From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <ast@kernel.org>, <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
<kpsingh@kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 21:32:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230412043300.360803-2-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230412043300.360803-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Make each bpf() syscall command a bit more self-contained, making it
easier to further enhance it. We move sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled
handling down to map_create() and bpf_prog_load(), two special commands
in this regard.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 6d575505f89c..c1d268025985 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1130,6 +1130,17 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
int f_flags;
int err;
+ /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
+ * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+ * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+ * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
+ * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
+ * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
+ * and other operations.
+ */
+ if (!bpf_capable() && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = CHECK_ATTR(BPF_MAP_CREATE);
if (err)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2512,6 +2523,17 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
char license[128];
bool is_gpl;
+ /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
+ * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+ * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+ * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
+ * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
+ * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
+ * and other operations.
+ */
+ if (!bpf_capable() && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_LOAD))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -5008,23 +5030,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_bind_map(union bpf_attr *attr)
static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
{
union bpf_attr attr;
- bool capable;
int err;
- capable = bpf_capable() || !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
-
- /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
- * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
- * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
- * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
- * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
- * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
- * and other operations.
- */
- if (!capable &&
- (cmd == BPF_MAP_CREATE || cmd == BPF_PROG_LOAD))
- return -EPERM;
-
err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-12 4:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-12 4:32 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-04-12 17:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_map_create_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: validate new " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:23 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] bpf: drop unnecessary bpf_capable() check in BPF_MAP_FREEZE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_btf_load_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:52 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:47 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 4:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: enhance lsm_map_create test with BTF LSM control Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Paul Moore
2023-04-12 17:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 18:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:56 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 5:16 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 15:11 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 23:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 14:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-21 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 16:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 19:03 ` Jonathan Corbet
2023-04-17 23:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 16:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-17 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18 0:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12 18:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-14 20:23 ` Dr. Greg
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-19 10:53 ` Dr. Greg
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