From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Gustavo Grieco <gustavo.grieco@imag.fr>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 11:10:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqtwd2sf9t.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <xmqq37kmtukf.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com> (Junio C. Hamano's message of "Mon, 26 Sep 2016 10:55:12 -0700")
Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> writes:
> I am inclined to say that it has no security implications. You have
> to be able to write a bogus loose object in an object store you
> already have write access to in the first place, in order to cause
> this ...
Note that you could social-engineer others to fetch from you and
feed a small enough update that results in loose objects created in
their repositories, without you having a direct write access to the
repository.
The codepath under discussion in this thread however cannot be used
as an attack vector via that route, because the "fetch from
elsewhere" codepath runs verification of the incoming data stream
before storing the results (either in loose object files, or in a
packfile) on disk.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-26 18:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1399913289.8224468.1474810664933.JavaMail.zimbra@imag.fr>
2016-09-25 14:12 ` Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0 Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 0:10 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 4:29 ` [PATCH] unpack_sha1_header(): detect malformed object header Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 14:03 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 16:15 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:33 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:35 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 17:39 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:34 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 17:38 ` Jeff King
2016-09-26 13:50 ` Stack read out-of-bounds in parse_sha1_header_extended using git 2.10.0 Jeff King
2016-09-26 17:48 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 17:55 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 18:01 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-26 18:06 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-26 18:10 ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2016-09-27 2:13 ` Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-27 7:19 ` Jeff King
2016-09-27 2:30 ` Possible integer overflow parsing malformed objects in " Gustavo Grieco
2016-09-27 8:07 ` Jeff King
2016-09-27 15:57 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-09-27 19:14 ` Gustavo Grieco
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