Re: [PATCH v2] common: dom0less-bindings: introduce XSM labels

["Orzel, Michal" <michal.orzel@amd.com>]

On 09-Sep-26 10:57, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> Add "seclabel" property to be able to specify security label for a domain
> when XSM Flask is enabled, similar to xl configuration files.
> 
> Currently guest domain can't be created by Xen in dom0less configuration when
> Flask is enabled, as domain is assigned "system_u:system_r:unlabeled_t" label
> by default, which Flask denies to create according to current policy.
> 
> Because code from outside of flask can't directly execute its internal API
> a new routine flask_context_to_sid() introduced as part of XSM API exposed
> to rest of Xen, which is a direct wrapper for security_context_to_sid().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
> CC: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> ---
> changes in v2:
>  - add & use flask_context_to_sid() wrapper
> ---
>  docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt      |  8 ++++++++
>  xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c | 11 +++++++++++
>  xen/include/xsm/xsm.h                      |  3 +++
>  xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c                      |  5 +++++
>  4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
> index bcb06bc796..fcc7be0ffb 100644
> --- a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
> +++ b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
> @@ -345,6 +345,12 @@ with the following properties:
>      not passed. This configuration requires static allocation (xen,static-mem)
>      and direct mapping (direct-map).
>  
> +- seclabel
> +
> +    A string property specifying an XSM security label to this domain. Effective
> +    only when FLASK is enabled. Domains will be classified “unlabeled” if
For "Effective only when FLASK is enabled" see below.

> +    this property not specified.
> +
>  Under the "xen,domain" compatible node, one or more sub-nodes are present
>  for the DomU kernel and ramdisk.
>  
> @@ -422,6 +428,7 @@ chosen {
>          memory = <0 131072>;
>          cpus = <2>;
>          vpl011;
> +        seclabel = "system_u:system_r:domU_t";
>  
>          vcpu0 {
>              compatible = "xen,vcpu";
> @@ -453,6 +460,7 @@ chosen {
>          #size-cells = <0x1>;
>          memory = <0 65536>;
>          cpus = <1>;
> +        seclabel = "system_u:system_r:domU_t";
>  
>          module@0x4c000000 {
>              compatible = "multiboot,kernel", "multiboot,module";
> diff --git a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> index 41d72d0d58..0b0ed6e25d 100644
> --- a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> +++ b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-bindings.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
>  #include <public/bootfdt.h>
>  #include <public/domctl.h>
>  
> +#include <xsm/xsm.h>
> +
>  int __init parse_dom0less_node(struct dt_device_node *node,
>                                 struct boot_domain *bd)
>  {
> @@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ int __init parse_dom0less_node(struct dt_device_node *node,
>      bool has_dtb = false;
>      bool iommu = false;
>      const char *dom0less_iommu = NULL;
> +    const char *xsm_seclabel = NULL;
>  
>      if ( !dt_device_is_compatible(node, "xen,domain") )
>          return -ENOENT;
> @@ -141,5 +144,13 @@ int __init parse_dom0less_node(struct dt_device_node *node,
>          panic("'llc-colors' found, but LLC coloring is disabled\n");
>  #endif
>  
> +    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XSM_FLASK) &&
> +         !dt_property_read_string(node, "seclabel", &xsm_seclabel) )
> +    {
> +        if ( flask_context_to_sid(xsm_seclabel, strlen(xsm_seclabel),
> +                                     &d_cfg->ssidref) )
> +            panic("Invalid security context for domain: %s\n", xsm_seclabel);
> +    }
The preferred way (you can look at e.g. SVE, SCI, LLC) is to stop Xen if a
property was found whose functionality cannot be satisfied.

~Michal