From: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org>
To: Will Deacon <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org"
<iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org"
<linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] iommu/arm-smmu: add support for access-protected mappings
Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:28:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <vnkwtx3zb885.fsf@mitchelh-linux.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140919220535.GM20773-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org> (Will Deacon's message of "Fri, 19 Sep 2014 23:05:36 +0100")
On Fri, Sep 19 2014 at 03:05:36 PM, Will Deacon <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 09:16:09PM +0100, Mitchel Humpherys wrote:
>> ARM SMMUs support memory access control via some bits in the translation
>> table descriptor memory attributes. Currently we assume all translations
>> are "unprivileged". Add support for privileged mappings, controlled by
>> the IOMMU_PRIV prot flag.
>>
>> Also sneak in a whitespace change for consistency with nearby code.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org>
>> ---
>> drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c | 5 +++--
>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> index ca18d6d42a..93999ec22c 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> @@ -1256,10 +1256,11 @@ static int arm_smmu_alloc_init_pte(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, pmd_t *pmd,
>> }
>>
>> if (stage == 1) {
>> - pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV | ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
>> + pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
>> + if (!(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
>> + pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV;
>
> I think this actually makes more sense if we invert the logic, i.e. have
> IOMMU_USER as a flag which sets the UNPRIV bit in the pte.
I'm fine either way but the common case seems to be unprivileged
mappings (at least in our system). We have one user of this flag out of
a dozen or so users.
>
> I don't have the spec to hand, but I guess you can't enforce this at
> stage-2? If so, do we also need a new IOMMU capability so people don't try
> to use this for stage-2 only SMMUs?
Hmm, actually we do have S2AP although it doesn't make a distinction
between accesses from EL0 and EL1. But maybe it would make sense to
make the `IOMMU_PRIV' mean `no access from EL0 or EL1' for stage 2
mappings? Something like:
-- >8 --
Subject: iommu/arm-smmu: add support for access-protected mappings
ARM SMMUs support memory access control via some bits in the translation
table descriptor memory attributes. Currently we assume all translations
are "unprivileged". Add support for privileged mappings, controlled by
the IOMMU_PRIV prot flag.
Also sneak in a whitespace change for consistency with nearby code.
Signed-off-by: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
index ca18d6d42a..4f85b64f74 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
@@ -1256,18 +1256,19 @@ static int arm_smmu_alloc_init_pte(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, pmd_t *pmd,
}
if (stage == 1) {
- pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV | ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
+ pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
+ if (!(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
+ pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV;
if (!(prot & IOMMU_WRITE) && (prot & IOMMU_READ))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_RDONLY;
-
if (prot & IOMMU_CACHE)
pteval |= (MAIR_ATTR_IDX_CACHE <<
ARM_SMMU_PTE_ATTRINDX_SHIFT);
} else {
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_FAULT;
- if (prot & IOMMU_READ)
+ if (prot & IOMMU_READ && !(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_READ;
- if (prot & IOMMU_WRITE)
+ if (prot & IOMMU_WRITE && !(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_WRITE;
if (prot & IOMMU_CACHE)
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_MEMATTR_OIWB;
--
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mitchelh@codeaurora.org (Mitchel Humpherys)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] iommu/arm-smmu: add support for access-protected mappings
Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:28:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <vnkwtx3zb885.fsf@mitchelh-linux.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140919220535.GM20773@arm.com> (Will Deacon's message of "Fri, 19 Sep 2014 23:05:36 +0100")
On Fri, Sep 19 2014 at 03:05:36 PM, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 09:16:09PM +0100, Mitchel Humpherys wrote:
>> ARM SMMUs support memory access control via some bits in the translation
>> table descriptor memory attributes. Currently we assume all translations
>> are "unprivileged". Add support for privileged mappings, controlled by
>> the IOMMU_PRIV prot flag.
>>
>> Also sneak in a whitespace change for consistency with nearby code.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh@codeaurora.org>
>> ---
>> drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c | 5 +++--
>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> index ca18d6d42a..93999ec22c 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
>> @@ -1256,10 +1256,11 @@ static int arm_smmu_alloc_init_pte(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, pmd_t *pmd,
>> }
>>
>> if (stage == 1) {
>> - pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV | ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
>> + pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
>> + if (!(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
>> + pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV;
>
> I think this actually makes more sense if we invert the logic, i.e. have
> IOMMU_USER as a flag which sets the UNPRIV bit in the pte.
I'm fine either way but the common case seems to be unprivileged
mappings (at least in our system). We have one user of this flag out of
a dozen or so users.
>
> I don't have the spec to hand, but I guess you can't enforce this at
> stage-2? If so, do we also need a new IOMMU capability so people don't try
> to use this for stage-2 only SMMUs?
Hmm, actually we do have S2AP although it doesn't make a distinction
between accesses from EL0 and EL1. But maybe it would make sense to
make the `IOMMU_PRIV' mean `no access from EL0 or EL1' for stage 2
mappings? Something like:
-- >8 --
Subject: iommu/arm-smmu: add support for access-protected mappings
ARM SMMUs support memory access control via some bits in the translation
table descriptor memory attributes. Currently we assume all translations
are "unprivileged". Add support for privileged mappings, controlled by
the IOMMU_PRIV prot flag.
Also sneak in a whitespace change for consistency with nearby code.
Signed-off-by: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
index ca18d6d42a..4f85b64f74 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu.c
@@ -1256,18 +1256,19 @@ static int arm_smmu_alloc_init_pte(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, pmd_t *pmd,
}
if (stage == 1) {
- pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV | ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
+ pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_nG;
+ if (!(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
+ pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_UNPRIV;
if (!(prot & IOMMU_WRITE) && (prot & IOMMU_READ))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_AP_RDONLY;
-
if (prot & IOMMU_CACHE)
pteval |= (MAIR_ATTR_IDX_CACHE <<
ARM_SMMU_PTE_ATTRINDX_SHIFT);
} else {
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_FAULT;
- if (prot & IOMMU_READ)
+ if (prot & IOMMU_READ && !(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_READ;
- if (prot & IOMMU_WRITE)
+ if (prot & IOMMU_WRITE && !(prot & IOMMU_PRIV))
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_HAP_WRITE;
if (prot & IOMMU_CACHE)
pteval |= ARM_SMMU_PTE_MEMATTR_OIWB;
--
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-22 22:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-17 20:16 [PATCH 0/2] Add access-protected IOMMU mappings Mitchel Humpherys
2014-09-17 20:16 ` Mitchel Humpherys
[not found] ` <1410984969-2340-1-git-send-email-mitchelh-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org>
2014-09-17 20:16 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: add IOMMU_PRIV flag for access-protected mappings Mitchel Humpherys
2014-09-17 20:16 ` Mitchel Humpherys
2014-09-17 20:16 ` [PATCH 2/2] iommu/arm-smmu: add support " Mitchel Humpherys
2014-09-17 20:16 ` Mitchel Humpherys
[not found] ` <1410984969-2340-3-git-send-email-mitchelh-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org>
2014-09-19 22:05 ` Will Deacon
2014-09-19 22:05 ` Will Deacon
[not found] ` <20140919220535.GM20773-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
2014-09-22 22:28 ` Mitchel Humpherys [this message]
2014-09-22 22:28 ` Mitchel Humpherys
[not found] ` <vnkwtx3zb885.fsf-Yf+dfxj6toJBVvN7MMdr1KRtKmQZhJ7pQQ4Iyu8u01E@public.gmane.org>
2014-09-24 16:27 ` Will Deacon
2014-09-24 16:27 ` Will Deacon
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