* [xen-4.3-testing test] 58367: regressions - trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass
@ 2015-06-11 9:47 osstest service user
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From: osstest service user @ 2015-06-11 9:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: ian.jackson
flight 58367 xen-4.3-testing real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/58367/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 14 guest-localmigrate.2 fail REGR. vs. 58060
Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin 3 host-install(3) broken like 57749
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 15 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail like 57933
test-amd64-i386-libvirt 11 guest-start fail like 58060
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a
test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 1 build-check(1) blocked n/a
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 9 debian-hvm-install fail never pass
build-i386-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass
build-amd64-rumpuserxen 6 xen-build fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 6 xen-boot fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 20 leak-check/check fail never pass
version targeted for testing:
xen 9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f
baseline version:
xen e580a92dd53dbba62518e17a3f4ebd57b626926c
------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
------------------------------------------------------------
jobs:
build-amd64 pass
build-armhf pass
build-i386 pass
build-amd64-libvirt pass
build-armhf-libvirt pass
build-i386-libvirt pass
build-amd64-pvops pass
build-armhf-pvops pass
build-i386-pvops pass
build-amd64-rumpuserxen fail
build-i386-rumpuserxen fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl fail
test-amd64-i386-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass
test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64 blocked
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 fail
test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck fail
test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass
test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386 blocked
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt fail
test-amd64-i386-libvirt fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu fail
test-amd64-amd64-pair pass
test-amd64-i386-pair pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin broken
test-amd64-amd64-pv pass
test-amd64-i386-pv pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass
------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images
Logs, config files, etc. are available at
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs
Test harness code can be found at
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary
broken-step test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin host-install(3)
Not pushing.
------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f
Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:50 2015 +0100
QEMU_TAG update
========================================
commit 8fcecdca2dd1e6b4e78114977388ff0ddb85db20
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
This is part of XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>)
commit c2ce1e99e4e16adb1b9abe5f720604a895134a70
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
to be given explicit descriptors.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
commit 5d688f2be26717ff45cb960dcd6f2fa71461bfb4
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
(and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
(introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
permissive mode).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
commit 9fa54a8818979ce375fa830402b5897996bbcc1a
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
to be read-only in hardware).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
commit 8599757a0a68333eca419e20561eaf49ab1f24e2
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space handling
This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
multiple places.
Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
commit 6bfd2cd948aa1bed3272bf41c838cb11b9175234
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
commit 54e3720bca9873e6e903b9488758f3777f4d55ba
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
patches to be less intrusive.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
commit 1c8bd2b55744d18db7e3ff3084765ec30e1c0fd2
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100
xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications
Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
security issue got addressed.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
commit bf53d1740edb05958c3e092e7c23cf9b1724cb06
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:14:05 2015 +0100
xen/MSI-X: disable logging by default
... to avoid allowing the guest to cause the control domain's disk to
fill.
This is XSA-130.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
commit 823757bf23f491d56a2d8353ddc838b83a3f8962
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:13:56 2015 +0100
xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
This is XSA-129.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
commit 835bc3eeba2cc52cc54b53578d78a2a7e56c54b6
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Wed Jun 10 14:13:52 2015 +0100
xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
doing any host write.
This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
host write attempt when already the host read failed.
This is XSA-128.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
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2015-06-11 9:47 [xen-4.3-testing test] 58367: regressions - trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass osstest service user
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