* [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
@ 2023-12-04 17:39 Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yonghong Song @ 2023-12-04 17:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann, kernel-team,
Martin KaFai Lau
When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
I once hit a kasan error like below:
[ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
[ 1887.186498]
[ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G OEL 6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
[ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
[ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
[ 1887.190666] <TASK>
[ 1887.190949] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
[ 1887.191423] ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 1887.192019] ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 1887.192449] print_report+0x14f/0x720
[ 1887.192930] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.193459] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
[ 1887.194004] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.194572] kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
[ 1887.195085] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.195668] bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
[ 1887.196183] ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1887.196736] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.197270] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[ 1887.197802] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
[ 1887.198319] bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
[ 1887.198883] array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
[ 1887.199380] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
[ 1887.199943] process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
[ 1887.200549] worker_thread+0x633/0x890
[ 1887.201047] ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
[ 1887.201574] ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
[ 1887.202020] kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
[ 1887.202447] ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
[ 1887.202954] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
[ 1887.203444] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[ 1887.203914] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
[ 1887.204397] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1887.204913] </TASK>
[ 1887.204913] </TASK>
[ 1887.205209]
[ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
[ 1887.205881] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
[ 1887.206366] __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
[ 1887.206856] __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
[ 1887.207293] btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
[ 1887.207836] btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
[ 1887.208387] btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
[ 1887.208851] __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
[ 1887.209292] __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
[ 1887.209762] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
[ 1887.210222] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
[ 1887.210868]
[ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
[ 1887.211460] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
[ 1887.211951] kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
[ 1887.212485] ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
[ 1887.213027] __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
[ 1887.213514] btf_free+0x5b/0x130
[ 1887.213918] rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
[ 1887.214347] __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e
The error happens at bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0:
00000000000034c0 <bpf_rb_root_free>:
; {
34c0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
34c4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x34c9 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x9>
34c9: 55 pushq %rbp
34ca: 48 89 e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
...
; if (rec && rec->refcount_off >= 0 &&
36aa: 4d 85 ed testq %r13, %r13
36ad: 74 a9 je 0x3658 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x198>
36af: 49 8d 7d 10 leaq 0x10(%r13), %rdi
36b3: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x36b8 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8>
<==== kasan function
36b8: 45 8b 7d 10 movl 0x10(%r13), %r15d
<==== use-after-free load
36bc: 45 85 ff testl %r15d, %r15d
36bf: 78 8c js 0x364d <bpf_rb_root_free+0x18d>
So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
CPU A CPU B
bpf_map_put:
...
btf_put with rcu callback
...
bpf_map_free_deferred
with system_unbound_wq
... ... ...
... btf_free_rcu: ...
... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
... ...
... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
... | race condition ...
... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
...
... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
...
__bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
...
Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
if (!meta)
return -EFAULT;
rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
significantly increased reproducibility.
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
+ mdelay(100);
security_bpf_map_free(map);
bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
/* implementation dependent freeing */
To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to ensure
struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j' with the
above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the error.
Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
+ struct btf *btf = map->btf;
security_bpf_map_free(map);
bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
/* implementation dependent freeing */
map->ops->map_free(map);
+ /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
+ * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
+ */
+ btf_put(btf);
/* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
* callback usually needs access to them. It is better to do it here
* than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
@@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
/* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
bpf_map_free_id(map);
- btf_put(map->btf);
INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
/* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might contend
* for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-04 17:39 [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free() Yonghong Song
@ 2023-12-05 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-05 1:31 ` Hou Tao
2023-12-05 3:58 ` Yonghong Song
0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2023-12-05 0:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
> I once hit a kasan error like below:
>
> [ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
> [ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
> [ 1887.186498]
> [ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G OEL 6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
> [ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> [ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
> [ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
> [ 1887.190666] <TASK>
> [ 1887.190949] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
> [ 1887.191423] ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
> [ 1887.192019] ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
> [ 1887.192449] print_report+0x14f/0x720
> [ 1887.192930] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
> [ 1887.193459] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
> [ 1887.194004] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
> [ 1887.194572] kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
> [ 1887.195085] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
> [ 1887.195668] bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
> [ 1887.196183] ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
> [ 1887.196736] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
> [ 1887.197270] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
> [ 1887.197802] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
> [ 1887.198319] bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
> [ 1887.198883] array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
> [ 1887.199380] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
> [ 1887.199943] process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
> [ 1887.200549] worker_thread+0x633/0x890
> [ 1887.201047] ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
> [ 1887.201574] ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
> [ 1887.202020] kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
> [ 1887.202447] ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
> [ 1887.202954] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
> [ 1887.203444] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
> [ 1887.203914] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
> [ 1887.204397] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
> [ 1887.204913] </TASK>
> [ 1887.204913] </TASK>
> [ 1887.205209]
> [ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
> [ 1887.205881] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
> [ 1887.206366] __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
> [ 1887.206856] __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
> [ 1887.207293] btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
> [ 1887.207836] btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
> [ 1887.208387] btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
> [ 1887.208851] __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
> [ 1887.209292] __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
> [ 1887.209762] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
> [ 1887.210222] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
> [ 1887.210868]
> [ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
> [ 1887.211460] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
> [ 1887.211951] kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
> [ 1887.212485] ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
> [ 1887.213027] __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
> [ 1887.213514] btf_free+0x5b/0x130
> [ 1887.213918] rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
> [ 1887.214347] __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e
>
> The error happens at bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0:
>
> 00000000000034c0 <bpf_rb_root_free>:
> ; {
> 34c0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
> 34c4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x34c9 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x9>
> 34c9: 55 pushq %rbp
> 34ca: 48 89 e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
> ...
> ; if (rec && rec->refcount_off >= 0 &&
> 36aa: 4d 85 ed testq %r13, %r13
> 36ad: 74 a9 je 0x3658 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x198>
> 36af: 49 8d 7d 10 leaq 0x10(%r13), %rdi
> 36b3: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x36b8 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8>
> <==== kasan function
> 36b8: 45 8b 7d 10 movl 0x10(%r13), %r15d
> <==== use-after-free load
> 36bc: 45 85 ff testl %r15d, %r15d
> 36bf: 78 8c js 0x364d <bpf_rb_root_free+0x18d>
>
> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>
> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
> CPU A CPU B
> bpf_map_put:
> ...
> btf_put with rcu callback
> ...
> bpf_map_free_deferred
> with system_unbound_wq
> ... ... ...
> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
> ... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
> ... ...
> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
> ... | race condition ...
> ... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
> ...
> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>
> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
> ...
> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
> ...
>
> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
>
> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
> if (!meta)
> return -EFAULT;
> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>
> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>
> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
> significantly increased reproducibility.
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>
> + mdelay(100);
> security_bpf_map_free(map);
> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>
> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to ensure
> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j' with the
> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the error.
>
> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
> {
> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>
> security_bpf_map_free(map);
> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
> /* implementation dependent freeing */
> map->ops->map_free(map);
> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
> + */
> + btf_put(btf);
The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
very last thing that's happening).
But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look, thanks!
[0] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to do it here
> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
> bpf_map_free_id(map);
> - btf_put(map->btf);
> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might contend
> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
> --
> 2.34.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
@ 2023-12-05 1:31 ` Hou Tao
2023-12-05 4:15 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 3:58 ` Yonghong Song
1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Hou Tao @ 2023-12-05 1:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrii Nakryiko, Yonghong Song
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
Hi,
On 12/5/2023 8:42 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
>> I once hit a kasan error like below:
SNIP
>>
>>
>> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>>
>> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
>> CPU A CPU B
>> bpf_map_put:
>> ...
>> btf_put with rcu callback
>> ...
>> bpf_map_free_deferred
>> with system_unbound_wq
>> ... ... ...
>> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
>> ... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
>> ... ...
>> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
>> ... | race condition ...
>> ... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
>> ...
>> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>>
>> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
>> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
>> ...
>> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
>> ...
>>
>> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
>>
>> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
>> if (!meta)
>> return -EFAULT;
>> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>>
>> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
>> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
>> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>>
>> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
>> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
>> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
>> significantly increased reproducibility.
Also found the problem when developing the "fix the release of inner
map" patch-set. I have written a selftest which could reliably reproduce
the problem by using map-in-map + bpf_list_head. The reason of using
map-in-map is to delay the release of inner map by using call_rcu() as
well, so the free of bpf_map happens after the release of btf. Will post
it later.
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>
>> + mdelay(100);
>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>
>> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to ensure
>> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j' with the
>> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the error.
>>
>> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>> ---
>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>> {
>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>>
>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>> map->ops->map_free(map);
>> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
>> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
>> + */
>> + btf_put(btf);
> The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
> btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
> back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
> very last thing that's happening).
>
>
> But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look, thanks!
>
> [0] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
The patch delays the release of BTF id of bpf map, so test_btf_id
failed. Can we fix the problem by optionally pinning the btf in
btf_field_graph_root just like btf_field_kptr, so the map BTF will still
be alive before the invocation of btf_record_free() ? We need to do the
pinning optionally, because btf_record may be contained in btf directly
(namely btf->struct_meta_tab) and is freed through btf_free().
>
>
>> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
>> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to do it here
>> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
>> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
>> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
>> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
>> bpf_map_free_id(map);
>> - btf_put(map->btf);
>> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
>> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might contend
>> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-05 1:31 ` Hou Tao
@ 2023-12-05 3:58 ` Yonghong Song
1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yonghong Song @ 2023-12-05 3:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
On 12/4/23 7:42 PM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
>> I once hit a kasan error like below:
>>
>> [ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>> [ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
>> [ 1887.186498]
>> [ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G OEL 6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
>> [ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>> [ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
>> [ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
>> [ 1887.190666] <TASK>
>> [ 1887.190949] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
>> [ 1887.191423] ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
>> [ 1887.192019] ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
>> [ 1887.192449] print_report+0x14f/0x720
>> [ 1887.192930] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>> [ 1887.193459] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
>> [ 1887.194004] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>> [ 1887.194572] kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
>> [ 1887.195085] ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>> [ 1887.195668] bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>> [ 1887.196183] ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
>> [ 1887.196736] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>> [ 1887.197270] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>> [ 1887.197802] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
>> [ 1887.198319] bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
>> [ 1887.198883] array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
>> [ 1887.199380] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
>> [ 1887.199943] process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
>> [ 1887.200549] worker_thread+0x633/0x890
>> [ 1887.201047] ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
>> [ 1887.201574] ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
>> [ 1887.202020] kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
>> [ 1887.202447] ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
>> [ 1887.202954] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
>> [ 1887.203444] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
>> [ 1887.203914] ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
>> [ 1887.204397] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
>> [ 1887.204913] </TASK>
>> [ 1887.204913] </TASK>
>> [ 1887.205209]
>> [ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
>> [ 1887.205881] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
>> [ 1887.206366] __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
>> [ 1887.206856] __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
>> [ 1887.207293] btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
>> [ 1887.207836] btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
>> [ 1887.208387] btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
>> [ 1887.208851] __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
>> [ 1887.209292] __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
>> [ 1887.209762] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
>> [ 1887.210222] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
>> [ 1887.210868]
>> [ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
>> [ 1887.211460] kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
>> [ 1887.211951] kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
>> [ 1887.212485] ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
>> [ 1887.213027] __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
>> [ 1887.213514] btf_free+0x5b/0x130
>> [ 1887.213918] rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
>> [ 1887.214347] __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e
>>
>> The error happens at bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0:
>>
>> 00000000000034c0 <bpf_rb_root_free>:
>> ; {
>> 34c0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
>> 34c4: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x34c9 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x9>
>> 34c9: 55 pushq %rbp
>> 34ca: 48 89 e5 movq %rsp, %rbp
>> ...
>> ; if (rec && rec->refcount_off >= 0 &&
>> 36aa: 4d 85 ed testq %r13, %r13
>> 36ad: 74 a9 je 0x3658 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x198>
>> 36af: 49 8d 7d 10 leaq 0x10(%r13), %rdi
>> 36b3: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x36b8 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8>
>> <==== kasan function
>> 36b8: 45 8b 7d 10 movl 0x10(%r13), %r15d
>> <==== use-after-free load
>> 36bc: 45 85 ff testl %r15d, %r15d
>> 36bf: 78 8c js 0x364d <bpf_rb_root_free+0x18d>
>>
>> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>>
>> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
>> CPU A CPU B
>> bpf_map_put:
>> ...
>> btf_put with rcu callback
>> ...
>> bpf_map_free_deferred
>> with system_unbound_wq
>> ... ... ...
>> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
>> ... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
>> ... ...
>> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
>> ... | race condition ...
>> ... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
>> ...
>> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>>
>> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
>> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
>> ...
>> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
>> ...
>>
>> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
>>
>> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
>> if (!meta)
>> return -EFAULT;
>> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>>
>> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
>> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
>> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>>
>> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
>> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
>> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
>> significantly increased reproducibility.
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>
>> + mdelay(100);
>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>
>> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to ensure
>> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j' with the
>> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the error.
>>
>> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>> ---
>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>> {
>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>>
>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>> map->ops->map_free(map);
>> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
>> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
>> + */
>> + btf_put(btf);
> The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
> btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
> back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
> very last thing that's happening).
Currently it is safe as btf_record_free() does not touch anything freed
by btf_put(). But surely will put btf_put() at the end just in case
in the future btf_record_free() changes.
>
>
> But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look, thanks!
>
> [0] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
It is a timing issue. The patch made a little bit longer to free btf and the test
may fail as it can still retrieve the btf_id although it has been freed.
Adding one kern_sync_rcu() in user space seems making it reliable again, at least
tentatively.
>
>
>> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
>> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to do it here
>> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
>> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
>> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
>> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
>> bpf_map_free_id(map);
>> - btf_put(map->btf);
>> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
>> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might contend
>> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 1:31 ` Hou Tao
@ 2023-12-05 4:15 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 6:30 ` Hou Tao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yonghong Song @ 2023-12-05 4:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hou Tao, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
On 12/4/23 8:31 PM, Hou Tao wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 12/5/2023 8:42 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
>>> I once hit a kasan error like below:
> SNIP
>>>
>>> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>>>
>>> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
>>> CPU A CPU B
>>> bpf_map_put:
>>> ...
>>> btf_put with rcu callback
>>> ...
>>> bpf_map_free_deferred
>>> with system_unbound_wq
>>> ... ... ...
>>> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
>>> ... ... bpf_map_free_deferred:
>>> ... ...
>>> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
>>> ... | race condition ...
>>> ... ---------> map->ops->map_free()
>>> ...
>>> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>>>
>>> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
>>> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
>>> ...
>>> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
>>> ...
>>>
>>> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:
>>>
>>> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
>>> if (!meta)
>>> return -EFAULT;
>>> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>>>
>>> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
>>> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
>>> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>>>
>>> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
>>> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
>>> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
>>> significantly increased reproducibility.
> Also found the problem when developing the "fix the release of inner
> map" patch-set. I have written a selftest which could reliably reproduce
> the problem by using map-in-map + bpf_list_head. The reason of using
> map-in-map is to delay the release of inner map by using call_rcu() as
> well, so the free of bpf_map happens after the release of btf. Will post
> it later.
>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>>
>>> + mdelay(100);
>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>>
>>> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to ensure
>>> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j' with the
>>> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the error.
>>>
>>> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
>>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
>>> {
>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>>>
>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>> map->ops->map_free(map);
>>> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
>>> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
>>> + */
>>> + btf_put(btf);
>> The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
>> btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
>> back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
>> very last thing that's happening).
>>
>>
>> But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look, thanks!
>>
>> [0] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
> The patch delays the release of BTF id of bpf map, so test_btf_id
> failed. Can we fix the problem by optionally pinning the btf in
> btf_field_graph_root just like btf_field_kptr, so the map BTF will still
> be alive before the invocation of btf_record_free() ? We need to do the
> pinning optionally, because btf_record may be contained in btf directly
> (namely btf->struct_meta_tab) and is freed through btf_free().
Thanks for suggestion, I guess you want two cases:
- if map->record won't access any btf data (e.g., btf->struct_meta_tab),
we should keep current btf_put() workflow,
- if map->record accesses some btf data, we should call btf_put()
immediately before or after btf_record_free().
This could be done but we need to be careful to find all cases
btf data might be accessed in map->record. The current approach
is simpler. I will post v2 with the change Andrii suggested and
fixed the failed test.
If people really want to fine tune this like the above two cases, I can
investigate too.
>>
>>> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
>>> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to do it here
>>> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
>>> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
>>> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
>>> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
>>> bpf_map_free_id(map);
>>> - btf_put(map->btf);
>>> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
>>> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might contend
>>> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
>>> --
>>> 2.34.1
>>>
>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 4:15 ` Yonghong Song
@ 2023-12-05 6:30 ` Hou Tao
2023-12-05 7:01 ` Yonghong Song
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Hou Tao @ 2023-12-05 6:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
Hi,
On 12/5/2023 12:15 PM, Yonghong Song wrote:
>
> On 12/4/23 8:31 PM, Hou Tao wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 12/5/2023 8:42 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song
>>> <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
>>>> I once hit a kasan error like below:
>> SNIP
>>>>
>>>> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>>>>
>>>> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
>>>> CPU A CPU B
>>>> bpf_map_put:
>>>> ...
>>>> btf_put with rcu callback
>>>> ...
>>>> bpf_map_free_deferred
>>>> with system_unbound_wq
>>>> ... ... ...
>>>> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
>>>> ... ...
>>>> bpf_map_free_deferred:
>>>> ... ...
>>>> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
>>>> ... | race condition ...
>>>> ... --------->
>>>> map->ops->map_free()
>>>> ...
>>>> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>>>>
>>>> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and
>>>> eventually
>>>> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
>>>> ...
>>>> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with
>>>> following code:
>>>>
>>>> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
>>>> if (!meta)
>>>> return -EFAULT;
>>>> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>>>>
>>>> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in
>>>> struct_metas_tab.
>>>> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
>>>> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>>>>
>>>> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current
>>>> bpf/bpf-next
>>>> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility,
>>>> I added
>>>> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(),
>>>> which
>>>> significantly increased reproducibility.
>> Also found the problem when developing the "fix the release of inner
>> map" patch-set. I have written a selftest which could reliably reproduce
>> the problem by using map-in-map + bpf_list_head. The reason of using
>> map-in-map is to delay the release of inner map by using call_rcu() as
>> well, so the free of bpf_map happens after the release of btf. Will post
>> it later.
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct
>>>> work_struct *work)
>>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map,
>>>> work);
>>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>>>
>>>> + mdelay(100);
>>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>>>
>>>> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to
>>>> ensure
>>>> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j'
>>>> with the
>>>> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the
>>>> error.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>>>> ---
>>>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct
>>>> work_struct *work)
>>>> {
>>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map,
>>>> work);
>>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>>> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>>>>
>>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>>> map->ops->map_free(map);
>>>> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may
>>>> need
>>>> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
>>>> + */
>>>> + btf_put(btf);
>>> The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
>>> btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
>>> back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
>>> very last thing that's happening).
>>>
>>>
>>> But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look,
>>> thanks!
>>>
>>> [0]
>>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
>> The patch delays the release of BTF id of bpf map, so test_btf_id
>> failed. Can we fix the problem by optionally pinning the btf in
>> btf_field_graph_root just like btf_field_kptr, so the map BTF will still
>> be alive before the invocation of btf_record_free() ? We need to do the
>> pinning optionally, because btf_record may be contained in btf directly
>> (namely btf->struct_meta_tab) and is freed through btf_free().
>
> Thanks for suggestion, I guess you want two cases:
> - if map->record won't access any btf data (e.g.,
> btf->struct_meta_tab),
> we should keep current btf_put() workflow,
> - if map->record accesses some btf data, we should call btf_put()
> immediately before or after btf_record_free().
Er, it is not what I want, although I have written a similar patch in
which bpf_map_put() will call btf_put() and set map->btf as NULL if
there is no BPF_LIST_HEAD and BPF_RB_ROOT fields in map->record,
otherwise calling bpf_put() in bpf_put_free_deferred(). What I have
suggested is to optionally pin btf in graph_root.btf just like
btf_field_kptr does.
>
> This could be done but we need to be careful to find all cases
> btf data might be accessed in map->record. The current approach
> is simpler. I will post v2 with the change Andrii suggested and
> fixed the failed test.
>
> If people really want to fine tune this like the above two cases, I can
> investigate too.
>
>>>
>>>> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
>>>> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to
>>>> do it here
>>>> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
>>>> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
>>>> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
>>>> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
>>>> bpf_map_free_id(map);
>>>> - btf_put(map->btf);
>>>> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
>>>> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might
>>>> contend
>>>> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
>>>> --
>>>> 2.34.1
>>>>
>>> .
>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 6:30 ` Hou Tao
@ 2023-12-05 7:01 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 21:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yonghong Song @ 2023-12-05 7:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hou Tao, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
kernel-team, Martin KaFai Lau
On 12/5/23 1:30 AM, Hou Tao wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 12/5/2023 12:15 PM, Yonghong Song wrote:
>> On 12/4/23 8:31 PM, Hou Tao wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 12/5/2023 8:42 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 9:40 AM Yonghong Song
>>>> <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>>> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
>>>>> I once hit a kasan error like below:
>>> SNIP
>>>>> So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.
>>>>>
>>>>> I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
>>>>> CPU A CPU B
>>>>> bpf_map_put:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> btf_put with rcu callback
>>>>> ...
>>>>> bpf_map_free_deferred
>>>>> with system_unbound_wq
>>>>> ... ... ...
>>>>> ... btf_free_rcu: ...
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> bpf_map_free_deferred:
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> ... ---------> btf_struct_metas_free()
>>>>> ... | race condition ...
>>>>> ... --------->
>>>>> map->ops->map_free()
>>>>> ...
>>>>> ... btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL
>>>>>
>>>>> In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and
>>>>> eventually
>>>>> calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>> Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with
>>>>> following code:
>>>>>
>>>>> meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
>>>>> if (!meta)
>>>>> return -EFAULT;
>>>>> rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;
>>>>>
>>>>> So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in
>>>>> struct_metas_tab.
>>>>> And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
>>>>> btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current
>>>>> bpf/bpf-next
>>>>> code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility,
>>>>> I added
>>>>> a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(),
>>>>> which
>>>>> significantly increased reproducibility.
>>> Also found the problem when developing the "fix the release of inner
>>> map" patch-set. I have written a selftest which could reliably reproduce
>>> the problem by using map-in-map + bpf_list_head. The reason of using
>>> map-in-map is to delay the release of inner map by using call_rcu() as
>>> well, so the free of bpf_map happens after the release of btf. Will post
>>> it later.
>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
>>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct
>>>>> work_struct *work)
>>>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map,
>>>>> work);
>>>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>>>>
>>>>> + mdelay(100);
>>>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>>>>
>>>>> To fix the problem, I moved btf_put() after map->ops->map_free() to
>>>>> ensure
>>>>> struct_metas available during map_free(). Rerun './test_progs -j'
>>>>> with the
>>>>> above mdelay() hack for a couple of times and didn't observe the
>>>>> error.
>>>>>
>>>>> Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
>>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> index 0ed286b8a0f0..9c6c3738adfe 100644
>>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>>>>> @@ -694,11 +694,16 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct
>>>>> work_struct *work)
>>>>> {
>>>>> struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map,
>>>>> work);
>>>>> struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
>>>>> + struct btf *btf = map->btf;
>>>>>
>>>>> security_bpf_map_free(map);
>>>>> bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
>>>>> /* implementation dependent freeing */
>>>>> map->ops->map_free(map);
>>>>> + /* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may
>>>>> need
>>>>> + * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + btf_put(btf);
>>>> The change makes sense to me, but logically I'd put it after
>>>> btf_record_free(rec), just in case if some of btf records ever refer
>>>> back to map's BTF or something (and just in general to keep it the
>>>> very last thing that's happening).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But it also seems like CI is not happy ([0]), please take a look,
>>>> thanks!
>>>>
>>>> [0]
>>>> https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/7090474333/job/19297672532
>>> The patch delays the release of BTF id of bpf map, so test_btf_id
>>> failed. Can we fix the problem by optionally pinning the btf in
>>> btf_field_graph_root just like btf_field_kptr, so the map BTF will still
>>> be alive before the invocation of btf_record_free() ? We need to do the
>>> pinning optionally, because btf_record may be contained in btf directly
>>> (namely btf->struct_meta_tab) and is freed through btf_free().
>> Thanks for suggestion, I guess you want two cases:
>> - if map->record won't access any btf data (e.g.,
>> btf->struct_meta_tab),
>> we should keep current btf_put() workflow,
>> - if map->record accesses some btf data, we should call btf_put()
>> immediately before or after btf_record_free().
> Er, it is not what I want, although I have written a similar patch in
> which bpf_map_put() will call btf_put() and set map->btf as NULL if
> there is no BPF_LIST_HEAD and BPF_RB_ROOT fields in map->record,
> otherwise calling bpf_put() in bpf_put_free_deferred(). What I have
> suggested is to optionally pin btf in graph_root.btf just like
> btf_field_kptr does.
Okay, I see what you mean. This is actually what I kind of think
as well in below to identify *all* cases btf data might be accessed.
I didn't explicitly mention this approach in detail but the idea is
to get a reference count for btf and later release it during btf_record_free.
I think this should work. I need to do an audit then to find other potential
places, if exists, to do similar things. The current approach
is simpler but looks like we can do better with existing
btf_field_kptr approach.
>> This could be done but we need to be careful to find all cases
>> btf data might be accessed in map->record. The current approach
>> is simpler. I will post v2 with the change Andrii suggested and
>> fixed the failed test.
>>
>> If people really want to fine tune this like the above two cases, I can
>> investigate too.
>>
>>>>> /* Delay freeing of btf_record for maps, as map_free
>>>>> * callback usually needs access to them. It is better to
>>>>> do it here
>>>>> * than require each callback to do the free itself manually.
>>>>> @@ -727,7 +732,6 @@ void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
>>>>> if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
>>>>> /* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
>>>>> bpf_map_free_id(map);
>>>>> - btf_put(map->btf);
>>>>> INIT_WORK(&map->work, bpf_map_free_deferred);
>>>>> /* Avoid spawning kworkers, since they all might
>>>>> contend
>>>>> * for the same mutex like slab_mutex.
>>>>> --
>>>>> 2.34.1
>>>>>
>>>> .
>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 7:01 ` Yonghong Song
@ 2023-12-05 21:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-05 22:50 ` Yonghong Song
0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2023-12-05 21:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song
Cc: Hou Tao, Andrii Nakryiko, bpf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann, Kernel Team, Martin KaFai Lau
On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 11:01 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> > Er, it is not what I want, although I have written a similar patch in
> > which bpf_map_put() will call btf_put() and set map->btf as NULL if
> > there is no BPF_LIST_HEAD and BPF_RB_ROOT fields in map->record,
> > otherwise calling bpf_put() in bpf_put_free_deferred(). What I have
> > suggested is to optionally pin btf in graph_root.btf just like
> > btf_field_kptr does.
>
> Okay, I see what you mean. This is actually what I kind of think
> as well in below to identify *all* cases btf data might be accessed.
> I didn't explicitly mention this approach in detail but the idea is
> to get a reference count for btf and later release it during btf_record_free.
> I think this should work. I need to do an audit then to find other potential
> places, if exists, to do similar things. The current approach
> is simpler but looks like we can do better with existing
> btf_field_kptr approach.
imo that would be the only correct way to fix it.
we btf_get(kptr_btf) before saving it kptr.btf in btf_parse_kptr() and
btf_put() it eventually in btf_record_free().
graph_root looks buggy.
It saved the btf pointer in btf_parse_graph_root() without taking refcnt.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
2023-12-05 21:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2023-12-05 22:50 ` Yonghong Song
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Yonghong Song @ 2023-12-05 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Hou Tao, Andrii Nakryiko, bpf, Alexei Starovoitov,
Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann, Kernel Team, Martin KaFai Lau
On 12/5/23 4:13 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 11:01 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>> Er, it is not what I want, although I have written a similar patch in
>>> which bpf_map_put() will call btf_put() and set map->btf as NULL if
>>> there is no BPF_LIST_HEAD and BPF_RB_ROOT fields in map->record,
>>> otherwise calling bpf_put() in bpf_put_free_deferred(). What I have
>>> suggested is to optionally pin btf in graph_root.btf just like
>>> btf_field_kptr does.
>> Okay, I see what you mean. This is actually what I kind of think
>> as well in below to identify *all* cases btf data might be accessed.
>> I didn't explicitly mention this approach in detail but the idea is
>> to get a reference count for btf and later release it during btf_record_free.
>> I think this should work. I need to do an audit then to find other potential
>> places, if exists, to do similar things. The current approach
>> is simpler but looks like we can do better with existing
>> btf_field_kptr approach.
> imo that would be the only correct way to fix it.
> we btf_get(kptr_btf) before saving it kptr.btf in btf_parse_kptr() and
> btf_put() it eventually in btf_record_free().
> graph_root looks buggy.
> It saved the btf pointer in btf_parse_graph_root() without taking refcnt.
Agreed. Just send v3 patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231205224812.813224-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-12-05 22:51 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2023-12-04 17:39 [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free() Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-12-05 1:31 ` Hou Tao
2023-12-05 4:15 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 6:30 ` Hou Tao
2023-12-05 7:01 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 21:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-05 22:50 ` Yonghong Song
2023-12-05 3:58 ` Yonghong Song
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