )
- p2m_altp2m_check(v, rsp.altp2m_idx);
-
- if ( rsp.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_REGISTERS )
- vm_event_set_registers(v, &rsp);
-
- if ( rsp.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_GET_NEXT_INTERRUPT )
- vm_event_monitor_next_interrupt(v);
-
- if ( rsp.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vm_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
- }
+ vm_event_handle_response(ved->d, v, &rsp);
}
return 0;
@@ -535,59 +611,361 @@ static int vm_event_ring_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_slee
return vm_event_ring_grab_slot(to_ring(ved), current->domain != ved->d);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
-/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
-static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+static void vm_event_ring_cleanup(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
{
- vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_paging));
+ struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(ved);
+ /* Destroying the wait queue head means waking up all
+ * queued vcpus. This will drain the list, allowing
+ * the disable routine to complete. It will also drop
+ * all domain refs the wait-queued vcpus are holding.
+ * Finally, because this code path involves previously
+ * pausing the domain (domain_kill), unpausing the
+ * vcpus causes no harm. */
+ destroy_waitqueue_head(&impl->wq);
}
-#endif
-/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
-static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+/*
+ * VM event NG (new generation)
+ */
+#define to_channels(_ved) container_of((_ved), \
+ struct vm_event_channels_domain, ved)
+
+struct vm_event_channels_domain
+{
+ /* VM event domain */
+ struct vm_event_domain ved;
+ /* shared channels buffer */
+ struct vm_event_slot *slots;
+ /* the buffer size (number of frames) */
+ unsigned int nr_frames;
+ /* buffer's mnf list */
+ mfn_t mfn[0];
+};
+
+static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_channels_ops;
+
+static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
{
- vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor));
+ int i;
+
+ vunmap(impl->slots);
+ impl->slots = NULL;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
+ free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
-/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
-static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+static int vm_event_channels_alloc_buffer(struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
{
- vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_share));
+ int i = 0;
+
+ impl->slots = vzalloc(impl->nr_frames * PAGE_SIZE);
+ if ( !impl->slots )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
+ impl->mfn[i] = vmap_to_mfn(impl->slots + i * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
+ share_xen_page_with_guest(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]), current->domain,
+ SHARE_rw);
+
+ return 0;
}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_enable(
+ struct domain *d,
+ struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec,
+ struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
+{
+ int rc, i = 0;
+ xen_event_channel_notification_t fn = vm_event_notification_fn(vec->type);
+ unsigned int nr_frames = PFN_UP(d->max_vcpus * sizeof(struct vm_event_slot));
+ struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl;
+
+ if ( *p_ved )
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ impl = _xzalloc(sizeof(struct vm_event_channels_domain) +
+ nr_frames * sizeof(mfn_t),
+ __alignof__(struct vm_event_channels_domain));
+ if ( unlikely(!impl) )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&impl->ved.lock);
+
+ impl->nr_frames = nr_frames;
+ impl->ved.d = d;
+ impl->ved.ops = &vm_event_channels_ops;
+
+ rc = vm_event_init_domain(d);
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = vm_event_channels_alloc_buffer(impl);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto err;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < d->max_vcpus; i++ )
+ {
+ rc = alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(d, i, current->domain->domain_id, fn);
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ goto err;
+
+ impl->slots[i].port = rc;
+ impl->slots[i].state = STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_IDLE;
+ }
+
+ *p_ved = &impl->ved;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ while ( --i >= 0 )
+ evtchn_close(d, impl->slots[i].port, 0);
+ xfree(impl);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_disable(struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
+{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct domain *d = (*p_ved)->d;
+ struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl = to_channels(*p_ved);
+ int i;
+
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
+
+ for_each_vcpu( impl->ved.d, v )
+ {
+ if ( atomic_read(&v->vm_event_pause_count) )
+ vm_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
+ }
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->ved.d->max_vcpus; i++ )
+ evtchn_close(impl->ved.d, impl->slots[i].port, 0);
+
+ vm_event_channels_free_buffer(impl);
+
+ vm_event_cleanup_domain(d);
+
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
+
+ xfree(impl);
+ *p_ved = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool vm_event_channels_check(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+{
+ return to_channels(ved)->slots != NULL;
+}
+
+static void vm_event_channels_cleanup(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+{
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_claim_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+ bool allow_sleep)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void vm_event_channels_cancel_slot(struct vm_event_domain *ved)
+{
+}
+
+static void vm_event_channels_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
+ vm_event_request_t *req)
+{
+ struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl = to_channels(ved);
+ struct vm_event_slot *slot;
+
+ ASSERT( req->vcpu_id >= 0 && req->vcpu_id < ved->d->max_vcpus );
+
+ slot = &impl->slots[req->vcpu_id];
+
+ if ( current->domain != ved->d )
+ {
+ req->flags |= VM_EVENT_FLAG_FOREIGN;
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+ if ( !(req->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED) )
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_G_WARNING, "d%dv%d was not paused.\n",
+ ved->d->domain_id, req->vcpu_id);
#endif
+ }
+
+ req->version = VM_EVENT_INTERFACE_VERSION;
+
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
+ if ( slot->state != STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_IDLE )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_G_WARNING, "The VM event slot for d%dv%d is not IDLE.\n",
+ impl->ved.d->domain_id, req->vcpu_id);
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ slot->u.req = *req;
+ slot->state = STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_SUBMIT;
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
+ notify_via_xen_event_channel(impl->ved.d, slot->port);
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_get_response(struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl,
+ struct vcpu *v, vm_event_response_t *rsp)
+{
+ struct vm_event_slot *slot = &impl->slots[v->vcpu_id];
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ ASSERT( slot != NULL );
+ spin_lock(&impl->ved.lock);
+
+ if ( slot->state != STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_FINISH )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_G_WARNING, "The VM event slot state for d%dv%d is invalid.\n",
+ impl->ved.d->domain_id, v->vcpu_id);
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *rsp = slot->u.rsp;
+ slot->state = STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_IDLE;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&impl->ved.lock);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_resume(struct vm_event_domain *ved, struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ vm_event_response_t rsp;
+ struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl = to_channels(ved);
+
+ ASSERT(ved->d != current->domain);
+
+ if ( vm_event_channels_get_response(impl, v, &rsp) ||
+ rsp.version != VM_EVENT_INTERFACE_VERSION ||
+ rsp.vcpu_id != v->vcpu_id )
+ return -1;
+
+ vm_event_handle_response(ved->d, v, &rsp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int vm_event_ng_get_frames(struct domain *d, unsigned int id,
+ unsigned long frame, unsigned int nr_frames,
+ xen_pfn_t mfn_list[])
+{
+ struct vm_event_domain *ved;
+ int i;
+
+ switch (id )
+ {
+ case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
+ ved = d->vm_event_monitor;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ( frame != 0 || nr_frames != to_channels(ved)->nr_frames )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_lock(&ved->lock);
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < to_channels(ved)->nr_frames; i++ )
+ mfn_list[i] = mfn_x(to_channels(ved)->mfn[i]);
+
+ spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * vm_event implementation agnostic functions
+ */
/* Clean up on domain destruction */
void vm_event_cleanup(struct domain *d)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
- d->vm_event_paging->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_paging);
+ {
+ d->vm_event_paging->ops->cleanup(d->vm_event_paging);
+ d->vm_event_paging->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_paging);
+ }
#endif
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
- d->vm_event_monitor->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_monitor);
+ {
+ d->vm_event_monitor->ops->cleanup(d->vm_event_monitor);
+ d->vm_event_monitor->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_monitor);
+ }
#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
if ( vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
- d->vm_event_share->ops->cleanup(&d->vm_event_share);
+ {
+ d->vm_event_share->ops->cleanup(d->vm_event_share);
+ d->vm_event_share->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_share);
+ }
#endif
}
-static void vm_event_ring_cleanup(struct vm_event_domain **_ved)
+static int vm_event_enable(struct domain *d,
+ struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec,
+ struct vm_event_domain **p_ved)
{
- struct vm_event_ring_domain *impl = to_ring(*_ved);
- /* Destroying the wait queue head means waking up all
- * queued vcpus. This will drain the list, allowing
- * the disable routine to complete. It will also drop
- * all domain refs the wait-queued vcpus are holding.
- * Finally, because this code path involves previously
- * pausing the domain (domain_kill), unpausing the
- * vcpus causes no harm. */
- destroy_waitqueue_head(&impl->wq);
- (void)vm_event_ring_disable(_ved);
+ return ( vec->flags & XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP ) ?
+ vm_event_channels_enable(d, vec, p_ved) :
+ vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, p_ved);
}
+static int vm_event_resume(struct vm_event_domain *ved, struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if ( !v )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return ved->ops->resume(ved, v);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
+/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
+static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+{
+ vm_event_resume(v->domain->vm_event_paging, v);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
+static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+{
+ vm_event_resume(v->domain->vm_event_monitor, v);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
+/* Registered with Xen-bound event channel for incoming notifications. */
+static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+{
+ vm_event_resume(v->domain->vm_event_share, v);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * vm_event domctl interface
+ */
+
int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
{
int rc;
@@ -632,6 +1010,13 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
{
rc = -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * The NG interface is only supported by XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR
+ * for now.
+ */
+ if ( vec->flags & XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP )
+ break;
+
switch( vec->op )
{
case XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE:
@@ -657,9 +1042,7 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
/* domain_pause() not required here, see XSA-99 */
- rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_paging, _VPF_mem_paging,
- HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN,
- mem_paging_notification);
+ rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_paging);
}
break;
@@ -667,12 +1050,13 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_paging) )
break;
domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_paging);
+ rc = d->vm_event_paging->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_paging);
domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_paging));
+ rc = vm_event_resume(d->vm_event_paging,
+ domain_vcpu(d, vec->u.resume.vcpu_id));
break;
default:
@@ -694,22 +1078,23 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
rc = arch_monitor_init_domain(d);
if ( rc )
break;
- rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_monitor, _VPF_mem_access,
- HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN,
- monitor_notification);
+
+ rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_monitor);
+
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_monitor) )
break;
domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_monitor);
+ rc = d->vm_event_monitor->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_monitor);
arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(d);
domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_monitor));
+ rc = vm_event_resume(d->vm_event_monitor,
+ domain_vcpu(d, vec->u.resume.vcpu_id));
break;
default:
@@ -724,6 +1109,13 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
{
rc = -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * The NG interface is only supported by XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR
+ * for now.
+ */
+ if ( vec->flags & XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP )
+ break;
+
switch( vec->op )
{
case XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE:
@@ -738,21 +1130,20 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec)
break;
/* domain_pause() not required here, see XSA-99 */
- rc = vm_event_ring_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_share, _VPF_mem_sharing,
- HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN,
- mem_sharing_notification);
+ rc = vm_event_enable(d, vec, &d->vm_event_share);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE:
if ( !vm_event_check(d->vm_event_share) )
break;
domain_pause(d);
- rc = vm_event_ring_disable(&d->vm_event_share);
+ rc = d->vm_event_share->ops->disable(&d->vm_event_share);
domain_unpause(d);
break;
case XEN_VM_EVENT_RESUME:
- rc = vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(d->vm_event_share));
+ rc = vm_event_resume(d->vm_event_share,
+ domain_vcpu(d, vec->u.resume.vcpu_id));
break;
default:
@@ -809,7 +1200,19 @@ static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_ring_ops = {
.cleanup = vm_event_ring_cleanup,
.claim_slot = vm_event_ring_claim_slot,
.cancel_slot = vm_event_ring_cancel_slot,
- .put_request = vm_event_ring_put_request
+ .disable = vm_event_ring_disable,
+ .put_request = vm_event_ring_put_request,
+ .resume = vm_event_ring_resume,
+};
+
+static const struct vm_event_ops vm_event_channels_ops = {
+ .check = vm_event_channels_check,
+ .cleanup = vm_event_channels_cleanup,
+ .claim_slot = vm_event_channels_claim_slot,
+ .cancel_slot = vm_event_channels_cancel_slot,
+ .disable = vm_event_channels_disable,
+ .put_request = vm_event_channels_put_request,
+ .resume = vm_event_channels_resume,
};
/*
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 234d8c5..fc7420c 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include "hvm/save.h"
#include "memory.h"
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000011
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000012
/*
* NB. xen_domctl.domain is an IN/OUT parameter for this operation.
@@ -781,12 +781,20 @@ struct xen_domctl_gdbsx_domstatus {
struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op {
uint32_t op; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_* */
uint32_t type; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_* */
+ /* Use the NG interface */
+#define _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP 0
+#define XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP (1U << _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP)
+ uint32_t flags;
union {
struct {
uint32_t port; /* OUT: event channel for ring */
} enable;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t vcpu_id; /* IN: vcpu_id*/
+ } resume;
+
uint32_t version;
} u;
};
diff --git a/xen/include/public/memory.h b/xen/include/public/memory.h
index 68ddadb..2e8912e 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ struct xen_mem_acquire_resource {
#define XENMEM_resource_ioreq_server 0
#define XENMEM_resource_grant_table 1
+#define XENMEM_resource_vm_event 2
/*
* IN - a type-specific resource identifier, which must be zero
@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ struct xen_mem_acquire_resource {
*
* type == XENMEM_resource_ioreq_server -> id == ioreq server id
* type == XENMEM_resource_grant_table -> id defined below
+ * type == XENMEM_resource_vm_event -> id == vm_event type
*/
uint32_t id;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
index c48bc21..2f2160b 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
@@ -421,6 +421,22 @@ typedef struct vm_event_st {
DEFINE_RING_TYPES(vm_event, vm_event_request_t, vm_event_response_t);
+/* VM Event slot state */
+#define STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_IDLE 0 /* the slot data is invalid */
+#define STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_SUBMIT 1 /* a request was submitted */
+#define STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_FINISH 2 /* a response was issued */
+
+struct vm_event_slot
+{
+ uint32_t port; /* evtchn for notifications to/from helper */
+ uint32_t state:4;
+ uint32_t pad:28;
+ union {
+ vm_event_request_t req;
+ vm_event_response_t rsp;
+ } u;
+};
+
#endif /* defined(__XEN__) || defined(__XEN_TOOLS__) */
#endif /* _XEN_PUBLIC_VM_EVENT_H */
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
index 21a3f50..0468269 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/vm_event.h
@@ -30,14 +30,17 @@
struct domain;
struct vm_event_domain;
+struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op;
struct vm_event_ops
{
bool (*check)(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
- void (*cleanup)(struct vm_event_domain **_ved);
- int (*claim_slot)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep);
+ void (*cleanup)(struct vm_event_domain *p_ved);
+ int (*claim_slot)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, bool allow_sleep);
void (*cancel_slot)(struct vm_event_domain *ved);
+ int (*disable)(struct vm_event_domain **p_ved);
void (*put_request)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, vm_event_request_t *req);
+ int (*resume)(struct vm_event_domain *ved, struct vcpu *v);
};
struct vm_event_domain
@@ -111,6 +114,10 @@ static inline void vm_event_put_request(struct vm_event_domain *ved,
int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op *vec);
+int vm_event_ng_get_frames(struct domain *d, unsigned int id,
+ unsigned long frame, unsigned int nr_frames,
+ xen_pfn_t mfn_list[]);
+
void vm_event_vcpu_pause(struct vcpu *v);
void vm_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v);
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 21:13 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 12:13 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-17 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 13:42 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 21:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila,
Xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> In high throughput introspection scenarios where lots of monitor
> vm_events are generated, the ring buffer can fill up before the monitor
> application gets a chance to handle all the requests thus blocking
> other vcpus which will have to wait for a slot to become available.
>
> This patch adds support for a different mechanism to handle synchronous
> vm_event requests / responses. As each synchronous request pauses the
> vcpu until the corresponding response is handled, it can be stored in
> a slotted memory buffer (one per vcpu) shared between the hypervisor and
> the controlling domain.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
So this is quite a large patch, perhaps it would be better to split it
into a hypervisor-side patch and then a toolstack-side one. Also,
would it make sense to keep the two implementations in separate files
within Xen (ie. common/vm_event.c and vm_event_ng.c)?
Tamas
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 21:13 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 12:13 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 12:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tamas K Lengyel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné
On Tue, 2019-07-16 at 15:13 -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
> <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> >
> > In high throughput introspection scenarios where lots of monitor
> > vm_events are generated, the ring buffer can fill up before the
> > monitor
> > application gets a chance to handle all the requests thus blocking
> > other vcpus which will have to wait for a slot to become available.
> >
> > This patch adds support for a different mechanism to handle
> > synchronous
> > vm_event requests / responses. As each synchronous request pauses
> > the
> > vcpu until the corresponding response is handled, it can be stored
> > in
> > a slotted memory buffer (one per vcpu) shared between the
> > hypervisor and
> > the controlling domain.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
>
> So this is quite a large patch, perhaps it would be better to split
> it
> into a hypervisor-side patch and then a toolstack-side one. Also,
> would it make sense to keep the two implementations in separate files
> within Xen (ie. common/vm_event.c and vm_event_ng.c)?
>
> Tamas
I thought about having 2 separate patches, one for hypervisor and one
for libxc, but my main concern was not to break "git bisect"(I'm not
sure if there are any tests (other than the build) which need to pass).
The "flags" field was added to vm_event_op, and, if it's not manually
set by the caller, an invalid value might be passed to XEN (e.g.
xc_vm_event_control).
Initially the new interface was contained in a separate file (has it's
own domctl) but I've copied it to vm_event because I wanted to have all
non-interface functions static. (e.g. the "enable" functions for both
transports and vm_event_handle_response). However, I will look into
this again, and, if I can find a clean way to minimize the
dependencies, I will split it again.
Many thanks,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:13 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 12:38 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 14:41 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-17 13:42 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-17 10:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Alexandru Isaila,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Roger Pau Monné
On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> +static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
> {
> - vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor));
> + int i;
> +
> + vunmap(impl->slots);
> + impl->slots = NULL;
> +
> + for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
> + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
> }
What guarantees that there are no mappings left of the pages you free
here? Sharing pages with guests is (so far) an (almost) irreversible
action, i.e. they may generally only be freed upon domain destruction.
See gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() for a case where we actually
make an attempt at freeing such pages (but where we fail the request
in case references are left in place).
Furthermore, is there any guarantee that the pages you free here
were actually allocated? ->nr_frames gets set ahead of the actual
allocation.
> +int vm_event_ng_get_frames(struct domain *d, unsigned int id,
> + unsigned long frame, unsigned int nr_frames,
> + xen_pfn_t mfn_list[])
> +{
> + struct vm_event_domain *ved;
> + int i;
> +
> + switch (id )
> + {
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> + ved = d->vm_event_monitor;
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + return -ENOSYS;
Various other error codes might be fine here, but ENOSYS is not
(despite pre-existing misuse elsewhere in the tree).
> + }
> +
> + if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if ( frame != 0 || nr_frames != to_channels(ved)->nr_frames )
> + return -EINVAL;
Is there a particular reason for this all-or-nothing model?
> + spin_lock(&ved->lock);
> +
> + for ( i = 0; i < to_channels(ved)->nr_frames; i++ )
> + mfn_list[i] = mfn_x(to_channels(ved)->mfn[i]);
> +
> + spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
What is the locking good for here? You obviously can't be afraid of
the values becoming stale, as they surely would be by the time the
caller gets to see them (if they can go stale in the first place).
> --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
> #include "hvm/save.h"
> #include "memory.h"
>
> -#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000011
> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000012
This looks to be needed only because of ...
> @@ -781,12 +781,20 @@ struct xen_domctl_gdbsx_domstatus {
> struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op {
> uint32_t op; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_* */
> uint32_t type; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_* */
> + /* Use the NG interface */
> +#define _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP 0
> +#define XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP (1U << _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP)
> + uint32_t flags;
... this addition. Is the new field really warranted here? Can't
you e.g. simply define a new set of ops (e.g. by setting their
high bits)?
I've omitted all style comments (formatting, plain vs unsigned int
etc) - I'd like to leave that to the VM event maintainers.
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-17 12:38 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 13:12 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 14:41 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-17 12:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Alexandru Isaila,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Roger Pau Monné
> I've omitted all style comments (formatting, plain vs unsigned int
> etc) - I'd like to leave that to the VM event maintainers.
Do we have an automated way to check for style issues, like astyle? In
my projects I integrate that into my Travis checks so I don't have to
do that manually (see
https://github.com/tklengyel/drakvuf/blob/master/.travis.yml#L28).
Checking for that kind-of stuff manually is far from ideal.
Tamas
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 12:38 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 13:12 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-17 13:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tamas K Lengyel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Alexandru Isaila,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Roger Pau Monné
On 17.07.2019 14:38, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>> I've omitted all style comments (formatting, plain vs unsigned int
>> etc) - I'd like to leave that to the VM event maintainers.
>
> Do we have an automated way to check for style issues, like astyle?
We don't; there is some work underway towards that, afaia. But to
be honest, people should be looking at their code/patches before
submitting. Then it at least would typically only be very few issues
for reviewers to point out. But there were quite a few here.
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 12:38 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 14:41 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-17 16:32 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 14:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 10:06 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> > +static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct
> > vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
> > {
> > - vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor));
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + vunmap(impl->slots);
> > + impl->slots = NULL;
> > +
> > + for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
> > + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
> > }
>
> What guarantees that there are no mappings left of the pages you free
> here? Sharing pages with guests is (so far) an (almost) irreversible
> action, i.e. they may generally only be freed upon domain
> destruction.
> See gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() for a case where we actually
> make an attempt at freeing such pages (but where we fail the request
> in case references are left in place).
>
I've tested manually 2 cases and they both work (no crashes):
1: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> monitor stops ->
domain stops
2: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> domain stops ->
monitor stops.
However, I will take a closer look at gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames
and post a follow up email.
> Furthermore, is there any guarantee that the pages you free here
> were actually allocated? ->nr_frames gets set ahead of the actual
> allocation.
>
vm_event_channels_free_buffer is called only from
vm_event_channels_disable. The latter is called only if vm_event_check
succeeds ( vm_event_cleanup and vm_event_domctl/VM_EVENT_DISABLE).
vm_event_check will only return true if vm_event_enable succeeds.
> > +int vm_event_ng_get_frames(struct domain *d, unsigned int id,
> > + unsigned long frame, unsigned int
> > nr_frames,
> > + xen_pfn_t mfn_list[])
> > +{
> > + struct vm_event_domain *ved;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + switch (id )
> > + {
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> > + ved = d->vm_event_monitor;
> > + break;
> > +
> > + default:
> > + return -ENOSYS;
>
> Various other error codes might be fine here, but ENOSYS is not
> (despite pre-existing misuse elsewhere in the tree).
vm_event_domctl also returns -ENOSYS if the type is neither
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR, nor
XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING. I've just followed the existing convention.
>
> > + }
> > +
> > + if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if ( frame != 0 || nr_frames != to_channels(ved)->nr_frames )
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> Is there a particular reason for this all-or-nothing model?
I've added this extra check due to the way acquire_resource interface
is designed. In our case, the memory is allocated from
XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE and the size is known beforehand: the number of
pages needed to store (vcpus_count * sizeof vm_event_slot) bytes.
However the acquire_resource needs a "nr_frames" parameter which is
computed in a similar manner in the libxc wrapper.
This check only verifies that userspace is not sending an invalid
parameter (using an ASSERT in this case would have been overkill
because it would crash the whole hypervisor)
>
> > + spin_lock(&ved->lock);
> > +
> > + for ( i = 0; i < to_channels(ved)->nr_frames; i++ )
> > + mfn_list[i] = mfn_x(to_channels(ved)->mfn[i]);
> > +
> > + spin_unlock(&ved->lock);
>
> What is the locking good for here? You obviously can't be afraid of
> the values becoming stale, as they surely would be by the time the
> caller gets to see them (if they can go stale in the first place).
Thanks for pointing this out. I will remove the lock in the next
patchset iteration.
>
> > --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> > @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
> > #include "hvm/save.h"
> > #include "memory.h"
> >
> > -#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000011
> > +#define XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION 0x00000012
>
> This looks to be needed only because of ...
>
> > @@ -781,12 +781,20 @@ struct xen_domctl_gdbsx_domstatus {
> > struct xen_domctl_vm_event_op {
> > uint32_t op; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_* */
> > uint32_t type; /* XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_* */
> > + /* Use the NG interface */
> > +#define _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP 0
> > +#define XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP (1U <<
> > _XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP)
> > + uint32_t flags;
>
> ... this addition. Is the new field really warranted here? Can't
> you e.g. simply define a new set of ops (e.g. by setting their
> high bits)?
>
You are right. Actually only a new op is needed (e.g.
XEN_VM_EVENT_NG_ENABLE).
The only needed adition is the vcpu_id for the resume op, in order to
specify the vcpu which will handle the request in case of the
"channels" vm_event transport. However, this will not affect the
domctl's offsets hence the interface version increment is not required.
I will change this in the next patchset iteration.
> I've omitted all style comments (formatting, plain vs unsigned int
> etc) - I'd like to leave that to the VM event maintainers.
I will check again the patch for style errors, but in the meantime, if
something stands out, please let me know and I will fix it asap.
>
> Jan
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 14:41 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-17 16:32 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 18:42 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-18 13:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-17 16:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, Paul Durrant
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Roger Pau Monné
On 17.07.2019 16:41, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 10:06 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
>>> +static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct
>>> vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
>>> {
>>> - vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain->vm_event_monitor));
>>> + int i;
>>> +
>>> + vunmap(impl->slots);
>>> + impl->slots = NULL;
>>> +
>>> + for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
>>> + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
>>> }
>>
>> What guarantees that there are no mappings left of the pages you free
>> here? Sharing pages with guests is (so far) an (almost) irreversible
>> action, i.e. they may generally only be freed upon domain
>> destruction.
>> See gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() for a case where we actually
>> make an attempt at freeing such pages (but where we fail the request
>> in case references are left in place).
>>
> I've tested manually 2 cases and they both work (no crashes):
> 1: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> monitor stops ->
> domain stops
> 2: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> domain stops ->
> monitor stops.
Well, testing is important, but doing tests like you describe won't
catch any misbehaving or malicious monitor domain.
> However, I will take a closer look at gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames
> and post a follow up email.
Thanks.
>> Furthermore, is there any guarantee that the pages you free here
>> were actually allocated? ->nr_frames gets set ahead of the actual
>> allocation.
>>
> vm_event_channels_free_buffer is called only from
> vm_event_channels_disable. The latter is called only if vm_event_check
> succeeds ( vm_event_cleanup and vm_event_domctl/VM_EVENT_DISABLE).
> vm_event_check will only return true if vm_event_enable succeeds.
Hmm, looks like I was mislead to believe the freeing function
would be called by vm_event_channels_enable() not itself freeing
what it might have allocated upon error. So perhaps the bug is
there, not where I thought it would be.
>>> +int vm_event_ng_get_frames(struct domain *d, unsigned int id,
>>> + unsigned long frame, unsigned int
>>> nr_frames,
>>> + xen_pfn_t mfn_list[])
>>> +{
>>> + struct vm_event_domain *ved;
>>> + int i;
>>> +
>>> + switch (id )
>>> + {
>>> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
>>> + ved = d->vm_event_monitor;
>>> + break;
>>> +
>>> + default:
>>> + return -ENOSYS;
>>
>> Various other error codes might be fine here, but ENOSYS is not
>> (despite pre-existing misuse elsewhere in the tree).
>
> vm_event_domctl also returns -ENOSYS if the type is neither
> XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING, XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR, nor
> XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING. I've just followed the existing convention.
Right - that's one of the pre-existing misuses that I was referring
to.
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + if ( frame != 0 || nr_frames != to_channels(ved)->nr_frames )
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>
>> Is there a particular reason for this all-or-nothing model?
>
> I've added this extra check due to the way acquire_resource interface
> is designed. In our case, the memory is allocated from
> XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE and the size is known beforehand: the number of
> pages needed to store (vcpus_count * sizeof vm_event_slot) bytes.
> However the acquire_resource needs a "nr_frames" parameter which is
> computed in a similar manner in the libxc wrapper.
Hmm, maybe I'm not up to date here: Paul, is the general resource
obtaining/mapping logic indeed meant to be an all-or-nothing thing
only?
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 16:32 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-17 18:42 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-18 13:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-17 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Jan Beulich', Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper, Tim (Xen.org),
George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
[snip]
> >>> + }
> >>> +
> >>> + if ( !vm_event_check(ved) )
> >>> + return -EINVAL;
> >>> +
> >>> + if ( frame != 0 || nr_frames != to_channels(ved)->nr_frames )
> >>> + return -EINVAL;
> >>
> >> Is there a particular reason for this all-or-nothing model?
> >
> > I've added this extra check due to the way acquire_resource interface
> > is designed. In our case, the memory is allocated from
> > XEN_VM_EVENT_ENABLE and the size is known beforehand: the number of
> > pages needed to store (vcpus_count * sizeof vm_event_slot) bytes.
> > However the acquire_resource needs a "nr_frames" parameter which is
> > computed in a similar manner in the libxc wrapper.
>
> Hmm, maybe I'm not up to date here: Paul, is the general resource
> obtaining/mapping logic indeed meant to be an all-or-nothing thing
> only?
>
Not really, no. The intention is that any subsection of the resource space may be mapped, so as frame + nr_frames doesn't exceed the size of the space then there should be no reason to return an error.
Paul
> Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 16:32 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-17 18:42 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-18 13:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-18 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-19 7:56 ` Paul Durrant
1 sibling, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-18 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Paul Durrant
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 16:32 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 17.07.2019 16:41, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> > On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 10:06 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> > > > +static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct
> > > > vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
> > > > {
> > > > - vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain-
> > > > >vm_event_monitor));
> > > > + int i;
> > > > +
> > > > + vunmap(impl->slots);
> > > > + impl->slots = NULL;
> > > > +
> > > > + for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
> > > > + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
> > > > }
> > >
> > > What guarantees that there are no mappings left of the pages you
> > > free
> > > here? Sharing pages with guests is (so far) an (almost)
> > > irreversible
> > > action, i.e. they may generally only be freed upon domain
> > > destruction.
> > > See gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() for a case where we
> > > actually
> > > make an attempt at freeing such pages (but where we fail the
> > > request
> > > in case references are left in place).
> > >
> >
> > I've tested manually 2 cases and they both work (no crashes):
> > 1: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> monitor stops ->
> > domain stops
> > 2: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> domain stops ->
> > monitor stops.
>
> Well, testing is important, but doing tests like you describe won't
> catch any misbehaving or malicious monitor domain.
>
> > However, I will take a closer look at
> > gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames
> > and post a follow up email.
>
> Thanks.
>
Hi Jan,
Could you help me clarify some things? Maybe am approaching the whole
problem incorrectly.
To help explaining things a little better I will use the following
abbreviations:
ID - introspected domain (the domain for which the vm_event requests
are generated)
MD - monitor domain (the domain which handles the requests and posts
the responses)
The legacy approach (ring) is to have a dedicated gfn in ID (ring
page), which is mapped by XEN using __map_domain_page_global and then
MD use xc_map_foreign_pages to create the mapping and
xc_domain_decrease_reservation_exact to remove the page from ID's
physmap.
The are a number of problems with this approach, the most impactfull
being that guests with a high number of vcpus will fills-up the ring
quite quicly. This and the fact vm_event_request size increases as
monitor applications become more complex incur idle times for vcpus
waiting to post a request.
To alleviate this problem I need to have a number of frames shared
between the hypervisor and MD. The ID doesn't need to know about those
frames because it will never access this memory area (unlike ioreq who
intercepts the access to certain addresses).
Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
different approaches:
- Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages (doesn't
work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
- Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN. To
my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the monitor
application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual gfns
for an allocated memory area.
So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the memory
in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and mapping
it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
To my understanding the cleanup sequence from
gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames basically boils down to:
1. guest_physmap_remove_page
2. if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
put_page(pg);
3. free_xenheap_page
My current implementation uses vzalloc instead of alloc_xenheap_pages
and that's why I assumed vunmap and free_domheap_pages will suffice (I
would have called vfree directly, but the temporary linked list that is
used to hold the page references causes free_domheap_pages to crash)
Do I also have to call guest_physmap_remove_page and put_page? (steps
1. and 2.)
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-18 13:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-18 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-18 14:55 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-31 12:53 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-19 7:56 ` Paul Durrant
1 sibling, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-18 14:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Paul Durrant, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Roger Pau Monné
On 18.07.2019 15:59, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
> different approaches:
> - Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages (doesn't
> work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
> - Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN. To
> my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the monitor
> application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual gfns
> for an allocated memory area.
>
> So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the memory
> in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and mapping
> it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
Which is fine - that's why Paul had introduced the generic interface.
> To my understanding the cleanup sequence from
> gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames basically boils down to:
> 1. guest_physmap_remove_page
> 2. if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
> put_page(pg);
> 3. free_xenheap_page
You're missing the crucial part of undoing step 2 if you find
that there are still references left to the page.
And then, because of your use of vzalloc(), you can't use
free_xenheap_pages(), as that takes a (direct map) linear address
as input. It has to be free_domheap_pages() in your case.
> My current implementation uses vzalloc instead of alloc_xenheap_pages
> and that's why I assumed vunmap and free_domheap_pages will suffice (I
> would have called vfree directly, but the temporary linked list that is
> used to hold the page references causes free_domheap_pages to crash)
>
> Do I also have to call guest_physmap_remove_page and put_page? (steps
> 1. and 2.)
guest_physmap_remove_page() needs to be called for translated page-
owning domains if the page was ever added to their physmap. As long
as you avoid adding, you also don't need to remove. I don't recall
though whether a translated domain can access a resource without it
having a representation in its GFN space.
You definitely need to do step 2 (which is to undo the respective
part of share_xen_page_with_guest(), and you _also_ need to clear
the page owner (undoing the other part of what that function has
done). And then, as said above, you need to check that the page
has no references left on it, and correctly deal with the case when
it still has some.
On the whole gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is very unfortunate
to have the way it is, including the various domain_crash()-es. It
was merely the only way we could see when dealing with XSA-255. I
would strongly recommend against new code trying to go this same
route, unless we introduce a generic and clean/safe function
inverting share_xen_page_with_guest() (which I've tried in the past
and failed).
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-18 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-18 14:55 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-31 12:53 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-18 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Paul Durrant, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Roger Pau Monné
On Thu, 2019-07-18 at 14:44 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 18.07.2019 15:59, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> > Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
> > different approaches:
> > - Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages
> > (doesn't
> > work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
> > - Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN.
> > To
> > my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the
> > monitor
> > application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual
> > gfns
> > for an allocated memory area.
> >
> > So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the
> > memory
> > in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and
> > mapping
> > it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
>
> Which is fine - that's why Paul had introduced the generic interface.
>
> > To my understanding the cleanup sequence from
> > gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames basically boils down to:
> > 1. guest_physmap_remove_page
> > 2. if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
> > put_page(pg);
> > 3. free_xenheap_page
>
> You're missing the crucial part of undoing step 2 if you find
> that there are still references left to the page.
>
> And then, because of your use of vzalloc(), you can't use
> free_xenheap_pages(), as that takes a (direct map) linear address
> as input. It has to be free_domheap_pages() in your case.
>
> > My current implementation uses vzalloc instead of
> > alloc_xenheap_pages
> > and that's why I assumed vunmap and free_domheap_pages will suffice
> > (I
> > would have called vfree directly, but the temporary linked list
> > that is
> > used to hold the page references causes free_domheap_pages to
> > crash)
> >
> > Do I also have to call guest_physmap_remove_page and put_page?
> > (steps
> > 1. and 2.)
>
> guest_physmap_remove_page() needs to be called for translated page-
> owning domains if the page was ever added to their physmap. As long
> as you avoid adding, you also don't need to remove. I don't recall
> though whether a translated domain can access a resource without it
> having a representation in its GFN space.
>
> You definitely need to do step 2 (which is to undo the respective
> part of share_xen_page_with_guest(), and you _also_ need to clear
> the page owner (undoing the other part of what that function has
> done). And then, as said above, you need to check that the page
> has no references left on it, and correctly deal with the case when
> it still has some.
>
> On the whole gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is very unfortunate
> to have the way it is, including the various domain_crash()-es. It
> was merely the only way we could see when dealing with XSA-255. I
> would strongly recommend against new code trying to go this same
> route, unless we introduce a generic and clean/safe function
> inverting share_xen_page_with_guest() (which I've tried in the past
> and failed).
>
> Jan
Thank-you very much for explaining this to me. I will update the
cleanup procedure and let you know the outcome.
Best regards,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-18 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-18 14:55 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-31 12:53 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-31 13:09 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-31 12:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Paul Durrant, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Roger Pau Monné
On Thu, 2019-07-18 at 14:44 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 18.07.2019 15:59, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> > Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
> > different approaches:
> > - Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages
> > (doesn't
> > work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
> > - Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN.
> > To
> > my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the
> > monitor
> > application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual
> > gfns
> > for an allocated memory area.
> >
> > So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the
> > memory
> > in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and
> > mapping
> > it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
>
> Which is fine - that's why Paul had introduced the generic interface.
>
> > To my understanding the cleanup sequence from
> > gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames basically boils down to:
> > 1. guest_physmap_remove_page
> > 2. if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
> > put_page(pg);
> > 3. free_xenheap_page
>
> You're missing the crucial part of undoing step 2 if you find
> that there are still references left to the page.
>
> And then, because of your use of vzalloc(), you can't use
> free_xenheap_pages(), as that takes a (direct map) linear address
> as input. It has to be free_domheap_pages() in your case.
>
> > My current implementation uses vzalloc instead of
> > alloc_xenheap_pages
> > and that's why I assumed vunmap and free_domheap_pages will suffice
> > (I
> > would have called vfree directly, but the temporary linked list
> > that is
> > used to hold the page references causes free_domheap_pages to
> > crash)
> >
> > Do I also have to call guest_physmap_remove_page and put_page?
> > (steps
> > 1. and 2.)
>
> guest_physmap_remove_page() needs to be called for translated page-
> owning domains if the page was ever added to their physmap. As long
> as you avoid adding, you also don't need to remove. I don't recall
> though whether a translated domain can access a resource without it
> having a representation in its GFN space.
>
I've traced the GFN value for the shared MFN and it's invalid. It's set
to INVALID_M2P_ENTRY in share_xen_page_with_guest, but I was expecting
it to be set to valid value later on (e.g. xenmem_add_to_physmap).
Am I missing something?
Many thanks,
Petre
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-31 12:53 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-31 13:09 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-31 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, IanJackson,
Tim Deegan, JulienGrall, Paul Durrant, Tamas K Lengyel,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Roger Pau Monné
On 31.07.2019 14:53, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-07-18 at 14:44 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 18.07.2019 15:59, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
>>> Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
>>> different approaches:
>>> - Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages
>>> (doesn't
>>> work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
>>> - Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN.
>>> To
>>> my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the
>>> monitor
>>> application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual
>>> gfns
>>> for an allocated memory area.
>>>
>>> So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the
>>> memory
>>> in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and
>>> mapping
>>> it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
>>> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
>>
>> Which is fine - that's why Paul had introduced the generic interface.
>>
>>> To my understanding the cleanup sequence from
>>> gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames basically boils down to:
>>> 1. guest_physmap_remove_page
>>> 2. if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
>>> put_page(pg);
>>> 3. free_xenheap_page
>>
>> You're missing the crucial part of undoing step 2 if you find
>> that there are still references left to the page.
>>
>> And then, because of your use of vzalloc(), you can't use
>> free_xenheap_pages(), as that takes a (direct map) linear address
>> as input. It has to be free_domheap_pages() in your case.
>>
>>> My current implementation uses vzalloc instead of
>>> alloc_xenheap_pages
>>> and that's why I assumed vunmap and free_domheap_pages will suffice
>>> (I
>>> would have called vfree directly, but the temporary linked list
>>> that is
>>> used to hold the page references causes free_domheap_pages to
>>> crash)
>>>
>>> Do I also have to call guest_physmap_remove_page and put_page?
>>> (steps
>>> 1. and 2.)
>>
>> guest_physmap_remove_page() needs to be called for translated page-
>> owning domains if the page was ever added to their physmap. As long
>> as you avoid adding, you also don't need to remove. I don't recall
>> though whether a translated domain can access a resource without it
>> having a representation in its GFN space.
>>
> I've traced the GFN value for the shared MFN and it's invalid. It's set
> to INVALID_M2P_ENTRY in share_xen_page_with_guest, but I was expecting
> it to be set to valid value later on (e.g. xenmem_add_to_physmap).
> Am I missing something?
By "traced" do you mean "observed" (e.g. by way of logging) or "gone
through the code to verify it can't ever become valid"? In the latter
case you'd have proven what you want/need. Thinking about it though,
seeing how xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() works and assuming you indeed
don't add the page by other means, it looks to me as if you've done
more than is needed, as I've said already that you need to remove the
page only if it had been added.
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-18 13:59 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-18 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-19 7:56 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-19 8:22 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-19 7:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Jan Beulich
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper, Tim (Xen.org),
George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> Sent: 18 July 2019 14:59
> To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>; Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> Cc: JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>; Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan
> Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne
> <roger.pau@citrix.com>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org;
> Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>; Tim (Xen.org)
> <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
>
> On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 16:32 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > On 17.07.2019 16:41, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 10:06 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > > On 16.07.2019 19:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> > > > > +static void vm_event_channels_free_buffer(struct
> > > > > vm_event_channels_domain *impl)
> > > > > {
> > > > > - vm_event_ring_resume(to_ring(v->domain-
> > > > > >vm_event_monitor));
> > > > > + int i;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + vunmap(impl->slots);
> > > > > + impl->slots = NULL;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + for ( i = 0; i < impl->nr_frames; i++ )
> > > > > + free_domheap_page(mfn_to_page(impl->mfn[i]));
> > > > > }
> > > >
> > > > What guarantees that there are no mappings left of the pages you
> > > > free
> > > > here? Sharing pages with guests is (so far) an (almost)
> > > > irreversible
> > > > action, i.e. they may generally only be freed upon domain
> > > > destruction.
> > > > See gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() for a case where we
> > > > actually
> > > > make an attempt at freeing such pages (but where we fail the
> > > > request
> > > > in case references are left in place).
> > > >
> > >
> > > I've tested manually 2 cases and they both work (no crashes):
> > > 1: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> monitor stops ->
> > > domain stops
> > > 2: introspected domain starts -> monitor starts -> domain stops ->
> > > monitor stops.
> >
> > Well, testing is important, but doing tests like you describe won't
> > catch any misbehaving or malicious monitor domain.
> >
> > > However, I will take a closer look at
> > > gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames
> > > and post a follow up email.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> Hi Jan,
>
> Could you help me clarify some things? Maybe am approaching the whole
> problem incorrectly.
>
> To help explaining things a little better I will use the following
> abbreviations:
> ID - introspected domain (the domain for which the vm_event requests
> are generated)
> MD - monitor domain (the domain which handles the requests and posts
> the responses)
>
> The legacy approach (ring) is to have a dedicated gfn in ID (ring
> page), which is mapped by XEN using __map_domain_page_global and then
> MD use xc_map_foreign_pages to create the mapping and
> xc_domain_decrease_reservation_exact to remove the page from ID's
> physmap.
> The are a number of problems with this approach, the most impactfull
> being that guests with a high number of vcpus will fills-up the ring
> quite quicly. This and the fact vm_event_request size increases as
> monitor applications become more complex incur idle times for vcpus
> waiting to post a request.
>
> To alleviate this problem I need to have a number of frames shared
> between the hypervisor and MD. The ID doesn't need to know about those
> frames because it will never access this memory area (unlike ioreq who
> intercepts the access to certain addresses).
>
> Before using xenforeignmemory_map_resource I investigated several
> different approaches:
> - Allocate the memory in hypervisor and xc_map_foreign_pages (doesn't
> work because you cannot "foreignmap" pages of your own domain.
> - Allocate the memory in guest, and map the allocated pages in XEN. To
> my knowledge there is no such API in linux to do this and the monitor
> application, as an userspace program, is not aware of the actual gfns
> for an allocated memory area.
>
> So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the memory
> in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and mapping
> it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
If that page is shared with the ID then XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the caller doesn't decide who owns the resource. TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of problems, which is why it is no longer used.
Paul
_______________________________________________
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 7:56 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-19 8:22 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-19 8:26 ` Paul Durrant
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-19 8:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant
Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper,
Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
>> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
>> Sent: 18 July 2019 14:59
>>
>> So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the memory
>> in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and mapping
>> it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
>> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
>
> If that page is shared with the ID then XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
> should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the caller
> doesn't decide who owns the resource.
I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I was
wrong doing so.
> TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of problems,
> which is why it is no longer used.
It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
Jan
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 8:22 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-19 8:26 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-19 11:23 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-19 8:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Jan Beulich'
Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper,
Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> Sent: 19 July 2019 09:22
> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU' <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>; JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>;
> Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew
> Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>; Stefano Stabellini
> <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; KonradRzeszutek Wilk
> <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>; Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu
> <wl@xen.org>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
>
> On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
> >> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> >> Sent: 18 July 2019 14:59
> >>
> >> So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the memory
> >> in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and mapping
> >> it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> >> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
> >
> > If that page is shared with the ID then XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
> > should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the caller
> > doesn't decide who owns the resource.
>
> I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I was
> wrong doing so.
>
> > TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of problems,
> > which is why it is no longer used.
>
> It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
> think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
I was indeed thinking I should find enough tuits to do that in the near future.
Paul
>
> Jan
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 8:26 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-19 11:23 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-19 12:11 ` Paul Durrant
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-19 11:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant, 'Jan Beulich'
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper, Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap,
JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 08:26 +0000, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> > Sent: 19 July 2019 09:22
> > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> > Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU' <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>;
> > JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>;
> > Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan Cojocaru
> > <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew
> > Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; George Dunlap <
> > George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> > <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>;
> > Stefano Stabellini
> > <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org;
> > KonradRzeszutek Wilk
> > <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>;
> > Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu
> > <wl@xen.org>
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
> >
> > On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > > > Sent: 18 July 2019 14:59
> > > >
> > > > So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the
> > > > memory
> > > > in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and
> > > > mapping
> > > > it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> > > > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
> > >
> > > If that page is shared with the ID then
> > > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
> > > should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the
> > > caller
> > > doesn't decide who owns the resource.
> >
> > I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I
> > was
> > wrong doing so.
> >
> > > TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of
> > > problems,
> > > which is why it is no longer used.
> >
> > It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
> > think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
>
> I was indeed thinking I should find enough tuits to do that in the
> near future.
>
> Paul
>
> >
> > Jan
Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 11:23 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-19 12:11 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-19 12:32 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-19 12:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', 'Jan Beulich'
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper, Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap,
JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>; 'Jan Beulich' <JBeulich@suse.com>
> Cc: JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>; Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan
> Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; George Dunlap
> <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne
> <roger.pau@citrix.com>; Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org;
> KonradRzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>; Tim (Xen.org)
> <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
>
> On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 08:26 +0000, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> > > Sent: 19 July 2019 09:22
> > > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> > > Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU' <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>;
> > > JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>;
> > > Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan Cojocaru
> > > <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew
> > > Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; George Dunlap <
> > > George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> > > <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>;
> > > Stefano Stabellini
> > > <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org;
> > > KonradRzeszutek Wilk
> > > <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>;
> > > Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu
> > > <wl@xen.org>
> > > Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
> > >
> > > On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > > From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > > > > Sent: 18 July 2019 14:59
> > > > >
> > > > > So, at this point the most promising solution is allocating the
> > > > > memory
> > > > > in XEN, sharing it with ID using share_xen_page_with_guest, and
> > > > > mapping
> > > > > it with xenforeignmemory_map_resource (with the flag
> > > > > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned set)
> > > >
> > > > If that page is shared with the ID then
> > > > XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
> > > > should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the
> > > > caller
> > > > doesn't decide who owns the resource.
> > >
> > > I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I
> > > was
> > > wrong doing so.
> > >
> > > > TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of
> > > > problems,
> > > > which is why it is no longer used.
> > >
> > > It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
> > > think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
> >
> > I was indeed thinking I should find enough tuits to do that in the
> > near future.
> >
> > Paul
> >
> > >
> > > Jan
> Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
>
> Many thanks for your support,
Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead. I found some tuits this morning and am about to a submit a patch.
Paul
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 12:11 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-19 12:32 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-19 12:37 ` Paul Durrant
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-19 12:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant
Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper,
Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger PauMonne
On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
>> Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
>>
>> On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 08:26 +0000, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>>>> Sent: 19 July 2019 09:22
>>>>
>>>> On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>>> If that page is shared with the ID then
>>>>> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
>>>>> should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the
>>>>> caller
>>>>> doesn't decide who owns the resource.
>>>>
>>>> I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I
>>>> was
>>>> wrong doing so.
>>>>
>>>>> TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of
>>>>> problems,
>>>> which is why it is no longer used.
>>>>
>>>> It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
>>>> think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
>>>
>>> I was indeed thinking I should find enough tuits to do that in the
>>> near future.
>>>
>> Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
>>
>> Many thanks for your support,
>
> Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
please with the more privileged entity. How would MD access the page
if it's shared with ID (which, aiui, has no business accessing the
page at all)?
Jan
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 12:32 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-19 12:37 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-19 12:59 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-19 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Jan Beulich'
Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper,
Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU' <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>; JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>;
> Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; Andrew
> Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>; Stefano Stabellini
> <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; KonradRzeszutek Wilk
> <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>; Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu
> <wl@xen.org>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
>
> On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> >> Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
> >>
> >> On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 08:26 +0000, Paul Durrant wrote:
> >>>> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> >>>> Sent: 19 July 2019 09:22
> >>>>
> >>>> On 19.07.2019 09:56, Paul Durrant wrote:
> >>>>> If that page is shared with the ID then
> >>>>> XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned
> >>>>> should *not* be set. Also, that flag is an 'out' flag... the
> >>>>> caller
> >>>>> doesn't decide who owns the resource.
> >>>>
> >>>> I had implied that it's really MD that's meant here, but maybe I
> >>>> was
> >>>> wrong doing so.
> >>>>
> >>>>> TBH I regret ever introducing the flag; it caused a lot of
> >>>>> problems,
> >>>> which is why it is no longer used.
> >>>>
> >>>> It's a tools only interface - why don't we drop the flag if you now
> >>>> think it was a bad idea to introduce it?
> >>>
> >>> I was indeed thinking I should find enough tuits to do that in the
> >>> near future.
> >>>
> >> Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
> >>
> >> Many thanks for your support,
> >
> > Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
>
> But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
> please with the more privileged entity.
Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is equivalent to IOREQ server... The pages are target assigned so that foreign mapping works, but protected from the guest itself because they are never in the P2M.
> How would MD access the page
> if it's shared with ID (which, aiui, has no business accessing the
> page at all)?
>
Using foreign mapping in the same way as IOREQ server. Otherwise we are back into the ref counting and general accounting hell that target assignment avoids. I agree that a better long term solution is probably desirable but I don't honestly know what that would look like.
Paul
> Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 12:37 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-19 12:59 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-19 17:40 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-19 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant
Cc: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Andrew Cooper,
Tim(Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
IanJackson, Roger Pau Monne
On 19.07.2019 14:37, Paul Durrant wrote:
>> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>> Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
>>
>> On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
>>>> Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
>>>>
>>>> Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
>>>>
>>>> Many thanks for your support,
>>>
>>> Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
>>
>> But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
>> please with the more privileged entity.
>
> Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is equivalent
> to IOREQ server...
Not sure: The main vm_event.c files live in common/ and arch/x86/
respectively, so I thought at least architecturally VM events were
possible for PV as well. If it's indeed HVM-only, then following
the IOREQ server model in its entirety would of course be fine.
Jan
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 12:59 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-19 17:40 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-22 7:58 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-22 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-19 17:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Paul Durrant, Andrew Cooper
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Tim(Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall,
Tamas K Lengyel, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, IanJackson, Roger Pau Monne
On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 12:59 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 19.07.2019 14:37, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> > > Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
> > >
> > > On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > > > > Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
> > > > >
> > > > > Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
> > > > >
> > > > > Many thanks for your support,
> > > >
> > > > Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
> > >
> > > But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
> > > please with the more privileged entity.
> >
> > Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is equivalent
> > to IOREQ server...
>
> Not sure: The main vm_event.c files live in common/ and arch/x86/
> respectively, so I thought at least architecturally VM events were
> possible for PV as well. If it's indeed HVM-only, then following
> the IOREQ server model in its entirety would of course be fine.
>
> Jan
In one of the previous version of the patchset there was a suggestion
to implement the new vm_event transport using IOREQ, but it was dropped
.
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-04/msg00173.html
Also, unless there isn't a proper way allocate the necessary pages, I
wouldn't introduce a HVM-only limitation because, other than the HVM
param used to keep track of the ring pfn, the vm_event mechanism is
quite generic.
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
_______________________________________________
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 17:40 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
@ 2019-07-22 7:58 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-22 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-22 7:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU', Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru,
KonradRzeszutek Wilk, Tim (Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall,
Tamas K Lengyel, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, Ian Jackson, Roger Pau Monne
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> Sent: 19 July 2019 18:40
> To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>; Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>; Andrew Cooper
> <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
> Cc: JulienGrall <julien.grall@arm.com>; Alexandru Stefan ISAILA <aisaila@bitdefender.com>; Razvan
> Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>; George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@citrix.com>; Ian Jackson
> <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>; Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>; Stefano Stabellini
> <sstabellini@kernel.org>; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; KonradRzeszutek Wilk
> <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>; Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>; Tim (Xen.org) <tim@xen.org>; Wei Liu
> <wl@xen.org>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
>
> On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 12:59 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > On 19.07.2019 14:37, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> > > > Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
> > > >
> > > > On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > > > > > Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Many thanks for your support,
> > > > >
> > > > > Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
> > > >
> > > > But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
> > > > please with the more privileged entity.
> > >
> > > Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is equivalent
> > > to IOREQ server...
> >
> > Not sure: The main vm_event.c files live in common/ and arch/x86/
> > respectively, so I thought at least architecturally VM events were
> > possible for PV as well. If it's indeed HVM-only, then following
> > the IOREQ server model in its entirety would of course be fine.
> >
> > Jan
>
> In one of the previous version of the patchset there was a suggestion
> to implement the new vm_event transport using IOREQ, but it was dropped
> .
>
> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-04/msg00173.html
>
> Also, unless there isn't a proper way allocate the necessary pages, I
> wouldn't introduce a HVM-only limitation because, other than the HVM
> param used to keep track of the ring pfn, the vm_event mechanism is
> quite generic.
Well, with resource mapping you wouldn't need the HVM param, presumably. IMO it would be best to make this HVM only in the first instance, to avoid blocking progress. This case does highlight the need for a solution to the issue of resource accounting for PV guests. My suggestion is a page type that can be assigned to a guest but cannot be mapped to that guest... something akin to a page table perhaps?
Paul
>
> Many thanks for your support,
> Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-19 17:40 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2019-07-22 7:58 ` Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-22 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-22 10:44 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
1 sibling, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-22 7:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, Andrew Cooper, Paul Durrant
Cc: StefanoStabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk,
Tim(Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
IanJackson, Roger Pau Monne
On 19.07.2019 19:40, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 12:59 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 19.07.2019 14:37, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>> From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>>>> Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
>>>>
>>>> On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
>>>>>> Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Many thanks for your support,
>>>>>
>>>>> Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
>>>>
>>>> But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all, then
>>>> please with the more privileged entity.
>>>
>>> Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is equivalent
>>> to IOREQ server...
>>
>> Not sure: The main vm_event.c files live in common/ and arch/x86/
>> respectively, so I thought at least architecturally VM events were
>> possible for PV as well. If it's indeed HVM-only, then following
>> the IOREQ server model in its entirety would of course be fine.
>
> In one of the previous version of the patchset there was a suggestion
> to implement the new vm_event transport using IOREQ, but it was dropped
> .
>
> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-04/msg00173.html
And validly so (imo), not the least because of also being HVM specific.
> Also, unless there isn't a proper way allocate the necessary pages, I
> wouldn't introduce a HVM-only limitation because, other than the HVM
> param used to keep track of the ring pfn, the vm_event mechanism is
> quite generic.
By "wouldn't introduce" do you mean "wouldn't want to introduce" or do
you mean to say you in fact wouldn't and I'm not seeing why that is?
Jan
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-22 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-22 10:44 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-22 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper, Paul Durrant
Cc: StefanoStabellini, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru, KonradRzeszutek Wilk,
Tim(Xen.org), George Dunlap, JulienGrall, Tamas K Lengyel,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
IanJackson, Roger Pau Monne
On Mon, 2019-07-22 at 07:59 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 19.07.2019 19:40, Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU wrote:
> > On Fri, 2019-07-19 at 12:59 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > > On 19.07.2019 14:37, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > > From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> > > > > Sent: 19 July 2019 13:32
> > > > >
> > > > > On 19.07.2019 14:11, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
> > > > > > > Sent: 19 July 2019 12:24
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Sorry, my mistake. I meant to say it's shared with MD.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Many thanks for your support,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Ok, in that case please share with the ID instead.
> > > > >
> > > > > But that's exactly what we want to avoid: If sharing at all,
> > > > > then
> > > > > please with the more privileged entity.
> > > >
> > > > Why? We're talking HVM guests only here IIUC so this is
> > > > equivalent
> > > > to IOREQ server...
> > >
> > > Not sure: The main vm_event.c files live in common/ and arch/x86/
> > > respectively, so I thought at least architecturally VM events
> > > were
> > > possible for PV as well. If it's indeed HVM-only, then following
> > > the IOREQ server model in its entirety would of course be fine.
> >
> > In one of the previous version of the patchset there was a
> > suggestion
> > to implement the new vm_event transport using IOREQ, but it was
> > dropped
> > .
> >
> >
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-04/msg00173.html
>
> And validly so (imo), not the least because of also being HVM
> specific.
>
> > Also, unless there isn't a proper way allocate the necessary pages,
> > I
> > wouldn't introduce a HVM-only limitation because, other than the
> > HVM
> > param used to keep track of the ring pfn, the vm_event mechanism is
> > quite generic.
>
> By "wouldn't introduce" do you mean "wouldn't want to introduce" or
> do
> you mean to say you in fact wouldn't and I'm not seeing why that is?
>
> Jan
Well, I think "I would prefer not to" would have been better. The main
ideea is that I wouldn't want to add a limitation to the applicability
of this feature unless it's the only possible solution.
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:13 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2019-07-17 13:42 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-17 14:46 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
2 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 13:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich,
Roger Pau Monné
> +
> +out:
> + rc2 = xc_domain_unpause(xch, domain_id);
> + if ( rc1 || rc2 )
> + {
> + if ( rc2 )
> + PERROR("Unable to pause domain\n");
> +
> + if ( rc1 == 0 )
> + rc1 = rc2;
You can use !rc1 here.
> + }
> +
> + return rc1;
> +}
> +
> +int xc_vm_event_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id, int type,
> + xenforeignmemory_resource_handle **fres)
> +{
> + xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(xch->fmem, *fres);
> + *fres = NULL;
> +
> + return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id, XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
> + type, XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP, NULL);
> +}
> +
>
> +static int vm_event_ring_pfn_param(uint32_t type)
> +{
> + switch( type )
> + {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> + return HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN;
> +#endif
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> + return HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> + return HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN;
> +#endif
> + };
> +
> + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> + return -1;
Blank line before final return...
> +}
> +
> +static int vm_event_pause_flag(uint32_t type)
> +{
> + switch( type )
> + {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> + return _VPF_mem_paging;
> +#endif
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> + return _VPF_mem_access;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> + return _VPF_mem_sharing;
> +#endif
> + };
> +
> + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> + return -1;
here
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> +static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
> +#endif
> +static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> +static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port);
> +#endif
> +
> +static xen_event_channel_notification_t vm_event_notification_fn(uint32_t type)
> +{
> + switch( type )
> + {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> + return mem_paging_notification;
> +#endif
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> + return monitor_notification;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> + return mem_sharing_notification;
> +#endif
> + };
> +
> + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> + return NULL;
and here
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * VM event ring implementation;
> + */
Alex
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-17 13:42 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
@ 2019-07-17 14:46 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 14:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Tamas K Lengyel, Jan Beulich,
Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, 2019-07-17 at 16:42 +0300, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> > +
> > +out:
> > + rc2 = xc_domain_unpause(xch, domain_id);
> > + if ( rc1 || rc2 )
> > + {
> > + if ( rc2 )
> > + PERROR("Unable to pause domain\n");
> > +
> > + if ( rc1 == 0 )
> > + rc1 = rc2;
>
> You can use !rc1 here.
>
> > + }
> > +
> > + return rc1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int xc_vm_event_ng_disable(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domain_id,
> > int type,
> > + xenforeignmemory_resource_handle
> > **fres)
> > +{
> > + xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(xch->fmem, *fres);
> > + *fres = NULL;
> > +
> > + return xc_vm_event_control(xch, domain_id,
> > XEN_VM_EVENT_DISABLE,
> > + type, XEN_VM_EVENT_FLAGS_NG_OP,
> > NULL);
> > +}
> > +
>
>
>
> >
> > +static int vm_event_ring_pfn_param(uint32_t type)
> > +{
> > + switch( type )
> > + {
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> > + return HVM_PARAM_PAGING_RING_PFN;
> > +#endif
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> > + return HVM_PARAM_MONITOR_RING_PFN;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> > + return HVM_PARAM_SHARING_RING_PFN;
> > +#endif
> > + };
> > +
> > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> > + return -1;
>
> Blank line before final return...
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int vm_event_pause_flag(uint32_t type)
> > +{
> > + switch( type )
> > + {
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> > + return _VPF_mem_paging;
> > +#endif
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> > + return _VPF_mem_access;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> > + return _VPF_mem_sharing;
> > +#endif
> > + };
> > +
> > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> > + return -1;
>
> here
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> > +static void mem_paging_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
> > port);
> > +#endif
> > +static void monitor_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
> > port);
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> > +static void mem_sharing_notification(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
> > port);
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +static xen_event_channel_notification_t
> > vm_event_notification_fn(uint32_t type)
> > +{
> > + switch( type )
> > + {
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_PAGING:
> > + return mem_paging_notification;
> > +#endif
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_MONITOR:
> > + return monitor_notification;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING
> > + case XEN_VM_EVENT_TYPE_SHARING:
> > + return mem_sharing_notification;
> > +#endif
> > + };
> > +
> > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> > + return NULL;
>
> and here
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * VM event ring implementation;
> > + */
>
> Alex
Thanks for noticing these. I will fix them in the next patch iteration.
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 07/10] vm_event: Add vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:09 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:16 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup Petre Pircalabu
` (2 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Ian Jackson, Alexandru Isaila
This simplifies the command line parsing logic and makes it easier to
add new test parameters.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
index 6aaee16..8a3eea5 100644
--- a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <poll.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
#include <xenctrl.h>
#include <xenevtchn.h>
@@ -397,93 +398,102 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
uint16_t altp2m_view_id = 0;
char* progname = argv[0];
- argv++;
- argc--;
+ char* command;
+ int c;
+ int option_index;
+ struct option long_options[] =
+ {
+ { "mem-access-listener", no_argument, 0, 'm' },
+ };
- if ( argc == 3 && argv[0][0] == '-' )
+ while ( 1 )
{
- if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "-m") )
- required = 1;
- else
+ c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "m", long_options, &option_index);
+ if ( c == -1 )
+ break;
+
+ switch ( c )
{
+ case 'm':
+ required = 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
usage(progname);
return -1;
}
- argv++;
- argc--;
}
- if ( argc != 2 )
+ if ( argc - optind != 2 )
{
usage(progname);
return -1;
}
- domain_id = atoi(argv[0]);
- argv++;
- argc--;
+ domain_id = atoi(argv[optind++]);
+ command = argv[optind];
- if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "write") )
+ if ( !strcmp(command, "write") )
{
default_access = XENMEM_access_rx;
after_first_access = XENMEM_access_rwx;
memaccess = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "exec") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "exec") )
{
default_access = XENMEM_access_rw;
after_first_access = XENMEM_access_rwx;
memaccess = 1;
}
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "breakpoint") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "breakpoint") )
{
breakpoint = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "altp2m_write") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "altp2m_write") )
{
default_access = XENMEM_access_rx;
altp2m = 1;
memaccess = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "altp2m_exec") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "altp2m_exec") )
{
default_access = XENMEM_access_rw;
altp2m = 1;
memaccess = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "altp2m_write_no_gpt") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "altp2m_write_no_gpt") )
{
default_access = XENMEM_access_rw;
altp2m_write_no_gpt = 1;
memaccess = 1;
altp2m = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "debug") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "debug") )
{
debug = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "cpuid") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "cpuid") )
{
cpuid = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "desc_access") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "desc_access") )
{
desc_access = 1;
}
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "write_ctrlreg_cr4") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "write_ctrlreg_cr4") )
{
write_ctrlreg_cr4 = 1;
}
#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
- else if ( !strcmp(argv[0], "privcall") )
+ else if ( !strcmp(command, "privcall") )
{
privcall = 1;
}
#endif
else
{
- usage(argv[0]);
+ usage(command);
return -1;
}
@@ -494,7 +504,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
return 1;
}
- DPRINTF("starting %s %u\n", argv[0], domain_id);
+ DPRINTF("starting %s %u\n", command, domain_id);
/* ensure that if we get a signal, we'll do cleanup, then exit */
act.sa_handler = close_handler;
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 21:09 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:16 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 21:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Alexandru Isaila, Xen-devel, Ian Jackson, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> This simplifies the command line parsing logic and makes it easier to
> add new test parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Thanks, this was much needed.
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:09 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 11:16 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 11:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel, Ian Jackson, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru
On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> This simplifies the command line parsing logic and makes it easier to
> add new test parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] xen-access: Use getopt_long for cmdline parsing Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:07 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:18 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 10/10] xen-access: Add support for vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 20:45 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Tamas K Lengyel
10 siblings, 2 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Ian Jackson, Alexandru Isaila
Cleanup xen-access code in accordance with the XEN style guide.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
index 8a3eea5..abf17a2 100644
--- a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int xenaccess_teardown(xc_interface *xch, xenaccess_t *xenaccess)
return 0;
/* Tear down domain xenaccess in Xen */
- if ( xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page )
+ if ( xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page != NULL )
munmap(xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page, XC_PAGE_SIZE);
if ( mem_access_enable )
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ xenaccess_t *xenaccess_init(xc_interface **xch_r, domid_t domain_id)
int rc;
xch = xc_interface_open(NULL, NULL, 0);
- if ( !xch )
+ if ( xch == NULL )
goto err_iface;
DPRINTF("xenaccess init\n");
@@ -218,16 +218,17 @@ xenaccess_t *xenaccess_init(xc_interface **xch_r, domid_t domain_id)
&xenaccess->vm_event.evtchn_port);
if ( xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page == NULL )
{
- switch ( errno ) {
- case EBUSY:
- ERROR("xenaccess is (or was) active on this domain");
- break;
- case ENODEV:
- ERROR("EPT not supported for this guest");
- break;
- default:
- perror("Error enabling mem_access");
- break;
+ switch ( errno )
+ {
+ case EBUSY:
+ ERROR("xenaccess is (or was) active on this domain");
+ break;
+ case ENODEV:
+ ERROR("EPT not supported for this guest");
+ break;
+ default:
+ perror("Error enabling mem_access");
+ break;
}
goto err;
}
@@ -283,15 +284,12 @@ xenaccess_t *xenaccess_init(xc_interface **xch_r, domid_t domain_id)
}
err_iface:
+
return NULL;
}
-static inline
-int control_singlestep(
- xc_interface *xch,
- domid_t domain_id,
- unsigned long vcpu,
- bool enable)
+static inline int control_singlestep(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
+ unsigned long vcpu, bool enable)
{
uint32_t op = enable ?
XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON : XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF;
@@ -361,11 +359,11 @@ void usage(char* progname)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-m] <domain_id> write|exec", progname);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- fprintf(stderr, "|breakpoint|altp2m_write|altp2m_exec|debug|cpuid|desc_access|write_ctrlreg_cr4|altp2m_write_no_gpt");
+ fprintf(stderr, "|breakpoint|altp2m_write|altp2m_exec|debug|cpuid|desc_access|write_ctrlreg_cr4|altp2m_write_no_gpt");
#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
- fprintf(stderr, "|privcall");
+ fprintf(stderr, "|privcall");
#endif
- fprintf(stderr,
+ fprintf(stderr,
"\n"
"Logs first page writes, execs, or breakpoint traps that occur on the domain.\n"
"\n"
@@ -562,7 +560,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DPRINTF("altp2m view created with id %u\n", altp2m_view_id);
DPRINTF("Setting altp2m mem_access permissions.. ");
- for(; gfn < xenaccess->max_gpfn; ++gfn)
+ for( ; gfn < xenaccess->max_gpfn; ++gfn )
{
rc = xc_altp2m_set_mem_access( xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id, gfn,
default_access);
@@ -671,7 +669,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
/* Wait for access */
- for (;;)
+ for ( ; ; )
{
if ( interrupted )
{
@@ -736,7 +734,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.flags = (req.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED);
rsp.reason = req.reason;
- switch (req.reason) {
+ switch ( req.reason )
+ {
case VM_EVENT_REASON_MEM_ACCESS:
if ( !shutting_down )
{
@@ -791,6 +790,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.u.mem_access = req.u.mem_access;
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT:
printf("Breakpoint: rip=%016"PRIx64", gfn=%"PRIx64" (vcpu %d)\n",
req.data.regs.x86.rip,
@@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
continue;
}
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_PRIVILEGED_CALL:
printf("Privileged call: pc=%"PRIx64" (vcpu %d)\n",
req.data.regs.arm.pc,
@@ -818,6 +819,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.data.regs.arm.pc += 4;
rsp.flags |= VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_REGISTERS;
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_SINGLESTEP:
printf("Singlestep: rip=%016"PRIx64", vcpu %d, altp2m %u\n",
req.data.regs.x86.rip,
@@ -835,6 +837,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.flags |= VM_EVENT_FLAG_TOGGLE_SINGLESTEP;
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_DEBUG_EXCEPTION:
printf("Debug exception: rip=%016"PRIx64", vcpu %d. Type: %u. Length: %u\n",
req.data.regs.x86.rip,
@@ -856,6 +859,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_CPUID:
printf("CPUID executed: rip=%016"PRIx64", vcpu %d. Insn length: %"PRIu32" " \
"0x%"PRIx32" 0x%"PRIx32": EAX=0x%"PRIx64" EBX=0x%"PRIx64" ECX=0x%"PRIx64" EDX=0x%"PRIx64"\n",
@@ -872,6 +876,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.data = req.data;
rsp.data.regs.x86.rip += req.u.cpuid.insn_length;
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_DESCRIPTOR_ACCESS:
printf("Descriptor access: rip=%016"PRIx64", vcpu %d: "\
"VMExit info=0x%"PRIx32", descriptor=%d, is write=%d\n",
@@ -882,6 +887,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
req.u.desc_access.is_write);
rsp.flags |= VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE;
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_WRITE_CTRLREG:
printf("Control register written: rip=%016"PRIx64", vcpu %d: "
"reg=%s, old_value=%016"PRIx64", new_value=%016"PRIx64"\n",
@@ -891,6 +897,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
req.u.write_ctrlreg.old_value,
req.u.write_ctrlreg.new_value);
break;
+
case VM_EVENT_REASON_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ( altp2m_write_no_gpt && req.flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_ALTERNATE_P2M )
{
@@ -901,6 +908,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
rsp.altp2m_idx = 0;
}
break;
+
default:
fprintf(stderr, "UNKNOWN REASON CODE %d\n", req.reason);
}
@@ -941,6 +949,7 @@ exit:
rc = rc1;
DPRINTF("xenaccess exit code %d\n", rc);
+
return rc;
}
--
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 21:07 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 11:18 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 21:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Alexandru Isaila, Xen-devel, Ian Jackson, Wei Liu,
Razvan Cojocaru
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> Cleanup xen-access code in accordance with the XEN style guide.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 21:07 ` Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 11:18 ` Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
1 sibling, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Stefan ISAILA @ 2019-07-17 11:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel, Ian Jackson, Wei Liu, Razvan Cojocaru
On 16.07.2019 20:06, Petre Pircalabu wrote:
> Cleanup xen-access code in accordance with the XEN style guide.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 10/10] xen-access: Add support for vm_event_ng interface
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 09/10] xen-access: Code cleanup Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 17:06 ` Petre Pircalabu
2019-07-16 20:45 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Tamas K Lengyel
10 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Pircalabu @ 2019-07-16 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Petre Pircalabu, Tamas K Lengyel, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Ian Jackson, Alexandru Isaila
Split xen-access in order to accommodate both vm_event interfaces
(legacy and NG). By default, the legacy vm_event is selected but
this can be changed by adding the '-n' flag in the command line.
Signed-off-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
---
tools/tests/xen-access/Makefile | 7 +-
tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event-ng.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event.c | 194 +++++++++++++++++++
tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 348 +++++++++++------------------------
tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.h | 91 +++++++++
5 files changed, 582 insertions(+), 241 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event-ng.c
create mode 100644 tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event.c
create mode 100644 tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.h
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/Makefile b/tools/tests/xen-access/Makefile
index 131c9f3..17760d8 100644
--- a/tools/tests/xen-access/Makefile
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ CFLAGS += -DXC_WANT_COMPAT_DEVICEMODEL_API
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl)
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenguest)
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenevtchn)
+CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenforeignmemory)
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_xeninclude)
TARGETS-y := xen-access
@@ -25,8 +26,10 @@ clean:
.PHONY: distclean
distclean: clean
-xen-access: xen-access.o Makefile
- $(CC) -o $@ $< $(LDFLAGS) $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(LDLIBS_libxenguest) $(LDLIBS_libxenevtchn)
+OBJS = xen-access.o vm-event.o vm-event-ng.o
+
+xen-access: $(OBJS) Makefile
+ $(CC) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(LDLIBS_libxenguest) $(LDLIBS_libxenevtchn) $(LDLIBS_libxenforeignmemory)
install uninstall:
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event-ng.c b/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event-ng.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c79f61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event-ng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * vm-event-ng.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Bitdefender S.R.L.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+ * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+ * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+ * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <xenforeignmemory.h>
+#include "xen-access.h"
+
+#ifndef PFN_UP
+#define PFN_UP(x) (((x) + XC_PAGE_SIZE-1) >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT)
+#endif /* PFN_UP */
+
+typedef struct vm_event_channels
+{
+ vm_event_t vme;
+ int num_channels;
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle *fres;
+ struct vm_event_slot *slots;
+ int *ports;
+} vm_event_channels_t;
+
+#define to_channels(_vme) container_of((_vme), vm_event_channels_t, vme)
+
+static int vm_event_channels_init(xc_interface *xch, xenevtchn_handle *xce,
+ domid_t domain_id, vm_event_ops_t *ops,
+ vm_event_t **vm_event)
+{
+ vm_event_channels_t *impl = NULL;
+ int rc, i;
+
+ impl = (vm_event_channels_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(vm_event_channels_t));
+ if ( impl == NULL )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = xc_monitor_ng_enable(xch, domain_id, &impl->fres, &impl->num_channels, (void**)&impl->slots);
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ ERROR("Failed to enable monitor");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ impl->ports = calloc(impl->num_channels, sizeof(int));
+ if ( impl->ports == NULL )
+ {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->num_channels; i++)
+ {
+ rc = xenevtchn_bind_interdomain(xce, domain_id, impl->slots[i].port);
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Failed to bind vm_event_slot port for vcpu %d", i);
+ rc = -errno;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ impl->ports[i] = rc;
+ }
+
+ *vm_event = (vm_event_t*) impl;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ while ( --i >= 0 )
+ xenevtchn_unbind(xce, impl->ports[i]);
+ free(impl->ports);
+ xc_monitor_ng_disable(xch, domain_id, &impl->fres);
+ free(impl);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int vcpu_id_by_port(vm_event_channels_t *impl, int port, int *vcpu_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->num_channels; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( port == impl->ports[i] )
+ {
+ *vcpu_id = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_teardown(vm_event_t *vm_event)
+{
+ vm_event_channels_t *impl = to_channels(vm_event);
+ int rc, i;
+
+ if ( impl == NULL || impl->ports == NULL )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < impl->num_channels; i++ )
+ {
+ rc = xenevtchn_unbind(vm_event->xce, impl->ports[i]);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Error unbinding event port");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return xc_monitor_ng_disable(impl->vme.xch, impl->vme.domain_id, &impl->fres);
+}
+
+static bool vm_event_channels_get_request(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_request_t *req, int *port)
+{
+ int vcpu_id;
+ vm_event_channels_t *impl = to_channels(vm_event);
+
+ if ( vcpu_id_by_port(impl, *port, &vcpu_id) != 0 )
+ return false;
+
+ if ( impl->slots[vcpu_id].state != STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_SUBMIT )
+ return false;
+
+ memcpy(req, &impl->slots[vcpu_id].u.req, sizeof(*req));
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void vm_event_channels_put_response(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_response_t *rsp, int port)
+{
+ int vcpu_id;
+ vm_event_channels_t *impl = to_channels(vm_event);
+
+ if ( vcpu_id_by_port(impl, port, &vcpu_id) != 0 )
+ return;
+
+ memcpy(&impl->slots[vcpu_id].u.rsp, rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+ impl->slots[vcpu_id].state = STATE_VM_EVENT_SLOT_FINISH;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_channels_notify_port(vm_event_t *vm_event, int port)
+{
+ return xenevtchn_notify(vm_event->xce, port);
+}
+
+vm_event_ops_t channel_ops = {
+ .get_request = vm_event_channels_get_request,
+ .put_response = vm_event_channels_put_response,
+ .notify_port = vm_event_channels_notify_port,
+ .init = vm_event_channels_init,
+ .teardown = vm_event_channels_teardown,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event.c b/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6b20ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/vm-event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * vm-event.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Bitdefender S.R.L.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+ * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+ * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+ * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include "xen-access.h"
+
+typedef struct vm_event_ring {
+ vm_event_t vme;
+ int port;
+ vm_event_back_ring_t back_ring;
+ uint32_t evtchn_port;
+ void *ring_page;
+} vm_event_ring_t;
+
+#define to_ring(_vme) container_of((_vme), vm_event_ring_t, vme)
+
+static int vm_event_ring_init(xc_interface *xch, xenevtchn_handle *xce,
+ domid_t domain_id, vm_event_ops_t *ops,
+ vm_event_t **vm_event)
+{
+ vm_event_ring_t *impl;
+ int rc;
+
+ impl = (vm_event_ring_t*) calloc (1, sizeof(vm_event_ring_t));
+ if ( impl == NULL )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Enable mem_access */
+ impl->ring_page = xc_monitor_enable(xch, domain_id, &impl->evtchn_port);
+ if ( impl->ring_page == NULL )
+ {
+ switch ( errno )
+ {
+ case EBUSY:
+ ERROR("xenaccess is (or was) active on this domain");
+ break;
+ case ENODEV:
+ ERROR("EPT not supported for this guest");
+ break;
+ default:
+ perror("Error enabling mem_access");
+ break;
+ }
+ rc = -errno;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Bind event notification */
+ rc = xenevtchn_bind_interdomain(xce, domain_id, impl->evtchn_port);
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Failed to bind event channel");
+ munmap(impl->ring_page, XC_PAGE_SIZE);
+ xc_monitor_disable(xch, domain_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ impl->port = rc;
+
+ /* Initialise ring */
+ SHARED_RING_INIT((vm_event_sring_t *)impl->ring_page);
+ BACK_RING_INIT(&impl->back_ring, (vm_event_sring_t *)impl->ring_page,
+ XC_PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ *vm_event = (vm_event_t*) impl;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ free(impl);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int vm_event_ring_teardown(vm_event_t *vm_event)
+{
+ vm_event_ring_t *impl = to_ring(vm_event);
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( impl->ring_page != NULL )
+ munmap(impl->ring_page, XC_PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Tear down domain xenaccess in Xen */
+ rc = xc_monitor_disable(vm_event->xch, vm_event->domain_id);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Error tearing down domain xenaccess in xen");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Unbind VIRQ */
+ rc = xenevtchn_unbind(vm_event->xce, impl->port);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Error unbinding event port");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that this function is not thread safe.
+ */
+static bool vm_event_ring_get_request(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_request_t *req, int *port)
+{
+ vm_event_back_ring_t *back_ring;
+ RING_IDX req_cons;
+ vm_event_ring_t *impl = to_ring(vm_event);
+
+ if ( !RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS(&impl->back_ring) )
+ return false;
+
+ back_ring = &impl->back_ring;
+ req_cons = back_ring->req_cons;
+
+ /* Copy request */
+ memcpy(req, RING_GET_REQUEST(back_ring, req_cons), sizeof(*req));
+ req_cons++;
+
+ /* Update ring */
+ back_ring->req_cons = req_cons;
+ back_ring->sring->req_event = req_cons + 1;
+
+ *port = impl->port;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that this function is not thread safe.
+ */
+static void vm_event_ring_put_response(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_response_t *rsp, int port)
+{
+ vm_event_back_ring_t *back_ring;
+ RING_IDX rsp_prod;
+ vm_event_ring_t *impl = to_ring(vm_event);
+
+ back_ring = &impl->back_ring;
+ rsp_prod = back_ring->rsp_prod_pvt;
+
+ /* Copy response */
+ memcpy(RING_GET_RESPONSE(back_ring, rsp_prod), rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+ rsp_prod++;
+
+ /* Update ring */
+ back_ring->rsp_prod_pvt = rsp_prod;
+ RING_PUSH_RESPONSES(back_ring);
+}
+
+static int vm_event_ring_notify_port(vm_event_t *vm_event, int port)
+{
+ return xenevtchn_notify(vm_event->xce, port);
+}
+
+vm_event_ops_t ring_ops = {
+ .get_request = vm_event_ring_get_request,
+ .put_response = vm_event_ring_put_response,
+ .notify_port = vm_event_ring_notify_port,
+ .init = vm_event_ring_init,
+ .teardown = vm_event_ring_teardown,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
index abf17a2..9157f23 100644
--- a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c
@@ -35,14 +35,9 @@
#include <time.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <getopt.h>
-#include <xenctrl.h>
-#include <xenevtchn.h>
-#include <xen/vm_event.h>
-
#include <xen-tools/libs.h>
#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
@@ -52,9 +47,7 @@
#define START_PFN 0ULL
#endif
-#define DPRINTF(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a, ## b)
-#define ERROR(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a "\n", ## b)
-#define PERROR(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a ": %s\n", ## b, strerror(errno))
+#include "xen-access.h"
/* From xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h */
#define X86_TRAP_DEBUG 1
@@ -63,32 +56,14 @@
/* From xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h */
#define X86_CR4_PGE 0x00000080 /* enable global pages */
-typedef struct vm_event {
- domid_t domain_id;
- xenevtchn_handle *xce_handle;
- int port;
- vm_event_back_ring_t back_ring;
- uint32_t evtchn_port;
- void *ring_page;
-} vm_event_t;
-
-typedef struct xenaccess {
- xc_interface *xc_handle;
-
- xen_pfn_t max_gpfn;
-
- vm_event_t vm_event;
-} xenaccess_t;
-
static int interrupted;
-bool evtchn_bind = 0, evtchn_open = 0, mem_access_enable = 0;
static void close_handler(int sig)
{
interrupted = sig;
}
-int xc_wait_for_event_or_timeout(xc_interface *xch, xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsigned long ms)
+static int xc_wait_for_event_or_timeout(xc_interface *xch, xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsigned long ms)
{
struct pollfd fd = { .fd = xenevtchn_fd(xce), .events = POLLIN | POLLERR };
int port;
@@ -129,161 +104,85 @@ int xc_wait_for_event_or_timeout(xc_interface *xch, xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsig
return -errno;
}
-int xenaccess_teardown(xc_interface *xch, xenaccess_t *xenaccess)
+static int vm_event_teardown(vm_event_t *vm_event)
{
int rc;
- if ( xenaccess == NULL )
+ if ( vm_event == NULL )
return 0;
- /* Tear down domain xenaccess in Xen */
- if ( xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page != NULL )
- munmap(xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page, XC_PAGE_SIZE);
-
- if ( mem_access_enable )
- {
- rc = xc_monitor_disable(xenaccess->xc_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.domain_id);
- if ( rc != 0 )
- {
- ERROR("Error tearing down domain xenaccess in xen");
- return rc;
- }
- }
-
- /* Unbind VIRQ */
- if ( evtchn_bind )
- {
- rc = xenevtchn_unbind(xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.port);
- if ( rc != 0 )
- {
- ERROR("Error unbinding event port");
- return rc;
- }
- }
+ rc = vm_event->ops->teardown(vm_event);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ return rc;
/* Close event channel */
- if ( evtchn_open )
+ rc = xenevtchn_close(vm_event->xce);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
{
- rc = xenevtchn_close(xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle);
- if ( rc != 0 )
- {
- ERROR("Error closing event channel");
- return rc;
- }
+ ERROR("Error closing event channel");
+ return rc;
}
/* Close connection to Xen */
- rc = xc_interface_close(xenaccess->xc_handle);
+ rc = xc_interface_close(vm_event->xch);
if ( rc != 0 )
{
ERROR("Error closing connection to xen");
return rc;
}
- xenaccess->xc_handle = NULL;
-
- free(xenaccess);
return 0;
}
-xenaccess_t *xenaccess_init(xc_interface **xch_r, domid_t domain_id)
+static vm_event_t *vm_event_init(domid_t domain_id, vm_event_ops_t *ops)
{
- xenaccess_t *xenaccess = 0;
+ vm_event_t *vm_event;
xc_interface *xch;
+ xenevtchn_handle *xce;
+ xen_pfn_t max_gpfn;
int rc;
+ if ( ops == NULL )
+ return NULL;
+
xch = xc_interface_open(NULL, NULL, 0);
if ( xch == NULL )
- goto err_iface;
+ goto err;
DPRINTF("xenaccess init\n");
- *xch_r = xch;
-
- /* Allocate memory */
- xenaccess = malloc(sizeof(xenaccess_t));
- memset(xenaccess, 0, sizeof(xenaccess_t));
-
- /* Open connection to xen */
- xenaccess->xc_handle = xch;
-
- /* Set domain id */
- xenaccess->vm_event.domain_id = domain_id;
-
- /* Enable mem_access */
- xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page =
- xc_monitor_enable(xenaccess->xc_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.domain_id,
- &xenaccess->vm_event.evtchn_port);
- if ( xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page == NULL )
- {
- switch ( errno )
- {
- case EBUSY:
- ERROR("xenaccess is (or was) active on this domain");
- break;
- case ENODEV:
- ERROR("EPT not supported for this guest");
- break;
- default:
- perror("Error enabling mem_access");
- break;
- }
- goto err;
- }
- mem_access_enable = 1;
/* Open event channel */
- xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle = xenevtchn_open(NULL, 0);
- if ( xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle == NULL )
+ xce = xenevtchn_open(NULL, 0);
+ if ( xce == NULL )
{
ERROR("Failed to open event channel");
goto err;
}
- evtchn_open = 1;
-
- /* Bind event notification */
- rc = xenevtchn_bind_interdomain(xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.domain_id,
- xenaccess->vm_event.evtchn_port);
- if ( rc < 0 )
- {
- ERROR("Failed to bind event channel");
- goto err;
- }
- evtchn_bind = 1;
- xenaccess->vm_event.port = rc;
-
- /* Initialise ring */
- SHARED_RING_INIT((vm_event_sring_t *)xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page);
- BACK_RING_INIT(&xenaccess->vm_event.back_ring,
- (vm_event_sring_t *)xenaccess->vm_event.ring_page,
- XC_PAGE_SIZE);
/* Get max_gpfn */
- rc = xc_domain_maximum_gpfn(xenaccess->xc_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.domain_id,
- &xenaccess->max_gpfn);
-
+ rc = xc_domain_maximum_gpfn(xch, domain_id, &max_gpfn);
if ( rc )
{
ERROR("Failed to get max gpfn");
goto err;
}
+ DPRINTF("max_gpfn = %"PRI_xen_pfn"\n", max_gpfn);
- DPRINTF("max_gpfn = %"PRI_xen_pfn"\n", xenaccess->max_gpfn);
+ rc = ops->init(xch, xce, domain_id, ops, &vm_event);
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ goto err;
- return xenaccess;
+ vm_event->xch = xch;
+ vm_event->xce = xce;
+ vm_event->domain_id = domain_id;
+ vm_event->ops = ops;
+ vm_event->max_gpfn = max_gpfn;
- err:
- rc = xenaccess_teardown(xch, xenaccess);
- if ( rc )
- {
- ERROR("Failed to teardown xenaccess structure!\n");
- }
+ return vm_event;
- err_iface:
+ err:
+ xenevtchn_close(xce);
+ xc_interface_close(xch);
return NULL;
}
@@ -298,26 +197,6 @@ static inline int control_singlestep(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
}
/*
- * Note that this function is not thread safe.
- */
-static void get_request(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_request_t *req)
-{
- vm_event_back_ring_t *back_ring;
- RING_IDX req_cons;
-
- back_ring = &vm_event->back_ring;
- req_cons = back_ring->req_cons;
-
- /* Copy request */
- memcpy(req, RING_GET_REQUEST(back_ring, req_cons), sizeof(*req));
- req_cons++;
-
- /* Update ring */
- back_ring->req_cons = req_cons;
- back_ring->sring->req_event = req_cons + 1;
-}
-
-/*
* X86 control register names
*/
static const char* get_x86_ctrl_reg_name(uint32_t index)
@@ -335,29 +214,9 @@ static const char* get_x86_ctrl_reg_name(uint32_t index)
return names[index];
}
-/*
- * Note that this function is not thread safe.
- */
-static void put_response(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_response_t *rsp)
-{
- vm_event_back_ring_t *back_ring;
- RING_IDX rsp_prod;
-
- back_ring = &vm_event->back_ring;
- rsp_prod = back_ring->rsp_prod_pvt;
-
- /* Copy response */
- memcpy(RING_GET_RESPONSE(back_ring, rsp_prod), rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
- rsp_prod++;
-
- /* Update ring */
- back_ring->rsp_prod_pvt = rsp_prod;
- RING_PUSH_RESPONSES(back_ring);
-}
-
void usage(char* progname)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-m] <domain_id> write|exec", progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-m] [-n] <domain_id> write|exec", progname);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
fprintf(stderr, "|breakpoint|altp2m_write|altp2m_exec|debug|cpuid|desc_access|write_ctrlreg_cr4|altp2m_write_no_gpt");
#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
@@ -367,19 +226,22 @@ void usage(char* progname)
"\n"
"Logs first page writes, execs, or breakpoint traps that occur on the domain.\n"
"\n"
- "-m requires this program to run, or else the domain may pause\n");
+ "-m requires this program to run, or else the domain may pause\n"
+ "-n uses the per-vcpu channels vm_event interface\n");
}
+extern vm_event_ops_t ring_ops;
+extern vm_event_ops_t channel_ops;
+
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct sigaction act;
domid_t domain_id;
- xenaccess_t *xenaccess;
+ vm_event_t *vm_event;
vm_event_request_t req;
vm_event_response_t rsp;
int rc = -1;
int rc1;
- xc_interface *xch;
xenmem_access_t default_access = XENMEM_access_rwx;
xenmem_access_t after_first_access = XENMEM_access_rwx;
int memaccess = 0;
@@ -394,6 +256,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int write_ctrlreg_cr4 = 0;
int altp2m_write_no_gpt = 0;
uint16_t altp2m_view_id = 0;
+ int new_interface = 0;
char* progname = argv[0];
char* command;
@@ -402,11 +265,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
struct option long_options[] =
{
{ "mem-access-listener", no_argument, 0, 'm' },
+ { "new-interface", no_argument, 0, 'n' },
};
while ( 1 )
{
- c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "m", long_options, &option_index);
+ c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "mn", long_options, &option_index);
if ( c == -1 )
break;
@@ -416,6 +280,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
required = 1;
break;
+ case 'n':
+ new_interface = 1;
+ break;
+
default:
usage(progname);
return -1;
@@ -495,10 +363,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
return -1;
}
- xenaccess = xenaccess_init(&xch, domain_id);
- if ( xenaccess == NULL )
+ vm_event = vm_event_init(domain_id,
+ (new_interface) ? &channel_ops : &ring_ops);
+ if ( vm_event == NULL )
{
- ERROR("Error initialising xenaccess");
+ ERROR("Error initialising vm_event");
return 1;
}
@@ -514,7 +383,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
sigaction(SIGALRM, &act, NULL);
/* Set whether the access listener is required */
- rc = xc_domain_set_access_required(xch, domain_id, required);
+ rc = xc_domain_set_access_required(vm_event->xch, domain_id, required);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting mem_access listener required\n", rc);
@@ -529,13 +398,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if( altp2m_write_no_gpt )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_inguest_pagefault(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_inguest_pagefault(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting inguest pagefault\n", rc);
goto exit;
}
- rc = xc_monitor_emul_unimplemented(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_emul_unimplemented(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d failed to enable emul unimplemented\n", rc);
@@ -543,14 +412,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
}
- rc = xc_altp2m_set_domain_state( xch, domain_id, 1 );
+ rc = xc_altp2m_set_domain_state( vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1 );
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d enabling altp2m on domain!\n", rc);
goto exit;
}
- rc = xc_altp2m_create_view( xch, domain_id, default_access, &altp2m_view_id );
+ rc = xc_altp2m_create_view( vm_event->xch, domain_id, default_access,
+ &altp2m_view_id );
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d creating altp2m view!\n", rc);
@@ -560,24 +430,24 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DPRINTF("altp2m view created with id %u\n", altp2m_view_id);
DPRINTF("Setting altp2m mem_access permissions.. ");
- for( ; gfn < xenaccess->max_gpfn; ++gfn )
+ for( ; gfn < vm_event->max_gpfn; ++gfn )
{
- rc = xc_altp2m_set_mem_access( xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id, gfn,
- default_access);
+ rc = xc_altp2m_set_mem_access( vm_event->xch, domain_id,
+ altp2m_view_id, gfn, default_access);
if ( !rc )
perm_set++;
}
DPRINTF("done! Permissions set on %lu pages.\n", perm_set);
- rc = xc_altp2m_switch_to_view( xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id );
+ rc = xc_altp2m_switch_to_view( vm_event->xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id );
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d switching to altp2m view!\n", rc);
goto exit;
}
- rc = xc_monitor_singlestep( xch, domain_id, 1 );
+ rc = xc_monitor_singlestep( vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1 );
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d failed to enable singlestep monitoring!\n", rc);
@@ -588,15 +458,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( memaccess && !altp2m )
{
/* Set the default access type and convert all pages to it */
- rc = xc_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, default_access, ~0ull, 0);
+ rc = xc_set_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, default_access, ~0ull, 0);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting default mem access type\n", rc);
goto exit;
}
- rc = xc_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, default_access, START_PFN,
- (xenaccess->max_gpfn - START_PFN) );
+ rc = xc_set_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, default_access, START_PFN,
+ (vm_event->max_gpfn - START_PFN) );
if ( rc < 0 )
{
@@ -608,7 +478,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( breakpoint )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_software_breakpoint(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_software_breakpoint(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting breakpoint trapping with vm_event\n", rc);
@@ -618,7 +488,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( debug )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(xch, domain_id, 1, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting debug exception listener with vm_event\n", rc);
@@ -628,7 +498,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( cpuid )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_cpuid(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_cpuid(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting cpuid listener with vm_event\n", rc);
@@ -638,7 +508,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( desc_access )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_descriptor_access(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_descriptor_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting descriptor access listener with vm_event\n", rc);
@@ -648,7 +518,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( privcall )
{
- rc = xc_monitor_privileged_call(xch, domain_id, 1);
+ rc = xc_monitor_privileged_call(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
ERROR("Error %d setting privileged call trapping with vm_event\n", rc);
@@ -659,7 +529,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( write_ctrlreg_cr4 )
{
/* Mask the CR4.PGE bit so no events will be generated for global TLB flushes. */
- rc = xc_monitor_write_ctrlreg(xch, domain_id, VM_EVENT_X86_CR4, 1, 1,
+ rc = xc_monitor_write_ctrlreg(vm_event->xch, domain_id, VM_EVENT_X86_CR4, 1, 1,
X86_CR4_PGE, 1);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
@@ -671,41 +541,43 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/* Wait for access */
for ( ; ; )
{
+ int port = 0;
+
if ( interrupted )
{
/* Unregister for every event */
DPRINTF("xenaccess shutting down on signal %d\n", interrupted);
if ( breakpoint )
- rc = xc_monitor_software_breakpoint(xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_software_breakpoint(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
if ( debug )
- rc = xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(xch, domain_id, 0, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0, 0);
if ( cpuid )
- rc = xc_monitor_cpuid(xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_cpuid(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
if ( desc_access )
- rc = xc_monitor_descriptor_access(xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_descriptor_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
if ( write_ctrlreg_cr4 )
- rc = xc_monitor_write_ctrlreg(xch, domain_id, VM_EVENT_X86_CR4, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_write_ctrlreg(vm_event->xch, domain_id, VM_EVENT_X86_CR4, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if ( privcall )
- rc = xc_monitor_privileged_call(xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_privileged_call(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
if ( altp2m )
{
- rc = xc_altp2m_switch_to_view( xch, domain_id, 0 );
- rc = xc_altp2m_destroy_view(xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id);
- rc = xc_altp2m_set_domain_state(xch, domain_id, 0);
- rc = xc_monitor_singlestep(xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_altp2m_switch_to_view( vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0 );
+ rc = xc_altp2m_destroy_view(vm_event->xch, domain_id, altp2m_view_id);
+ rc = xc_altp2m_set_domain_state(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
+ rc = xc_monitor_singlestep(vm_event->xch, domain_id, 0);
} else {
- rc = xc_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, XENMEM_access_rwx, ~0ull, 0);
- rc = xc_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, XENMEM_access_rwx, START_PFN,
- (xenaccess->max_gpfn - START_PFN) );
+ rc = xc_set_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, XENMEM_access_rwx, ~0ull, 0);
+ rc = xc_set_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, XENMEM_access_rwx, START_PFN,
+ (vm_event->max_gpfn - START_PFN) );
}
shutting_down = 1;
}
- rc = xc_wait_for_event_or_timeout(xch, xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle, 100);
+ rc = xc_wait_for_event_or_timeout(vm_event->xch, vm_event->xce, 100);
if ( rc < -1 )
{
ERROR("Error getting event");
@@ -717,10 +589,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DPRINTF("Got event from Xen\n");
}
- while ( RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS(&xenaccess->vm_event.back_ring) )
- {
- get_request(&xenaccess->vm_event, &req);
+ port = rc;
+ while ( vm_event->ops->get_request(vm_event, &req, &port) )
+ {
if ( req.version != VM_EVENT_INTERFACE_VERSION )
{
ERROR("Error: vm_event interface version mismatch!\n");
@@ -744,7 +616,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
* At shutdown we have already reset all the permissions so really no use getting it again.
*/
xenmem_access_t access;
- rc = xc_get_mem_access(xch, domain_id, req.u.mem_access.gfn, &access);
+ rc = xc_get_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, req.u.mem_access.gfn, &access);
if (rc < 0)
{
ERROR("Error %d getting mem_access event\n", rc);
@@ -777,7 +649,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
else if ( default_access != after_first_access )
{
- rc = xc_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, after_first_access,
+ rc = xc_set_mem_access(vm_event->xch, domain_id, after_first_access,
req.u.mem_access.gfn, 1);
if (rc < 0)
{
@@ -798,7 +670,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
req.vcpu_id);
/* Reinject */
- rc = xc_hvm_inject_trap(xch, domain_id, req.vcpu_id,
+ rc = xc_hvm_inject_trap(vm_event->xch, domain_id, req.vcpu_id,
X86_TRAP_INT3,
req.u.software_breakpoint.type, -1,
req.u.software_breakpoint.insn_length, 0);
@@ -846,7 +718,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
req.u.debug_exception.insn_length);
/* Reinject */
- rc = xc_hvm_inject_trap(xch, domain_id, req.vcpu_id,
+ rc = xc_hvm_inject_trap(vm_event->xch, domain_id, req.vcpu_id,
X86_TRAP_DEBUG,
req.u.debug_exception.type, -1,
req.u.debug_exception.insn_length,
@@ -914,17 +786,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
/* Put the response on the ring */
- put_response(&xenaccess->vm_event, &rsp);
- }
-
- /* Tell Xen page is ready */
- rc = xenevtchn_notify(xenaccess->vm_event.xce_handle,
- xenaccess->vm_event.port);
+ put_response(vm_event, &rsp, port);
- if ( rc != 0 )
- {
- ERROR("Error resuming page");
- interrupted = -1;
+ /* Tell Xen page is ready */
+ rc = notify_port(vm_event, port);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Error resuming page");
+ interrupted = -1;
+ }
}
if ( shutting_down )
@@ -937,13 +807,13 @@ exit:
{
uint32_t vcpu_id;
for ( vcpu_id = 0; vcpu_id<XEN_LEGACY_MAX_VCPUS; vcpu_id++)
- rc = control_singlestep(xch, domain_id, vcpu_id, 0);
+ rc = control_singlestep(vm_event->xch, domain_id, vcpu_id, 0);
}
- /* Tear down domain xenaccess */
- rc1 = xenaccess_teardown(xch, xenaccess);
+ /* Tear down domain */
+ rc1 = vm_event_teardown(vm_event);
if ( rc1 != 0 )
- ERROR("Error tearing down xenaccess");
+ ERROR("Error tearing down vm_event");
if ( rc == 0 )
rc = rc1;
diff --git a/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.h b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fc640c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * xen-access.h
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Bitdefender S.R.L.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+ * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+ * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+ * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef XEN_ACCESS_H
+#define XEN_ACCESS_H
+
+#include <xenctrl.h>
+#include <xenevtchn.h>
+#include <xen/vm_event.h>
+
+#ifndef container_of
+#define container_of(ptr, type, member) ({ \
+ const typeof( ((type *)0)->member ) *__mptr = (ptr); \
+ (type *)( (char *)__mptr - offsetof(type,member) );})
+#endif /* container_of */
+
+#define DPRINTF(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a, ## b)
+#define ERROR(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a "\n", ## b)
+#define PERROR(a, b...) fprintf(stderr, a ": %s\n", ## b, strerror(errno))
+
+struct vm_event_ops;
+
+typedef struct vm_event {
+ xc_interface *xch;
+ domid_t domain_id;
+ xenevtchn_handle *xce;
+ xen_pfn_t max_gpfn;
+ struct vm_event_ops *ops;
+} vm_event_t;
+
+typedef struct vm_event_ops {
+ int (*init)(xc_interface *, xenevtchn_handle *, domid_t,
+ struct vm_event_ops *, vm_event_t **);
+ int (*teardown)(vm_event_t *);
+ bool (*get_request)(vm_event_t *, vm_event_request_t *, int *);
+ void (*put_response)(vm_event_t *, vm_event_response_t *, int);
+ int (*notify_port)(vm_event_t *, int port);
+} vm_event_ops_t;
+
+static inline bool get_request(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_request_t *req,
+ int *port)
+{
+ return ( vm_event ) ? vm_event->ops->get_request(vm_event, req, port) :
+ false;
+}
+
+static inline void put_response(vm_event_t *vm_event, vm_event_response_t *rsp, int port)
+{
+ if ( vm_event )
+ vm_event->ops->put_response(vm_event, rsp, port);
+}
+
+static inline int notify_port(vm_event_t *vm_event, int port)
+{
+ if ( !vm_event )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return vm_event->ops->notify_port(vm_event, port);
+}
+
+#endif /* XEN_ACCESS_H */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels
2019-07-16 17:06 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Petre Pircalabu
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-16 17:06 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 10/10] xen-access: Add support for vm_event_ng interface Petre Pircalabu
@ 2019-07-16 20:45 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2019-07-17 9:14 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
10 siblings, 1 reply; 55+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2019-07-16 20:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petre Pircalabu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Isaila,
Xen-devel, Volodymyr Babchuk, Roger Pau Monné
On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
<ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>
> This patchset adds a new mechanism of sending synchronous vm_event
> requests and handling vm_event responses without using a ring.
> As each synchronous request pauses the vcpu until the corresponding
> response is handled, it can be stored in a slotted memory buffer
> (one per vcpu) shared between the hypervisor and the controlling domain.
>
> The main advantages of this approach are:
> * the ability to dynamicaly allocate the necessary memory used to hold
> the requests/responses (the size of vm_event_request_t/vm_event_response_t
> can grow unrestricted by the ring's one page limitation)
> * the ring's waitqueue logic is unnecessary in this case because the
> vcpu sending the request is blocked until a response is received.
Could you please push a git branch for this somewhere?
Thanks,
Tamas
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels
2019-07-16 20:45 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/10] Per vcpu vm_event channels Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2019-07-17 9:14 ` Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Petre Ovidiu PIRCALABU @ 2019-07-17 9:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tamas K Lengyel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Razvan Cojocaru, Wei Liu,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson,
Tim Deegan, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA,
Xen-devel, Volodymyr Babchuk, Roger Pau Monné
On Tue, 2019-07-16 at 14:45 -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:06 AM Petre Pircalabu
> <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> >
> > This patchset adds a new mechanism of sending synchronous vm_event
> > requests and handling vm_event responses without using a ring.
> > As each synchronous request pauses the vcpu until the corresponding
> > response is handled, it can be stored in a slotted memory buffer
> > (one per vcpu) shared between the hypervisor and the controlling
> > domain.
> >
> > The main advantages of this approach are:
> > * the ability to dynamicaly allocate the necessary memory used to
> > hold
> > the requests/responses (the size of
> > vm_event_request_t/vm_event_response_t
> > can grow unrestricted by the ring's one page limitation)
> > * the ring's waitqueue logic is unnecessary in this case because
> > the
> > vcpu sending the request is blocked until a response is received.
>
> Could you please push a git branch for this somewhere?
>
> Thanks,
> Tamas
I've pushed this changes to my github xen fork:
https://github.com/petrepircalabu/xen/tree/vm_event_ng/devel
The tag for patchset is per_cpu_vm_event_channels_v2.
Many thanks for your support,
Petre
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread