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From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Linus Torvalds' <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"llvm@lists.linux.dev" <llvm@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: RE: [RFC] Mitigating unexpected arithmetic overflow
Date: Thu, 9 May 2024 21:23:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f41cd250b90d4eb883ea5ff245718200@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgoE5EkH+sQwi4KhRhCZizUxwZAnC=+9RbZcw7g6016LQ@mail.gmail.com>

...
> I think that would be a completely different area that might be worth
> looking at: instrumenting implicit casts for "drops bits". I'm afraid
> that it's just *so* common than we might not be able to do that
> sanely.

Things like:
	buf[0] = val;
	buf[1] = val >>= 8;
	buf[2] = val >>= 8;
	buf[3] = val >>= 8;
for writing a value little-endian and potentially misaligned.
Really doesn't want any annotation.

I've also seen code like:
	buf[0] = (unsigned char)(val & 0xff);
not only ugly by it got compiled to:
	val &= 0xff // for the &
	val &= 0xff // for the cast
	byte write to memory.
Modern gcc doesn't do that, but...

There are some spurious casts that drop bits.
I found plenty of dubious min_t(u8/u16,...) examples.
(Well they are dubious, some are just a lot more dubious than others.)
The problem is that every one needs careful inspection just in case
the strange behaviour is required like min_t(u8, val - 1, lo_lim - 1)
which treats lo_lim of zero as 'not a limit' and I think was ok.

A slow, concerted effort to remove min_t() calls wouldn't be a bad thing.

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-09 21:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-07 23:27 [RFC] Mitigating unexpected arithmetic overflow Kees Cook
2024-05-08 12:22 ` David Laight
2024-05-08 23:43   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-08 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-08 19:44   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-08 20:07     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-08 22:54       ` Kees Cook
2024-05-08 23:47         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09  0:06           ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09  0:23           ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09  6:11           ` Kees Cook
2024-05-09 14:08             ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-05-09 15:38               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09 17:54                 ` Al Viro
2024-05-09 18:08                   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09 18:39                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09 18:48                       ` Al Viro
2024-05-09 19:15                         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09 19:28                           ` Al Viro
2024-05-09 21:06                 ` David Laight
2024-05-18  5:11             ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-09 21:23           ` David Laight [this message]
2024-05-12  8:03           ` Martin Uecker
2024-05-12 16:09             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-12 19:29               ` Martin Uecker
2024-05-13 18:34               ` Kees Cook
2024-05-15  7:36           ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-15 17:12             ` Justin Stitt
2024-05-16  7:45               ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-16 13:30             ` Kees Cook
2024-05-16 14:09               ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-16 19:48                 ` Justin Stitt
2024-05-16 20:07                   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-16 20:51                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-05-17 21:15                     ` Kees Cook
2024-05-18  2:51                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-05-17 22:04                   ` Fangrui Song
2024-05-18 13:08               ` David Laight
2024-05-15  7:57           ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-17  7:45       ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-05-11 16:19 ` Dan Carpenter
2024-05-13 19:43   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-14  8:45     ` Dan Carpenter
2024-05-18 15:39       ` David Laight

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