* [PATCH v2] sched/psi: Check CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the initial user namespace
@ 2026-11-20 8:51 Hungyu Lin
2026-11-20 8:56 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Hungyu Lin @ 2026-11-20 8:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hannes
Cc: surenb, peterz, mingo, juri.lelli, vincent.guittot,
dietmar.eggemann, rostedt, bsegall, mgorman, vschneid,
kprateek.nayak, cerasuolodomenico, mic, gnoack3000, didtldms2525,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel, dennylin0707
Commit d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s
period") moved the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check for psi triggers from the
open() of the /proc/pressure files to psi_trigger_create(), so that the
credentials of the opener decide whether a trigger is privileged. In
doing so it replaced capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) with a direct test of the
opener's effective capability set:
privileged = cap_raised(file->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
Unlike capable(), cap_raised() does not check against the initial user
namespace and does not go through the LSM capable hook. A task that
creates a user namespace has a full effective set inside it, so an
unprivileged user gets privileged triggers on /proc/pressure/* and on
delegated cgroup pressure files: windows that are not a multiple of 2s,
served by the SCHED_FIFO psimon kthread, which the N*2s rule was meant
to keep from unprivileged users. LSM policies that deny CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
are not consulted either.
Use file_ns_capable(), which checks the opener's credentials against the
given user namespace through security_capable(). This brings back the
user namespace and LSM checks of the capable() call it replaced.
Fixes: d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s period")
Reported-by: Sieun Yang <didtldms2525@jnu.ac.kr>
Signed-off-by: Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sieun Yang <didtldms2525@jnu.ac.kr>
Tested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
v2: Collect Reported-by, Tested-by and Reviewed-by tags; no code change.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261106120004.90041-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com/
kernel/sched/psi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/psi.c b/kernel/sched/psi.c
index 7c5381423334..cf2593183b25 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/psi.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/psi.c
@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ struct psi_trigger *psi_trigger_create(struct psi_group *group, char *buf,
* Checking the privilege here on file->f_cred implies that a privileged user
* could open the file and delegate the write to an unprivileged one.
*/
- privileged = cap_raised(file->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
+ privileged = file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
if (sscanf(buf, "some %u %u", &threshold_us, &window_us) == 2)
state = PSI_IO_SOME + res * 2;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2] sched/psi: Check CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the initial user namespace
2026-11-20 8:51 [PATCH v2] sched/psi: Check CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the initial user namespace Hungyu Lin
@ 2026-11-20 8:56 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-20 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module
> Commit d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s
> period") moved the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check for psi triggers from the
> open() of the /proc/pressure files to psi_trigger_create(), so that the
> credentials of the opener decide whether a trigger is privileged. In
> doing so it replaced capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) with a direct test of the
> opener's effective capability set:
>
> privileged = cap_raised(file->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
>
> Unlike capable(), cap_raised() does not check against the initial user
> namespace and does not go through the LSM capable hook. A task that
> creates a user namespace has a full effective set inside it, so an
> unprivileged user gets privileged triggers on /proc/pressure/* and on
> delegated cgroup pressure files: windows that are not a multiple of 2s,
> served by the SCHED_FIFO psimon kthread, which the N*2s rule was meant
> to keep from unprivileged users. LSM policies that deny CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
> are not consulted either.
>
> Use file_ns_capable(), which checks the opener's credentials against the
> given user namespace through security_capable(). This brings back the
> user namespace and LSM checks of the capable() call it replaced.
>
> Fixes: d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s period")
> Reported-by: Sieun Yang <didtldms2525@jnu.ac.kr>
> Signed-off-by: Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120085135.40368-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com?part=1
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