From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Matthew Auld" <matthew.auld@intel.com>, intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] drm/xe/pat: always check is_valid() when querying an index
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 16:12:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-173147@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015154553.483229-8-matthew.auld@intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] drm/xe: speculative OOB read via unmitigated pat_index in madvise ioctl
--
commit 9ef2350e60afb2ff1710835baa5a7f21be86bd9c
Author: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
drm/xe/pat: always check is_valid() when querying an index
This commit makes the behavior consistent by treating unknown indices as
programmer errors when extracting comp or l3, similar to coh_mode.
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_pat.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_pat.c
> index d0dac1ebd4784..9ab8fab43a884 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_pat.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_pat.c
> @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ bool xe_pat_index_is_valid(struct xe_device *xe, u16 pat_index)
>
> u16 xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(struct xe_device *xe, u16 pat_index)
> {
> - WARN_ON(pat_index >= xe->pat.n_entries);
> + WARN_ON(!xe_pat_index_is_valid(xe, pat_index));
[Severity: High]
Does this WARN_ON() allow a speculative out-of-bounds read?
When xe_vm_madvise_ioctl() passes an unmitigated user value args->pat_index.val
into check_pat_args_are_sane():
xe_vm_madvise_ioctl() {
...
if (args->type == DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PAT) {
if (!check_pat_args_are_sane(xe, &madvise_range,
args->pat_index.val)) {
...
}
It bypasses the array_index_nospec() mitigation computed earlier in the same
function. check_pat_args_are_sane() then calls xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(),
which now invokes xe_pat_index_is_valid():
xe_pat_index_is_valid() {
WARN_ON(pat_index >= xe->pat.n_entries);
return xe->pat.table[pat_index].valid;
}
Since WARN_ON() does not return early on failure, could an unmitigated
speculative index cause a speculative out-of-bounds read on
xe->pat.table[pat_index]?
The loaded values are then used in branching logic (if (coh_mode != XE_COH_NONE)),
which might create a speculative disclosure gadget reachable by an unprivileged
user.
> WARN_ON(!xe->pat.table[pat_index].coh_mode ||
> xe->pat.table[pat_index].coh_mode > XE_COH_2WAY);
> return xe->pat.table[pat_index].coh_mode;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261015154553.483229-5-matthew.auld@intel.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-15 16:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-15 15:45 [PATCH v2 0/3] Improve hw reserved PAT checking Matthew Auld
2026-10-15 15:45 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] drm/xe/pat: initialise pat.valid everywhere Matthew Auld
2026-10-15 15:45 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] drm/xe: revamp hw reserved PAT index checking Matthew Auld
2026-10-15 16:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 15:45 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] drm/xe/pat: always check is_valid() when querying an index Matthew Auld
2026-10-15 16:12 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-15 15:54 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for Improve hw reserved PAT checking (rev2) Patchwork
2026-10-15 20:15 ` ✓ Xe.CI.BAT: " Patchwork
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