From: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org,
yonghong.song@linux.dev, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com,
haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2023 08:39:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230818083920.3771-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230818083920.3771-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com>
After we converted the capabilities of our networking-bpf program from
cap_sys_admin to cap_net_admin+cap_bpf, our networking-bpf program
failed to start. Because it failed the bpf verifier, and the error log
is "R3 pointer comparison prohibited".
A simple reproducer as follows,
SEC("cls-ingress")
int ingress(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);
if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
return TC_ACT_STOLEN;
return TC_ACT_OK;
}
Per discussion with Yonghong and Alexei [1], comparison of two packet
pointers is not a pointer leak. This patch fixes it.
Our local kernel is 6.1.y and we expect this fix to be backported to
6.1.y, so stable is CCed.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+Nmspr7Si+pxWn8zkE7hX-7s93ugwC+94aXSy4uQ9vBg@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4ccca1f..b6b60cd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -14047,6 +14047,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* check src2 operand */
+ err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14058,12 +14064,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (err)
return err;
- if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+ src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg];
+ if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) &&
+ is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
- src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg];
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14071,12 +14078,6 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
- /* check src2 operand */
- err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-18 8:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-18 8:39 [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] bpf: Fix an issue in verifing allow_ptr_leaks Yafang Shao
2023-08-18 8:39 ` Yafang Shao [this message]
2023-08-21 12:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks Eduard Zingerman
2023-08-18 8:39 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add selftest for allow_ptr_leaks Yafang Shao
2023-08-21 22:45 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-08-22 2:42 ` Yafang Shao
2023-08-22 3:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-08-22 3:44 ` Yafang Shao
2023-08-23 9:44 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-08-23 15:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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