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* [PATCH] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
@ 2018-02-01  1:47 Dan Williams
  2018-02-01 10:03 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Dan Williams
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Dan Williams @ 2018-02-01  1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: tglx; +Cc: Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, linux-kernel, kvm, Paolo Bonzini

Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup"
added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of
'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. We can save an lfence in this path and
just use the common array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types
of fixes.

Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
Hi Thomas,

Here's that KVM patch rebased on latest tip/x86/pti.

 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   20 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index a8b96dc4cd83..28942823cc3a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
 #include <linux/frame.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 
@@ -898,21 +899,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
 
 static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
+	const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table);
+	unsigned short offset;
 
-	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX);
+	if (field >= size)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	/*
-	 * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753.  To be replaced with a
-	 * generic mechanism.
-	 */
-	asm("lfence");
-
-	if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+	field = array_index_nospec(field, size);
+	offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+	if (offset == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
-
-	return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+	return offset;
 }
 
 static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* [tip:x86/pti] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
  2018-02-01  1:47 [PATCH] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
@ 2018-02-01 10:03 ` tip-bot for Dan Williams
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for Dan Williams @ 2018-02-01 10:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-tip-commits
  Cc: ahonig, mingo, jmattson, pbonzini, linux-kernel, hpa,
	dan.j.williams, tglx

Commit-ID:  085331dfc6bbe3501fb936e657331ca943827600
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/085331dfc6bbe3501fb936e657331ca943827600
Author:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 17:47:03 -0800
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 10:59:10 +0100

x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation

Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup"
added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of
'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'.

The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec()
helper designed for these types of fixes.

Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151744959670.6342.3001723920950249067.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index a8b96dc..2894282 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
 #include <linux/frame.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 
@@ -898,21 +899,18 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
 
 static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
+	const size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table);
+	unsigned short offset;
 
-	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(size > SHRT_MAX);
+	if (field >= size)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	/*
-	 * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753.  To be replaced with a
-	 * generic mechanism.
-	 */
-	asm("lfence");
-
-	if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+	field = array_index_nospec(field, size);
+	offset = vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+	if (offset == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
-
-	return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
+	return offset;
 }
 
 static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-02-01 10:06 UTC | newest]

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2018-02-01 10:03 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Dan Williams

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