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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220147@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-13-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 9 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: setns tests fail to open /proc/self/ns/mnt
  and hang
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: nested_ns fails with EPERM in unmapped user
  namespace
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: enter_perms fails under PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
  as owner
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: PID 1 exit race with sibling tasks in
  enter_concurrent
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: missing SKIP() in fixture setup and silent
  child skips
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: enter_unpriv_user_mntns() fails to restore
  dumpability
- [Medium] selftests/rootns: fsconfig test fails with EPERM at
  sys_fsopen() for sysfs
- [Low] selftests/rootns: fallback syscall definitions omit MIPS ABI
  offsets
- [Low] selftests/rootns: fd leak in create_rootns_as_uid() when
  waitpid() fails
--

commit 180af99245923a2ffc15ed3bd6aa532d0e868807
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite

This commit adds a kselftest harness suite under
tools/testing/selftests/rootns to test root namespace creation, lifecycle,
mount configuration, and permission checks.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c b/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..fdb6a74822204
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c
[ ... ]
> +#ifndef __NR_rootns_create
> +#ifdef __alpha__
> +#define __NR_rootns_create 583
> +#define __NR_rootns_wait 584
> +#define __NR_rootns_kill 585
> +#define __NR_rootns_enter 586
> +#else
> +#define __NR_rootns_create 473
> +#define __NR_rootns_wait 474
> +#define __NR_rootns_kill 475
> +#define __NR_rootns_enter 476
> +#endif
> +#endif

[Severity: Low]
On mips, syscall numbers in syscall_*.tbl are offset by the ABI base (4000
for o32, 5000 for n64, and 6000 for n32).  Should the fallback definitions
account for _MIPS_SIM so builds without updated system headers do not invoke
unrelated syscalls?

[ ... ]

> +static int create_rootns_as_uid(uid_t uid, unsigned int flags, int *cfd)
> +{
[ ... ]
> +	if (!err) {
> +		*cfd = recv_fd(sv[0]);
> +		if (*cfd < 0)
> +			err = errno;
> +	}
> +	close(sv[0]);
> +
> +	if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid && !err)
> +		err = errno;
> +	if (!err && (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)))
> +		err = ECHILD;
> +
> +	return err ? -err : 0;
> +}

[Severity: Low]
Does create_rootns_as_uid() leak *cfd if recv_fd() succeeds and waitpid() or
the child exit status check then sets err?

[ ... ]

> +FIXTURE(rootns) {
> +	int cfd;
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(rootns) {
> +	self->cfd = create_test_rootns(false, ROOTNS_ALL_NAMESPACES |
> +					ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE |
> +					ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
> +	ASSERT_GE(self->cfd, 0);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Does FIXTURE_SETUP(rootns) fail all 16 tests instead of skipping when
CONFIG_ROOTNS is disabled (ENOSYS) or when the test runs without root
privileges (EPERM from sys_fsopen("tmpfs", 0) in mount_root())?

Because rootns is added unconditionally to TARGETS in
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile while CONFIG_ROOTNS defaults to n, missing
kernel support or privileges should call SKIP(return, ...) with a reason
string.  Conversely, the child helpers in mount_perms and fsconfig call
_exit(0) when unprivileged user namespaces or sysfs are unavailable, which
reports a silent pass instead of a skip with a reason.

[ ... ]

> +TEST_F(rootns, nested_ns) {
> +	pid_t pid;
> +	int nsfd;
> +
> +	nsfd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	ASSERT_GE(nsfd, 0);
> +
> +	pid = sys_rootns_enter(self->cfd);
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +	if (pid == 0) {
> +		close(self->cfd);
> +
> +		if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS))
> +			_exit(1);
> +		if (clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWNS))
> +			_exit(2);
> +		if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER))
> +			_exit(3);
> +		if (clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER))
> +			_exit(4);
> +		if (setns(nsfd, CLONE_NEWNS) != -1 || errno != EPERM)
> +			_exit(5);
> +
> +		close(nsfd);
> +		_exit(0);
> +	}
> +
> +	close(nsfd);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(reap_child_exit_code(pid), 0);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Will unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER) always fail
with EPERM here?

FIXTURE_SETUP(rootns) creates self->cfd with ROOTNS_ALL_NAMESPACES (which
includes ROOTNS_USER), allocating a new user namespace with no UID or GID
mappings.  When the child enters self->cfd and calls unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER),
create_user_ns() checks kuid_has_mapping() and kgid_has_mapping() in the
parent user namespace (self->cfd->cred->user_ns) and returns -EPERM, causing
the child to exit with status 3.  In addition, unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) places
the child into another unmapped user namespace before
clone_with_flags(CLONE_NEWUSER) runs, so the second user namespace creation
also fails with EPERM unless UID and GID mappings are written first.

> +
> +TEST_F(rootns, setns_same) {
> +	ssize_t nwritten;
> +	pid_t pid1;
> +	pid_t pid2;
> +	char ch;
> +	int nsfd;
> +	int sv[2];
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, sv), 0);
> +
> +	pid1 = sys_rootns_enter(self->cfd);
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid1, 0);
> +	if (pid1 == 0) {
> +		int ret;
> +
> +		close(self->cfd);
> +		close(sv[0]);
> +		ret = send_unshared_mntns_and_wait(sv[1]);
> +		close(sv[1]);
> +		_exit(ret);
> +	}
> +	close(sv[1]);
> +
> +	nsfd = recv_fd(sv[0]);
> +	ASSERT_GE(nsfd, 0);

[Severity: Medium]
Does recv_fd(sv[0]) hang in both setns_same and setns_foreign after
send_unshared_mntns_and_wait() fails with ENOENT?

Both self->cfd (in FIXTURE_SETUP) and beta_cfd (in setns_foreign) are
created via create_test_rootns(false, ...), which mounts an empty tmpfs at
/proc instead of procfs:

tools/testing/selftests/rootns/smoke.c:mount_proc() {
	const char *fstype = need_proc ? "proc" : "tmpfs";
}

When pid1 (or beta_pid) enters the rootns and runs
send_unshared_mntns_and_wait(), open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", ...) fails with
ENOENT and the child exits without calling send_fd().  Because sv is an
AF_UNIX SOCK_DGRAM socketpair, closing sv[1] on child exit does not wake a
blocking recvmsg() on sv[0], so the parent blocks in recv_fd(sv[0]) until
the test harness times out.

[ ... ]

> +static int enter_unpriv_user_mntns(uid_t drop_uid)
> +{
> +	char map[32];
> +	uid_t uid;
> +	gid_t gid;
> +	int fd;
> +	int len;
> +
> +	if (geteuid() == 0 &&
> +	    (setresgid(drop_uid, drop_uid, drop_uid) < 0 ||
> +	     setresuid(drop_uid, drop_uid, drop_uid) < 0))
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	uid = geteuid();
> +	gid = getegid();
> +	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0)
> +		return -errno;
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	if (fd >= 0) {
> +		(void)write(fd, "deny\n", 5);
> +		close(fd);
> +	}
> +
> +	fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	if (fd < 0)
> +		return -errno;

[Severity: Medium]
When the test runs as root, does enter_unpriv_user_mntns() always fail with
-EACCES when opening /proc/self/uid_map?

Dropping privileges with setresgid() and setresuid() clears task dumpability
in commit_creds(), which makes /proc/self/uid_map owned by GLOBAL_ROOT_UID.
After unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID is unmapped in the new user
namespace, so open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC) fails with
EACCES unless prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) is called after
setresuid().  Because both mount_perms and fsconfig treat -EACCES from
enter_unpriv_user_mntns() as _exit(0), both tests silently skip their
unprivileged checks when run as root.

[ ... ]

> +TEST_F(rootns, enter_perms) {
> +	pid_t pid;
> +	int cfd;
> +
> +	cfd = sys_rootns_create(ROOTNS_ALL_NAMESPACES |
> +			    ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE |
> +			    ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
> +	ASSERT_GE(cfd, 0);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(sys_rootns_enter(cfd), -1);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(mount_root(cfd), 0);
> +
> +	pid = fork();
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +	if (pid == 0) {
> +		if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
> +			_exit(1);
> +		if (sys_rootns_enter(cfd) != -1 || errno != EPERM)
> +			_exit(2);
> +		close(cfd);
> +		_exit(0);
> +	}
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(reap_child_exit_code(pid), 0);
> +	close(cfd);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Does sys_rootns_enter(cfd) succeed here instead of failing with EPERM?

The child inherits the same credentials that created cfd, so in
may_enter_rootns_creds(old, target), cred_cap_issubset(old, target),
uid_eq(old->euid, target->euid), and gid_eq(old->egid, target->egid) all
hold (as old->user_ns == target->user_ns->parent and old->euid ==
target->user_ns->owner).  may_enter_rootns_creds() returns true before
checking task_no_new_privs(current), causing the child to fork into the
rootns and exit with status 2.

> +
> +TEST_F(rootns, fsconfig) {
[ ... ]
> +	pid = fork();
> +	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +	if (pid == 0) {
> +		int ucfd;
> +		int ret;
> +		int sfd;
> +
> +		ret = enter_unpriv_user_mntns(1000);
> +		if (ret == -EPERM || ret == -EACCES || ret == -EINVAL ||
> +		    ret == -ENOSPC)
> +			_exit(0);
> +		if (ret < 0)
> +			_exit(1);
> +
> +		ucfd = sys_rootns_create(ROOTNS_USER | ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
> +		if (ucfd < 0) {
> +			if (errno == EPERM || errno == EACCES ||
> +			    errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOSPC)
> +				_exit(0);
> +			_exit(2);
> +		}
> +
> +		sfd = sys_fsopen("sysfs", 0);
> +		if (sfd < 0) {
> +			if (errno == ENODEV) {
> +				close(ucfd);
> +				_exit(0);
> +			}
> +			_exit(3);
> +		}
> +
> +		if (sys_fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, NULL, NULL, ucfd) < 0)
> +			_exit(4);
> +		if (sys_fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0) != -1 ||
> +		    errno != EPERM)
> +			_exit(5);

[Severity: Medium]
When enter_unpriv_user_mntns() succeeds, doesn't sys_fsopen("sysfs", 0) fail
with EPERM and exit with code 3 before reaching sys_fsconfig()?

enter_unpriv_user_mntns() unshares CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS without
CLONE_NEWNET, so current->nsproxy->net_ns still belongs to the parent user
namespace.  sysfs_init_fs_context() checks
kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET), which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
net_ns->user_ns and fails during fsopen("sysfs", 0) with EPERM.

> +
> +		close(sfd);
> +		close(ucfd);
> +		_exit(0);
> +	}
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(reap_child_exit_code(pid), 0);
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F(rootns, enter_concurrent) {
[ ... ]
> +			ent_pid = sys_rootns_enter(self->cfd);
> +			if (ent_pid < 0)
> +				_exit(1);
> +			if (ent_pid == 0) {
> +				unsigned char my_pid = (unsigned char)getpid();
> +
> +				if (write(ready_pipe[1], &my_pid, 1) != 1)
> +					_exit(2);
> +				close(ready_pipe[1]);
> +				(void)read(hold_pipe[0], &ch, 1);
> +				close(hold_pipe[0]);
> +				_exit(0);
> +			}
> +
> +			close(ready_pipe[1]);
> +			close(hold_pipe[0]);
> +			close(self->cfd);
> +			_exit(reap_child_exit_code(ent_pid) == 0 ? 0 : 3);
> +		}
> +	}
[ ... ]
> +	close(ready_pipe[0]);
> +	close(hold_pipe[1]);
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(seen_mask, 0x1eU);
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
> +		ASSERT_EQ(reap_child_exit_code(workers[i]), 0);

[Severity: Medium]
Can PID 1 inside the rootns exit before PIDs 2..4 when hold_pipe[1] is
closed, killing its siblings with SIGKILL and failing the test?

CPU0 (rootns PID 1)               CPU1 (rootns PID 2 / worker)
read(hold_pipe[0]) -> EOF
_exit(0)
  zap_pid_ns_processes()
    group_send_sig_info(SIGKILL)
                                  killed by SIGKILL
                                  reap_child_exit_code(ent_pid)
                                    !WIFEXITED(status) -> returns -2
                                    worker calls _exit(3)  <-- test fails

Closing hold_pipe[1] wakes PID 1 and PIDs 2..4 at the same time, and PID 1
was queued first on hold_pipe[0].  If PID 1 reaches zap_pid_ns_processes()
before a sibling finishes _exit(0), the sibling is terminated by SIGKILL and
reap_child_exit_code() fails because !WIFEXITED(status).

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=12

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  5:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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