* Re: [PATCH] percpu_counter: change inaccurate comment
From: Christoph Lameter @ 2010-10-07 21:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet; +Cc: Andrew Morton, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1286484131.3745.88.camel@edumazet-laptop>
On Thu, 7 Oct 2010, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> >
> > The only difference between __this_cpu_ptr and this_cpu_ptr is that
> > this_cpu_ptr checks that preempt was disabled. __this_cpu_ptr allows use
> > even without preempt. Preempt must be disabled here so the use of
> > this_cpu_ptr is appropriate.
> >
> >
>
> Thats not how I read the thing.
>
> In both variants, preemption _must_ be disabled, its only the context
> that can tell how sure we are...
Correct. One checks the other one does not check.
> <quote>
>
> commit 7340a0b15280c
>
> __this_cpu_ptr -> Do not check for preemption context
> this_cpu_ptr -> Check preemption context
>
> </quote>
>
> If preemption was enabled, both pointers would not be very useful...
>
> We use __this_cpu_ptr() in contexts where cpu _cannot_ change under us,
> (we just disabled preemption one line above), so its not necessary to
> perform the check.
Someone could screw up the code in the future. Thats what its there for.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] ceph/rbd block driver for qemu-kvm (v4)
From: Anthony Liguori @ 2010-10-07 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yehuda Sadeh Weinraub
Cc: Kevin Wolf, ceph-devel, qemu-devel, kvm, Christian Brunner
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimW98qPTYZ=Bct7k7XqaOXswC51QdQOW6fLsWkQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/07/2010 03:47 PM, Yehuda Sadeh Weinraub wrote:
>> How is that possible? Are the callbacks delivered in the context of a
>> different thread? If so, don't you need locking?
>>
> Not sure I'm completely following you. The callbacks are delivered in
> the context of a different thread, but won't run concurrently.
Concurrently to what? How do you prevent them from running concurrently
with qemu?
If you saw lock ups, I bet that's what it was from.
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
> Do you
> see any specific concurrency issue? We can add some mutex protection
> around at the aio callback, so that if librados turns multithreaded at
> this point we're covered.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Yehuda
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] serial: DCC(JTAG) serial and console emulation support
From: Mike Frysinger @ 2010-10-07 21:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Walker
Cc: linux-kernel, Hyok S. Choi, Tony Lindgren, Jeff Ohlstein,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Ben Dooks, Alan Cox, Kukjin Kim, Feng Tang,
Tobias Klauser, Jason Wessel, Philippe Langlais
In-Reply-To: <1286485186.23836.56.camel@c-dwalke-linux.qualcomm.com>
On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 16:59, Daniel Walker wrote:
> On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 16:47 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 16:06, Daniel Walker wrote:
>> > On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 16:02 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote:
>> >> how is that any different from:
>> >> ln -s ttyJ0 /dev/ttyS0
>> >
>> > It has the same major and minors as ttyS* does. So you don't have to run
>> > anything on the target.
>>
>> i dont see how those things are related. the major/minor are
>> irrelevant, unless you've already hard coded these in some app that
>> creates device nodes manually (instead of mdev/udev), but even then
>> that's something that "needs to be run on the target". and both
>> already have config support to transparently do something like
>> "symlink ttyS# to XXX" as XXX is created.
>
> Something does ultimately run on all targets, the issues is does the
> person debugging have the ability to change it .. It's not always the
> case that they can change it. The userspace may not have udev at all.
> The userspace may consist of a single binary .. I'm not making any
> assumptions about the userspace here, it can be anything.
then there is already a static rootfs with pre-populated /dev which
would be fixed, or the single binary fixed. if the options are "my
system works" or "my system doesnt work", i cant imagine people would
continue to attempt to use "/dev/ttyS#" if it didnt exist or didnt
work.
-mike
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys: added cleanup code for trusted and encrypted key types
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 21:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: keyrings, linux-crypto, David Howells, David Safford,
Rajiv Andrade, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <201010071430.46281.roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Thanks for catching this! This patch applies cleanly to the
trusted/encrypted patch set posted today.
thanks,
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 14:30 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> This patch frees the payload at the end of the instantiate
> method of both trusted and encrypted key types if an error occurs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
> ---
> security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 6 ++++++
> security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> index 54c0f0f..8426e66 100644
> --- a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> @@ -624,7 +624,13 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
> }
> ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen,
> hex_encoded_iv, hex_encoded_data);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out_free_epayload;
> +
> rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, epayload);
> +out_free_epayload:
> + if (ret)
> + kfree(epayload);
> out:
> kfree(datablob);
> return ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> index aedad16..ab7c7f9 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
> @@ -848,6 +848,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
> out:
> if (!ret)
> rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, p);
> + else {
> + if (p)
> + kfree(p);
> + }
> kfree(datablob);
> return ret;
> }
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] serial: DCC(JTAG) serial and console emulation support
From: Mike Frysinger @ 2010-10-07 21:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Walker
Cc: Alan Cox, linux-kernel, Hyok S. Choi, Tony Lindgren,
Jeff Ohlstein, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Ben Dooks, Alan Cox,
Kukjin Kim, Feng Tang, Tobias Klauser, Jason Wessel,
Philippe Langlais
In-Reply-To: <1286484678.23836.49.camel@c-dwalke-linux.qualcomm.com>
On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 16:51, Daniel Walker wrote:
> On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 22:05 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
>> On Thu, 07 Oct 2010 13:36:06 -0700 Daniel Walker wrote:
>> > On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 21:50 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
>> > > > + Say Y here if you want to install DCC driver as a normal serial port
>> > > > + /dev/ttyS0 (major 4, minor 64). Otherwise, it appears as /dev/ttyJ0
>> > > > + (major 4, minor 128) and can co-exist with other UARTs, such as
>> > > > + 8250/16C550 compatibles.
>> > > > +
>> > >
>> > > NAK to both
>> >
>> > I would agree if this wasn't strictly for debugging embedded devices in
>> > difficult situations.. After talking to Mike, it's seems like it would
>> > be useful to have this as a ttyS* specifically because embedded devices
>> > won't always create a ttyJ* for you and ttyS* will likely already exist.
>>
>> If you are debugging an embedded device you are capable of changing it
>> (otherwise you wouldn't debug it). Therefore the fact you might need to
>> tweak the tty creation on the device is not a problem. If you can't
>> change the device well there is no point debugging it is there !
>
> Your making too many assumptions .. You might be able to modify the
> kernel, and not the userspace. So you couldn't tweak the device
> creation .. It's much easier in the server world ..
this driver isnt in the kernel. there is no ABI to preserve. if
people want to use the mainline driver, they can fix their userspace.
i dont think the "binary userspace" argument is terribly relevant to
new driver submissions.
-mike
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: OT: compilation
From: Grzesiek Sójka @ 2010-10-07 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xavier Chantry; +Cc: nouveau-PD4FTy7X32lNgt0PjOBp9y5qC8QIuHrW
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTi=HO9rxCTOXdhagYm7WB-pF73C8_eipMCrYeGOG-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On 10/07/10 22:50, Xavier Chantry wrote:
> 2010/10/7 Grzesiek Sójka<pld-t9zbU3WrWHI@public.gmane.org>:
>> I have two problems with the kernel compilation.
>>
>> 1. I have a small rootfs. It is too small to put all the modules there
>> without gzipping it first. So installing it requires lots of sweating. That
>> is why I was wondering if there is a (more/less easy) way to make the "make
>> modules_install" command gzip the modules "on the fly".
>>
>
> No idea if you can do that but here are some possible alternatives :
> 1) increase the size of your rootfs
Veeeeeeeeeeeeery difficult in my case.
> 2) remove modules you don't need and change from modules to builtin
> for features or drivers that you don't need to unload/reload
I'm trying to do this. Unfortunately I did not compile the kernel by
myself for at lest 5 yeas and it is a big in my a%$#.
> 3) a quick googling showed me this patch :
> http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org/msg271865.html
> However it seems to install first then compress so if that's the case,
> you will need to adapt it to your need
If I'm right it compress every module _just_after_ imstalling it. So it
should be fine for me.
> 4) set INSTALL_MOD_PATH to a prefix , compress modules , then move to
> /lib/modules/
If 3) don't helps I try to do this.
> LOCALVERSION_AUTO is found in :
> make menuconfig
> General Setup
> Automatically append version information to the version string
Supper thanks
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] ceph/rbd block driver for qemu-kvm (v4)
From: Anthony Liguori @ 2010-10-07 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yehuda Sadeh Weinraub
Cc: Kevin Wolf, kvm, qemu-devel, ceph-devel, Christian Brunner
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimW98qPTYZ=Bct7k7XqaOXswC51QdQOW6fLsWkQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/07/2010 03:47 PM, Yehuda Sadeh Weinraub wrote:
>> How is that possible? Are the callbacks delivered in the context of a
>> different thread? If so, don't you need locking?
>>
> Not sure I'm completely following you. The callbacks are delivered in
> the context of a different thread, but won't run concurrently.
Concurrently to what? How do you prevent them from running concurrently
with qemu?
If you saw lock ups, I bet that's what it was from.
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
> Do you
> see any specific concurrency issue? We can add some mutex protection
> around at the aio callback, so that if librados turns multithreaded at
> this point we're covered.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Yehuda
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] keys: fixed handling of update method of the encrypted key type
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 21:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: keyrings, linux-crypto, David Howells, David Safford,
Rajiv Andrade, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <201010071429.24664.roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Nice! This patch applies cleanly to the trusted/encrypted patch set
posted today.
thanks,
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 14:29 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> This patch adds the UPDATE keyword for encrypted key types:
> prevents updating existent keys if UPDATE is missing and creating
> new keys when UPDATE is specified.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
> ---
> security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> index 6b26db6..54c0f0f 100644
> --- a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
> @@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ static int aes_get_sizes(int *ivsize, int *blksize)
> }
>
> enum {
> - Opt_err = -1, Opt_new = 1, Opt_load, Opt_NEW, Opt_LOAD
> + Opt_err = -1, Opt_new = 1, Opt_load,
> + Opt_update, Opt_NEW, Opt_LOAD, Opt_UPDATE
> };
>
> static match_table_t key_tokens = {
> @@ -72,6 +73,8 @@ static match_table_t key_tokens = {
> {Opt_NEW, "NEW"},
> {Opt_load, "load"},
> {Opt_LOAD, "LOAD"},
> + {Opt_update, "update"},
> + {Opt_UPDATE, "UPDATE"},
> {Opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> @@ -81,6 +84,7 @@ static match_table_t key_tokens = {
> * datablob format:
> * NEW <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
> * LOAD <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data>
> + * UPDATE <new-master-key name>
> *
> * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
> * which is null terminated.
> @@ -104,23 +108,36 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc,
> *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> if (!*master_desc)
> goto out;
> - *decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> - if (!*decrypted_datalen)
> - goto out;
> +
> + if (decrypted_datalen) {
> + *decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> + if (!*decrypted_datalen)
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> switch (key_cmd) {
> case Opt_new:
> case Opt_NEW:
> + if (!decrypted_datalen)
> + break;
> ret = 0;
> break;
> case Opt_load:
> case Opt_LOAD:
> + if (!decrypted_datalen)
> + break;
> *hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> if (!*hex_encoded_iv)
> break;
> *hex_encoded_data = *hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2;
> ret = 0;
> break;
> + case Opt_update:
> + case Opt_UPDATE:
> + if (decrypted_datalen)
> + break;
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> case Opt_err:
> break;
> }
> @@ -647,11 +664,9 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
> - new_master_desc = strsep(&buf, " \t");
> - if (!*new_master_desc) {
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> + ret = datablob_parse(buf, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> + if (ret < 0)
> goto out;
> - }
>
> new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc,
> epayload->datalen);
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: hoist sta->lock from reorder release timer
From: Johannes Berg @ 2010-10-07 21:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John W. Linville
Cc: Christian Lamparter, linux-wireless, Ben Greear, Ming Lei
In-Reply-To: <20101006202106.GL2472@tuxdriver.com>
On Wed, 2010-10-06 at 16:21 -0400, John W. Linville wrote:
> > I think it's probably easier to fix than to revert now? There are only a
> > handful of fields, and it seemed to me that most of them can easily be
> > moved under the reorder lock.
>
> I would prefer a fix on top rather than a series of reverts...
I think this should fix it. Somebody review please?
johannes
---
net/mac80211/agg-rx.c | 8 +++-----
net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
net/mac80211/rx.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 29 ++++++++++++++---------------
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
--- wireless-testing.orig/net/mac80211/agg-rx.c 2010-10-07 22:44:04.000000000 +0200
+++ wireless-testing/net/mac80211/agg-rx.c 2010-10-07 22:53:33.000000000 +0200
@@ -129,9 +129,7 @@ static void sta_rx_agg_reorder_timer_exp
timer_to_tid[0]);
rcu_read_lock();
- spin_lock(&sta->lock);
ieee80211_release_reorder_timeout(sta, *ptid);
- spin_unlock(&sta->lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -256,7 +254,7 @@ void ieee80211_process_addba_request(str
}
/* prepare A-MPDU MLME for Rx aggregation */
- tid_agg_rx = kmalloc(sizeof(struct tid_ampdu_rx), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ tid_agg_rx = kmalloc(sizeof(struct tid_ampdu_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tid_agg_rx) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_HT_DEBUG
if (net_ratelimit())
@@ -280,9 +278,9 @@ void ieee80211_process_addba_request(str
/* prepare reordering buffer */
tid_agg_rx->reorder_buf =
- kcalloc(buf_size, sizeof(struct sk_buff *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ kcalloc(buf_size, sizeof(struct sk_buff *), GFP_KERNEL);
tid_agg_rx->reorder_time =
- kcalloc(buf_size, sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ kcalloc(buf_size, sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tid_agg_rx->reorder_buf || !tid_agg_rx->reorder_time) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_HT_DEBUG
if (net_ratelimit())
--- wireless-testing.orig/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c 2010-10-07 22:47:41.000000000 +0200
+++ wireless-testing/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c 2010-10-07 22:50:03.000000000 +0200
@@ -116,34 +116,35 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struc
char buf[71 + STA_TID_NUM * 40], *p = buf;
int i;
struct sta_info *sta = file->private_data;
+ struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_rx;
+ struct tid_ampdu_tx *tid_tx;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
- spin_lock_bh(&sta->lock);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "next dialog_token: %#02x\n",
sta->ampdu_mlme.dialog_token_allocator + 1);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p,
"TID\t\tRX active\tDTKN\tSSN\t\tTX\tDTKN\tpending\n");
+
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++) {
+ tid_rx = rcu_dereference(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]);
+ tid_tx = rcu_dereference(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]);
+
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "%02d", i);
- p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t\t%x",
- !!sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]);
+ p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t\t%x", !!tid_rx);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t%#.2x",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i] ?
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
+ tid_rx ? tid_rx->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t%#.3x",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i] ?
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->ssn : 0);
+ tid_rx ? tid_rx->ssn : 0);
- p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t\t%x",
- !!sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]);
+ p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t\t%x", !!tid_tx);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t%#.2x",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i] ?
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
+ tid_tx ? tid_tx->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\t%03d",
- sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i] ?
- skb_queue_len(&sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->pending) : 0);
+ tid_tx ? skb_queue_len(&tid_tx->pending) : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) + buf - p, "\n");
}
- spin_unlock_bh(&sta->lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, p - buf);
}
--- wireless-testing.orig/net/mac80211/sta_info.h 2010-10-07 22:44:16.000000000 +0200
+++ wireless-testing/net/mac80211/sta_info.h 2010-10-07 23:01:53.000000000 +0200
@@ -81,13 +81,14 @@ enum ieee80211_sta_info_flags {
* @stop_initiator: initiator of a session stop
* @tx_stop: TX DelBA frame when stopping
*
- * This structure is protected by RCU and the per-station
- * spinlock. Assignments to the array holding it must hold
- * the spinlock, only the TX path can access it under RCU
- * lock-free if, and only if, the state has the flag
- * %HT_AGG_STATE_OPERATIONAL set. Otherwise, the TX path
- * must also acquire the spinlock and re-check the state,
- * see comments in the tx code touching it.
+ * This structure's lifetime is managed by RCU, assignments to
+ * the array holding it must hold the aggregation mutex.
+ *
+ * The TX path can access it under RCU lock-free if, and
+ * only if, the state has the flag %HT_AGG_STATE_OPERATIONAL
+ * set. Otherwise, the TX path must also acquire the spinlock
+ * and re-check the state, see comments in the tx code
+ * touching it.
*/
struct tid_ampdu_tx {
struct rcu_head rcu_head;
@@ -115,15 +116,13 @@ struct tid_ampdu_tx {
* @rcu_head: RCU head used for freeing this struct
* @reorder_lock: serializes access to reorder buffer, see below.
*
- * This structure is protected by RCU and the per-station
- * spinlock. Assignments to the array holding it must hold
- * the spinlock.
+ * This structure's lifetime is managed by RCU, assignments to
+ * the array holding it must hold the aggregation mutex.
*
- * The @reorder_lock is used to protect the variables and
- * arrays such as @reorder_buf, @reorder_time, @head_seq_num,
- * @stored_mpdu_num and @reorder_time from being corrupted by
- * concurrent access of the RX path and the expired frame
- * release timer.
+ * The @reorder_lock is used to protect the members of this
+ * struct, except for @timeout, @buf_size and @dialog_token,
+ * which are constant across the lifetime of the struct (the
+ * dialog token being used only for debugging).
*/
struct tid_ampdu_rx {
struct rcu_head rcu_head;
--- wireless-testing.orig/net/mac80211/rx.c 2010-10-07 22:52:03.000000000 +0200
+++ wireless-testing/net/mac80211/rx.c 2010-10-07 22:58:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ static void ieee80211_release_reorder_fr
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tid_agg_rx->reorder_buf[index];
+ lockdep_assert_held(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
+
if (!skb)
goto no_frame;
@@ -557,6 +559,8 @@ static void ieee80211_release_reorder_fr
{
int index;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
+
while (seq_less(tid_agg_rx->head_seq_num, head_seq_num)) {
index = seq_sub(tid_agg_rx->head_seq_num, tid_agg_rx->ssn) %
tid_agg_rx->buf_size;
@@ -581,6 +585,8 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_reorder_releas
{
int index, j;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
+
/* release the buffer until next missing frame */
index = seq_sub(tid_agg_rx->head_seq_num, tid_agg_rx->ssn) %
tid_agg_rx->buf_size;
@@ -659,10 +665,11 @@ static bool ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder
int index;
bool ret = true;
+ spin_lock(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
+
buf_size = tid_agg_rx->buf_size;
head_seq_num = tid_agg_rx->head_seq_num;
- spin_lock(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
/* frame with out of date sequence number */
if (seq_less(mpdu_seq_num, head_seq_num)) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -1899,9 +1906,12 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ctrl(struct ieee80211_rx_
mod_timer(&tid_agg_rx->session_timer,
TU_TO_EXP_TIME(tid_agg_rx->timeout));
+ spin_lock(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
/* release stored frames up to start of BAR */
ieee80211_release_reorder_frames(hw, tid_agg_rx, start_seq_num,
frames);
+ spin_unlock(&tid_agg_rx->reorder_lock);
+
kfree_skb(skb);
return RX_QUEUED;
}
@@ -2493,9 +2503,8 @@ static void ieee80211_invoke_rx_handlers
}
/*
- * This function makes calls into the RX path. Therefore the
- * caller must hold the sta_info->lock and everything has to
- * be under rcu_read_lock protection as well.
+ * This function makes calls into the RX path, therefore
+ * it has to be invoked under RCU read lock.
*/
void ieee80211_release_reorder_timeout(struct sta_info *sta, int tid)
{
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: bttv: No analogue sound output by TV card
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab @ 2010-10-07 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Atterer; +Cc: linux-media
In-Reply-To: <20101007205540.GA3640@arbonne.lan>
Em 07-10-2010 17:55, Richard Atterer escreveu:
> Hello,
>
> my problem is still present in 2.6.36-rc7, the log output is unchanged from
> rc5.
>
> All the best,
> Richard
>
> On Fri, Oct 01, 2010 at 12:19:53AM +0200, Richard Atterer wrote:
>> [Please CC me, I'm not on the list.]
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> after switching from 2.6.34 to 2.6.36-rc5, the sound on my old Hauppauge
>> analogue TV card has stopped working. Audio out from the TV card is
>> connected to line-in of my motherboard (Gigabyte EG45M-DS2H) using the
>> short cable that came with the TV card. Other audio sources (e.g. MP3
>> player) are audible when connected to line-in. The TV picture is fine.
>>
>> The log messages look really similar for the two kernels.
>>
>> 2.6.34 works:
>> kernel: bttv: driver version 0.9.18 loaded
>> kernel: bttv: using 8 buffers with 2080k (520 pages) each for capture
>> kernel: bttv: Bt8xx card found (0).
>> kernel: bttv0: Bt878 (rev 17) at 0000:03:01.0, irq: 19, latency: 32, mmio: 0xe3600000
>> kernel: bttv0: detected: Hauppauge WinTV [card=10], PCI subsystem ID is 0070:13eb
>> kernel: bttv0: using: Hauppauge (bt878) [card=10,autodetected]
>> kernel: IRQ 19/bttv0: IRQF_DISABLED is not guaranteed on shared IRQs
>> kernel: bttv0: gpio: en=00000000, out=00000000 in=00ffffdb [init]
>> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge/Voodoo msp34xx: reset line init [5]
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: Hauppauge model 44354, rev D147, serial# 1234567
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: tuner model is LG TP18PSB01D (idx 47, type 28)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: TV standards PAL(B/G) (eeprom 0x04)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: audio processor is MSP3415 (idx 6)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: has radio
>> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge eeprom indicates model#44354
>> kernel: bttv0: tuner type=28
>> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: MSP3415D-B3 found @ 0x80 (bt878 #0 [sw])
>> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: msp3400 supports nicam, mode is autodetect
>> kernel: tuner 1-0061: chip found @ 0xc2 (bt878 #0 [sw])
>> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: creating new instance
>> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: type set to 28 (LG PAL_BG+FM (TPI8PSB01D))
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device video0
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device vbi0
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device radio0
>> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 .
>> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 . ok
>> kernel: ok
>>
>> 2.6.36-rc5 does not work:
>> kernel: bttv: driver version 0.9.18 loaded
>> kernel: bttv: using 8 buffers with 2080k (520 pages) each for capture
>> kernel: bttv: Bt8xx card found (0).
>> kernel: bttv0: Bt878 (rev 17) at 0000:03:01.0, irq: 19, latency: 32, mmio: 0xe3600000
>> kernel: bttv0: detected: Hauppauge WinTV [card=10], PCI subsystem ID is 0070:13eb
>> kernel: bttv0: using: Hauppauge (bt878) [card=10,autodetected]
>> kernel: bttv0: gpio: en=00000000, out=00000000 in=00ffffdb [init]
>> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge/Voodoo msp34xx: reset line init [5]
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: Hauppauge model 44354, rev D147, serial# 1234567
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: tuner model is LG TP18PSB01D (idx 47, type 28)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: TV standards PAL(B/G) (eeprom 0x04)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: audio processor is MSP3415 (idx 6)
>> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: has radio
>> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge eeprom indicates model#44354
>> kernel: bttv0: tuner type=28
>> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: MSP3415D-B3 found @ 0x80 (bt878 #0 [sw])
>> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: msp3400 supports nicam, mode is autodetect
>> kernel: tuner 1-0061: chip found @ 0xc2 (bt878 #0 [sw])
>> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: creating new instance
>> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: type set to 28 (LG PAL_BG+FM (TPI8PSB01D))
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device video0
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device vbi0
>> kernel: bttv0: registered device radio0
>> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 . ok
>>
>> The only real change is that the IRQF_DISABLED warning is gone.
>
I can't remember of any functional changes at sound stuff that might cause such trouble.
The better would be if you could bisect what patch broke it and point it to us.
Thanks,
Mauro
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Questions on interrupt vector assignment on MPC8641D
From: david.hagood @ 2010-10-07 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Wood; +Cc: david.hagood, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
In-Reply-To: <20101007152626.4e834d43@udp111988uds.am.freescale.net>
> On Thu, 7 Oct 2010 15:12:26 -0500.
>
> BTW, the MSIs are already described in an msi node in the device tree.
As far as I can tell, ONLY in root complex mode, not in endpoint mode,
which is what I am working with.
What I want is a means by which the system root complex can generate one
or more interrupts INTO the 8641 when it is operating in endpoint mode.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] serial: DCC(JTAG) serial and console emulation support
From: Daniel Walker @ 2010-10-07 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Frysinger
Cc: linux-kernel, Hyok S. Choi, Tony Lindgren, Jeff Ohlstein,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Ben Dooks, Alan Cox, Kukjin Kim, Feng Tang,
Tobias Klauser, Jason Wessel, Philippe Langlais
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinDvL9vPb6nmve3rO9dMtMAqh=d1oqBVTOHzYWH@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 16:47 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 16:06, Daniel Walker wrote:
> > On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 16:02 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote:
> >> how is that any different from:
> >> ln -s ttyJ0 /dev/ttyS0
> >
> > It has the same major and minors as ttyS* does. So you don't have to run
> > anything on the target.
>
> i dont see how those things are related. the major/minor are
> irrelevant, unless you've already hard coded these in some app that
> creates device nodes manually (instead of mdev/udev), but even then
> that's something that "needs to be run on the target". and both
> already have config support to transparently do something like
> "symlink ttyS# to XXX" as XXX is created.
Something does ultimately run on all targets, the issues is does the
person debugging have the ability to change it .. It's not always the
case that they can change it. The userspace may not have udev at all.
The userspace may consist of a single binary .. I'm not making any
assumptions about the userspace here, it can be anything.
Daniel
--
Sent by a consultant of the Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] sched: use the old min_vruntime when normalizing on dequeue
From: Dima Zavin @ 2010-10-07 21:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Mike Galbraith, Dima Zavin,
Arve Hjønnevåg
In-Reply-To: <1285742774-5013-2-git-send-email-dima@android.com>
Mike,
Thanks for the Ack for patch 1/2, could you take a look at this one too?
Should I re-upload the series as v2 or you can pick the latest from
patch 1 and take this one?
--Dima
On Tue, Sep 28, 2010 at 11:46 PM, Dima Zavin <dima@android.com> wrote:
> After pulling the thread off the run-queue during a cgroup change,
> the cfs_rq.min_vruntime gets recalculated. The dequeued thread's vruntime
> then gets normalized to this new value. This can then lead to the thread
> getting an unfair boost in the new group if the vruntime of the next
> task in the old run-queue was way further ahead.
>
> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dima Zavin <dima@android.com>
> ---
> kernel/sched_fair.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sched_fair.c b/kernel/sched_fair.c
> index 008fe57..cb24ddb 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched_fair.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched_fair.c
> @@ -802,6 +802,8 @@ static void clear_buddies(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
> static void
> dequeue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
> {
> + u64 min_vruntime;
> +
> /*
> * Update run-time statistics of the 'current'.
> */
> @@ -826,6 +828,8 @@ dequeue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
> if (se != cfs_rq->curr)
> __dequeue_entity(cfs_rq, se);
> account_entity_dequeue(cfs_rq, se);
> +
> + min_vruntime = cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
> update_min_vruntime(cfs_rq);
>
> /*
> @@ -834,7 +838,7 @@ dequeue_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags)
> * movement in our normalized position.
> */
> if (!(flags & DEQUEUE_SLEEP))
> - se->vruntime -= cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
> + se->vruntime -= min_vruntime;
> }
>
> /*
> --
> 1.6.6
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] drivers:staging:ti-st: move TI_ST from staging
From: Alan Cox @ 2010-10-07 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Savoy, Pavan
Cc: Jiri Slaby, gregkh@suse.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
devel@driverdev.osuosl.org, linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <19F8576C6E063C45BE387C64729E739404AA21D248@dbde02.ent.ti.com>
> But, I want to attach my data not when ldsic is opened, but when ldisc is registered.
> I want to begin accessing the data when ldisc is opened.
How can you attach per tty data when the ldisc is registered - the
relevant tty driver might not even have been loaded at that point. The
user may not even have been to the shop and bought it even !
What sort of data is this ?
> to be like a bunch of helpers (1 for FM, 1 for GPS, 1 for NFC, 1 for power-management), also the problem of who owns the /dev/tty begins to occur, Bluetooth has a utility called hciattach, I don't want my FM radio software to run hciattach when /dev/radio0 is opened and communicated via FM.
I would have assumed the hotplug script would have run your own attach
and daemon and the FM radio etc would talk to the ldisc via other kernel
interfaces it presented.
So whenever the hardware is detected it would load the hardware driver
The hardware driver would create a tty instance for each physical port
The hotplug user space would run 'ti-st-attach' as a helper which would
load the ldisc and set up the bluetooth as well as providing exported
methods for FM radio etc.
> In any case, the ti-st/ seems better now by look of things, I certainly welcome suggestions to improve it.
> Also, is there any plan to re-write whole of TTY like a the i2C or the SPI bus structure?
>
> Here I can imagine, all TTY line disciplines being sort of protocol/client drivers, the TTY sub-system in itself would be like the algos driver and then
> The uart drivers (like 8250.c) can be the adapter drivers.. What say?
They already are, with the one oddity being that something needs to have
it opened from user space and to attach the ldisc. Thats fixable but hard
to fix and I'm not aware of any plan to do so - mostly because nobody
needs it so far.
Alan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] net: Fix rxq ref counting
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2010-10-07 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Herbert; +Cc: davem, netdev
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.1.00.1010071304240.4792@pokey.mtv.corp.google.com>
Le jeudi 07 octobre 2010 à 13:09 -0700, Tom Herbert a écrit :
> The rx->count reference is used to track reference counts to the
> number of rx-queue kobjects created for the device. This patch
> eliminates initialization of the counter in netif_alloc_rx_queues
> and instead increments the counter each time a kobject is created.
> This is now symmetric with the decrement that is done when an object is
> released.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> index 7d14955..58b31d1 100644
> --- a/net/core/dev.c
> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> @@ -5026,7 +5026,6 @@ static int netif_alloc_rx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
> dev->_rx = rx;
> - atomic_set(&rx->count, count);
>
> /*
> * Set a pointer to first element in the array which holds the
> diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> index fa81fd0..b143173 100644
> --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> @@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ static struct kobj_type rx_queue_ktype = {
> static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct net_device *net, int index)
> {
> struct netdev_rx_queue *queue = net->_rx + index;
> + struct netdev_rx_queue *first = queue->first;
> struct kobject *kobj = &queue->kobj;
> int error = 0;
>
> @@ -738,6 +739,7 @@ static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct net_device *net, int index)
> }
>
> kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
> + atomic_inc(&first->count);
>
> return error;
> }
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next-2.6] net: Fix rxq ref counting
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2010-10-07 20:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Herbert; +Cc: davem, netdev
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.1.00.1010071304240.4792@pokey.mtv.corp.google.com>
Le jeudi 07 octobre 2010 à 13:09 -0700, Tom Herbert a écrit :
> The rx->count reference is used to track reference counts to the
> number of rx-queue kobjects created for the device. This patch
> eliminates initialization of the counter in netif_alloc_rx_queues
> and instead increments the counter each time a kobject is created.
> This is now symmetric with the decrement that is done when an object is
> released.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> index 7d14955..58b31d1 100644
> --- a/net/core/dev.c
> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> @@ -5026,7 +5026,6 @@ static int netif_alloc_rx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
> dev->_rx = rx;
> - atomic_set(&rx->count, count);
>
> /*
> * Set a pointer to first element in the array which holds the
> diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> index fa81fd0..b143173 100644
> --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
> @@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ static struct kobj_type rx_queue_ktype = {
> static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct net_device *net, int index)
> {
> struct netdev_rx_queue *queue = net->_rx + index;
> + struct netdev_rx_queue *first = queue->first;
> struct kobject *kobj = &queue->kobj;
> int error = 0;
>
> @@ -738,6 +739,7 @@ static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct net_device *net, int index)
> }
>
> kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
> + atomic_inc(&first->count);
>
> return error;
> }
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: bttv: No analogue sound output by TV card
From: Richard Atterer @ 2010-10-07 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mchehab; +Cc: linux-media
In-Reply-To: <20100930221953.GA7062@arbonne.lan>
Hello,
my problem is still present in 2.6.36-rc7, the log output is unchanged from
rc5.
All the best,
Richard
On Fri, Oct 01, 2010 at 12:19:53AM +0200, Richard Atterer wrote:
> [Please CC me, I'm not on the list.]
>
> Hi,
>
> after switching from 2.6.34 to 2.6.36-rc5, the sound on my old Hauppauge
> analogue TV card has stopped working. Audio out from the TV card is
> connected to line-in of my motherboard (Gigabyte EG45M-DS2H) using the
> short cable that came with the TV card. Other audio sources (e.g. MP3
> player) are audible when connected to line-in. The TV picture is fine.
>
> The log messages look really similar for the two kernels.
>
> 2.6.34 works:
> kernel: bttv: driver version 0.9.18 loaded
> kernel: bttv: using 8 buffers with 2080k (520 pages) each for capture
> kernel: bttv: Bt8xx card found (0).
> kernel: bttv0: Bt878 (rev 17) at 0000:03:01.0, irq: 19, latency: 32, mmio: 0xe3600000
> kernel: bttv0: detected: Hauppauge WinTV [card=10], PCI subsystem ID is 0070:13eb
> kernel: bttv0: using: Hauppauge (bt878) [card=10,autodetected]
> kernel: IRQ 19/bttv0: IRQF_DISABLED is not guaranteed on shared IRQs
> kernel: bttv0: gpio: en=00000000, out=00000000 in=00ffffdb [init]
> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge/Voodoo msp34xx: reset line init [5]
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: Hauppauge model 44354, rev D147, serial# 1234567
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: tuner model is LG TP18PSB01D (idx 47, type 28)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: TV standards PAL(B/G) (eeprom 0x04)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: audio processor is MSP3415 (idx 6)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: has radio
> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge eeprom indicates model#44354
> kernel: bttv0: tuner type=28
> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: MSP3415D-B3 found @ 0x80 (bt878 #0 [sw])
> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: msp3400 supports nicam, mode is autodetect
> kernel: tuner 1-0061: chip found @ 0xc2 (bt878 #0 [sw])
> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: creating new instance
> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: type set to 28 (LG PAL_BG+FM (TPI8PSB01D))
> kernel: bttv0: registered device video0
> kernel: bttv0: registered device vbi0
> kernel: bttv0: registered device radio0
> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 .
> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 . ok
> kernel: ok
>
> 2.6.36-rc5 does not work:
> kernel: bttv: driver version 0.9.18 loaded
> kernel: bttv: using 8 buffers with 2080k (520 pages) each for capture
> kernel: bttv: Bt8xx card found (0).
> kernel: bttv0: Bt878 (rev 17) at 0000:03:01.0, irq: 19, latency: 32, mmio: 0xe3600000
> kernel: bttv0: detected: Hauppauge WinTV [card=10], PCI subsystem ID is 0070:13eb
> kernel: bttv0: using: Hauppauge (bt878) [card=10,autodetected]
> kernel: bttv0: gpio: en=00000000, out=00000000 in=00ffffdb [init]
> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge/Voodoo msp34xx: reset line init [5]
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: Hauppauge model 44354, rev D147, serial# 1234567
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: tuner model is LG TP18PSB01D (idx 47, type 28)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: TV standards PAL(B/G) (eeprom 0x04)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: audio processor is MSP3415 (idx 6)
> kernel: tveeprom 1-0050: has radio
> kernel: bttv0: Hauppauge eeprom indicates model#44354
> kernel: bttv0: tuner type=28
> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: MSP3415D-B3 found @ 0x80 (bt878 #0 [sw])
> kernel: msp3400 1-0040: msp3400 supports nicam, mode is autodetect
> kernel: tuner 1-0061: chip found @ 0xc2 (bt878 #0 [sw])
> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: creating new instance
> kernel: tuner-simple 1-0061: type set to 28 (LG PAL_BG+FM (TPI8PSB01D))
> kernel: bttv0: registered device video0
> kernel: bttv0: registered device vbi0
> kernel: bttv0: registered device radio0
> kernel: bttv0: PLL: 28636363 => 35468950 . ok
>
> The only real change is that the IRQF_DISABLED warning is gone.
--
__ ,
| ) /| Richard Atterer
| \/ | http://atterer.org
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] dell-laptop: Add hwswitch_only module parameter
From: Mario Limonciello @ 2010-10-07 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Garrett
Cc: Keng-Yu Lin, len.brown, alan-jenkins, platform-driver-x86,
linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20101007205049.GB32726@srcf.ucam.org>
Hi Matthew:
On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 15:50, Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 07, 2010 at 03:49:05PM -0500, Mario Limonciello wrote:
>> Hi Matthew:
>> > Is the kernel able to unblock it under those circumstances?
>>
>> Manually running rfkill unblock will unblock it in this broken
>> firmware scenario in question.
>
> So the issue is in the firmware's response to the keystroke? Ok. I'd
> rather have a DMI list of the broken machines than a module parameter.
Yes the issue is the firmware's response to the keystroke. The
intention here is to individual submit machines in future patches as
they're discovered. The parameter's primary purpose is to assist in
building the list. If someone reports a bug with these symptoms, they
can add the parameter to their kernel command line, and report if it
helps them. If it helps, their machine can be added to the DMI table.
--
Mario Limonciello
superm1@gmail.com
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v1 4/4] keys: add new key-type encrypted
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Mimi Zohar, linux-security-module, keyrings, linux-crypto,
David Howells, James Morris, David Safford, Rajiv Andrade,
Mimi Zohar
In-Reply-To: <1286484734-3119-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Defines a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are
kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with
a 'trusted' symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted
in the kernel. Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
Changelog:
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
---
include/keys/encrypted-type.h | 30 ++
security/Kconfig | 16 +
security/keys/Makefile | 1 +
security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 782 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/encrypted_defined.h | 52 +++
5 files changed, 881 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/encrypted-type.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.h
diff --git a/include/keys/encrypted-type.h b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2312e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* encrypted-type.h: encrypted-defined key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+struct encrypted_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */
+ char *master_desc; /* datablob: master key name */
+ char *datalen; /* datablob: decrypted key length */
+ void *iv; /* datablob: iv */
+ void *encrypted_data; /* datablob: encrypted key */
+ unsigned short datablob_len; /* length of datablob */
+ unsigned short decrypted_datalen; /* decrypted data length */
+ char decrypted_data[0]; /* decrypted data + datablob + hmac */
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_ENCRYPTED_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 38fdaf6..d591398 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -36,6 +36,22 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+ tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+ in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
+ which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
+ 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
+ Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index fcb1070..6c94105 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ obj-y := \
user_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68fff82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
@@ -0,0 +1,782 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: encrypted_defined.c
+ *
+ * Defines a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys
+ * are kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted
+ * using a 'master' key. The 'master' key can either be a trusted-key or
+ * user-key type. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the
+ * kernel. Userspace ever only sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+ *
+ * keyctl add "encrypted" "name" "NEW master-key-name keylen" ring
+ * keyctl add "encrypted" "name" "LOAD master-key-name keylen hex_blob" ring
+ * keyctl update keyid "UPDATE master-key-name"
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+
+#include "encrypted_defined.h"
+
+static char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
+static char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
+static int hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+static char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
+static int ivsize;
+static int blksize;
+
+static int aes_get_sizes(int *ivsize, int *blksize)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ *ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ *blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1, Opt_new = 1, Opt_load, Opt_NEW, Opt_LOAD
+};
+
+static match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_NEW, "NEW"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_LOAD, "LOAD"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
+ *
+ * datablob format:
+ * NEW <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * LOAD <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data>
+ *
+ * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
+ * which is null terminated.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc,
+ char **decrypted_datalen, char **hex_encoded_iv,
+ char **hex_encoded_data)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *p;
+
+ p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!p)
+ return ret;
+ key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+ *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*master_desc)
+ goto out;
+ *decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*decrypted_datalen)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ case Opt_NEW:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ case Opt_LOAD:
+ *hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!*hex_encoded_iv)
+ break;
+ *hex_encoded_data = *hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* datablob_format - format as an ascii string, before copying to userspace */
+static int datablob_format(char __user *buffer,
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ int asciiblob_len)
+{
+ char *ascii_buf, *bufp;
+ char *iv = (char *)epayload->iv;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int len;
+ int i;
+
+ ascii_buf = kzalloc(asciiblob_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s ", epayload->master_desc,
+ epayload->datalen);
+
+ /* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */
+ bufp = &ascii_buf[len];
+ for (i = 0; i < (asciiblob_len - len) / 2; i++)
+ bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, iv[i]);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
+ *
+ * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
+ * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
+ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
+ */
+static struct key *request_trusted_key(char *trusted_desc, void **master_key,
+ unsigned int *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
+ struct key *tkey;
+
+ tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(tkey))
+ goto error;
+
+ tpayload = tkey->payload.data;
+ *master_key = tpayload->key;
+ *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
+error:
+ return tkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * request_user_key - request the user key
+ *
+ * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_user_key(char *master_desc, void **master_key,
+ unsigned int *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ struct key *ukey;
+
+ ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ukey))
+ goto error;
+
+ upayload = ukey->payload.data;
+ *master_key = upayload->data;
+ *master_keylen = (unsigned int)upayload->datalen;
+error:
+ return ukey;
+}
+
+static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc, char *alg)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
+ alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
+ ret = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ ret = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (ret)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int calc_hmac(char *digest, char *key, int keylen,
+ char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = init_desc(&desc, hmac_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen);
+ ret = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, buf, buflen);
+ ret = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, buflen);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+out:
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int calc_hash(char *digest, void *buf, int buflen)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = init_desc(&desc, hash_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, buf, buflen);
+ ret = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, buflen);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
+
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
+static int get_derived_key(char *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
+ void *master_key, unsigned int master_keylen)
+{
+ char derived_buf[hash_size + 10];
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(derived_buf, 0, sizeof derived_buf);
+ if (key_type)
+ strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
+ else
+ strcpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY");
+
+ memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
+ master_keylen);
+ ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, sizeof derived_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const void *key,
+ unsigned int key_len, void *iv, int ivsize)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
+ blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ void **master_key,
+ unsigned int *master_keylen)
+{
+ struct key *mkey;
+
+ mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc,
+ master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey)) {
+ mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc,
+ master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey)) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: trusted/user key %s not found",
+ epayload->master_desc);
+ return mkey;
+ }
+ }
+ dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
+ return mkey;
+}
+
+/* Before returning data to userspace, encrypt decrypted data. */
+static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ void *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg_in[2];
+ struct scatterlist sg_out[1];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned int padlen;
+ char pad[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen;
+
+ ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
+ epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+
+ memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
+ sg_init_table(sg_in, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen);
+
+ sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+ sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret);
+ else
+ dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ void *master_key, unsigned int master_keylen)
+{
+ char derived_key[hash_size];
+ char *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(derived_key, 0, sizeof derived_key);
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ digest = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
+ epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ if (!ret)
+ dump_hmac(NULL, digest, hash_size);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */
+static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ void *master_key, unsigned int master_keylen)
+{
+ char derived_key[hash_size];
+ char digest[hash_size];
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(derived_key, 0, sizeof derived_key);
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ memset(digest, 0, sizeof digest);
+ ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
+ epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ sizeof digest);
+ if (ret) {
+ dump_hmac("datablob",
+ epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ hash_size);
+ dump_hmac("calc", digest, hash_size);
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ void *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keylen)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg_in[1];
+ struct scatterlist sg_out[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ char pad[16];
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen,
+ epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad);
+ sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+ sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data,
+ (unsigned int)epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad);
+
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ dump_decrypted_data(epayload);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */
+static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
+ const char *master_desc,
+ char *datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+ unsigned short datablob_len;
+ unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
+ size_t encrypted_datalen;
+ long dlen;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
+ if (ret < 0 || dlen < 20 || dlen > hash_size)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ decrypted_datalen = (unsigned short)dlen;
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+
+ datablob_len = strlen(master_desc) + 1 + strlen(datalen) + 1
+ + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, decrypted_datalen + datablob_len
+ + hash_size + 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + decrypted_datalen +
+ datablob_len + hash_size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!epayload)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+ epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
+ return epayload;
+}
+
+static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ char *hex_encoded_iv, char *hex_encoded_data)
+{
+ char derived_key[hash_size];
+ struct key *mkey;
+ void *master_key;
+ unsigned int master_keylen;
+ size_t encrypted_datalen;
+ char *hmac;
+ int ret;
+
+ encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize);
+ hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize);
+ hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data, encrypted_datalen);
+
+ hmac = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2), hash_size);
+
+ mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+ ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memset(derived_key, 0, sizeof derived_key);
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = derived_key_decrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to decrypt key (%d)\n", ret);
+out:
+ key_put(mkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ char *master_desc, char *datalen)
+{
+ epayload->master_desc = epayload->decrypted_data
+ + epayload->decrypted_datalen;
+ epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1;
+ epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1;
+ epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1;
+
+ memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc));
+ memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen));
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
+ *
+ * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
+ * itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ */
+static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ char *master_desc, char *datalen,
+ char *hex_encoded_iv, char *hex_encoded_data)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ __ekey_init(epayload, master_desc, datalen);
+ if (!hex_encoded_data) {
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+
+ get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ } else
+ ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, hex_encoded_iv,
+ hex_encoded_data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
+ *
+ * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
+ * based on a kernel random number.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
+ char *datablob = NULL;
+ char *master_desc = NULL;
+ char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
+ char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+ char *hex_encoded_data = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen,
+ &hex_encoded_iv, &hex_encoded_data);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, master_desc, decrypted_datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen,
+ hex_encoded_iv, hex_encoded_data);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, epayload);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ return ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret;
+}
+
+static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+
+ epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
+ memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ kfree(epayload);
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_update - update the master key description
+ *
+ * Change the master key description for an existing encrypted key.
+ * The next read will return an encrypted datablob using the new
+ * master key description.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
+ char *buf;
+ char *new_master_desc = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
+ new_master_desc = strsep(&buf, " \t");
+ if (!*new_master_desc) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc,
+ epayload->datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ __ekey_init(new_epayload, new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+
+ memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
+ memcpy(new_epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_epayload);
+ call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace
+ *
+ * The resulting datablob format is:
+ * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
+ *
+ * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user * buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
+ struct key *mkey;
+ void *master_key;
+ unsigned int master_keylen;
+ char derived_key[hash_size];
+ int asciiblob_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+
+ /* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
+ asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
+ + roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize)
+ + (hash_size * 2);
+
+ if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+ return asciiblob_len;
+
+ mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ return PTR_ERR(mkey);
+
+ memset(derived_key, 0, sizeof derived_key);
+ ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = datablob_format(buffer, epayload, asciiblob_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ key_put(mkey);
+ return asciiblob_len;
+out:
+ key_put(mkey);
+ return ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ *
+ * Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the descrypted
+ * key data.
+ */
+static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+
+ if (!epayload)
+ return;
+
+ memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
+ .name = "encrypted",
+ .instantiate = encrypted_instantiate,
+ .update = encrypted_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .destroy = encrypted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = encrypted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted);
+
+static int __init init_encrypted(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = aes_get_sizes(&ivsize, &blksize);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_encrypted);
+module_exit(cleanup_encrypted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e0b6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+#define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
+
+#define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0
+
+#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_master_key(void *master_key, unsigned int master_keylen)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "master key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ master_key, (size_t) master_keylen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "decrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ epayload->decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "encrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1,
+ epayload->encrypted_data, (size_t) encrypted_datalen, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(char *str, void *digest, unsigned int hmac_size)
+{
+ if (str)
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: %s", str);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "hmac: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, digest,
+ (size_t) hmac_size, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_master_key(void *master_key, unsigned int master_keylen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ unsigned int encrypted_datalen)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_hmac(char *str, void *digest, int hmac_size)
+{
+}
+#endif
+#endif
--
1.7.2.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v1 2/4] key: add tpm_send command
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Mimi Zohar, linux-security-module, keyrings, linux-crypto,
David Howells, James Morris, David Safford, Rajiv Andrade
In-Reply-To: <1286484734-3119-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add internal kernel tpm_send() command used to seal/unseal keys.
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Reviewd-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tpm.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 7c41335..5987d9c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -780,6 +780,23 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
+int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, char *cmd, int buflen)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, (struct tpm_cmd_t *)cmd, buflen,
+ "attempting tpm_cmd");
+
+ module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
+
ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index ac5d1c1..a0ecaa9 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, char *cmd, int buflen);
#else
static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
return -ENODEV;
@@ -38,5 +39,7 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) {
static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) {
return -ENODEV;
}
+static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, char *cmd, int buflen) {
+ return -ENODEV;
#endif
#endif
--
1.7.2.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v1 0/4] keys: trusted and encrypted keys
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Mimi Zohar, linux-security-module, keyrings, linux-crypto,
David Howells, James Morris, David Safford, Rajiv Andrade
Since the original posting, the encrypted keys are started at
late_initcall, in order to wait for the crypto API to be
initialized, minor changes were made to Kconfig, and the
TPM Maintainer acked the second patch.
Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are
variable length symmetic keys, and in both cases all keys are
created in the kernel, and user space sees, stores, and loads
only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability of a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while
Encrypted Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs,
are displayed and loaded in hex ascii for convenience, and
are integrity verified.
Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys.
Keys are sealed under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally
sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement) values, and only
unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity verifications match.
A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new (future) PCR values,
so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as when the
kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many
saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are
easily supported.
Trusted Keys are sealed under the SRK, which must have the default
authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership
time with the trouser's utility "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
Usage:
keyctl add trusted name "NEW keylen [hex_pcrinfo]" ring
keyctl add trusted name "LOAD hex_blob" ring
keyctl update key "UPDATE hex_pcrinfo"
keyctl print keyid
keyctl pipe keyid > filename
The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper
limit is to fit within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with
all necessary structure/padding. The keywords NEW, LOAD, and
UPDATE can be all upper or all lower case.
Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they
use AES for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel
generated random numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a
specified 'master' key. The 'master' key can either be a trusted-key
or user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if
they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the
user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in
boot.
Usage:
keyctl add encrypted name "NEW master-key-name keylen" ring
keyctl add encrypted name "LOAD master-key-name keylen hex_blob" ring
keyctl update keyid "UPDATE master-key-name"
The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time
needs a high quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file
metadata. The use of a trusted key provides strong guarantees
that the EVM key has not been compromised by a user level problem,
and when sealed to specific boot PCR values, protects against
boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and encrypted
keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated.
Mimi Zohar
Dave Safford
Mimi Zohar (4):
lib: hex2bin converts ascii hexadecimal string to binary
key: add tpm_send command
keys: add new trusted key-type
keys: add new key-type encrypted
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 17 +
include/keys/encrypted-type.h | 30 ++
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 33 ++
include/linux/kernel.h | 1 +
include/linux/tpm.h | 3 +
lib/hexdump.c | 16 +
security/Kconfig | 31 ++
security/keys/Makefile | 2 +
security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 782 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/encrypted_defined.h | 52 ++
security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 997 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 125 +++++
12 files changed, 2089 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/encrypted-type.h
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted-type.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted_defined.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.h
--
1.7.2.2
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v1 3/4] keys: add new trusted key-type
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Mimi Zohar, linux-security-module, keyrings, linux-crypto,
David Howells, James Morris, David Safford, Rajiv Andrade,
Mimi Zohar
In-Reply-To: <1286484734-3119-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Defines a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are TPM
generated random numbers, RSA sealed by the TPM, and only unsealed by
the TPM, if boot PCRs and other criteria match. Trusted keys are
created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel. Userspace ever only
sees/stores encrypted blobs.
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 33 ++
security/Kconfig | 15 +
security/keys/Makefile | 1 +
security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 997 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 125 +++++
5 files changed, 1171 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted-type.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.h
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be7d44e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* trusted-type.h: trusted-defined key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320
+#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
+
+struct trusted_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */
+ unsigned int key_len;
+ unsigned int blob_len;
+ unsigned int pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bd72ae6..38fdaf6 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -21,6 +21,21 @@ config KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+ tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ help
+ This option provides support for creating/sealing/unsealing keys
+ in the kernel. Trusted keys are TPM generated random numbers
+ symmetric keys, RSA sealed by the TPM, and only unsealed by the
+ TPM, if boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace ever only
+ sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 74d5447..fcb1070 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ obj-y := \
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aedad16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
@@ -0,0 +1,997 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: trusted_defined.c
+ *
+ * Defines a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are
+ * TPM generated random numbers, RSA sealed by the TPM, and only unsealed
+ * by the TPM, if boot PCRs and other criteria match. Trusted keys are
+ * created/sealed/unsealed in the kernel. Userspace ever only sees/stores
+ * encrypted blobs.
+ *
+ * Keys are sealed under the SRK, which must have the default
+ * authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership
+ * time with the trouser's utility "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * keyctl add trusted name "NEW keylen [hex_pcrinfo]" ring
+ * keyctl add trusted name "LOAD hex_blob" ring
+ * keyctl update key "UPDATE hex_pcrinfo"
+ * keyctl print keyid
+ * keys can be 32 - 128 bytes, blob max is 1024 hex ascii characters
+ * binary pcrinfo max is 512 hex ascii characters
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#include "trusted_defined.h"
+
+static char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+static int init_sha1_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (rc)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int init_hmac_desc(struct hash_desc *desc, unsigned char *key,
+ int keylen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ crypto_hash_setkey(desc->tfm, key, keylen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (rc)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_sha1(unsigned char *data, int datalen, unsigned char *digest)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, datalen);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, datalen);
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ va_list argp;
+ int error;
+
+ error = init_hmac_desc(&desc, key, keylen);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = (unsigned char *)va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, dlen);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ }
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ va_end(argp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+ unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+{
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char c;
+ int rc;
+
+ va_list argp;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ c = h3;
+ va_start(argp, h3);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = (unsigned char *)va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, dlen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, uint32_t command,
+ unsigned char *ononce, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce;
+ unsigned char *continueflag;
+ unsigned char *authdata;
+ unsigned char testhmac[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int rc;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+ return -1;
+ authdata = buffer + bufsize - TPM_HASH_SIZE;
+ continueflag = authdata - 1;
+ enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ sg_init_one(sg, &result, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(sg, &ordinal, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ sg_init_one(sg, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+ if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, uint32_t command,
+ unsigned char *ononce, unsigned char *key1,
+ unsigned int keylen1, unsigned char *key2,
+ unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce1;
+ unsigned char *continueflag1;
+ unsigned char *authdata1;
+ unsigned char *enonce2;
+ unsigned char *continueflag2;
+ unsigned char *authdata2;
+ unsigned char testhmac1[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char testhmac2[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int rc;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+ return -1;
+ authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (TPM_HASH_SIZE + 1
+ + TPM_HASH_SIZE + TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+ continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+ enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+ enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ sg_init_one(sg, &result, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(sg, &ordinal, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen2);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ sg_init_one(sg, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ }
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+ if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_tpm_send(u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, int buflen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int tpm_reset(struct tpm_buf *tb)
+{
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_RESET_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_RESET);
+ return trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the TPM random number generator for all new keys and nonces
+ */
+static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
+ store32(tb, len);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_RETURN, len);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int srkosap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s)
+{
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char key[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+ store16(tb, SRKKEYTYPE);
+ store32(tb, SRKHANDLE);
+ storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ memset(key, 0, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE]),
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE +
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, TPM_HASH_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t * handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE],
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).
+ */
+static int srkseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ unsigned char *data, int datalen,
+ unsigned char *blob, unsigned int *bloblen,
+ unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+ struct osapsess sess;
+ unsigned char encauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char pubauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char xorwork[TPM_HASH_SIZE * 2];
+ unsigned char xorhash[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char dummyauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char cont;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t pcrsize;
+ uint32_t datsize;
+ int sealinfosize;
+ int encdatasize;
+ int storedsize;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(dummyauth, 0, sizeof dummyauth);
+
+ ret = srkosap(tb, &sess);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ dump_sess(&sess);
+
+ /* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+ memcpy(xorwork, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ memcpy(xorwork + TPM_HASH_SIZE, sess.enonce, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ ret = TSS_sha1(xorwork, TPM_HASH_SIZE * 2, xorhash);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ datsize = htonl(datalen);
+ pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+ cont = 0;
+
+ /* encrypt data authorization key */
+ for (i = 0; i < TPM_HASH_SIZE; ++i)
+ encauth[i] = xorhash[i] ^ dummyauth[i];
+
+ /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+ if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+ /* no pcr info specified */
+ TSS_authhmac(pubauth, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, TPM_HASH_SIZE, encauth,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, &pcrsize, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ /* pcr info specified */
+ TSS_authhmac(pubauth, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, TPM_HASH_SIZE, encauth,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, &pcrsize, pcrinfosize,
+ pcrinfo, TPM_U32_SIZE, &datsize, datalen,
+ data, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ store32(tb, SRKHANDLE);
+ storebytes(tb, encauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+ storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+ store32(tb, datalen);
+ storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
+ store32(tb, sess.handle);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, pubauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+ sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE +
+ TPM_U32_SIZE + sealinfosize);
+ storedsize = TPM_U32_SIZE + TPM_U32_SIZE + sealinfosize +
+ TPM_U32_SIZE + encdatasize;
+
+ /* check the HMAC in the response */
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, sess.secret,
+ TPM_HASH_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, 0);
+
+ /* copy the returned blob to caller */
+ memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+ *bloblen = storedsize;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both SRK and blob
+ */
+static int srkunseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char dummyauth[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata1[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata2[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+ uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+ unsigned char cont = 0;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t keyhndl;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(dummyauth, 0, sizeof dummyauth);
+
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* network order for HMAC */
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ TSS_authhmac(authdata1, dummyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce1, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+ TSS_authhmac(authdata2, dummyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce2, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ store32(tb, SRKHANDLE);
+ storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
+ store32(tb, authhandle1);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata1, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, authhandle2);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata2, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+ dummyauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ dummyauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+ *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE, *datalen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new trusted key based on a TPM random number
+ */
+static int key_create(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, p->key, p->key_len);
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm_reset(tb);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_reset failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = srkseal(tb, p->key, p->key_len, p->blob,
+ &p->blob_len, p->pcrinfo, p->pcrinfo_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm_reset(tb);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_reset failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = srkunseal(tb, p->blob, p->blob_len, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+out:
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_new = 1, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+ Opt_NEW, Opt_LOAD, Opt_UPDATE
+};
+
+static match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_NEW, "NEW"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_LOAD, "LOAD"},
+ {Opt_update, "update"},
+ {Opt_UPDATE, "UPDATE"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
+ *
+ * datablob format:
+ * "NEW keylen [hex_pcrinfo]"
+ * "LOAD hex_blob"
+ * "UPDATE hex_pcrinfo"
+ *
+ * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
+ * which is null terminated.
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **keylen, char **pcrinfo,
+ char **hex_encoded_data)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *p;
+
+ p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!p)
+ return ret;
+ key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+ /* All key commands require at least one argument */
+ p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!p)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ case Opt_NEW:
+ *keylen = p;
+ ret = 0;
+ p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (p)
+ *pcrinfo = p;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ case Opt_LOAD:
+ *hex_encoded_data = p;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_update:
+ case Opt_UPDATE:
+ *pcrinfo = p;
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate payload.
+ */
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return p;
+ p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * safety check user inputs and fill in payload
+ */
+static int trusted_key_fill(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *asc_keylen,
+ char *hex_pcrinfo, char *hex_blob)
+{
+ long key_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (hex_blob) {
+ p->blob_len = strlen(hex_blob) / 2;
+ if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(p->blob, hex_blob, p->blob_len);
+ }
+ if (asc_keylen) {
+ ret = strict_strtol(asc_keylen, 10, &key_len);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (key_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE) ||
+ (key_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->key_len = key_len;
+ }
+ if (hex_pcrinfo) {
+ p->pcrinfo_len = strlen(hex_pcrinfo) / 2;
+ if (p->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(p->pcrinfo, hex_pcrinfo, p->pcrinfo_len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create an encryted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ char *hex_blob = NULL;
+ char *asc_keylen = NULL;
+ char *datablob;
+ char *hex_pcrinfo = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &asc_keylen, &hex_pcrinfo, &hex_blob);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ p = trusted_key_alloc(key);
+ if (!p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = trusted_key_fill(p, asc_keylen, hex_pcrinfo, hex_blob);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ dump_payload(p);
+
+ if (hex_blob) {
+ ret = key_unseal(p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (asc_keylen) {
+ ret = key_create(p);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = key_seal(p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+out:
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, p);
+ kfree(datablob);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+ char *hex_blob = NULL;
+ char *asc_keylen = NULL;
+ char *datablob;
+ char *hex_pcrinfo = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &asc_keylen, &hex_pcrinfo, &hex_blob);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ new_p = trusted_key_alloc(key);
+ if (!new_p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = trusted_key_fill(new_p, asc_keylen, hex_pcrinfo, hex_blob);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_fill failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+ new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+ memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+ dump_payload(p);
+ dump_payload(new_p);
+
+ ret = key_seal(new_p);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user * buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ char *ascii_buf;
+ char *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+
+ ascii_buf = kzalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = ascii_buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+
+ if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+ .name = "trusted",
+ .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+ .update = trusted_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .destroy = trusted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = trusted_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+module_init(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.h b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2d0c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+
+#define TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198
+#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_HASH_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
+#define TPM_U32_SIZE 4
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RETURN 14
+#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70
+#define TPM_RESET_SIZE 10
+#define TPM_ORD_RESET 90
+#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
+#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11
+#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
+#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10
+#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
+#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23
+#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24
+#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
+#define SRKKEYTYPE 4
+#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
+#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
+
+#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct tpm_buf {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char data[TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE];
+};
+
+#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
+
+struct osapsess {
+ uint32_t handle;
+ unsigned char secret[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+#define TPM_DEBUG 0
+
+#if TPM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", p->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->pcrinfo, p->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
+ len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char value)
+{
+ buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
+}
+
+static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint16_t value)
+{
+ *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof(value);
+}
+
+static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint32_t value)
+{
+ *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof(value);
+}
+
+static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char *in, int len)
+{
+ memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
+ buf->len += len;
+}
+#endif
--
1.7.2.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v1 1/4] lib: hex2bin converts ascii hexadecimal string to binary
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Mimi Zohar, linux-security-module, keyrings, linux-crypto,
David Howells, James Morris, David Safford, Rajiv Andrade,
Mimi Zohar
In-Reply-To: <1286484734-3119-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Similar to the kgdb_hex2mem() code, hex2bin converts a string
to binary using the hex_to_bin() library call.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 1 +
lib/hexdump.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 2b0a35e..69ddea8 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ static inline char *pack_hex_byte(char *buf, u8 byte)
}
extern int hex_to_bin(char ch);
+extern void hex2bin(unsigned char *mem, char *buf, int count);
#ifndef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
diff --git a/lib/hexdump.c b/lib/hexdump.c
index 5d7a480..66f96bb 100644
--- a/lib/hexdump.c
+++ b/lib/hexdump.c
@@ -34,6 +34,22 @@ int hex_to_bin(char ch)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex_to_bin);
/**
+ * hex2bin - convert an ascii hexadecimal string to its binary representation
+ * @mem: result
+ * @buf: ascii hexadecimal string
+ * @count: result length
+ */
+void hex2bin(unsigned char *mem, char *buf, int count)
+{
+ while (count--) {
+ *mem = hex_to_bin(*buf++) << 4;
+ *mem += hex_to_bin(*buf++);
+ mem++;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hex2bin);
+
+/**
* hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory
* @buf: data blob to dump
* @len: number of bytes in the @buf
--
1.7.2.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: Can you please define "snapshot" and "subvolume"?
From: David Nicol @ 2010-10-07 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Hommey; +Cc: Jérôme Poulin, Francis Galiegue, linux-btrfs
In-Reply-To: <20101007131823.GB1536@glandium.org>
On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 8:18 AM, Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org> wrote:
> BTW, it would be very useful to be able to turn existing directories
> into subvolumes.
does a (link,unlink) move work across subvolumes?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] serial: DCC(JTAG) serial and console emulation support
From: Daniel Walker @ 2010-10-07 20:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alan Cox
Cc: linux-kernel, Hyok S. Choi, Tony Lindgren, Jeff Ohlstein,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Ben Dooks, Alan Cox, Kukjin Kim,
Mike Frysinger, Feng Tang, Tobias Klauser, Jason Wessel,
Philippe Langlais
In-Reply-To: <20101007220538.2294a7e4@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 22:05 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Thu, 07 Oct 2010 13:36:06 -0700
> Daniel Walker <dwalker@codeaurora.org> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, 2010-10-07 at 21:50 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > > > + Say Y here if you want to install DCC driver as a normal serial port
> > > > + /dev/ttyS0 (major 4, minor 64). Otherwise, it appears as /dev/ttyJ0
> > > > + (major 4, minor 128) and can co-exist with other UARTs, such as
> > > > + 8250/16C550 compatibles.
> > > > +
> > >
> > > NAK to both
> >
> > Both what?
>
> Both device allocations. Please use the 204,186 assigned for JTAG DCC.
>
> > I would agree if this wasn't strictly for debugging embedded devices in
> > difficult situations.. After talking to Mike, it's seems like it would
> > be useful to have this as a ttyS* specifically because embedded devices
> > won't always create a ttyJ* for you and ttyS* will likely already exist.
>
> If you are debugging an embedded device you are capable of changing it
> (otherwise you wouldn't debug it). Therefore the fact you might need to
> tweak the tty creation on the device is not a problem. If you can't
> change the device well there is no point debugging it is there !
Your making too many assumptions .. You might be able to modify the
kernel, and not the userspace. So you couldn't tweak the device
creation .. It's much easier in the server world ..
Hyok should really be addressing this .. If he added for some random
useless reason , then for sure we can rip it out .. Otherwise I think it
deserves some more discussion ..
> We've said no over a period of about ten years to a lot of attempts to
> just borrow the ttyS0 range. If we'd said yes it would have been a
> complete mess by now.
>
> So the answer is no.
Nothing can be unilateral, there's always room for exceptions. You
should say something more like "it's possible, but unlikely".
Daniel
--
Sent by a consultant of the Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc.
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum.
^ permalink raw reply
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