[PATCH v3] projects/selinux: enroll the SELinux userspace project

[PATCH v3] projects/selinux: enroll the SELinux userspace project

[Stephen Smalley]

Enroll the SELinux userspace project in oss-scanner similar to how we
are already enrolled in the oss-fuzz project. I may later migrate the
Dockerfile and .md files to our repo and point to them from
project.yaml to ease future updates but this seems reasonable for now.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: <omosnacek@gmail.com>
cc: <jwcart2@gmail.com>
cc: <cgzones@googlemail.com>
cc: <jason@perfinion.com>
cc: <plautrba@redhat.com>
---
v3 adds newrole build dependencies and flags and updates
patch_guidelines.md per the sashiko review.

 projects/selinux/Dockerfile           |  36 +++++++
 projects/selinux/patch_guidelines.md  |  13 +++
 projects/selinux/project.yaml         |  15 +++
 projects/selinux/report_guidelines.md |  10 ++
 projects/selinux/threat_model.md      | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 207 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 projects/selinux/Dockerfile
 create mode 100644 projects/selinux/patch_guidelines.md
 create mode 100644 projects/selinux/project.yaml
 create mode 100644 projects/selinux/report_guidelines.md
 create mode 100644 projects/selinux/threat_model.md

diff --git a/projects/selinux/Dockerfile b/projects/selinux/Dockerfile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b81a35e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/projects/selinux/Dockerfile
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+FROM ubuntu:latest
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      ca-certificates build-essential pkg-config git python3 \
+	bison \
+	flex \
+	gawk \
+	gcc \
+	gettext \
+	libaudit-dev \
+	libbz2-dev \
+	libcap-dev \
+	libcap-ng-dev \
+	libcunit1-dev \
+	libdbus-glib-1-dev \
+	libpcre2-dev \
+	libpam0g-dev \
+	libpam-modules \
+	ruby-dev \
+	swig \
+	xmlto \
+	python3-build \
+	python3-dev \
+	python3-pip \
+	python3-setuptools \
+	python3-wheel \
+	&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# scanner contract: the checkout lives inside the image, at /src
+COPY . /src
+WORKDIR /src
+
+RUN make -k DEBUG=1 LSPP_PRIV=y DESTDIR=/src/build install install-pywrap
+
+# Smoke-test
+RUN make -k DESTDIR=/src/build -C libsepol test
diff --git a/projects/selinux/patch_guidelines.md b/projects/selinux/patch_guidelines.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a16e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/projects/selinux/patch_guidelines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# How we would like patches made
+
+## Size and scope of a fix
+as narrow as possible: change only the faulty function, no refactoring
+
+## Code style
+format with the .clang-format in /src
+
+## Tests
+add a regression test in a new file under the per-component tests/ for those that have one, or create one for those that do not
+
+## Branch and commit message
+against the main branch; subject line in the form 'component: what changed'; include a Signed-off-by: line per the DCO; see /src/CONTRIBUTING.md
diff --git a/projects/selinux/project.yaml b/projects/selinux/project.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dbc5bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/projects/selinux/project.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+repo: https://github.com/selinuxproject/selinux
+primary_contact: stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com
+auto_ccs:
+  - omosnacek@gmail.com
+  - jwcart2@gmail.com
+  - cgzones@googlemail.com
+  - paul@paul-moore.com
+  - jason@perfinion.com
+  - plautrba@redhat.com
+
+output_format:
+  email:
+    min_severity: low
+  github_security_advisory:
+    min_severity: medium
diff --git a/projects/selinux/report_guidelines.md b/projects/selinux/report_guidelines.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4469ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/projects/selinux/report_guidelines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# How we would like reports written
+
+## Layout and length
+under one page, with these sections in this order: Summary, Affected versions, Reproduction, Suggested fix
+
+## What every report should state
+the affected versions and configuration, the attacker's starting position, and the public API that reaches the faulty code
+
+## Style
+plain text, no Markdown tables; one root cause per report; start the title with the component's name
diff --git a/projects/selinux/threat_model.md b/projects/selinux/threat_model.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f049921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/projects/selinux/threat_model.md
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+# Threat model
+
+## What this project does and where untrusted input enters
+
+selinux provides the core SELinux userspace libraries, daemons, and
+tools. It also includes some optional SELinux userspace daemons and
+tools that are not installed by default. Applications use libsepol to
+generate and read SELinux policy files, libsemanage to perform policy
+management tasks, and libselinux to look up access and labeling
+decisions, interact with the SELinux daemons, and invoke the
+SELinux-specific kernel APIs (/proc/pid/attr/*, /sys/fs/selinux/*, and
+the [l][f][gs]etxattr(2) system calls with the security.selinux xattr
+name).
+
+libsepol parses and validates binary and CIL source policy files and
+memory buffers, but any bug that requires attacker-controlled policy
+is handled as a regular bug, not as a security bug (i.e. no security
+advisory). checkpolicy and checkmodule parse and validate source
+policy files, but any bug that requires attacker-controlled source
+policy is likewise handled as a regular bug, not a security bug.  The
+libsepol API is not a trust boundary. The checkpolicy and checkmodule
+interfaces are not a trust boundary. Similarly, the semodule-utils
+programs operate on binary policy modules but their interfaces are not
+a trust boundary.
+
+All root-owned configuration files used by the SELinux userspace are
+considered to be trusted. Any bug that requires attacker-controlled
+root-owned configuration is handled as a regular bug, not a security
+bug.
+
+libsemanage parses and validates many different configuration files,
+but the caveat above regarding root-owned configuration files holds.
+The libsemanage API is not a trust boundary. The semodule, semanage,
+and setsebool program interfaces are not trust boundaries.
+
+The kernel interfaces are considered to be trusted by all of the
+SELinux userspace. Reading from the /proc/pid/attr/* interfaces will
+always return an attribute (context) value canonicalized against the
+policy by the kernel. Similarly, reading from any of the
+/sys/fs/selinux/* interfaces will always return a canonicalized value
+against the policy or the set of valid values for a given interface
+(e.g. 0 or 1 for enforce). In the case of the security.selinux xattrs
+returned by getxattr(2) and similar system calls, the underlying xattr
+value may originate from an untrusted filesystem in some cases,
+although these xattr values will only be used and returned by the
+kernel if the policy specifies the fs_use_xattr behavior for the
+filesystem type and the mounter did not specify a SELinux context=
+mount option at mount time to override it. Otherwise, the kernel will
+assign a default value from policy or use the value specified via the
+context= mount option and will always return this trusted value on
+getxattr(2) calls. Even when the kernel uses the filesystem-provided
+xattr values, it canonicalizes them against the policy before
+returning them to userspace unless the process has the CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+capability and has the SELinux mac_admin permission in the policy;
+such processes are considered to be trusted with respect to handling
+raw attribute values.
+
+Despite the items noted above as being trusted or not being trust
+boundaries, please report and fix bugs in parsing and processing
+inputs, but there is no need to open a security advisory for these.
+
+Depending on build configuration (any of AUDIT_LOG_PRIV=y,
+NAMESPACE_PRIV=y, LSPP_PRIV=y), the newrole utility may run with
+greater privileges than its caller and therefore considers all of its
+caller-supplied inputs and environment to be untrusted and considers
+the shell or command it launches in the new role to be untrusted.
+
+The sandbox/seunshare utility considers all of its caller-supplied
+inputs and environment to be untrusted and considers anything it runs
+within the sandboxed process to be untrusted.
+
+restorecond considers its environment, arguments, and configurations
+to be trusted but not the file trees it walks. Note that walking of
+user home directories is done by a separate per-user restorecond
+instance.
+
+mcstrans considers its environment, arguments, and configurations to
+be trusted. mcstrans considers its clients to be untrusted but is
+known to be subject to denial of service attacks. Fixes for such
+denial of service attacks will be accepted but not treated as security
+bugs.
+
+## Components that matter most / least
+
+Start with policycoreutils/newrole, sandbox/seunshare, restorecond,
+and mcstrans (in that order) since they often run as root or with
+Linux capabilities and deal with untrusted inputs. These are however
+all optional components in Linux and unused by Android.
+
+Next prioritize libselinux since it is the most widely linked library
+across both Linux and Android userspace.
+
+Next prioritize libsepol, checkpolicy, and secilc since they are used
+by both Linux and Android, but remember that bugs that depend on
+attacker-controlled policy are handled as regular bugs, not security
+bugs.
+
+Next prioritize libsemanage, followed by policycoreutils and python/*,
+since they are widely used by Linux but not by Android.
+
+Next review dbus and gui; while these often run as root or with Linux
+capabilities, they are optional components, rarely used, and gated by
+polkit or invoked by privileged authorized users.
+
+Last review any remaining components e.g. semodule-utils.
+
+## How to exercise it
+
+.github/actions/build-userspace/action.yml is the GitHub action for
+building the code, and .github/workflows/run_tests.yml is the workflow
+for running the tests. The TL;DR version is 'make DESTDIR=/src/build test'.
+
+FUZZING.md contains instructions for fuzzing selected components;
+oss-fuzz is used to regularly run the fuzzers.
+
+## How you rate severity
+
+Anything that depends on attacker-controlled policy is low.
+
+All DoS is low.
+
+For memory-safety findings, provide a reproducer using a public API
+where possible. Separate observed corruption or undefined behavior
+from any claim of code execution; explain attacker control and
+required features. Describe realistic impact.
+
+## Anything to leave alone
+
+The policy compilers (checkpolicy, checkmodule, and secilc) will
+consume resources in accordance with the size and complexity of the
+policies they are compiling. Small memory leaks on fatal error paths
+during policy compilation are not of interest because the policy
+compiler will exit shortly thereafter.
-- 
2.56.0

Re: [PATCH v3] projects/selinux: enroll the SELinux userspace project

[sashiko-bot]

> Enroll the SELinux userspace project in oss-scanner similar to how we
> are already enrolled in the oss-fuzz project. I may later migrate the
> Dockerfile and .md files to our repo and point to them from
> project.yaml to ease future updates but this seems reasonable for now.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261113143126.103018-2-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com?part=1