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From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
To: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] ALSA: control: Hardening for potential Spectre v1
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 09:56:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180424075619.29602-4-tiwai@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180424075619.29602-1-tiwai@suse.de>

As the recent Smatch warned, a few places in ALSA control core codes
may expand the array directly from the user-space value with
speculation:

  sound/core/control.c:1003 snd_ctl_elem_lock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:1031 snd_ctl_elem_unlock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:844 snd_ctl_elem_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:891 snd_ctl_elem_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:939 snd_ctl_elem_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'

Although all these seem doing only the first load without further
reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with
array_index_nospec() would still make sense.

In this patch, we put array_index_nospec() to the common
snd_ctl_get_ioff*() helpers instead of each caller.  They are also
referred from some drivers, too, and basically all usages are to
calculate the array index from the user-space value.

BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
 include/sound/control.h | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/sound/control.h b/include/sound/control.h
index ca13a44ae9d4..6011a58d3e20 100644
--- a/include/sound/control.h
+++ b/include/sound/control.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <sound/asound.h>
 
 #define snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol) ((kcontrol)->private_data)
@@ -148,12 +149,14 @@ int snd_ctl_get_preferred_subdevice(struct snd_card *card, int type);
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffnum(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
 {
-	return id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
+	unsigned int ioff = id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
+	return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffidx(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
 {
-	return id->index - kctl->id.index;
+	unsigned int ioff = id->index - kctl->id.index;
+	return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioff(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
-- 
2.16.3

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-24  7:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-24  7:56 [PATCH 0/8] ALSA: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 1/8] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix unbalanced use lock for synth MIDI device Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 2/8] ALSA: seq: oss: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` Takashi Iwai [this message]
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 4/8] ALSA: hda: " Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 5/8] ALSA: opl3: " Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 6/8] ALSA: asihpi: " Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 7/8] ALSA: hdspm: " Takashi Iwai
2018-04-24  7:56 ` [PATCH 8/8] ALSA: rme9652: " Takashi Iwai

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