RE: Security Enhanced Linux distro

RE: Security Enhanced Linux distro

[Joshua Brindle]

I'm in the process of trying to integrate SELinux into Gentoo linux, if
you don't know anything about it it's a source based distro with a very
cool package management system. It was originally based on BSD Ports,
but has since become a very full solution. It is dependancy based etc,
has USE keywords to tell what support you want compiled in. Basically if
a user has the SELinux USE keyword it'll patch the userland utils (with
dependancy on the policy compiler and selinux kernel). This live system
upgrade you mention, what is it about? I presume you mean the problem
with having unlabeled files on the filesystem for some amount of time.
In gentoo all apps install to a temp directory where the file list is
enumerated and logged before copying to the live filesystem, is there
any way for me to label these files while in the temp directory, so that
they are labeled when they are copied to the live filesystem and this
latency between installation and labeling isn't a problem?


Joshua Brindle
UNIX Administrator
Southern Nazarene University

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RE: Security Enhanced Linux distro

[Mark Westerman]

On SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Russell Coker wrote:

>OK.  Could you please tell us more about this distro.  What is it based on, 
>what have you done to make is a "SE Linux distro"?
>
>Is the distro based on RPM or Debian packaging systems?
>If RPM then have you solved the issues of upgrading a live system?  If so >then  please release it.

The distro uses anaconda to load the OS onto the disk and is RPM based. No we
still have not solved the upgrading a live system. One way we have been
trying to approach the problem is to look at all the files in the package and
relabel according to existing labels. The problem comes when there are new
files, and the scripts in the rpm package uses to update any existing files.
Still requires a relabel of the files system, which can take a while
depending on CPU speed, Disk speed, and how much you have loaded on you
system.


We want SELinux to be in the hands of people that might not want compile and
install kernel. The more use and feed back we get of the beta the better the
overall product SELinux will become. All changes will be GPL and we do not
plan write any non-GPL code on top of the system. We have even started to
convert the rules to XML so update to policies can be handled more
programmatically. The initial XML version uses XLST template to create the
policy.conf file and uses the checkpolicy to compile the policy.conf file.
The XML stuff is not near ready for public consumption.

Mark

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Re: Security Enhanced Linux distro

[Russell Coker]

On Fri, 15 Nov 2002 13:54, Mark Westerman wrote:
> >OK.  Could you please tell us more about this distro.  What is it based
> > on, what have you done to make is a "SE Linux distro"?
> >
> >Is the distro based on RPM or Debian packaging systems?
> >If RPM then have you solved the issues of upgrading a live system?  If so
> > >then  please release it.
>
> The distro uses anaconda to load the OS onto the disk and is RPM based. No
> we still have not solved the upgrading a live system. One way we have been
> trying to approach the problem is to look at all the files in the package
> and relabel according to existing labels.

That's what I do.  I have a modified version of dpkg to relabel the files 
after the package is unpacked but before the postinst script is run.  However 
this is still not quite satisfactory for upgrades of important packages such 
as libc6 as for a short time window it may be impossible to run dynamically 
linked programs.

For the moment I am taking the approach that when you do something so serious 
and significant as upgrading libc6 then having programs in domains other than 
sysadm_t be unable to execute other programs temporarily is not a serious 
problem.  Upgrading libc6 is not something that you expect to be entirely 
transperant (consider all the times that a libc6 upgrade required daemons 
such as sshd to be restarted for correct operation).

> The problem comes when there are
> new files, and the scripts in the rpm package uses to update any existing
> files.

Yes, little things like the following in a postinst are a real bitch:
some_program > /tmp/foo ; mv /tmp/foo /etc

Of course the fact that most occurances of such things are a security hole on 
non-SE systems makes it easier to get them fixed.  ;)

> Still requires a relabel of the files system, which can take a while
> depending on CPU speed, Disk speed, and how much you have loaded on you
> system.

A relabel of a live file system is not an option except in the most extreme 
situations.  In the NSA policy /tmp and /var/tmp will be relabelled and thus 
access to open temporary files will be denied (and in the case of /var/tmp it 
may interfere with the next system boot).

Also relabelling of /home is really undesirable for obvious reasons, and if 
you have only a single file system (typical for workstations and small 
servers) then you'll need to specifically exclude /home from the relabel.

Finally, some of the systems I run take over 30 minutes to relabel all the 
file systems (and I don't have SE installed on anything I consider to be a 
big server).  I could halve that or better by optimising setfiles but it 
would still be excessively long (and of course if a security issue is opened 
the window will be long enough to be easily exploitable).

> We have even
> started to convert the rules to XML so update to policies can be handled
> more programmatically. The initial XML version uses XLST template to create
> the policy.conf file and uses the checkpolicy to compile the policy.conf
> file. The XML stuff is not near ready for public consumption.

Brian May has started work on similar things.  What you have developed may not 
be ready for public consumption, but it may be ready to be sent to Brian.  
I'm sure that Brian could offer some useful suggestions for it.

-- 
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/   My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/  Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/    Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/  My home page


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(no subject)

[Mark Westerman]

On Fri 11/15/2002 4:24 AM, Russell Coker wrote:
>
>On Fri, 15 Nov 2002 05:55, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>> Russell Coker(russell@coker.com.au)@Thu, Nov 07, 2002 at 12:15:18PM +0100:
>> > http://www.securityenhancedlinux.com/
>> >
>> > So how do you go about becoming an "Authorized SE Linux Courseware
>> > Developer and Training Deliverer"?
>>
>> Well, based on the whois info for the domain, it looks like Mark
>> teaches candidates what he knows and, should he encounter he trouble, he
>> asks this list what in Hell to do.
>
> I didn't think to check whois until long after I had raised the issue on the 
> list.  Since noticing the whois information I had been waiting for Mark to 
> respond.

We created the Security Enhanced Linux distro. I am working with the OSDGroup
to promote and resale the distro. I only did a cursory look at the web page.
After Russell comments (which is a very good point) I had then remove the
"Authorized" and put in the disclaimer "... imply an endorsement or
association with the National Security Agency or other government entities."

>> So why not just ask Mark directly what his intentions are, preferably
>> with the rest of the list getting the results.  Hell, if I were to
>
>Mark is doing some good things.  I'm surprised that he hasn't posted on this 
>topic yet.  I'm also surprised that he didn't announce his web site and keep 
>the list informed of progress on it.

Thanks, Not to announce here was a mistake on my part. We have been really
involved in the technical aspects and were letting OSDGroup handle the PR
part.   

The distro is planned for release in the first quarter of 2003. It is our
intension to get SELinux in hands of more people. A securer Internet is a
better Internet.


Mark

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Security Enhanced Linux distro

[Russell Coker]

On Fri, 15 Nov 2002 13:25, Mark Westerman wrote:
> We created the Security Enhanced Linux distro. I am working with the
> OSDGroup to promote and resale the distro. I only did a cursory look at the

OK.  Could you please tell us more about this distro.  What is it based on, 
what have you done to make is a "SE Linux distro"?

Is the distro based on RPM or Debian packaging systems?

If RPM then have you solved the issues of upgrading a live system?  If so then 
please release it.

-- 
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/   My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/  Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/    Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/  My home page


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