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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Thorsten Blum" <blum@kernel.org>,
	"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
	"Chris Mason" <mason@kernel.org>,
	"Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, "Chao Yu" <chao@kernel.org>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Zhihao Cheng" <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	dsterba@suse.cz
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Use FSTR() in ubifs_xattr_{set,get,remove}()
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:35:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219856@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118002845.574426-10-blum@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues
in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not
introduce:
- [High] ubifs: missing read-only and error state checks in fileattr and
  xattr setters [1]
--

This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but can ubifs_xattr_set(),
ubifs_xattr_remove(), and setflags() (via ubifs_fileattr_set()) mutate
state on a read-only or errored UBIFS filesystem [1]?

A stacked filesystem such as ecryptfs can call vfs_setxattr(),
vfs_removexattr(), or vfs_fileattr_set() on a lower UBIFS mount without
acquiring write access on the lower mount, and those VFS helpers
dispatch into UBIFS without rejecting read-only or emergency read-only
lower superblocks.

ubifs_xattr_set() and ubifs_xattr_remove() then call create_xattr(),
change_xattr(), and remove_xattr(), which mutate in-memory host and
xattr inode state before reaching reserve_space(), where ubifs_assert(c,
!c->ro_media && !c->ro_mount) fires, c->ro_error is set, and the xattr
inode is marked bad. Similarly, setflags() in fs/ubifs/ioctl.c allocates
dirty inode budget via ubifs_budget_space() and dirties the inode
without checking c->ro_mount, c->ro_media, or c->ro_error, leaking
c->bi.dd_growth on a read-only mount and tripping ubifs_assert(c,
c->bi.dd_growth == 0) at unmount.

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-5bb2275d-76e5-4d6a-b814-a7ac921778bf

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118002845.574426-7-blum@kernel.org?part=4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Thorsten Blum" <blum@kernel.org>,
	"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
	"Chris Mason" <mason@kernel.org>,
	"Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, "Chao Yu" <chao@kernel.org>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Zhihao Cheng" <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	dsterba@suse.cz
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Use FSTR() in ubifs_xattr_{set,get,remove}()
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:35:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219856@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118002845.574426-10-blum@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues
in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not
introduce:
- [High] ubifs: missing read-only and error state checks in fileattr and
  xattr setters [1]
--

This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but can ubifs_xattr_set(),
ubifs_xattr_remove(), and setflags() (via ubifs_fileattr_set()) mutate
state on a read-only or errored UBIFS filesystem [1]?

A stacked filesystem such as ecryptfs can call vfs_setxattr(),
vfs_removexattr(), or vfs_fileattr_set() on a lower UBIFS mount without
acquiring write access on the lower mount, and those VFS helpers
dispatch into UBIFS without rejecting read-only or emergency read-only
lower superblocks.

ubifs_xattr_set() and ubifs_xattr_remove() then call create_xattr(),
change_xattr(), and remove_xattr(), which mutate in-memory host and
xattr inode state before reaching reserve_space(), where ubifs_assert(c,
!c->ro_media && !c->ro_mount) fires, c->ro_error is set, and the xattr
inode is marked bad. Similarly, setflags() in fs/ubifs/ioctl.c allocates
dirty inode budget via ubifs_budget_space() and dirties the inode
without checking c->ro_mount, c->ro_media, or c->ro_error, leaking
c->bi.dd_growth on a read-only mount and tripping ubifs_assert(c,
c->bi.dd_growth == 0) at unmount.

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-5bb2275d-76e5-4d6a-b814-a7ac921778bf

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118002845.574426-7-blum@kernel.org?part=4

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Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  0:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18  0:28 [PATCH 0/4] fscrypt: Add FSTR() helper macro and convert initializers Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28 ` Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28 ` [f2fs-dev] " Thorsten Blum via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  0:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] fscrypt: Add FSTR() helper macro Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` [f2fs-dev] " Thorsten Blum via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  0:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] btrfs: Use FSTR() for the "default" name Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` [f2fs-dev] " Thorsten Blum via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  0:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] f2fs: Use FSTR() in f2fs_do_make_empty_dir() Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` [f2fs-dev] " Thorsten Blum via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  0:28 ` [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Use FSTR() in ubifs_xattr_{set,get,remove}() Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` Thorsten Blum
2026-11-18  0:28   ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Use FSTR() in ubifs_xattr_{set, get, remove}() Thorsten Blum via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  0:34   ` [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Use FSTR() in ubifs_xattr_{set,get,remove}() sashiko-bot
2026-11-18  0:34     ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18  0:35   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18  0:35     ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18  5:01 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 0/4] fscrypt: Add FSTR() helper macro and convert initializers Eric Biggers via Linux-f2fs-devel
2026-11-18  5:01   ` Eric Biggers
2026-11-18  5:01   ` Eric Biggers

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