* [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/2] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses
2023-12-21 23:22 [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/2] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses Andrei Matei
@ 2023-12-21 23:22 ` Andrei Matei
2023-12-21 23:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] bpf: add a possibly-zero-sized read test Andrei Matei
2024-01-03 18:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/2] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2023-12-21 23:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf; +Cc: andrii.nakryiko, eddyz87, Andrei Matei, Andrii Nakryiko
This patch simplifies the verification of size arguments associated to
pointer arguments to helpers and kfuncs. Many helpers take a pointer
argument followed by the size of the memory access performed to be
performed through that pointer. Before this patch, the handling of the
size argument in check_mem_size_reg() was confusing and wasteful: if the
size register's lower bound was 0, then the verification was done twice:
once considering the size of the access to be the lower-bound of the
respective argument, and once considering the upper bound (even if the
two are the same). The upper bound checking is a super-set of the
lower-bound checking(*), except: the only point of the lower-bound check
is to handle the case where zero-sized-accesses are explicitly not
allowed and the lower-bound is zero. This static condition is now
checked explicitly, replacing a much more complex, expensive and
confusing verification call to check_helper_mem_access().
Error messages change in this patch. Before, messages about illegal
zero-size accesses depended on the type of the pointer and on other
conditions, and sometimes the message was plain wrong: in some tests
that changed you'll see that the old message was something like "R1 min
value is outside of the allowed memory range", where R1 is the pointer
register; the error was wrongly claiming that the pointer was bad
instead of the size being bad. Other times the information that the size
came for a register with a possible range of values was wrong, and the
error presented the size as a fixed zero. Now the errors refer to the
right register. However, the old error messages did contain useful
information about the pointer register which is now lost; recovering
this information was deemed not important enough.
(*) Besides standing to reason that the checks for a bigger size access
are a super-set of the checks for a smaller size access, I have also
mechanically verified this by reading the code for all types of
pointers. I could convince myself that it's true for all but
PTR_TO_BTF_ID (check_ptr_to_btf_access). There, simply looking
line-by-line does not immediately prove what we want. If anyone has any
qualms, let me know.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 ++++------
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c | 8 ++++----
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 1863826a4ac3..d041927b862b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7296,12 +7296,10 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
- if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
- err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
- zero_size_allowed,
- meta);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n",
+ regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value);
+ return -EACCES;
}
if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
index 692216c0ad3d..3e8340c2408f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to map: empty range")
-__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=0")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read")
__naked void access_to_map_empty_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): empty range")
-__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=0")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read")
__naked void via_const_imm_empty_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): empty range")
-__failure __msg("R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read")
__naked void via_const_reg_empty_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to adjusted map (via variable): empty range")
-__failure __msg("R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read")
__naked void map_via_variable_empty_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c
index f67390224a9c..7cc83acac727 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ __naked void load_bytes_negative_len_2(void)
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, zero len")
-__failure __msg("invalid zero-sized read")
+__failure __msg("R4 invalid zero-sized read: u64=[0,0]")
__naked void skb_load_bytes_zero_len(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
--
2.40.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] bpf: add a possibly-zero-sized read test
2023-12-21 23:22 [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/2] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses Andrei Matei
2023-12-21 23:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/2] " Andrei Matei
@ 2023-12-21 23:22 ` Andrei Matei
2024-01-03 18:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/2] bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2023-12-21 23:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf; +Cc: andrii.nakryiko, eddyz87, Andrei Matei
This patch adds a test for the condition that the previous patch mucked
with - illegal zero-sized helper memory access. As opposed to existing
tests, this new one uses a size whose lower bound is zero, as opposed to
a known-zero one.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
.../bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
index 3e8340c2408f..886498b5e6f3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_helper_value_access.c
@@ -89,9 +89,14 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
: __clobber_all);
}
+/* Call a function taking a pointer and a size which doesn't allow the size to
+ * be zero (i.e. bpf_trace_printk() declares the second argument to be
+ * ARG_CONST_SIZE, not ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO). We attempt to pass zero for the
+ * size and expect to fail.
+ */
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to map: empty range")
-__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read: u64=[0,0]")
__naked void access_to_map_empty_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -113,6 +118,38 @@ l0_%=: exit; \
: __clobber_all);
}
+/* Like the test above, but this time the size register is not known to be zero;
+ * its lower-bound is zero though, which is still unacceptable.
+ */
+SEC("tracepoint")
+__description("helper access to map: possibly-empty ange")
+__failure __msg("R2 invalid zero-sized read: u64=[0,4]")
+__naked void access_to_map_possibly_empty_range(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_48b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r1 = r0; \
+ /* Read an unknown value */ \
+ r7 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \
+ /* Make it small and positive, to avoid other errors */ \
+ r7 &= 4; \
+ r2 = 0; \
+ r2 += r7; \
+ call %[bpf_trace_printk]; \
+l0_%=: exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm(bpf_trace_printk),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_48b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
SEC("tracepoint")
__description("helper access to map: out-of-bound range")
__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=56")
--
2.40.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread