From: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev,
song@kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com, andrii@kernel.org
Cc: sinquersw@gmail.com, kuifeng@meta.com,
Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test __kptr_user on the value of a task storage map.
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 16:57:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240807235755.1435806-6-thinker.li@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240807235755.1435806-1-thinker.li@gmail.com>
Make sure the memory of user kptrs have been mapped to the kernel
properly. Also ensure the values of user kptrs in the kernel haven't been
copied to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
---
.../bpf/prog_tests/task_local_storage.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/task_ls_kptr_user.c | 72 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 194 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_ls_kptr_user.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_local_storage.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_local_storage.c
index c33c05161a9e..17221024fb28 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_local_storage.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/task_local_storage.c
@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <pthread.h>
+#include <sys/eventfd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h> /* For SYS_xxx definitions */
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <test_progs.h>
#include "task_local_storage_helpers.h"
#include "task_local_storage.skel.h"
@@ -14,6 +16,21 @@
#include "task_ls_recursion.skel.h"
#include "task_storage_nodeadlock.skel.h"
+struct user_data {
+ int a;
+ int b;
+ int result;
+};
+
+struct value_type {
+ struct user_data *udata_mmap;
+ struct user_data *udata;
+};
+
+#define MAGIC_VALUE 0xabcd1234
+
+#include "task_ls_kptr_user.skel.h"
+
static void test_sys_enter_exit(void)
{
struct task_local_storage *skel;
@@ -40,6 +57,109 @@ static void test_sys_enter_exit(void)
task_local_storage__destroy(skel);
}
+static void test_kptr_user(void)
+{
+ struct user_data user_data = { .a = 1, .b = 2, .result = 0 };
+ struct user_data user_data_mmap_v = { .a = 7, .b = 7 };
+ struct task_ls_kptr_user *skel = NULL;
+ struct user_data *user_data_mmap;
+ int task_fd = -1, ev_fd = -1;
+ struct value_type value;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int err, wstatus;
+ __u64 dummy = 1;
+
+ user_data_mmap = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*user_data_mmap), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_NEQ(user_data_mmap, MAP_FAILED, "mmap"))
+ return;
+
+ memcpy(user_data_mmap, &user_data_mmap_v, sizeof(*user_data_mmap));
+ value.udata_mmap = user_data_mmap;
+ value.udata = &user_data;
+
+ task_fd = sys_pidfd_open(getpid(), 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_NEQ(task_fd, -1, "sys_pidfd_open"))
+ goto out;
+
+ ev_fd = eventfd(0, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_NEQ(ev_fd, -1, "eventfd"))
+ goto out;
+
+ skel = task_ls_kptr_user__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open_and_load"))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = bpf_map_update_elem(bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.datamap), &task_fd, &value, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "update_datamap"))
+ exit(1);
+
+ /* Make sure the BPF program can access the user_data_mmap even if
+ * it's munmapped already.
+ */
+ munmap(user_data_mmap, sizeof(*user_data_mmap));
+ user_data_mmap = NULL;
+
+ err = task_ls_kptr_user__attach(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_attach"))
+ goto out;
+
+ fflush(stdout);
+ fflush(stderr);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Call syscall in the child process, but access the map value of
+ * the parent process in the BPF program to check if the user kptr
+ * is translated/mapped correctly.
+ */
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ /* child */
+
+ /* Overwrite the user_data in the child process to check if
+ * the BPF program accesses the user_data of the parent.
+ */
+ user_data.a = 0;
+ user_data.b = 0;
+
+ /* Wait for the parent to set child_pid */
+ read(ev_fd, &dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ skel->bss->parent_pid = syscall(SYS_gettid);
+ skel->bss->child_pid = pid;
+
+ write(ev_fd, &dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
+ err = waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(err, pid, "waitpid");
+ skel->bss->child_pid = 0;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(MAGIC_VALUE + user_data.a + user_data.b +
+ user_data_mmap_v.a + user_data_mmap_v.b,
+ user_data.result, "result");
+
+ /* Check if user programs can access the value of user kptrs
+ * through bpf_map_lookup_elem(). Make sure the kernel value is not
+ * leaked.
+ */
+ err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.datamap), &task_fd, &value);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem"))
+ goto out;
+ ASSERT_EQ(value.udata_mmap, NULL, "lookup_udata_mmap");
+ ASSERT_EQ(value.udata, NULL, "lookup_udata");
+
+out:
+ task_ls_kptr_user__destroy(skel);
+ close(ev_fd);
+ close(task_fd);
+ munmap(user_data_mmap, sizeof(*user_data_mmap));
+}
+
static void test_exit_creds(void)
{
struct task_local_storage_exit_creds *skel;
@@ -237,4 +357,6 @@ void test_task_local_storage(void)
test_recursion();
if (test__start_subtest("nodeadlock"))
test_nodeadlock();
+ if (test__start_subtest("kptr_user"))
+ test_kptr_user();
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_ls_kptr_user.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_ls_kptr_user.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ff5ca3a5da1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_ls_kptr_user.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2024 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "task_kfunc_common.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+struct user_data {
+ int a;
+ int b;
+ int result;
+};
+
+struct value_type {
+ struct user_data __kptr_user *udata_mmap;
+ struct user_data __kptr_user *udata;
+};
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE);
+ __uint(map_flags, BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
+ __type(key, int);
+ __type(value, struct value_type);
+} datamap SEC(".maps");
+
+#define MAGIC_VALUE 0xabcd1234
+
+/* This is a workaround to avoid clang generating a forward reference for
+ * struct user_data. This is a known issue and will be fixed in the future.
+ */
+struct user_data __dummy;
+
+pid_t child_pid = 0;
+pid_t parent_pid = 0;
+
+SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
+int BPF_PROG(on_enter, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task, *data_task;
+ struct value_type *ptr;
+ struct user_data *udata;
+ int acc;
+
+ task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+ if (task->pid != child_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ data_task = bpf_task_from_pid(parent_pid);
+ if (!data_task)
+ return 0;
+
+ ptr = bpf_task_storage_get(&datamap, data_task, 0,
+ BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
+ bpf_task_release(data_task);
+ if (!ptr)
+ return 0;
+
+ udata = ptr->udata_mmap;
+ if (!udata)
+ return 0;
+ acc = udata->a + udata->b;
+
+ udata = ptr->udata;
+ if (!udata)
+ return 0;
+ udata->result = MAGIC_VALUE + udata->a + udata->b + acc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-07 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-07 23:57 [RFC bpf-next 0/5] Share user memory to BPF program through task storage map Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 1/5] bpf: Parse and support "kptr_user" tag Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 2/5] bpf: Handle BPF_KPTR_USER in verifier Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-13 16:52 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-13 19:35 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-13 23:13 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 3/5] bpf: pin, translate, and unpin __kptr_user from syscalls Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-08 0:05 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-08 0:39 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:00 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:45 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:24 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 17:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:51 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 4/5] libbpf: define __kptr_user Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` Kui-Feng Lee [this message]
2024-08-12 16:58 ` [RFC bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test __kptr_user on the value of a task storage map Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:15 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 17:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 18:10 ` Kui-Feng Lee
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