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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/14] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig()
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 22:44:43 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-226300@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119224312.1037966-9-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] fs: user_ns delegation and init_fs_context() mismatch in
  fsconfig_set_rootns()
- [High] fs: condition anon mnt_ns user_ns and seq_origin on
  rootns_bound in fsmount()
- [Medium] proc: allow pidns option to overwrite rootns binding in
  proc_parse_param()
--

commit 08909a29107ff970d2d4b5a71eaa424398baf6f2
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig()

This commit adds the FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS command to fsconfig() so callers
holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a target rootns user namespace can bind a newly
opened fs_context to that rootns before configuring parameters and mounting.

> diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
> index 70024870fefa2..85b31af68a4d6 100644
> --- a/fs/fsopen.c
> +++ b/fs/fsopen.c
[ ... ]
> +static int fsconfig_set_rootns(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
> +{
[ ... ]
> +	put_net(fc->net_ns);
> +	fc->net_ns = get_net(c->ns->net_ns);
> +	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
> +	if ((fc->fs_type->fs_flags & (FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_USERNS_DELEGATABLE)) &&
> +	    ((kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, fc->cred->fsuid) &&
> +	      kgid_has_mapping(user_ns, fc->cred->fsgid)) ||
> +	     !ns_capable(fc->cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
> +		fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
> +	else
> +		fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(fc->cred->user_ns);
> +
> +	fc->rootns_bound = true;
> +	fc->rootns_mnt_id = c->ns->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id;
> +
> +	ret = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc);

[Severity: High]
Can fsconfig_set_rootns() leave fc->user_ns pointing to a user namespace
other than c->user_ns while still marking fc->rootns_bound = true and
fc->rootns_mnt_id = c->ns->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id?

First, fsopen() sets priv from may_mount() (CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns), whereas the fallback here tests
!ns_capable(fc->cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  If a task calls
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) without CLONE_NEWNS (so priv is false in
init_mnt_ns, but the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its new cred->user_ns U1)
and binds to a child rootns (U2) before writing uid_map/gid_map,
fc->user_ns falls back to U1 while fc->rootns_bound is true.  Subsequent
FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and fsmount() calls then authorize against U1 despite
!may_mount(), and fsmount() allocates an anonymous mount namespace in U1
with ns->seq_origin set to U2's mount namespace ID.

Second, a nested container manager with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in U1 that binds a
context to a child rootns U2 before U2's uid_map/gid_map are written (or
when U2 maps subordinate IDs excluding fc->cred->fsuid/fsgid) also hits
the else branch, leaving the superblock in U1 instead of delegating it to
U2.

Third, calling fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc) after setting fc->user_ns
allows filesystems without a ->set_rootns() hook to overwrite fc->user_ns
from current->nsproxy (for example, cgroup_init_fs_context() resets
fc->user_ns to current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns->user_ns).

> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 781380945d784..dfe0ee9ecdcd0 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -4658,6 +4661,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags,
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> +	if (fc->rootns_bound) {
> +		if (flags & FSMOUNT_NAMESPACE)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (!ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +			return -EPERM;
> +	} else if (!(flags & FSMOUNT_NAMESPACE) && !priv) {
> +		return -EPERM;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* There must be a valid superblock or we can't mount it */
>  	ret = -EINVAL;
>  	if (!fc->root)
> @@ -4699,9 +4711,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags,
>  		return FD_ADD((flags & FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0,
>  			      open_new_namespace(&new_path, MOUNT_COPY_NEW));
>  
> -	ns = alloc_mnt_ns(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, true);
> +	ns = alloc_mnt_ns(priv ? current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns :
> +			  fc->user_ns, true);
>  	if (IS_ERR(ns))
>  		return PTR_ERR(ns);
> +	if (!priv)
> +		ns->seq_origin = fc->rootns_mnt_id;

[Severity: High]
Should alloc_mnt_ns() and ns->seq_origin be conditioned on fc->rootns_bound
rather than priv?

When a manager process already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its own mount
namespace (priv == true) and uses FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS to prepare a mount
for a target rootns, testing priv allocates the anonymous mount namespace
in current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns instead of fc->user_ns (causing
attach_recursive_mnt() to lock the mount with MNT_LOCKED when moved into
the target rootns) and leaves ns->seq_origin at 0 instead of restricting
the detached mount to fc->rootns_mnt_id.

> diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
> index 7fbbe92bf73a7..323296b030892 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/root.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/root.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -323,6 +325,21 @@ static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	return get_tree_nodev(fc, proc_fill_super);
>  }
>  
> +static int proc_set_rootns(struct fs_context *fc, struct rootns *rootns)
> +{
> +	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
> +	struct pid_namespace *target = rootns->ns->pid_ns_for_children;
> +
> +	if (!pidns_is_ancestor(target, task_active_pid_ns(current)))
> +		return invalfc(fc, "cannot set pidns to non-descendant pidns");
> +
> +	put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
> +	ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(target);
> +	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
> +	fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ctx->pid_ns->user_ns);
> +	return 0;
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
After proc_set_rootns() binds a context to a rootns, can a subsequent
"pidns" mount option overwrite ctx->pid_ns and fc->user_ns?

fs/proc/root.c:proc_parse_param() {
	...
	case Opt_pidns:
		if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) {
			errorfc(fc, "cannot reconfigure pidns for existing procfs");
			return -EBUSY;
		}
		err = proc_parse_pidns_param(fc, param, &result);
	...
}

proc_parse_pidns_param() replaces ctx->pid_ns and sets fc->user_ns to the
new PID namespace's user_ns while fc->rootns_bound remains true and
fc->rootns_mnt_id retains the original rootns mount namespace ID.
fsmount() then checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN and allocates the anonymous mount
namespace against the overwritten fc->user_ns while pairing it with
ns->seq_origin = fc->rootns_mnt_id from the original rootns.  Should
Opt_pidns also be rejected when fc->rootns_bound is set?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261119224312.1037966-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=8

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 22:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-19 22:42 [RFC PATCH v4 00/14] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/14] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/14] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/14] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 13:18   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 13:30     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 15:24       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/14] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/14] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/14] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/14] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 10:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 12:47     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/14] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/14] fs: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/14] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/14] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/14] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/14] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 22:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/14] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20  5:58 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/14] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 10:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 10:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 22:44 ` sashiko-bot

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