* Re: [GIT PULL] rockchip clock changes for 4.12 part1
From: Stephen Boyd @ 2017-04-05 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heiko Stuebner; +Cc: mturquette, linux-clk, linux-rockchip
In-Reply-To: <5160508.89PunkDez8@phil>
On 03/28, Heiko Stuebner wrote:
> Hi Mike, Stephen,
>
> Please find below rockchip clock changes for 4.12. As the tag states,
> I've included the rk1108 -> rv1108 clock rename in here. Pinctrl changes
> go through the pinctrl tree and once everything is in mainline I'll put
> the actual devicetree on top. That way we keep cross-tree changes to a
> minimum while keeping everything error-free and bisectable.
>
> So please pull if nothing stands out.
>
>
Thanks. Pulled into clk-next.
--
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project
^ permalink raw reply
* [Buildroot] [git commit] syslinux: use Git formatted patches
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2017-04-05 20:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=34da6a65adae8463149a28c560926f3349142c2a
branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master
In preparation for the addition of more patches to the syslinux
package, reformat the two existing patches as proper Git formatted
patches.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
---
...001-bios-Fix-alignment-change-with-gcc-5.patch} | 30 +++++++++++++---------
.../0002-Disable-PIE-to-avoid-FTBFS-on-amd64.patch | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++
boot/syslinux/0002-disable-pie.patch | 22 ----------------
3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/boot/syslinux/0001-Fix-gcc-5-ALIGN-causing-Boot-error.patch b/boot/syslinux/0001-bios-Fix-alignment-change-with-gcc-5.patch
similarity index 66%
rename from boot/syslinux/0001-Fix-gcc-5-ALIGN-causing-Boot-error.patch
rename to boot/syslinux/0001-bios-Fix-alignment-change-with-gcc-5.patch
index 2df6766..633d996 100644
--- a/boot/syslinux/0001-Fix-gcc-5-ALIGN-causing-Boot-error.patch
+++ b/boot/syslinux/0001-bios-Fix-alignment-change-with-gcc-5.patch
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
-commit e5f2b577ded109291c9632dacb6eaa621d8a59fe
-Author: Sylvain Gault <sylvain.gault@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue Sep 29 02:38:25 2015 +0200
+From da5cbd1a3b248f2d32281a1766a3d1414c0e8e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sylvain Gault <sylvain.gault@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 02:38:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] bios: Fix alignment change with gcc 5
- bios: Fix alignment change with gcc 5
-
- The section aligment specified in the ld scripts have to be greater or
- equal to those in the .o files generated by gcc.
-
- Signed-off-by: Sylvain Gault <sylvain.gault@gmail.com>
- Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
- Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pcacjr@zytor.com>
- Signed-off-by: Frank Hunleth <fhunleth@troodon-software.com>
+The section aligment specified in the ld scripts have to be greater or
+equal to those in the .o files generated by gcc.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sylvain Gault <sylvain.gault@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pcacjr@zytor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Frank Hunleth <fhunleth@troodon-software.com>
+---
+ core/i386/syslinux.ld | 6 +++---
+ core/x86_64/syslinux.ld | 6 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/i386/syslinux.ld b/core/i386/syslinux.ld
index 7b4e012..7390451 100644
@@ -74,3 +77,6 @@ index 1057112..bf815c4 100644
__bss_vma = .;
__bss_lma = .; /* Dummy */
.bss (NOLOAD) : AT (__bss_lma) {
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/boot/syslinux/0002-Disable-PIE-to-avoid-FTBFS-on-amd64.patch b/boot/syslinux/0002-Disable-PIE-to-avoid-FTBFS-on-amd64.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64a08b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/boot/syslinux/0002-Disable-PIE-to-avoid-FTBFS-on-amd64.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 250bf2c921713434627dc7bc8b0918fa0841f9b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Graham Inggs <ginggs@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2017 22:03:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Disable PIE to avoid FTBFS on amd64
+
+gcc 6.x has PIE support enabled by default, which causes a build issue
+with syslinux. This patch disables PIE support in the relevant
+syslinux Makefile.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ryan Coe <bluemrp9@gmail.com>
+---
+ gpxe/src/Makefile | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gpxe/src/Makefile b/gpxe/src/Makefile
+index cc91d78..077af64 100644
+--- a/gpxe/src/Makefile
++++ b/gpxe/src/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ #
+
+ CLEANUP :=
+-CFLAGS :=
++CFLAGS := -fno-PIE
+ ASFLAGS :=
+ LDFLAGS :=
+ MAKEDEPS := Makefile
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/boot/syslinux/0002-disable-pie.patch b/boot/syslinux/0002-disable-pie.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b31b622..0000000
--- a/boot/syslinux/0002-disable-pie.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Description: Disable PIE to avoid FTBFS on amd64
-Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1579023
-Author: Graham Inggs <ginggs@ubuntu.com>
-Last-Update: 2016-05-06
-
-gcc 6.x has PIE support enabled by default, which causes a build issue
-with syslinux. This patch disables PIE support in the relevant
-syslinux Makefile.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ryan Coe <bluemrp9@gmail.com>
-
---- a/gpxe/src/Makefile
-+++ b/gpxe/src/Makefile
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
- #
-
- CLEANUP :=
--CFLAGS :=
-+CFLAGS := -fno-PIE
- ASFLAGS :=
- LDFLAGS :=
- MAKEDEPS := Makefile
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH v2 19/20] IB/rdmavt, IB/qib, IB/hfi1: Make percpu refcount optional for user MRs
From: Marciniszyn, Mike @ 2017-04-05 20:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Leon Romanovsky, Dalessandro, Dennis; +Cc: Doug Ledford, linux-rdma
In-Reply-To: <CALq1K=JsjSCiSBeZVe4kHQmjw7tznL36JcsamZTVGZ5RhBvZPw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
> Is there a another way we should be looking at for setting things like this?
>
> Use vendor channel interface to configure your driver.
>
What is that? configfs or something else?
Mike
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] string-list: use ALLOC_GROW macro when reallocing string_list
From: Jeff King @ 2017-04-05 20:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: git; +Cc: git, gitster, Jeff Hostetler
In-Reply-To: <20170405195600.54801-2-git@jeffhostetler.com>
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 07:55:59PM +0000, git@jeffhostetler.com wrote:
> From: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhost@microsoft.com>
>
> Use ALLOC_GROW() macro when reallocing a string_list array
> rather than simply increasing it by 32. This is a performance
> optimization.
>
> During status on a very large repo and there are many changes,
> a significant percentage of the total run time was spent
> reallocing the wt_status.changes array.
>
> This change decreased the time in wt_status_collect_changes_worktree()
> from 125 seconds to 45 seconds on my very large repository.
Oof. Looks like the original was quadratic. I'm surprised this didn't
bite us more often. I guess we don't usually use string-lists for big
lists.
Aside from the redundant size-check that Stefan pointed out, the patch
looks obviously correct. I grepped for "alloc +=" and "alloc =.*+' to
see if there were any other cases, but didn't find any. Obviously that
is dependent on calling the variable "alloc", but that is normal for us
(and it does turn up a number of cases that do allocate correctly).
-Peff
^ permalink raw reply
* [Buildroot] [PATCH] beaglebone: add DT for BeagleBone Green
From: Matthias Fritzsche @ 2017-04-05 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fritzsche <txt.file@txtfile.eu>
---
board/beaglebone/genimage.cfg | 1 +
configs/beaglebone_defconfig | 2 +-
configs/beaglebone_qt5_defconfig | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/board/beaglebone/genimage.cfg b/board/beaglebone/genimage.cfg
index ba60297..cfc1039 100644
--- a/board/beaglebone/genimage.cfg
+++ b/board/beaglebone/genimage.cfg
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ image boot.vfat {
"am335x-evmsk.dtb",
"am335x-bone.dtb",
"am335x-boneblack.dtb",
+ "am335x-bonegreen.dtb",
}
}
size = 16M
diff --git a/configs/beaglebone_defconfig b/configs/beaglebone_defconfig
index 6fe3a5e..b74ffbc 100644
--- a/configs/beaglebone_defconfig
+++ b/configs/beaglebone_defconfig
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_CUSTOM_REPO_URL="git://git.ti.com/processor-sdk/processor-sdk-l
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_CUSTOM_REPO_VERSION="adde2ca9f86797071f6e7b2b9e779fa5e4a8f3cd"
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_DEFCONFIG="omap2plus"
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_DTS_SUPPORT=y
-BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_INTREE_DTS_NAME="am335x-evm am335x-bone am335x-boneblack am335x-evmsk"
+BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_INTREE_DTS_NAME="am335x-evm am335x-bone am335x-boneblack am335x-bonegreen am335x-evmsk"
BR2_TARGET_ROOTFS_EXT2=y
BR2_TARGET_ROOTFS_EXT2_4=y
BR2_TARGET_UBOOT=y
diff --git a/configs/beaglebone_qt5_defconfig b/configs/beaglebone_qt5_defconfig
index a9ab5a2..78dc109 100644
--- a/configs/beaglebone_qt5_defconfig
+++ b/configs/beaglebone_qt5_defconfig
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_CUSTOM_REPO_VERSION="52c4aa7cdb93d61f8008f380135beaf7b8fa6593"
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_DEFCONFIG="omap2plus"
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_CONFIG_FRAGMENT_FILES="board/beaglebone/linux-4.1-sgx.fragment"
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_DTS_SUPPORT=y
-BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_INTREE_DTS_NAME="am335x-evm am335x-bone am335x-boneblack am335x-evmsk"
+BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_INTREE_DTS_NAME="am335x-evm am335x-bone am335x-boneblack am335x-bonegreen am335x-evmsk"
BR2_PACKAGE_FBV=y
BR2_PACKAGE_QT5=y
BR2_PACKAGE_QT5BASE_LICENSE_APPROVED=y
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] fpga fr br: fix warning for unexpected version number
From: Moritz Fischer @ 2017-04-05 20:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matthew.gerlach; +Cc: Alan Tull, linux-fpga, Linux Kernel Mailing List
In-Reply-To: <1491419155-17440-1-git-send-email-matthew.gerlach@linux.intel.com>
Hi Matthew,
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 12:05 PM, <matthew.gerlach@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> From: Matthew Gerlach <matthew.gerlach@linux.intel.com>
>
> The value in the version register of the altera freeze bridge
> controller changed from the beta value of 2 to the
> value of 0xad000003 in the official release of the IP.
> This patch supports the old and new version numbers
> without printing an warning.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Gerlach <matthew.gerlach@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c | 9 ++++++---
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c b/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c
> index 8dcd9fb..bdfd5eb 100644
> --- a/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c
> +++ b/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #define FREEZE_CSR_REG_VERSION 12
>
> #define FREEZE_CSR_SUPPORTED_VERSION 2
> +#define FREEZE_CSR_OFFICIAL_VERSION 0xad000003
>
> #define FREEZE_CSR_STATUS_FREEZE_REQ_DONE BIT(0)
> #define FREEZE_CSR_STATUS_UNFREEZE_REQ_DONE BIT(1)
> @@ -241,10 +242,12 @@ static int altera_freeze_br_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> priv->enable = 1;
>
> revision = readl(priv->base_addr + FREEZE_CSR_REG_VERSION);
> - if (revision != FREEZE_CSR_SUPPORTED_VERSION)
> + if ((revision != FREEZE_CSR_SUPPORTED_VERSION) &&
> + (revision != FREEZE_CSR_OFFICIAL_VERSION))
> dev_warn(dev,
> - "%s Freeze Controller unexpected revision %d != %d\n",
> - __func__, revision, FREEZE_CSR_SUPPORTED_VERSION);
> + "%s unexpected revision 0x%x != 0x%x != 0x%x\n",
> + __func__, revision, FREEZE_CSR_SUPPORTED_VERSION,
> + FREEZE_CSR_OFFICIAL_VERSION);
Maybe you actually wanna bail out if you read a random other value
instead of what you
expect instead of printing a warning.
>
> return fpga_bridge_register(dev, FREEZE_BRIDGE_NAME,
> &altera_freeze_br_br_ops, priv);
> --
> 2.7.4
>
Cheers,
Moritz
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: gnomes, linux-efi, matthew.garrett, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
These patches provide a facility by which a variety of avenues by which
userspace can feasibly modify the running kernel image can be locked down.
These include:
(*) No unsigned modules and no modules for which can't validate the
signature.
(*) No use of ioperm(), iopl() and no writing to /dev/port.
(*) No writing to /dev/mem or /dev/kmem.
(*) No hibernation.
(*) Restrict PCI BAR access.
(*) Restrict MSR access.
(*) No kexec_load().
(*) Certain ACPI restrictions.
(*) Restrict debugfs interface to ASUS WMI.
The lock-down can be configured to be triggered by the EFI secure boot
status, provided the shim isn't insecure. The lock-down can be lifted by
typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system.
The patches can be found here also:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=efi-lockdown
They are dependent on the hwparam branch, which I posted separately.
David
---
Chun-Yi Lee (2):
kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Dave Young (1):
Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
David Howells (7):
Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
scsi: Lock down the eata driver
Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
Josh Boyer (3):
efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
Kyle McMartin (1):
Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
Linn Crosetto (2):
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Matthew Garrett (8):
Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++
drivers/char/mem.c | 8 +++++++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 ++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 ++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 5 +++++
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 ++++++++
drivers/scsi/eata.c | 7 ++++++
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 ++++++++++++------
include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 ++++++++++
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 ++++++-
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
kernel/kexec.c | 7 ++++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
kernel/params.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 ++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 15 ++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
35 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
These patches provide a facility by which a variety of avenues by which
userspace can feasibly modify the running kernel image can be locked down.
These include:
(*) No unsigned modules and no modules for which can't validate the
signature.
(*) No use of ioperm(), iopl() and no writing to /dev/port.
(*) No writing to /dev/mem or /dev/kmem.
(*) No hibernation.
(*) Restrict PCI BAR access.
(*) Restrict MSR access.
(*) No kexec_load().
(*) Certain ACPI restrictions.
(*) Restrict debugfs interface to ASUS WMI.
The lock-down can be configured to be triggered by the EFI secure boot
status, provided the shim isn't insecure. The lock-down can be lifted by
typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system.
The patches can be found here also:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=efi-lockdown
They are dependent on the hwparam branch, which I posted separately.
David
---
Chun-Yi Lee (2):
kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Dave Young (1):
Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
David Howells (7):
Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
scsi: Lock down the eata driver
Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
Josh Boyer (3):
efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
Kyle McMartin (1):
Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
Linn Crosetto (2):
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Matthew Garrett (8):
Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++
drivers/char/mem.c | 8 +++++++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 ++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 ++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 5 +++++
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 ++++++++
drivers/scsi/eata.c | 7 ++++++
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 ++++++++++++------
include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 ++++++++++
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 ++++++-
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
kernel/kexec.c | 7 ++++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
kernel/params.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 ++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 15 ++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
35 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply
* [Bug 99136] Blood Effects corrupt graphics in Total War: Warhammer
From: bugzilla-daemon @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dri-devel
In-Reply-To: <bug-99136-502@http.bugs.freedesktop.org/>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 858 bytes --]
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99136
--- Comment #39 from siyia <eutychios23@gmail.com> ---
problem persists with mesa 17.02 and llvm 3.9.1
On 15/03/2017 03:56 μμ, bugzilla-daemon@freedesktop.org wrote:
>
> *Comment # 37 <https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99136#c37>
> on bug 99136 <https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99136> from
> Samuel Pitoiset <mailto:samuel.pitoiset@gmail.com> *
> Not sure but this might help for your issue.
>
> https://cgit.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/commit/?id=7751ed39e40e08e5aa0633d018c9f25ad17f9bb0
>
> Let me know if you get a chance to try.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> You are receiving this mail because:
>
> * You reported the bug.
>
--
You are receiving this mail because:
You are the assignee for the bug.
[-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 2612 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 160 bytes --]
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: gnomes, linux-efi, matthew.garrett, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings, Josh Boyer
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
enabled.
This will be used by the SysRq+x handler, registered by the x86 arch, to find
out whether secure boot mode is enabled so that it can be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4bf0c8926a1c..396285bddb93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 94d34e0be24f..6049600e5475 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 11 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
enabled.
This will be used by the SysRq+x handler, registered by the x86 arch, to find
out whether secure boot mode is enabled so that it can be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi at vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4bf0c8926a1c..396285bddb93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 94d34e0be24f..6049600e5475 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 11 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
--
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^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA,
gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
allow the running kernel image to be changed including the loading of
modules that aren't validly signed with a key we recognise, fiddling with
MSR registers and disallowing hibernation,
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 4c26dc3a8295..b820a80dc949 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern bool kernel_is_locked_down(void);
+#else
+static inline bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Internal, do not use. */
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b576645..68bab18ddd57 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1698,5 +1698,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern void lock_kernel_down(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+extern void lift_kernel_lockdown(void);
+#endif
+#else
+static inline void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf91080e..e3830171bdcb 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -198,6 +198,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
+ help
+ Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for
+ instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel
+ turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
+ kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
+
+config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+ bool
+ help
+ Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, thereby restoring the
+ ability of userspace to access the kernel image (eg. by SysRq+x under
+ x86).
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f2d71cdb8e19..8c4a43e3d4e0 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
+
+# Allow the kernel to be locked down
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5788c60ff4e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+
+static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take the kernel out of lockdown mode.
+ */
+void lift_kernel_lockdown(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kernel_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ */
+bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return kernel_locked_down;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
allow the running kernel image to be changed including the loading of
modules that aren't validly signed with a key we recognise, fiddling with
MSR registers and disallowing hibernation,
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 4c26dc3a8295..b820a80dc949 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern bool kernel_is_locked_down(void);
+#else
+static inline bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Internal, do not use. */
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b576645..68bab18ddd57 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1698,5 +1698,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern void lock_kernel_down(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+extern void lift_kernel_lockdown(void);
+#endif
+#else
+static inline void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf91080e..e3830171bdcb 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -198,6 +198,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
+ help
+ Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for
+ instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel
+ turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
+ kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
+
+config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+ bool
+ help
+ Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, thereby restoring the
+ ability of userspace to access the kernel image (eg. by SysRq+x under
+ x86).
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f2d71cdb8e19..8c4a43e3d4e0 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
+
+# Allow the kernel to be locked down
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5788c60ff4e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells at redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+
+static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take the kernel out of lockdown mode.
+ */
+void lift_kernel_lockdown(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kernel_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ */
+bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return kernel_locked_down;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: gnomes, linux-efi, matthew.garrett, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 +++++++-
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a294ee..21f39855661d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
If unsure, say N.
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+ def_bool n
+ depends on EFI
+ prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+ ---help---
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may
+ also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+ userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+ image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+ system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
config SECCOMP
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 396285bddb93..85dfa745c442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+ lock_kernel_down();
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ }
break;
default:
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi at vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 +++++++-
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a294ee..21f39855661d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
If unsure, say N.
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+ def_bool n
+ depends on EFI
+ prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+ ---help---
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may
+ also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+ userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+ image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+ system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
config SECCOMP
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 396285bddb93..85dfa745c442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+ lock_kernel_down();
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ }
break;
default:
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: gnomes, linux-efi, matthew.garrett, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
allow the running kernel image to be changed including the loading of
modules that aren't validly signed with a key we recognise, fiddling with
MSR registers and disallowing hibernation,
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 4c26dc3a8295..b820a80dc949 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern bool kernel_is_locked_down(void);
+#else
+static inline bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Internal, do not use. */
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b576645..68bab18ddd57 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1698,5 +1698,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern void lock_kernel_down(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+extern void lift_kernel_lockdown(void);
+#endif
+#else
+static inline void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3ff1bf91080e..e3830171bdcb 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -198,6 +198,21 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
+ help
+ Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for
+ instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel
+ turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
+ kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
+
+config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+ bool
+ help
+ Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, thereby restoring the
+ ability of userspace to access the kernel image (eg. by SysRq+x under
+ x86).
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f2d71cdb8e19..8c4a43e3d4e0 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
+
+# Allow the kernel to be locked down
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5788c60ff4e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+
+static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take the kernel out of lockdown mode.
+ */
+void lift_kernel_lockdown(void)
+{
+ kernel_locked_down = false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kernel_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ */
+bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return kernel_locked_down;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_is_locked_down);
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: gnomes, linux-efi, matthew.garrett, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
}
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+ if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
return err;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 7eba6dea4f41..3331f2eb9b93 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2756,7 +2756,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
}
/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+ if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
err = 0;
return err;
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: matthew.garrett, linux-efi, gnomes, gregkh, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when the
kernel has been locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 6d9cc2d39d22..f8144049bda3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (p != *ppos)
return -EFBIG;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when the
kernel has been locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 6d9cc2d39d22..f8144049bda3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (p != *ppos)
return -EFBIG;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info@ http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Kyle McMartin, linux-efi, gnomes, gregkh, x86, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings, matthew.garrett
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Make sysrq+x exit secure boot mode on x86_64, thereby allowing the running
kernel image to be modified. This lifts the lockdown.
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 +++++++-
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f39855661d..457c04971849 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1829,6 +1829,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+config EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+ def_bool n
+ depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN && MAGIC_SYSRQ
+ select ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+ prompt "Allow secure boot mode to be exited with SysRq+x on a keyboard"
+ ---help---
+ Allow secure boot mode to be exited and the kernel lockdown lifted by
+ typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system (not permitted
+ through procfs).
+
config SECCOMP
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 85dfa745c442..a415a4817684 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+
#include <video/edid.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
@@ -1330,6 +1335,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+
+static void sysrq_handle_secure_boot(int key)
+{
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ lift_kernel_lockdown();
+}
+static struct sysrq_key_op secure_boot_sysrq_op = {
+ .handler = sysrq_handle_secure_boot,
+ .help_msg = "unSB(x)",
+ .action_msg = "Disabling Secure Boot restrictions",
+ .enable_mask = SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE,
+};
+static int __init secure_boot_sysrq(void)
+{
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ register_sysrq_key('x', &secure_boot_sysrq_op);
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(secure_boot_sysrq);
+#endif /*CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT*/
+
+
static struct notifier_block kernel_offset_notifier = {
.notifier_call = dump_kernel_offset
};
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 022be0e22eba..4a054a564636 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int uinput_allocate_device(struct uinput_device *udev)
if (!udev->dev)
return -ENOMEM;
+ udev->dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC;
udev->dev->event = uinput_dev_event;
input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
index c6fc7141d7b2..0c96cf60f1a6 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
+ /* x: May be registered on x86_64 for disabling secure boot */
NULL, /* x */
/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
NULL, /* y */
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
}
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from)
{
struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
int orig_log_level;
@@ -544,11 +545,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
if (op_p) {
+ /* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */
+ if ((from == SYSRQ_FROM_PROC || from == SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC) &&
+ op_p->enable_mask & SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE)
+ printk("This sysrq operation is disabled from userspace.\n");
/*
* Should we check for enabled operations (/proc/sysrq-trigger
* should not) and is the invoked operation enabled?
*/
- if (!check_mask || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
+ if (from == SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
op_p->handler(key);
@@ -580,7 +585,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
void handle_sysrq(int key)
{
if (sysrq_on())
- __handle_sysrq(key, true);
+ __handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
{
if (state->reset_requested)
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
default:
if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
+ int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ?
+ SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC : 0;
sysrq->need_reinject = false;
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], true);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], from);
}
break;
}
@@ -1097,7 +1104,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (get_user(c, buf))
return -EFAULT;
- __handle_sysrq(c, false);
+ __handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC);
}
return count;
diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h
index a65e3b24fb18..8b0357175049 100644
--- a/include/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/linux/input.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct input_value {
* @phys: physical path to the device in the system hierarchy
* @uniq: unique identification code for the device (if device has it)
* @id: id of the device (struct input_id)
+ * @flags: input device flags (SYNTHETIC, etc.)
* @propbit: bitmap of device properties and quirks
* @evbit: bitmap of types of events supported by the device (EV_KEY,
* EV_REL, etc.)
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev {
const char *uniq;
struct input_id id;
+ unsigned int flags;
+
unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)];
unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)];
@@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev {
};
#define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev)
+#define INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC 0x000000001
+
/*
* Verify that we are in sync with input_device_id mod_devicetable.h #defines
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/sysrq.h b/include/linux/sysrq.h
index 387fa7d05c98..f7c52a9ea394 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysrq.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysrq.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT 0x0080
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE 0x0100
+#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE 0x00010000
+
struct sysrq_key_op {
void (*handler)(int);
char *help_msg;
@@ -42,8 +44,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op {
* are available -- else NULL's).
*/
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL 0x0001
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC 0x0002
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC 0x0004
+
void handle_sysrq(int key);
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask);
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from);
int register_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index c8146d53ca67..b480cadf9272 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
kdb_trap_printk++;
- __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask);
+ __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0);
kdb_trap_printk--;
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Make sysrq+x exit secure boot mode on x86_64, thereby allowing the running
kernel image to be modified. This lifts the lockdown.
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: x86 at kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 +++++++-
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f39855661d..457c04971849 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1829,6 +1829,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+config EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+ def_bool n
+ depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN && MAGIC_SYSRQ
+ select ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+ prompt "Allow secure boot mode to be exited with SysRq+x on a keyboard"
+ ---help---
+ Allow secure boot mode to be exited and the kernel lockdown lifted by
+ typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system (not permitted
+ through procfs).
+
config SECCOMP
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 85dfa745c442..a415a4817684 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+
#include <video/edid.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
@@ -1330,6 +1335,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+
+static void sysrq_handle_secure_boot(int key)
+{
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ lift_kernel_lockdown();
+}
+static struct sysrq_key_op secure_boot_sysrq_op = {
+ .handler = sysrq_handle_secure_boot,
+ .help_msg = "unSB(x)",
+ .action_msg = "Disabling Secure Boot restrictions",
+ .enable_mask = SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE,
+};
+static int __init secure_boot_sysrq(void)
+{
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ register_sysrq_key('x', &secure_boot_sysrq_op);
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(secure_boot_sysrq);
+#endif /*CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT*/
+
+
static struct notifier_block kernel_offset_notifier = {
.notifier_call = dump_kernel_offset
};
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 022be0e22eba..4a054a564636 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int uinput_allocate_device(struct uinput_device *udev)
if (!udev->dev)
return -ENOMEM;
+ udev->dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC;
udev->dev->event = uinput_dev_event;
input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
index c6fc7141d7b2..0c96cf60f1a6 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
+ /* x: May be registered on x86_64 for disabling secure boot */
NULL, /* x */
/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
NULL, /* y */
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
}
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from)
{
struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
int orig_log_level;
@@ -544,11 +545,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
if (op_p) {
+ /* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */
+ if ((from == SYSRQ_FROM_PROC || from == SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC) &&
+ op_p->enable_mask & SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE)
+ printk("This sysrq operation is disabled from userspace.\n");
/*
* Should we check for enabled operations (/proc/sysrq-trigger
* should not) and is the invoked operation enabled?
*/
- if (!check_mask || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
+ if (from == SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
op_p->handler(key);
@@ -580,7 +585,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
void handle_sysrq(int key)
{
if (sysrq_on())
- __handle_sysrq(key, true);
+ __handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
{
if (state->reset_requested)
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
default:
if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
+ int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ?
+ SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC : 0;
sysrq->need_reinject = false;
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], true);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], from);
}
break;
}
@@ -1097,7 +1104,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (get_user(c, buf))
return -EFAULT;
- __handle_sysrq(c, false);
+ __handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC);
}
return count;
diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h
index a65e3b24fb18..8b0357175049 100644
--- a/include/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/linux/input.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct input_value {
* @phys: physical path to the device in the system hierarchy
* @uniq: unique identification code for the device (if device has it)
* @id: id of the device (struct input_id)
+ * @flags: input device flags (SYNTHETIC, etc.)
* @propbit: bitmap of device properties and quirks
* @evbit: bitmap of types of events supported by the device (EV_KEY,
* EV_REL, etc.)
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev {
const char *uniq;
struct input_id id;
+ unsigned int flags;
+
unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)];
unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)];
@@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev {
};
#define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev)
+#define INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC 0x000000001
+
/*
* Verify that we are in sync with input_device_id mod_devicetable.h #defines
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/sysrq.h b/include/linux/sysrq.h
index 387fa7d05c98..f7c52a9ea394 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysrq.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysrq.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT 0x0080
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE 0x0100
+#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE 0x00010000
+
struct sysrq_key_op {
void (*handler)(int);
char *help_msg;
@@ -42,8 +44,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op {
* are available -- else NULL's).
*/
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL 0x0001
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC 0x0002
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC 0x0004
+
void handle_sysrq(int key);
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask);
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from);
int register_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index c8146d53ca67..b480cadf9272 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
kdb_trap_printk++;
- __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask);
+ __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0);
kdb_trap_printk--;
return 0;
--
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^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/intel_rdt: Fix issue when mkdir uses a freed CLOSid
From: Fenghua Yu @ 2017-04-05 20:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luck, Tony
Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Vikas Shivappa, vikas.shivappa, x86,
linux-kernel, hpa, mingo, peterz, ravi.v.shankar, fenghua.yu,
h.peter.anvin
In-Reply-To: <20170405180737.GA4850@intel.com>
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 11:07:37AM -0700, Luck, Tony wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 05:20:24PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > That's just wrong.
> >
> > The proper behaviour for a new control group is, that at the time when it
> > is created it copies the CBM values of the default group and not claiming
> > access to ALL of the cache by default.
>
> I don't see that as any more helpful. When you make a new
> control group it is because none of the existing groups
> provides the QoS that you want. So the first thing the
> user will do is write the schemata file with the values
> they do want.
>
> So "all access", or "same as default group" are both the
> same to the user ... not what they want.
>
> We do need to make sure that the schemata matches what is
> in the registers. We need to make sure that changes to the
> schemata file result in the MSRs being written where needed.
FYI. This behavior and a fix patch were discussed before:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2017/1/9/747
Thanks.
-Fenghua
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: matthew.garrett, linux-efi, gnomes, gregkh, kexec, dhowells,
linux-security-module, keyrings
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable
kexec in this situation.
This does not affect kexec_file_load() which can check for a signature on the
image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 980936a90ee6..46de8e6b42f4 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
return -EPERM;
/*
+ * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+ * prevent loading in that case
+ */
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
*/
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
From: David Howells @ 2017-04-05 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable
kexec in this situation.
This does not affect kexec_file_load() which can check for a signature on the
image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org
---
kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 980936a90ee6..46de8e6b42f4 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
return -EPERM;
/*
+ * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+ * prevent loading in that case
+ */
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
*/
--
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^ permalink raw reply related
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