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* [PATCH 1/3] stackdepot: check depot_index before accessing the stack slab
From: glider @ 2020-02-20 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dvyukov, andreyknvl, aryabinin, akpm
  Cc: sergey.senozhatsky, arnd, linux-mm, vegard.nossum, elver,
	Alexander Potapenko

Avoid crashes on corrupted stack ids.
Despite stack ID corruption may indicate other bugs in the program, we'd
better fail gracefully on such IDs instead of crashing the kernel.

This patch has been previously mailed as part of KMSAN RFC patch series.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 lib/stackdepot.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/stackdepot.c b/lib/stackdepot.c
index 81c69c08d1d15..a2f6cb900db80 100644
--- a/lib/stackdepot.c
+++ b/lib/stackdepot.c
@@ -202,9 +202,22 @@ unsigned int stack_depot_fetch(depot_stack_handle_t handle,
 			       unsigned long **entries)
 {
 	union handle_parts parts = { .handle = handle };
-	void *slab = stack_slabs[parts.slabindex];
+	void *slab;
 	size_t offset = parts.offset << STACK_ALLOC_ALIGN;
-	struct stack_record *stack = slab + offset;
+	struct stack_record *stack;
+
+	if (parts.slabindex > depot_index) {
+		WARN(1, "slab index %d out of bounds (%d) for stack id %08x\n",
+			parts.slabindex, depot_index, handle);
+		*entries = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	slab = stack_slabs[parts.slabindex];
+	stack = slab + offset;
+	if (!stack) {
+		*entries = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	*entries = stack->entries;
 	return stack->size;
-- 
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog



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