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From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	jgg@nvidia.com, jgg@ziepe.ca, kevin.tian@intel.com,
	will@kernel.org
Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	joro@8bytes.org, robin.murphy@arm.com, shuah@kernel.org,
	nicolinc@nvidia.com, aik@amd.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, yilun.xu@linux.intel.com,
	yilun.xu@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] iommufd: Add iommufd_object_tombstone_user() helper
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 11:21:15 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5a4iw45pyk.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250623094946.1714996-2-yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>

Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com> writes:

> Add the iommufd_object_tombstone_user() helper, which allows the caller
> to destroy an iommufd object created by userspace.
>
> This is useful on some destroy paths when the kernel caller finds the
> object should have been removed by userspace but is still alive. With
> this helper, the caller destroys the object but leave the object ID
> reserved (so called tombstone). The tombstone prevents repurposing the
> object ID without awareness from the original user.
>
> Since this happens for abnomal userspace behavior, for simplicity, the
> tombstoned object ID would be permanently leaked until
> iommufd_fops_release(). I.e. the original user gets an error when
> calling ioctl(IOMMU_DESTROY) on that ID.
>
> The first use case would be to ensure the iommufd_vdevice can't outlive
> the associated iommufd_device.
>
> Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++-
>  drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c            | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> index 9ccc83341f32..fbc9ef78d81f 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
> @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ void iommufd_object_finalize(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
>  			     struct iommufd_object *obj);
>  
>  enum {
> -	REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM = 1,
> +	REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM	= BIT(0),
> +	REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE	= BIT(1),
>  };
>  int iommufd_object_remove(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
>  			  struct iommufd_object *to_destroy, u32 id,
> @@ -213,6 +214,26 @@ static inline void iommufd_object_destroy_user(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
>  	WARN_ON(ret);
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Similar to iommufd_object_destroy_user(), except that the object ID is left
> + * reserved/tombstoned.
> + */
> +static inline void iommufd_object_tombstone_user(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
> +						 struct iommufd_object *obj)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = iommufd_object_remove(ictx, obj, obj->id,
> +				    REMOVE_WAIT_SHORTTERM | REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If there is a bug and we couldn't destroy the object then we did put
> +	 * back the caller's users refcount and will eventually try to free it
> +	 * again during close.
> +	 */
> +	WARN_ON(ret);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * The HWPT allocated by autodomains is used in possibly many devices and
>   * is automatically destroyed when its refcount reaches zero.
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> index 3df468f64e7d..5fd75aba068b 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c
> @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int iommufd_object_remove(struct iommufd_ctx *ictx,
>  		goto err_xa;
>  	}
>  
> -	xas_store(&xas, NULL);
> +	xas_store(&xas, (flags & REMOVE_OBJ_TOMBSTONE) ? XA_ZERO_ENTRY : NULL);
>  	if (ictx->vfio_ioas == container_of(obj, struct iommufd_ioas, obj))
>  		ictx->vfio_ioas = NULL;
>  	xa_unlock(&ictx->objects);
> @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static int iommufd_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>  	struct iommufd_ctx *ictx = filp->private_data;
>  	struct iommufd_sw_msi_map *next;
>  	struct iommufd_sw_msi_map *cur;
> +	XA_STATE(xas, &ictx->objects, 0);
>  	struct iommufd_object *obj;
>  
>  	/*
> @@ -251,16 +252,30 @@ static int iommufd_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>  	 */
>  	while (!xa_empty(&ictx->objects)) {
>  		unsigned int destroyed = 0;
> -		unsigned long index;
>  
> -		xa_for_each(&ictx->objects, index, obj) {
> -			if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&obj->users))
> -				continue;
> +		xas_set(&xas, 0);
> +		for (;;) {
> +			rcu_read_lock();
> +			obj = xas_find(&xas, ULONG_MAX);
> +			rcu_read_unlock();
>

What is the need for the rcu_read_lock()? 

> +
> +			if (!obj)
> +				break;
> +
> +			if (!xa_is_zero(obj)) {
> +				if (!refcount_dec_if_one(&obj->users))
> +					continue;
> +
> +				iommufd_object_ops[obj->type].destroy(obj);
> +				kfree(obj);
> +			}
> +
>  			destroyed++;
> -			xa_erase(&ictx->objects, index);
> -			iommufd_object_ops[obj->type].destroy(obj);
> -			kfree(obj);
> +			xas_lock(&xas);
> +			xas_store(&xas, NULL);
> +			xas_unlock(&xas);

is that xas_lock needed?. we can't run a xarray update parallel to this
because neither iommufd ioctl not vfio cdev unbind can happen in parallel.

I have this as an additonal comment added to the function in my change.

/*
 * We don't need additional locks because the iommufd_fops_release() function is
 * only triggered when the iommufd descriptor is released. At that point, no
 * other iommufd-based ioctl operations can be running concurrently.
 *
 * The destruction of the vdevice via idevice unbind is also safe:
 * iommufd_fops_release() can only be called after the idevice has been unbound.
 * The idevice bind operation takes a reference to the iommufd descriptor,
 * preventing early release.
 */


>  		}
> +
>  		/* Bug related to users refcount */
>  		if (WARN_ON(!destroyed))
>  			break;
> -- 
> 2.25.1

-aneesh

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-06-25  5:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-23  9:49 [PATCH v2 0/4] iommufd: Destroy vdevice on device unbind Xu Yilun
2025-06-23  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] iommufd: Add iommufd_object_tombstone_user() helper Xu Yilun
2025-06-24 13:35   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-25  7:24     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-25  5:51   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2025-06-25  8:40     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-23  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] iommufd/viommu: Fix the uninitialized iommufd_vdevice::ictx Xu Yilun
2025-06-24  3:24   ` Baolu Lu
2025-06-24  6:35     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-23  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] iommufd: Destroy vdevice on idevice destroy Xu Yilun
2025-06-24  3:32   ` Baolu Lu
2025-06-24  8:11     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-24  8:28       ` Tian, Kevin
2025-06-24  8:12     ` Tian, Kevin
2025-06-25  1:55       ` Baolu Lu
2025-06-24  6:47   ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-24  8:22   ` Tian, Kevin
2025-06-26  4:59     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-24 14:53   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-24 23:57     ` Tian, Kevin
2025-06-25  1:36       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-25  2:11         ` Tian, Kevin
2025-06-25 12:33           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-25 10:06     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-25 12:38       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-26  3:31         ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-26 14:36           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-25  6:40   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-25  9:38     ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-23  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] iommufd/selftest: Add coverage for vdevice tombstone Xu Yilun
2025-06-24 13:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-25  8:29     ` Xu Yilun

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