From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Gustavo Grieco <gustavo.grieco@imag.fr>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 17:10:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqbmzbwmfc.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1825523389.8224664.1474812766424.JavaMail.zimbra@imag.fr> (Gustavo Grieco's message of "Sun, 25 Sep 2016 16:12:46 +0200 (CEST)")
Gustavo Grieco <gustavo.grieco@imag.fr> writes:
> We found a stack read out-of-bounds parsing object files using git 2.10.0. It was tested on ArchLinux x86_64. To reproduce, first recompile git with ASAN support and then execute:
>
> $ git init ; mkdir -p .git/objects/b2 ; printf 'x' > .git/objects/b2/93584ddd61af21260be75ee9f73e9d53f08cd0
Interesting. If you prepare such a broken loose object file in your
local repository, I would expect that either unpack_sha1_header() or
unpack_sha1_header_to_strbuf() that sha1_loose_object_info() calls
would detect and barf by noticing that an error came from libz while
it attempts to inflate and would not even call parse_sha1_header.
But it is nevertheless bad to assume that whatever happens to
inflate without an error must be formatted correctly to allow
parsing (i.e. has ' ' and then NUL termination within the first 32
bytes after inflation), which is exactly what the hdr[32] is saying.
Perhaps we need something like the following to tighten the
codepath.
Note that this is totally unteseted and not thought through; I
briefly thought about what unpack_sha1_header_to_strbuf() does with
this change (it first lets unpack_sha1_header() to attempt with a
small buffer but it seems to discard the error code from it before
seeing if the returned buffer has NUL in it); there may be bad
interactions with it.
sha1_file.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index 60ff21f..dfcbd76 100644
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -1648,6 +1648,8 @@ unsigned long unpack_object_header_buffer(const unsigned char *buf,
int unpack_sha1_header(git_zstream *stream, unsigned char *map, unsigned long mapsize, void *buffer, unsigned long bufsiz)
{
+ int status;
+
/* Get the data stream */
memset(stream, 0, sizeof(*stream));
stream->next_in = map;
@@ -1656,7 +1658,15 @@ int unpack_sha1_header(git_zstream *stream, unsigned char *map, unsigned long ma
stream->avail_out = bufsiz;
git_inflate_init(stream);
- return git_inflate(stream, 0);
+ status = git_inflate(stream, 0);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+
+ /* Make sure we got the terminating NUL for the object header */
+ if (!memchr(buffer, '\0', stream->next_out - (unsigned char *)buffer))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
}
static int unpack_sha1_header_to_strbuf(git_zstream *stream, unsigned char *map,
@@ -1758,6 +1768,8 @@ static int parse_sha1_header_extended(const char *hdr, struct object_info *oi,
char c = *hdr++;
if (c == ' ')
break;
+ if (!c)
+ die("invalid object header");
type_len++;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-26 0:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1399913289.8224468.1474810664933.JavaMail.zimbra@imag.fr>
2016-09-25 14:12 ` Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0 Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 0:10 ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2016-09-26 4:29 ` [PATCH] unpack_sha1_header(): detect malformed object header Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 14:03 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 16:15 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:33 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:35 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 17:39 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:34 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:38 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 13:50 ` Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0 Jeff King
2016-09-26 17:48 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 17:55 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 18:01 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 18:06 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 18:10 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-27 2:13 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-27 7:19 ` Jeff King
2016-09-27 2:30 ` Possible integer overflow parsing malformed objects in " Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-27 8:07 ` Jeff King
2016-09-27 15:57 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-27 19:14 ` Gustavo Grieco
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