* [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary
@ 2017-05-04 13:32 ` Daniel Micay
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Micay @ 2017-05-04 13:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook, Arjan van Ven, Ingo Molnar, kernel-hardening, LKML
Cc: Daniel Micay, stable
The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
---
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 56d85fd81411..ff84ff82f56a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
- tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
+ tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
#endif
/*
--
2.12.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary
2017-05-04 13:32 ` Daniel Micay
@ 2017-05-04 13:33 ` Arjan van de Ven
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Arjan van de Ven @ 2017-05-04 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Micay, Kees Cook, Ingo Molnar, kernel-hardening, LKML; +Cc: stable
On 5/4/2017 6:32 AM, Daniel Micay wrote:
> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized to
> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
that makes sense to me... ack
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary
2017-05-04 13:32 ` Daniel Micay
(?)
(?)
@ 2017-05-04 14:04 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-04 14:29 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Rik van Riel @ 2017-05-04 14:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Micay, Kees Cook, Arjan van Ven, Ingo Molnar,
kernel-hardening, LKML
Cc: stable
On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized
> to
> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary
2017-05-04 14:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
@ 2017-05-04 14:29 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-05-04 14:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Micay, Ingo Molnar
Cc: Rik van Riel, Arjan van Ven, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:04 AM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
>> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized
>> to
>> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
>>
> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Thanks! Ingo, should this go via tip?
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [tip:core/urgent] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
2017-05-04 13:32 ` Daniel Micay
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
(?)
@ 2017-05-05 8:10 ` tip-bot for Daniel Micay
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot for Daniel Micay @ 2017-05-05 8:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits
Cc: mingo, peterz, keescook, torvalds, tglx, linux-kernel, arjan, hpa,
danielmicay, riel
Commit-ID: 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05
Author: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Thu, 4 May 2017 09:32:09 -0400
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:05:13 +0200
stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arjan van Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 3a4343c..d681f8f 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
- tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
+ tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
#endif
/*
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread