From: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>,
Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 0/2] XSM labels support in dom0less
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 09:38:00 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1787821757.git.Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com> (raw)
Currently FLASK can't really be enforced for domains being brought up in
dom0less mode, as security contexts are not assigned for domains in this
configuration. Thus domains are left with default SECINITSID_UNLABELED SID
which policy forbids to create:
(XEN) [ 0.637379] avc: denied { create } for current=d[IDLE] scontext=system_u:system_r:xenboot_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:unlabeled_t tclass=domain
This series extends dom0less bindings with ability to provide human-readable
security context in domain's DTS configuration, replicating a toolstack
approach and naming.
-Sergiy
Sergiy Kibrik (2):
flask: add const qualifier to security_context_to_sid()
common: dom0less-bindings: introduce XSM labels
docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt | 8 ++++++++
xen/common/device-tree/Makefile | 2 ++
xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c | 11 +++++++++++
xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h | 2 +-
xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-27 9:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-27 9:38 Sergiy Kibrik [this message]
2026-08-27 9:38 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] flask: add const qualifier to security_context_to_sid() Sergiy Kibrik
2026-08-27 18:08 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-08-28 6:40 ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-31 10:01 ` Sergiy Kibrik
2026-09-01 6:34 ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 9:38 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] common: dom0less-bindings: introduce XSM labels Sergiy Kibrik
2026-08-27 18:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-08-31 10:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-09-04 10:01 ` Sergiy Kibrik
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