From: Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>, Kernel Team <kernel-team@meta.com>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Kui-Feng Lee <kuifeng@meta.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC bpf-next 2/5] bpf: Handle BPF_KPTR_USER in verifier.
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2024 16:13:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3107f476-b844-4dfa-bcf9-c89baa95cb6f@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQLLpdRMVJsaVMrUBTyzXBbg+1uxZTs-12n2BXQuSVLK2g@mail.gmail.com>
On 8/13/24 12:35, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 9:52 AM Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 8/12/24 09:48, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2024 at 4:58 PM Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Give PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF to kptr_user
>>>> to the memory pointed by it readable and writable.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +++++++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> index df3be12096cf..84647e599595 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> @@ -5340,6 +5340,10 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>>>> int perm_flags;
>>>> const char *reg_name = "";
>>>>
>>>> + if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_USER)
>>>> + /* BPF programs should not change any user kptr */
>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>> +
>>>> if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
>>>> perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -5483,6 +5487,12 @@ static u32 btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf_field *kptr
>>>> ret |= NON_OWN_REF;
>>>> } else {
>>>> ret |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
>>>> + if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_USER)
>>>> + /* In oder to access directly from bpf
>>>> + * programs. NON_OWN_REF make the memory
>>>> + * writable. Check check_ptr_to_btf_access().
>>>> + */
>>>> + ret |= MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF;
>>>
>>> UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF ?!
>>>
>>> That doesn't fit into any of the existing verifier schemes.
>>> I cannot make sense of this part.
>>>
>>> UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC is read only through exceptions logic.
>>> The uptr has to be read/write through normal load/store.
>>
>> I will remove UNTRUSTED and leave MEM_ALLOC and NON_OWN_REF.
>> Does it make sense to you?
>
> I don't think it fits either.
> MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF is specific to bpf_rbtree/linklist nodes.
> There are various checks and logic like:
> 1.
> if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) ||
> type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) &&
> WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off))
> return;
> 2.
> invalidate_non_owning_refs() during unlock
>
> that shouldn't apply in this case.
>
> PTR_TO_MEM with specific mem_size fits better.
> Since it's user/kernel shared memory PTR_TO_BTF_ID logic with field walking
> won't work anyway, so opaque array of bytes is better. Which is PTR_TO_MEM.
Make sense!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-13 23:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-07 23:57 [RFC bpf-next 0/5] Share user memory to BPF program through task storage map Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 1/5] bpf: Parse and support "kptr_user" tag Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 2/5] bpf: Handle BPF_KPTR_USER in verifier Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-13 16:52 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-13 19:35 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-13 23:13 ` Kui-Feng Lee [this message]
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 3/5] bpf: pin, translate, and unpin __kptr_user from syscalls Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-08 0:05 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-08 0:39 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:00 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:45 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:24 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 17:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:51 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 4/5] libbpf: define __kptr_user Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-07 23:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test __kptr_user on the value of a task storage map Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 16:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 17:15 ` Kui-Feng Lee
2024-08-12 17:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-08-12 18:10 ` Kui-Feng Lee
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