From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <ast@kernel.org>, <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
<kpsingh@kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 21:32:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230412043300.360803-4-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230412043300.360803-1-andrii@kernel.org>
This allows to do more centralized decisions later on, and generally
makes it very explicit which maps are privileged and which are not.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 4 --
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 6 --
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c | 4 --
kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 3 -
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++---
net/core/sock_map.c | 4 --
net/xdp/xskmap.c | 4 --
.../bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 6 +-
14 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c b/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
index 540331b610a9..addf3dd57b59 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
@@ -86,9 +86,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *bloom_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
struct bpf_bloom_filter *bloom;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
if (attr->key_size != 0 || attr->value_size == 0 ||
attr->max_entries == 0 ||
attr->map_flags & ~BLOOM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
index dab2ff4c99d9..2bb35b1c3740 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
@@ -720,9 +720,6 @@ int bpf_local_storage_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
!attr->btf_key_type_id || !attr->btf_value_type_id)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
-
if (attr->value_size > BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE)
return -E2BIG;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
index d3f0a4825fa6..116a0ce378ec 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
@@ -655,9 +655,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
const struct btf_type *t, *vt;
struct bpf_map *map;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find_value(attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id);
if (!st_ops)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index 8ec18faa74ac..8a33e8747a0e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <trace/events/xdp.h>
#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
@@ -89,9 +88,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *cpu_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
u32 value_size = attr->value_size;
struct bpf_cpu_map *cmap;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
(value_size != offsetofend(struct bpf_cpumap_val, qsize) &&
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index 802692fa3905..49cc0b5671c6 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -160,9 +160,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
struct bpf_dtab *dtab;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
dtab = bpf_map_area_alloc(sizeof(*dtab), NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!dtab)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 00c253b84bf5..c69db80fc947 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -422,12 +422,6 @@ static int htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct htab_elem, fnode.next) !=
offsetof(struct htab_elem, hash_node.pprev));
- if (lru && !bpf_capable())
- /* LRU implementation is much complicated than other
- * maps. Hence, limit to CAP_BPF.
- */
- return -EPERM;
-
if (zero_seed && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
/* Guard against local DoS, and discourage production use. */
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
index e0d3ddf2037a..17c7e7782a1f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
@@ -544,9 +544,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
struct lpm_trie *trie;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
!(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) ||
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
index 601609164ef3..8d2ddcb7566b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
#include "percpu_freelist.h"
@@ -46,9 +45,6 @@ static bool queue_stack_map_is_full(struct bpf_queue_stack *qs)
/* Called from syscall */
static int queue_stack_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
-
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 0 ||
attr->value_size == 0 ||
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
index cbf2d8d784b8..4b4f9670f1a9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c
@@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *reuseport_array_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
struct reuseport_array *array;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
/* allocate all map elements and zero-initialize them */
array = bpf_map_area_alloc(struct_size(array, ptrs, attr->max_entries), numa_node);
if (!array)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index b25fce425b2c..458bb80b14d5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -74,9 +74,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
u64 cost, n_buckets;
int err;
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
if (attr->map_flags & ~STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index a090737f98ea..cbea4999e92f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1101,17 +1101,6 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
int f_flags;
int err;
- /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
- * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
- * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
- * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
- * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
- * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
- * and other operations.
- */
- if (!bpf_capable() && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
- return -EPERM;
-
err = CHECK_ATTR(BPF_MAP_CREATE);
if (err)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1155,6 +1144,65 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
ops = &bpf_map_offload_ops;
if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
+ * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+ * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+ * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for
+ * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
+ * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
+ * and other operations.
+ */
+ if (!bpf_capable() && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* check privileged map type permissions */
+ switch (map_type) {
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
+ if (!bpf_capable())
+ return -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
+ case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
+ /* unprivileged */
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "unsupported map type %d", map_type);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 7c189c2e2fbf..4b67bb5e7f9c 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
struct bpf_stab *stab;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
attr->key_size != 4 ||
(attr->value_size != sizeof(u32) &&
@@ -1085,8 +1083,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_hash_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
struct bpf_shtab *htab;
int i, err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
attr->key_size == 0 ||
(attr->value_size != sizeof(u32) &&
diff --git a/net/xdp/xskmap.c b/net/xdp/xskmap.c
index 2c1427074a3b..e1c526f97ce3 100644
--- a/net/xdp/xskmap.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xskmap.c
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <net/xdp_sock.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -68,9 +67,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *xsk_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
int numa_node;
u64 size;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
attr->value_size != 4 ||
attr->map_flags & ~(BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c
index 8383a99f610f..0adf8d9475cb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c
@@ -171,7 +171,11 @@ static void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_negative(struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *s
prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts),
-EPERM, "prog_load_fails");
- for (i = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH; i <= BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER; i++)
+ /* some map types require particular correct parameters which could be
+ * sanity-checked before enforcing -EPERM, so only validate that
+ * the simple ARRAY and HASH maps are failing with -EPERM
+ */
+ for (i = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH; i <= BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY; i++)
ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_create(i, NULL, sizeof(int), sizeof(int), 1, NULL),
-EPERM, "map_create_fails");
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-12 4:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-12 4:32 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:49 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-04-12 18:01 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_map_create_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: validate new " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:23 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] bpf: drop unnecessary bpf_capable() check in BPF_MAP_FREEZE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 0:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_btf_load_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:52 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:47 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 4:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: enhance lsm_map_create test with BTF LSM control Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Paul Moore
2023-04-12 17:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 18:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 1:43 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 2:56 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 5:16 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 15:11 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 23:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 14:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-21 0:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-21 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 16:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 19:03 ` Jonathan Corbet
2023-04-17 23:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 16:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-17 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18 0:28 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 0:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12 18:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-14 20:23 ` Dr. Greg
2023-04-17 23:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-19 10:53 ` Dr. Greg
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