[PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks

[PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks

[Mickaël Salaün]

Hi,

This is series 1 of 3:

* 1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
  2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
  3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.

LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE, merged for v7.4, denies capabilities
through the LSM capable hook, but commoncap's mmap_addr, capset and
vm_enough_memory hooks call cap_capable() directly.  A domain that
denies a capability can therefore still:

- map memory below vm.mmap_min_addr (CAP_SYS_RAWIO), which defeats a
  mitigation for kernel NULL pointer dereferences;
- add inheritable capabilities outside of its permitted set
  (CAP_SETPCAP), which lets a privileged sandbox without no_new_privs
  gain capabilities through execve(), although the domain still
  restricts their use;
- use the admin memory reserve with vm.overcommit_memory=2
  (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

As SELinux does, patches 2 to 4 add Landlock's own check to these hooks,
with commoncap's conditions, so they only deny what commoncap granted
because of the capability.  Patch 1 factors out the shared check.  Patch
5 adds tests, including audit tests, that fail without the fixes.  Patch
6 fixes the documentation, which overstated what the permission
restricts and how its denials show.

Two other direct capability-set checks are fixed separately:

- PSI triggers (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE):
  https://patch.msgid.link/20261106120004.90041-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com
- user namespace uid 0 mapping (CAP_SETFCAP):
  https://patch.msgid.link/20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (6):
  landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
  landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr
  landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
  landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve
  selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook
  landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

 Documentation/security/landlock.rst         |   8 +-
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst    |   8 +-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h               |   6 +-
 security/landlock/cap.c                     | 110 +++-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 535 ++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h   |   4 +-
 6 files changed, 650 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)


base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
-- 
2.56.0

[PATCH 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks

[Mickaël Salaün]

hook_capable() is the only place that checks a capability against a
Landlock domain.  commoncap also makes capability decisions from other
LSM hooks, and the following commits add Landlock counterparts for them.
Move the check and its denial logging into check_cap() so that these
hooks share it.

No functional change.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 security/landlock/cap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index b4f491b09baa..fa59118e3486 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -24,25 +24,21 @@ static const struct access_masks cap_permission = {
 };
 
 /**
- * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
+ * check_cap - Check a capability use against the domain of @cred
  *
  * @cred: Credentials being checked.
- * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
- *      acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
  * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
  * @opts: Capability check options.  CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT skips the denial record:
  *        no audit record, no trace event, and no denial count.
  *
  * Pure bitmask check: denies the capability if it is not in the layer's allowed
- * set.  This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with
- * LSM_ORDER_FIRST so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can
- * deny capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities
- * that commoncap denied.
+ * set.  It does not check that @cred holds @cap: only call it for a capability
+ * that commoncap already granted.
  *
  * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
  */
-static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
-			int cap, unsigned int opts)
+static int check_cap(const struct cred *const cred, const int cap,
+		     const unsigned int opts)
 {
 	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
 	size_t denied_layer;
@@ -72,6 +68,28 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/**
+ * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
+ *
+ * @cred: Credentials being checked.
+ * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
+ *      acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
+ * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
+ * @opts: Capability check options, see check_cap().
+ *
+ * This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with LSM_ORDER_FIRST
+ * so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can deny
+ * capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities that
+ * commoncap denied.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
+ */
+static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
 };
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks

[sashiko-bot]

> hook_capable() is the only place that checks a capability against a
> Landlock domain.  commoncap also makes capability decisions from other
> LSM hooks, and the following commits add Landlock counterparts for them.
> Move the check and its denial logging into check_cap() so that these
> hooks share it.
> 
> No functional change.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1

[PATCH 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr

[Mickaël Salaün]

Until now, a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_RAWIO could still
map memory below the vm.mmap_min_addr limit if it held this capability.
cap_mmap_addr() is commoncap's mmap_addr hook, and it checks
CAP_SYS_RAWIO with cap_capable(), not security_capable(), so the check
never reaches hook_capable().  Mapping the lowest pages is what this
limit protects against, because it helps to exploit kernel NULL pointer
dereferences.

Add a Landlock mmap_addr hook that checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO against the
domain under the same condition as cap_mmap_addr().  With the same
vm.mmap_min_addr value, the hook only denies mappings for which
commoncap required the capability.  security_mmap_addr() stops at
commoncap's error, so processes without the capability get the same
result as before.  This also covers the x86 vm86() syscalls, which use
the same check for address 0.

Making cap_mmap_addr() call capable() would also fix this, but it would
send every low mapping through the capable hook of all LSMs (SELinux,
AppArmor, SafeSetID, BPF LSM programs), adding capability checks that
their policies never had to handle.  For instance, SELinux checks
mmap_zero in its own mmap_addr hook and keeps it separate from the
capability on purpose.  LSMs with their own policy for low mappings
implement it in this hook, so Landlock does the same.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 security/landlock/cap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index fa59118e3486..10e1ca772b9c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
 
 #include "cap.h"
@@ -90,8 +91,29 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 	return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
 }
 
+/**
+ * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
+ *
+ * @addr: Address of the new mapping.
+ *
+ * cap_mmap_addr() requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO to map below dac_mmap_min_addr, but
+ * calls cap_capable() directly, which skips hook_capable().  Check the same
+ * condition against the domain.  commoncap runs first, so this only sees
+ * mappings that commoncap allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SYS_RAWIO use is denied.
+ */
+static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	if (addr >= dac_mmap_min_addr)
+		return 0;
+
+	return check_cap(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
 };
 
 __init void landlock_add_cap_hooks(void)
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr

[sashiko-bot]

> Until now, a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_RAWIO could still
> map memory below the vm.mmap_min_addr limit if it held this capability.
> cap_mmap_addr() is commoncap's mmap_addr hook, and it checks
> CAP_SYS_RAWIO with cap_capable(), not security_capable(), so the check
> never reaches hook_capable().  Mapping the lowest pages is what this
> limit protects against, because it helps to exploit kernel NULL pointer
> dereferences.
> 
> Add a Landlock mmap_addr hook that checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO against the
> domain under the same condition as cap_mmap_addr().  With the same
> vm.mmap_min_addr value, the hook only denies mappings for which
> commoncap required the capability.  security_mmap_addr() stops at
> commoncap's error, so processes without the capability get the same
> result as before.  This also covers the x86 vm86() syscalls, which use
> the same check for address 0.
> 
> Making cap_mmap_addr() call capable() would also fix this, but it would
> send every low mapping through the capable hook of all LSMs (SELinux,
> AppArmor, SafeSetID, BPF LSM programs), adding capability checks that
> their policies never had to handle.  For instance, SELinux checks
> mmap_zero in its own mmap_addr hook and keeps it separate from the
> capability on purpose.  LSMs with their own policy for low mappings
> implement it in this hook, so Landlock does the same.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=2

[PATCH 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities

[Mickaël Salaün]

A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP.  cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
hook_capable().  Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
under the same condition as cap_capset().  As with the mmap_addr hook,
LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
its own permission.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 	return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
 }
 
+/**
+ * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
+ *
+ * @new: New credentials (unused).
+ * @old: Current credentials.
+ * @effective: New effective set (unused).
+ * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
+ * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
+ *
+ * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
+ * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
+ * hook_capable().  Check the same condition against the domain.  commoncap runs
+ * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed.  capset(2) discards
+ * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
+ */
+static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+		       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+			 cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
+		return 0;
+
+	return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+}
+
 /**
  * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
  *
@@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
 };
 
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities

[sashiko-bot]

> A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP.  cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> hook_capable().  Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> under the same condition as cap_capset().  As with the mmap_addr hook,
> LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> its own permission.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=3

[PATCH 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve

[Mickaël Salaün]

With vm.overcommit_memory set to 2, __vm_enough_memory() keeps the
vm.admin_reserve_kbytes reserve for callers whose LSMs all agree that
they hold CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  cap_vm_enough_memory() checks it with
cap_capable(), so a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_ADMIN could
still use this reserve, which is meant to let an administrator recover
from memory exhaustion.

Add a Landlock vm_enough_memory hook that withholds the reserve when the
domain denies CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  Like commoncap and SELinux, do not audit
this check: it only selects a limit, it runs for every accounted
mapping, and withholding the reserve can only make an allocation fail
with -ENOMEM.  As with the previous hooks, LSMs implement their own
policy in this hook: SELinux already checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its own
vm_enough_memory hook, so making commoncap call security_capable() would
make SELinux check it twice.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 security/landlock/cap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
index c89e8d76db8c..c9a900888f3b 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cap.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
@@ -140,10 +140,32 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 	return check_cap(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, CAP_OPT_NONE);
 }
 
+/**
+ * hook_vm_enough_memory - Restrict the admin memory reserve
+ *
+ * @mm: Address space being charged (unused).
+ * @pages: Number of pages being charged (unused).
+ *
+ * cap_vm_enough_memory() lets CAP_SYS_ADMIN use the vm.admin_reserve_kbytes
+ * reserve, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips hook_capable().  Check
+ * the same capability against the domain.  commoncap runs first, so this only
+ * sees tasks that commoncap let use the reserve.  Like commoncap, do not log
+ * denials: this only selects a memory limit.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the domain does not withhold the reserve, -EPERM if
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN use is denied.  An error does not fail the allocation by
+ * itself, but without the reserve, the allocation may fail with -ENOMEM.
+ */
+static int hook_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+	return check_cap(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, hook_vm_enough_memory),
 };
 
 __init void landlock_add_cap_hooks(void)
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve

[sashiko-bot]

> With vm.overcommit_memory set to 2, __vm_enough_memory() keeps the
> vm.admin_reserve_kbytes reserve for callers whose LSMs all agree that
> they hold CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  cap_vm_enough_memory() checks it with
> cap_capable(), so a process in a domain that denies CAP_SYS_ADMIN could
> still use this reserve, which is meant to let an administrator recover
> from memory exhaustion.
> 
> Add a Landlock vm_enough_memory hook that withholds the reserve when the
> domain denies CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  Like commoncap and SELinux, do not audit
> this check: it only selects a limit, it runs for every accounted
> mapping, and withholding the reserve can only make an allocation fail
> with -ENOMEM.  As with the previous hooks, LSMs implement their own
> policy in this hook: SELinux already checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its own
> vm_enough_memory hook, so making commoncap call security_capable() would
> make SELinux check it twice.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Reported-by: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=4

[PATCH 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook

[Mickaël Salaün]

The previous commits make Landlock restrict the capability checks that
commoncap makes from LSM hooks other than capable, which no test covers:
mapping below vm.mmap_min_addr (CAP_SYS_RAWIO), adding inheritable
capabilities outside of the permitted set (CAP_SETPCAP), and using the
admin memory reserve under vm.overcommit_memory=2 (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

Each test first checks that the operation fails without the capability,
so that it exercises the capability check, and then checks it with the
capability effective in four variants: unsandboxed, in a domain that
denies the capability, in a domain that allows it, and in a domain that
does not handle capabilities.

Audit tests check that the capset and mmap_addr denials are logged, that
the admin reserve check is not, and that allowed uses log nothing.

The admin reserve test has to change system-wide overcommit settings: it
sets a commit limit that only fits its mapping with the reserve, with
margins of 96 MiB for other processes.  It changes them after the
fixture setup, so that the teardown restores them after any failure, and
it only runs as root (EUID 0) while writing them.

Add CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the capabilities that the tests may raise, and drop
the stale count from the comment of this list.

Without the fixes, the three denied variants and the denial audit test
fail.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 535 ++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h   |   4 +-
 2 files changed, 538 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 3d7fd02e21ed..c79bb42c6282 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
 #include <sched.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <sys/xattr.h>
@@ -738,6 +740,451 @@ TEST(cap_target_userns_independent)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(target_userns_fd));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Capability checks that commoncap makes from hooks other than the capable
+ * hook.  Each test first checks that the operation needs the capability, then
+ * checks it with the capability effective.  Variants cover an unsandboxed
+ * baseline, a domain that denies the capability, a domain that allows it, and a
+ * domain that does not handle capabilities.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(cap_other_hooks) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(cap_other_hooks)
+{
+	const bool is_sandboxed;
+	const bool handle_caps;
+	const bool is_allowed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_other_hooks, unsandboxed) {
+	.is_sandboxed = false,
+	.handle_caps = false,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_other_hooks, denied) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = true,
+	.is_allowed = false,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_other_hooks, allowed) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = true,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_other_hooks, unhandled) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = false,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(cap_other_hooks)
+{
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(cap_other_hooks)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a ruleset that handles capabilities and allows @cap if @is_allowed,
+ * or, if !@handle_caps, a ruleset that only handles a filesystem access right.
+ * Returns the ruleset FD, or -1 with errno set.
+ */
+static int create_variant_ruleset(const bool handle_caps, const bool is_allowed,
+				  const int cap)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr fs_attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, err;
+
+	if (!handle_caps)
+		return landlock_create_ruleset(&fs_attr, sizeof(fs_attr), 0);
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+	if (ruleset_fd < 0 || !is_allowed)
+		return ruleset_fd;
+
+	if (add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, cap)) {
+		err = errno;
+		close(ruleset_fd);
+		errno = err;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return ruleset_fd;
+}
+
+static void
+enforce_cap_variant(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+		    const FIXTURE_VARIANT(cap_other_hooks) *const variant,
+		    const int cap)
+{
+	int ruleset_fd;
+
+	if (!variant->is_sandboxed)
+		return;
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_variant_ruleset(variant->handle_caps,
+					    variant->is_allowed, cap);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
+static unsigned long read_sysctl(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+				 const char *const path)
+{
+	char buf[32];
+	ssize_t len;
+	int fd;
+
+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
+	{
+		TH_LOG("Failed to open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_LT(0, len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+	buf[len] = '\0';
+	return strtoul(buf, NULL, 10);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 on success, or -1 with errno set. */
+static int write_sysctl(const char *const path, const unsigned long value)
+{
+	char buf[32];
+	int fd, len, err = 0;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu", value);
+	fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+	ret = write(fd, buf, len);
+	if (ret != len) {
+		if (ret >= 0)
+			errno = EIO;
+		err = -1;
+	}
+	if (close(fd) && !err)
+		err = -1;
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cap_mmap_addr() requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO to map below the vm.mmap_min_addr
+ * sysctl (dac_mmap_min_addr).
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_other_hooks, mmap_min_addr)
+{
+	const size_t page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	void *addr;
+
+	if (read_sysctl(_metadata, "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr") == 0)
+		SKIP(return, "vm.mmap_min_addr is 0");
+
+	enforce_cap_variant(_metadata, variant, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+
+	addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
+		    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, addr);
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+	addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
+		    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+	if (variant->is_allowed) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(NULL, addr)
+		{
+			TH_LOG("Failed to map page 0: %s", strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (addr != MAP_FAILED)
+			EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(addr, page_size));
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, addr);
+		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+		if (addr != MAP_FAILED)
+			munmap(addr, page_size);
+	}
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+}
+
+static int add_inheritable_cap(const cap_value_t cap)
+{
+	cap_t cap_p;
+	int ret, err;
+
+	cap_p = cap_get_proc();
+	if (!cap_p)
+		return -1;
+
+	ret = cap_set_flag(cap_p, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, &cap, CAP_SET);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = cap_set_proc(cap_p);
+	err = errno;
+	cap_free(cap_p);
+	errno = err;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add an inheritable capability that is
+ * not in the permitted set.  CAP_NET_RAW is in the bounding set, but
+ * disable_caps() does not put it in the permitted set.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_other_hooks, capset_inheritable)
+{
+	enforce_cap_variant(_metadata, variant, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(-1, add_inheritable_cap(CAP_NET_RAW));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+	if (variant->is_allowed) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, add_inheritable_cap(CAP_NET_RAW))
+		{
+			TH_LOG("Failed to raise CAP_NET_RAW: %s",
+			       strerror(errno));
+		}
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, add_inheritable_cap(CAP_NET_RAW));
+		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+	}
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+}
+
+/*
+ * With vm.overcommit_memory=2, cap_vm_enough_memory() lets CAP_SYS_ADMIN use
+ * the vm.admin_reserve_kbytes reserve.  The test sets a commit limit that
+ * leaves room for the test mapping only with the reserve, and keeps some room
+ * for other processes.  The fixture setup only saves the settings, so that the
+ * teardown restores them after any failure once they are changed.
+ */
+#define OVERCOMMIT_PATH "/proc/sys/vm/"
+#define ADMIN_RESERVE_KB (256UL * 1024)
+#define HEADROOM_KB (64UL * 1024)
+#define MAPPING_KB (160UL * 1024)
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(cap_admin_reserve) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	unsigned long overcommit_memory, overcommit_kbytes, overcommit_ratio;
+	unsigned long admin_reserve_kbytes, committed;
+	bool is_set;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(cap_admin_reserve)
+{
+	const bool is_sandboxed;
+	const bool handle_caps;
+	const bool is_allowed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_admin_reserve, unsandboxed) {
+	.is_sandboxed = false,
+	.handle_caps = false,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_admin_reserve, denied) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = true,
+	.is_allowed = false,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_admin_reserve, allowed) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = true,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(cap_admin_reserve, unhandled) {
+	.is_sandboxed = true,
+	.handle_caps = false,
+	.is_allowed = true,
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static unsigned long read_committed_kb(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
+{
+	unsigned long committed = 0;
+	char line[128];
+	FILE *file;
+
+	file = fopen("/proc/meminfo", "re");
+	ASSERT_NE(NULL, file);
+
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), file))
+		if (sscanf(line, "Committed_AS: %lu kB", &committed) == 1)
+			break;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, fclose(file));
+	EXPECT_NE(0, committed);
+	return committed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * sysctl_perm() only lets the root user write the vm.* sysctls.  Switching to
+ * EUID 0 raises all permitted capabilities, so drop them again.
+ */
+static void set_root_euid(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
+{
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(0));
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Switching back to the real UID needs no capability.  Keep the permitted
+ * capabilities, which the setuid fixup would otherwise clear.
+ */
+static void restore_euid(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
+{
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(getuid()));
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(cap_admin_reserve)
+{
+	self->is_set = false;
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+
+	self->overcommit_memory =
+		read_sysctl(_metadata, OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_memory");
+	self->overcommit_kbytes =
+		read_sysctl(_metadata, OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_kbytes");
+	self->overcommit_ratio =
+		read_sysctl(_metadata, OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_ratio");
+	self->admin_reserve_kbytes =
+		read_sysctl(_metadata, OVERCOMMIT_PATH "admin_reserve_kbytes");
+	self->committed = read_committed_kb(_metadata);
+	ASSERT_NE(0, self->committed);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(cap_admin_reserve)
+{
+	if (!self->is_set)
+		return;
+
+	/* Restores every value, even if one of the writes fails. */
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, seteuid(0));
+	disable_caps(_metadata);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_memory",
+				  self->overcommit_memory));
+	/* Writing one of these two resets the other to 0. */
+	if (self->overcommit_kbytes) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_kbytes",
+					  self->overcommit_kbytes));
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_ratio",
+					  self->overcommit_ratio));
+	}
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "admin_reserve_kbytes",
+				  self->admin_reserve_kbytes));
+	restore_euid(_metadata);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from the test, after the fixture setup, so that the teardown restores
+ * the settings if any of these writes fails.
+ */
+static void set_admin_reserve(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+			      FIXTURE_DATA(cap_admin_reserve) *const self)
+{
+	set_root_euid(_metadata);
+	self->is_set = true;
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "admin_reserve_kbytes",
+				  ADMIN_RESERVE_KB));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_kbytes",
+				  self->committed + ADMIN_RESERVE_KB +
+					  HEADROOM_KB));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_memory", 2));
+	restore_euid(_metadata);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if a writable private mapping of MAPPING_KB fits, or errno. */
+static int
+test_admin_reserve(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(cap_admin_reserve) *const variant,
+		   const bool is_admin)
+{
+	const size_t size = MAPPING_KB * 1024;
+	int ruleset_fd, status;
+	void *addr;
+	pid_t child;
+
+	child = fork();
+	if (child < 0)
+		return errno;
+
+	if (child == 0) {
+		if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+			ruleset_fd = create_variant_ruleset(
+				variant->handle_caps, variant->is_allowed,
+				CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+			if (ruleset_fd < 0)
+				_exit(255);
+			if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) ||
+			    landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
+				_exit(255);
+			close(ruleset_fd);
+		}
+
+		if (is_admin) {
+			cap_t cap_p = cap_get_proc();
+			const cap_value_t cap = CAP_SYS_ADMIN;
+
+			if (!cap_p ||
+			    cap_set_flag(cap_p, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cap,
+					 CAP_SET) ||
+			    cap_set_proc(cap_p))
+				_exit(255);
+			cap_free(cap_p);
+		}
+
+		addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+		_exit(addr == MAP_FAILED ? errno : 0);
+	}
+
+	if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) != child || !WIFEXITED(status))
+		return 255;
+	return WEXITSTATUS(status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(cap_admin_reserve, mmap)
+{
+	set_admin_reserve(_metadata, self);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENOMEM, test_admin_reserve(variant, false));
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->is_allowed ? 0 : ENOMEM,
+		  test_admin_reserve(variant, true));
+}
+
 /* Audit tests */
 
 static int matches_log_cap(int audit_fd, int cap_number)
@@ -828,6 +1275,94 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
+ * denials.  The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
+ * CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, so an accounted mapping made with CAP_SYS_ADMIN effective
+ * leaves no record.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, other_hooks)
+{
+	const size_t page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	struct audit_records records = {};
+	int ruleset_fd;
+	__u64 domain_id;
+	void *addr;
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	/* Allow CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL for child-side audit cleanup. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+	EXPECT_EQ(-1, add_inheritable_cap(CAP_NET_RAW));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, getpid(),
+						  &domain_id));
+
+	/* The mmap_addr hook has nothing to check without a limit. */
+	if (read_sysctl(_metadata, "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr")) {
+		set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+		addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
+			    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, addr);
+		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+		clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SYS_RAWIO));
+	}
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+		    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(MAP_FAILED, addr);
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	if (addr != MAP_FAILED)
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(addr, page_size));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+/* Allowed capability uses in the capset and mmap_addr paths. */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, other_hooks_allowed)
+{
+	const size_t page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	struct audit_records records = {};
+	int ruleset_fd;
+	void *addr;
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_SYS_RAWIO));
+	/* Allow CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL for child-side audit cleanup. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, add_inheritable_cap(CAP_NET_RAW));
+	clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+	if (read_sysctl(_metadata, "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr")) {
+		set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+		addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
+			    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(NULL, addr);
+		clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
+		if (addr != MAP_FAILED)
+			EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(addr, page_size));
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+}
+
 TEST_F(cap_audit, allowed)
 {
 	struct audit_records records = {};
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
index e29406900c04..a6fdfb422fad 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static const char bin_wait_pipe_sandbox[] = "./wait-pipe-sandbox";
 static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
 {
 	cap_t cap_p;
-	/* Only these three capabilities are useful for the tests. */
+	/* Only these capabilities are useful for the tests. */
 	const cap_value_t caps[] = {
 		/* clang-format off */
 		CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL,
@@ -44,9 +44,11 @@ static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
 		CAP_MKNOD,
 		CAP_NET_ADMIN,
 		CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
+		CAP_SETPCAP,
 		CAP_SETUID,
 		CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 		CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
+		CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
 		/* clang-format on */
 	};
 	const unsigned int noroot = SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED;
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] selftests/landlock: unaccounted swap space in
  set_admin_reserve()
- [Low] selftests/landlock: commit message omits CAP_SETPCAP in
  _init_caps()
- [Low] selftests/landlock: MAP_FIXED at NULL fails arch_mmap_check() on
  32-bit ARM
It also noticed 1 related pre-existing issue this patch does not
introduce:
- [Medium] selftests/landlock: null pointer dereference in _change_cap()
  [1]
--

commit 1b0a2ef8af3441bc1c12e3659de9a61de2c9490f
Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook

This commit adds selftests covering Landlock capability restrictions and
auditing for commoncap checks performed in the mmap_addr, capset, and
vm_enough_memory LSM hooks.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
> index 3d7fd02e21ed9..c79bb42c6282b 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
[ ... ]
> +TEST_F(cap_other_hooks, mmap_min_addr)
> +{
> +	const size_t page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> +	void *addr;
> +
> +	if (read_sysctl(_metadata, "/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr") == 0)
> +		SKIP(return, "vm.mmap_min_addr is 0");
> +
> +	enforce_cap_variant(_metadata, variant, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
> +
> +	addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
> +		    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
> +	EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, addr);
> +	EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
> +
> +	set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_RAWIO);
> +	addr = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ,
> +		    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);

[Severity: Low]
Does mapping at NULL with MAP_FIXED fail with EINVAL on 32-bit ARM before
reaching security_mmap_addr()?

In mm/mmap.c:__get_unmapped_area(), arch_mmap_check() runs before
security_mmap_addr().  On 32-bit ARM, FIRST_USER_ADDRESS is 2 * PAGE_SIZE
and arch_mmap_check() rejects MAP_FIXED mappings below FIRST_USER_ADDRESS
with -EINVAL:

arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/mman.h:
#define arch_mmap_check(addr, len, flags) \
	(((flags) & MAP_FIXED && (addr) < FIRST_USER_ADDRESS) ? -EINVAL : 0)

As a result, mmap_min_addr, cap_audit.other_hooks, and
cap_audit.other_hooks_allowed will get EINVAL instead of EPERM or NULL on
32-bit ARM, and cap_audit.other_hooks will not generate the expected
CAP_SYS_RAWIO audit record.

[ ... ]
> +static unsigned long read_committed_kb(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
> +{
> +	unsigned long committed = 0;
> +	char line[128];
> +	FILE *file;
> +
> +	file = fopen("/proc/meminfo", "re");
> +	ASSERT_NE(NULL, file);
> +
> +	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), file))
> +		if (sscanf(line, "Committed_AS: %lu kB", &committed) == 1)
> +			break;
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, fclose(file));
> +	EXPECT_NE(0, committed);
> +	return committed;
> +}
[ ... ]
> +static void set_admin_reserve(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
> +			      FIXTURE_DATA(cap_admin_reserve) *const self)
> +{
> +	set_root_euid(_metadata);
> +	self->is_set = true;
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "admin_reserve_kbytes",
> +				  ADMIN_RESERVE_KB));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_kbytes",
> +				  self->committed + ADMIN_RESERVE_KB +
> +					  HEADROOM_KB));
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, write_sysctl(OVERCOMMIT_PATH "overcommit_memory", 2));
> +	restore_euid(_metadata);
> +}
[ ... ]
> +TEST_F(cap_admin_reserve, mmap)
> +{
> +	set_admin_reserve(_metadata, self);
> +
> +	EXPECT_EQ(ENOMEM, test_admin_reserve(variant, false));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(variant->is_allowed ? 0 : ENOMEM,
> +		  test_admin_reserve(variant, true));
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Does set_admin_reserve() need to account for active swap when computing the
commit limit?

In mm/util.c:vm_commit_limit(), the kernel adds total_swap_pages on top of
sysctl_overcommit_kbytes:

mm/util.c:vm_commit_limit() {
	if (sysctl_overcommit_kbytes)
		allowed = sysctl_overcommit_kbytes >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
	else
		allowed = ((totalram_pages() - hugetlb_total_pages())
			   * sysctl_overcommit_ratio / 100);
	allowed += total_swap_pages;

	return allowed;
}

When SwapTotal is 96 MiB (MAPPING_KB - HEADROOM_KB) or larger, the
unprivileged commit limit (CommitLimit - admin_reserve_kbytes) still has
room for the 160 MiB mapping, so test_admin_reserve() succeeds and returns 0
instead of ENOMEM.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> index e29406900c04a..a6fdfb422fad5 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static const char bin_wait_pipe_sandbox[] = "./wait-pipe-sandbox";
>  static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
>  {
>  	cap_t cap_p;
> -	/* Only these three capabilities are useful for the tests. */
> +	/* Only these capabilities are useful for the tests. */
>  	const cap_value_t caps[] = {
>  		/* clang-format off */
>  		CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL,
> @@ -44,9 +44,11 @@ static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
>  		CAP_MKNOD,
>  		CAP_NET_ADMIN,
>  		CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
> +		CAP_SETPCAP,
>  		CAP_SETUID,
>  		CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
>  		CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
> +		CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
>  		/* clang-format on */
>  	};
>  	const unsigned int noroot = SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED;

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but the commit message says "Add CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the
capabilities that the tests may raise" while _init_caps() adds both
CAP_SETPCAP and CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

[Severity: Medium]
This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but _init_caps() and
_change_cap() [1] check the return value of cap_get_proc() with
EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p) instead of ASSERT_NE(NULL, cap_p):

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h:_change_cap() {
	cap_t cap_p;

	cap_p = cap_get_proc();
	EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p);
	EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_flag(cap_p, flag, 1, &cap, value));
	...
}

Because EXPECT_NE() does not abort the test on failure, a NULL return from
cap_get_proc() is passed directly to cap_clear() or cap_set_flag(), causing
a NULL pointer dereference.

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-78e86289-9899-4c8f-a69a-109bbe06ac40

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=5

[PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

[Mickaël Salaün]

Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
hold for every capability check.  Remove them instead of listing their
exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 Documentation/security/landlock.rst      | 8 ++++----
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h            | 6 +++---
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
 ==================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
 
 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing).  To
 harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
@@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
 (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
 
 Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
-flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
-independent of these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
-always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
+flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire independently of
+these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
+incremented regardless of logging configuration.
 
 Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
 audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
 =====================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
 
 The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
 filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`.  Namespaces
 the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
 allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
 which new namespace types the process may acquire.
-``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
+``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
 after the domain is enforced, regardless
 of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
 grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.).  Configuring
@@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
 privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
 capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
 In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
-but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised.  Do not rely
+but any denied capability will fail when exercised.  Do not rely
 on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
-capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
+capability.
 
 Truncating files
 ----------------
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
  * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
  *   capabilities.  A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
  *   is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
- *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This hook is purely restrictive: it can
- *   deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
- *   grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
+ *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This permission is purely restrictive: it
+ *   can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
+ *   never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
  *   Landlock ABI version 12.
  */
 #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE			(1ULL << 0)
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

[sashiko-bot]

> Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
> hold for every capability check.  Remove them instead of listing their
> exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net?part=6

Re: [PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks

[Serge Hallyn (AMD)]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:24:28PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> This is series 1 of 3:
> 
> * 1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
>   2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
>   3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.
> 
> LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE, merged for v7.4, denies capabilities
> through the LSM capable hook, but commoncap's mmap_addr, capset and
> vm_enough_memory hooks call cap_capable() directly.  A domain that
> denies a capability can therefore still:
> 
> - map memory below vm.mmap_min_addr (CAP_SYS_RAWIO), which defeats a
>   mitigation for kernel NULL pointer dereferences;
> - add inheritable capabilities outside of its permitted set
>   (CAP_SETPCAP), which lets a privileged sandbox without no_new_privs
>   gain capabilities through execve(), although the domain still
>   restricts their use;
> - use the admin memory reserve with vm.overcommit_memory=2
>   (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
> 
> As SELinux does, patches 2 to 4 add Landlock's own check to these hooks,
> with commoncap's conditions, so they only deny what commoncap granted
> because of the capability.  Patch 1 factors out the shared check.  Patch
> 5 adds tests, including audit tests, that fail without the fixes.  Patch
> 6 fixes the documentation, which overstated what the permission
> restricts and how its denials show.
> 
> Two other direct capability-set checks are fixed separately:
> 
> - PSI triggers (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE):
>   https://patch.msgid.link/20261106120004.90041-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com
> - user namespace uid 0 mapping (CAP_SETFCAP):
>   https://patch.msgid.link/20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net
> 
> Regards,

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> 
> Mickaël Salaün (6):
>   landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
>   landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr
>   landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
>   landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve
>   selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook
>   landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation
> 
>  Documentation/security/landlock.rst         |   8 +-
>  Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst    |   8 +-
>  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h               |   6 +-
>  security/landlock/cap.c                     | 110 +++-
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 535 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h   |   4 +-
>  6 files changed, 650 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
> -- 
> 2.56.0
>