From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>,
"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>,
Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] common: dom0less-bindings: introduce XSM labels
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 11:19:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d98bff6b-c32c-4c52-bbc9-cf88e4be6c3f@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e97ab666be0d667dc823c3d881ac9ed76267a7a5.1787821757.git.Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
On 27/08/2026 10:38 am, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> diff --git a/xen/common/device-tree/Makefile b/xen/common/device-tree/Makefile
> index 9036e455d6..e4de292533 100644
> --- a/xen/common/device-tree/Makefile
> +++ b/xen/common/device-tree/Makefile
> @@ -11,3 +11,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DOMAIN_BUILD_HELPERS) += kernel.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_STATIC_EVTCHN) += static-evtchn.init.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_STATIC_MEMORY) += static-memory.init.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_STATIC_SHM) += static-shmem.init.o
> +
> +CFLAGS-y += -I$(srctree)/xsm/flask/include
> diff --git a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> index 41d72d0d58..bffd2ec65d 100644
> --- a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> +++ b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
> #include <public/bootfdt.h>
> #include <public/domctl.h>
>
> +#include <security.h>
> +
security.h is a private header for internals of flask. Requiring the
CFLAGS += -I should have been a hint.
If a suitable public function doesn't exist, then make one rather than
inserting a layering violation.
To this specifically, I'm not sure security_context_to_sid() handing out
SECINITSID_XEN if you happen to call it too early is the wisest
behaviour. It's current call-chain has an earlier check which I think
excludes this from occurring.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 10:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-27 9:38 [PATCH v1 0/2] XSM labels support in dom0less Sergiy Kibrik
2026-08-27 9:38 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] flask: add const qualifier to security_context_to_sid() Sergiy Kibrik
2026-08-27 18:08 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-08-28 6:40 ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-31 10:01 ` Sergiy Kibrik
2026-09-01 6:34 ` Jan Beulich
2026-08-27 9:38 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] common: dom0less-bindings: introduce XSM labels Sergiy Kibrik
2026-08-27 18:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-08-31 10:19 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2026-09-04 10:01 ` Sergiy Kibrik
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=d98bff6b-c32c-4c52-bbc9-cf88e4be6c3f@citrix.com \
--to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com \
--cc=Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com \
--cc=bertrand.marquis@arm.com \
--cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
--cc=julien@xen.org \
--cc=michal.orzel@amd.com \
--cc=sstabellini@kernel.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.