All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220141@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-7-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] rootns: fork() race in rootns_kill_members() missing
  tasklist_lock
- [High] rootns: missing PID namespace ancestry check in
  rootns_kill_members()
--

commit af3e55bb2ee92ebb14699cd9c72b34e3ddb26ffe
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call

This commit adds the rootns_kill() system call to walk a root namespace's
PID namespace IDR and send a signal to every member thread group.

> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index 8a1254db69df7..f59b2fe9910de 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -390,3 +391,67 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rootns_wait, int, rootnsfd,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  #endif
> +
> +static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig)
> +{
> +	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = rootns->ns->pid_ns_for_children;

[Severity: High]
Should rootns_kill_members() verify that the caller's active PID namespace
is equal to or an ancestor of pid_ns before delivering signals?

Without an ancestry check, a caller holding rootnsfd in a sibling or
descendant PID namespace can signal processes outside its PID namespace
hierarchy.  Because kill_pid() passes SEND_SIG_NOINFO to
send_signal_locked():

kernel/signal.c:send_signal_locked() {
    ...
	if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO) {
		/* Force if sent from an ancestor pid namespace */
		force = !task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(t));
	}
    ...
}

when current has no PID in task_active_pid_ns(t), send_signal_locked()
treats the signal as coming from an ancestor PID namespace and sets
force = true, bypassing SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE and allowing SIGKILL or SIGSTOP
to kill or stop the PID namespace init process.

> +	bool any_success = false;
> +	bool any_other = false;
> +	bool any_perm = false;
> +	int other_err = 0;
> +	struct pid *pid;
> +	int nr;
> +
> +	if (READ_ONCE(rootns->state) != ROOTNS_RUNNING)
> +		return -ESRCH;
> +
> +	scoped_guard(rcu) {
> +		idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) {
> +			int err;
> +
> +			if (!pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID))
> +				continue;
> +
> +			err = kill_pid(pid, sig, 0);

[Severity: High]
Can a concurrent fork() still escape signals sent by rootns_kill_members()?

CPU0                              CPU1
copy_process()
  hlist_add_head(&delayed.node,
    &current->signal->multiprocess)
  ...
  pid = alloc_pid(...)
                                  rootns_kill_members()
                                    idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, ...)
                                      /* parent: kill_pid() uses
                                       * PIDTYPE_TGID, so delayed.signal
                                       * is not updated */
                                      kill_pid(parent_pid, SIGTERM, 0)
                                      /* child: not attached yet */
                                      !pid_task(child_pid, PIDTYPE_TGID)
                                        -> continue
  write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
  p->signal->shared_pending.signal =
    delayed.signal
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID)
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)
  write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
                                    /* child escapes SIGTERM */

__send_signal_locked() only records signals in t->signal->multiprocess for
in-flight forks when type > PIDTYPE_TGID, whereas kill_pid() passes
PIDTYPE_TGID.  In addition, because pid_ns->idr is walked without holding
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), a parent at a higher IDR entry can fork and
attach a child at a lower, already-scanned IDR entry (via PID wrap-around
or clone3() set_tid) before the scan reaches the parent, allowing the child
to escape even SIGKILL, or rootns_kill_members() can observe
pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID) before attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID) completes and
get -ESRCH from kill_pid().

Holding read_lock(&tasklist_lock) during the IDR walk and signaling via
group_send_sig_info(sig, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, task, PIDTYPE_MAX), as
zap_pid_ns_processes() and kill(-1, sig) do, would close these races.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  5:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-220141@kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=bsegall@google.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave@stgolabs.net \
    --cc=david@kernel.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dietmar.eggemann@arm.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=juri.lelli@redhat.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kprateek.nayak@amd.com \
    --cc=liam@infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=ljs@kernel.org \
    --cc=manfred@colorfullife.com \
    --cc=mgorman@suse.de \
    --cc=mhocko@suse.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=neal@gompa.dev \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=surenb@google.com \
    --cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
    --cc=vincent.guittot@linaro.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=vschneid@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.