* [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN
@ 2026-10-16 23:52 Amirmohammad Eftekhar
2026-10-17 0:44 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Amirmohammad Eftekhar @ 2026-10-16 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: seanjc, pbonzini; +Cc: kvm, linux-kernel
The SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE (VLS) bit in
vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 is OR-set in nested_vmcb02_prepare_control()
when L2 is allowed to use virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE, but it is never reset.
vmcb02 is a persistent per-vCPU structure reused across nested VMRUNs,
so once one nested entry enables VLS the bit leaks into every later
entry -- including entries where vmcb12 has VLS cleared and L1 has asked
KVM to intercept VMLOAD/VMSAVE. Per AMD's APM, virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE is
honored over the VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts, so with the stale bit set
L2's VMLOAD/VMSAVE are virtualized and run without a #VMEXIT, and the
intercept L1 explicitly requested is silently dropped.
misc_ctl is reset from vmcb01 a few lines earlier; misc_ctl2's VLS bit
has no equivalent reset. The only writes to misc_ctl2 are this OR-set,
the vmcb01 init OR-set, and the independent V_LBR (bit 0) set/clear, so
nothing clears bit 1 between entries. nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts()
sets INTERCEPT_VMLOAD/VMSAVE when nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept() is
true and otherwise only WARNs on the reverse condition; it never catches
the real hazard of VLS on while the intercept is also set.
Reset the VLS bit before the conditional set, mirroring misc_ctl, and
add a forward WARN so a future regression trips immediately.
This is distinct from CVE-2021-3656 (single-VMRUN under-sanitization of
a VLS bit L1 set in vmcb12 without being granted the feature); here L1
is granted VLS and uses it legitimately, and the bit goes stale across
VMRUNs.
Signed-off-by: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index af0ef6784..65e61b796 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -197,6 +197,14 @@ void nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
} else {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
}
+
+ /*
+ * If KVM is intercepting VMLOAD/VMSAVE, virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE must be
+ * off, or hardware would honor the virtualization and render the
+ * intercept inert.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcb_is_intercept(&vmcb02->control, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD) &&
+ (vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
}
/*
@@ -994,6 +1002,13 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
/* SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_LBR is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */
+ /*
+ * vmcb02 is reused across nested VMRUNs and the VLS bit below is only
+ * OR-set, so clear it first; a stale bit would let L2 run VMLOAD/VMSAVE
+ * unintercepted even on a VMRUN that asks KVM to intercept them.
+ */
+ vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 &= ~SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
+
if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
--
2.54.0 (Apple Git-157)
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN
2026-10-16 23:52 [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN Amirmohammad Eftekhar
@ 2026-10-17 0:44 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-10-17 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Amirmohammad Eftekhar; +Cc: kvm
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] KVM: nSVM: guest-triggerable WARN_ON_ONCE in nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts()
--
commit f74a55775787865d4cf964f0af9f8bea8ecd1acb
Author: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de>
KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN
This commit clears SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in
vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 before conditionally setting it in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(), and adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts() if both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE are set in vmcb02.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index f9090b601efaa..67985c676db35 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -197,6 +197,14 @@ void nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> } else {
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * If KVM is intercepting VMLOAD/VMSAVE, virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE must be
> + * off, or hardware would honor the virtualization and render the
> + * intercept inert.
> + */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcb_is_intercept(&vmcb02->control, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD) &&
> + (vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE));
> }
[Severity: High]
Can an L1 guest or host userspace trigger this WARN_ON_ONCE() at will, and is
the hardware precedence between INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE reversed in the comment and commit message?
In nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(), SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE is set
in vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 whenever !nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)
is true:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept() {
if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
return true;
if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
return true;
if (!(svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl2 & SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE))
return true;
return false;
}
nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept() does not check whether INTERCEPT_VMLOAD is
set in vmcb12 or vmcb01. Immediately after setting
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE, nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() calls
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts(), which copies vmcb01->control.intercepts and
unconditionally ORs vmcb12_ctrl->intercepts into vmcb02->control.intercepts:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts() {
...
for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
vmcb02->control.intercepts[i] = vmcb01->control.intercepts[i];
...
for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
vmcb02->control.intercepts[i] |= vmcb12_ctrl->intercepts[i];
}
If an L1 guest sets both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD in vmcb12->control.intercepts and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in vmcb12->control.misc_ctl2 (with nested NPT
and X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD enabled), vmcb02 will have both bits set and
hit the new WARN_ON_ONCE() on VMRUN.
This occurs in normal software as well as malicious guests:
1. KVM's own selftest in
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_vmsave_vmload_test.c:l1_guest_code()
explicitly sets both INTERCEPT_VMLOAD | INTERCEPT_VMSAVE and
SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in vmcb12 and runs L2 to verify that
SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE is still delivered:
/* ..and SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE set */
svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
svm->vmcb->save.rip = (u64)l2_guest_code_vmsave;
run_guest(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb_gpa);
GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code, SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE);
2. KVM running as an L1 hypervisor sets SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE in
init_vmcb() and never clears it, while svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts()
sets INTERCEPT_VMLOAD whenever L2 has EFER.SVME=0 or an Intel-compatible
CPUID:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() {
/*
* No need to toggle any of the vgif/vls/etc. enable bits here, as they
* are set when the VMCB is initialized and never cleared (if the
* relevant intercepts are set, the enablements are meaningless anyway).
*/
...
}
3. Host userspace can also trigger this warning via KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE
(svm_set_nested_state() -> nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() ->
nested_vmcb02_recalc_intercepts()), either by supplying a vmcb12 with both
bits set, or by calling KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE before the first KVM_RUN while
vmcb01->control.intercepts still has INTERCEPT_VMLOAD set from init_vmcb() (as
KVM_REQ_RECALC_INTERCEPTS is not serviced until vcpu_enter_guest()), or by
calling KVM_SET_CPUID2 to clear X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD while in guest
mode.
As noted in the svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts() comment and verified by
nested_vmsave_vmload_test.c, AMD SVM hardware gives INTERCEPT_VMLOAD and
INTERCEPT_VMSAVE precedence over SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE. Should the
WARN_ON_ONCE() be dropped (or should SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE not be
set when INTERCEPT_VMLOAD/VMSAVE is set), and the hardware behavior
description in the commit message updated?
> @@ -986,6 +994,13 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>
> /* SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_LBR is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */
>
> + /*
> + * vmcb02 is reused across nested VMRUNs and the VLS bit below is only
> + * OR-set, so clear it first; a stale bit would let L2 run VMLOAD/VMSAVE
> + * unintercepted even on a VMRUN that asks KVM to intercept them.
> + */
> + vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 &= ~SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
> +
> if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
> vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE;
>
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261016235221.33726-2-amirmohammad.eftekhar@cispa.de?part=1
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2026-10-16 23:52 [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Reset the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE bit in vmcb02 on every nested VMRUN Amirmohammad Eftekhar
2026-10-17 0:44 ` sashiko-bot
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