[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 147/244] selftests/bpf: fix uprobe.path leak in bpf_testmod

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 147/244] selftests/bpf: fix uprobe.path leak in bpf_testmod

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit db61e6a4eee5a7884b2cafeaf407895f253bbaa7 ]

testmod_unregister_uprobe() forgets to path_put(&uprobe.path).

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240801132724.GA8791@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
index fd28c1157bd3d..72f565af4f829 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ static void testmod_unregister_uprobe(void)
 	if (uprobe.offset) {
 		uprobe_unregister(d_real_inode(uprobe.path.dentry),
 				  uprobe.offset, &uprobe.consumer);
+		path_put(&uprobe.path);
 		uprobe.offset = 0;
 	}
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 236/244] bpf: Make the pointer returned by iter next method valid

[Sasha Levin]

From: Juntong Deng <juntong.deng@outlook.com>

[ Upstream commit 4cc8c50c9abcb2646a7a4fcef3cea5dcb30c06cf ]

Currently we cannot pass the pointer returned by iter next method as
argument to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS or KF_RCU kfuncs, because the pointer
returned by iter next method is not "valid".

This patch sets the pointer returned by iter next method to be valid.

This is based on the fact that if the iterator is implemented correctly,
then the pointer returned from the iter next method should be valid.

This does not make NULL pointer valid. If the iter next method has
KF_RET_NULL flag, then the verifier will ask the ebpf program to
check NULL pointer.

KF_RCU_PROTECTED iterator is a special case, the pointer returned by
iter next method should only be valid within RCU critical section,
so it should be with MEM_RCU, not PTR_TRUSTED.

Another special case is bpf_iter_num_next, which returns a pointer with
base type PTR_TO_MEM. PTR_TO_MEM should not be combined with type flag
PTR_TRUSTED (PTR_TO_MEM already means the pointer is valid).

The pointer returned by iter next method of other types of iterators
is with PTR_TRUSTED.

In addition, this patch adds get_iter_from_state to help us get the
current iterator from the current state.

Signed-off-by: Juntong Deng <juntong.deng@outlook.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/AM6PR03MB584869F8B448EA1C87B7CDA399962@AM6PR03MB5848.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d8520095ca030..3b20c3e614e19 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7987,6 +7987,15 @@ static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st,
+						 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+	int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno;
+	int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi;
+
+	return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
+}
+
 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next
  * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer
  * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below.
@@ -8071,12 +8080,10 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st;
 	struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter;
-	int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno;
-	int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi;
 
 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter);
 
-	cur_iter = &env->cur_state->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
+	cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta);
 
 	if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE &&
 	    cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) {
@@ -8104,7 +8111,7 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
 		if (!queued_st)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		queued_iter = &queued_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
+		queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta);
 		queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
 		queued_iter->iter.depth++;
 		if (prev_st)
@@ -12671,6 +12678,17 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id;
+
+			if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) {
+				struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter;
+
+				cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta);
+
+				if (cur_iter->type & MEM_RCU) /* KF_RCU_PROTECTED */
+					regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU;
+				else
+					regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) {
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 241/244] bpftool: Fix undefined behavior caused by shifting into the sign bit

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4cdc0e4ce5e893bc92255f5f734d983012f2bc2e ]

Replace shifts of '1' with '1U' in bitwise operations within
__show_dev_tc_bpf() to prevent undefined behavior caused by shifting
into the sign bit of a signed integer. By using '1U', the operations
are explicitly performed on unsigned integers, avoiding potential
integer overflow or sign-related issues.

Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240908140009.3149781-1-visitorckw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
index 968714b4c3d45..ad2ea6cf2db11 100644
--- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
+++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
@@ -482,9 +482,9 @@ static void __show_dev_tc_bpf(const struct ip_devname_ifindex *dev,
 		if (prog_flags[i] || json_output) {
 			NET_START_ARRAY("prog_flags", "%s ");
 			for (j = 0; prog_flags[i] && j < 32; j++) {
-				if (!(prog_flags[i] & (1 << j)))
+				if (!(prog_flags[i] & (1U << j)))
 					continue;
-				NET_DUMP_UINT_ONLY(1 << j);
+				NET_DUMP_UINT_ONLY(1U << j);
 			}
 			NET_END_ARRAY("");
 		}
@@ -493,9 +493,9 @@ static void __show_dev_tc_bpf(const struct ip_devname_ifindex *dev,
 			if (link_flags[i] || json_output) {
 				NET_START_ARRAY("link_flags", "%s ");
 				for (j = 0; link_flags[i] && j < 32; j++) {
-					if (!(link_flags[i] & (1 << j)))
+					if (!(link_flags[i] & (1U << j)))
 						continue;
-					NET_DUMP_UINT_ONLY(1 << j);
+					NET_DUMP_UINT_ONLY(1U << j);
 				}
 				NET_END_ARRAY("");
 			}
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 243/244] bpftool: Fix undefined behavior in qsort(NULL, 0, ...)

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f04e2ad394e2755d0bb2d858ecb5598718bf00d5 ]

When netfilter has no entry to display, qsort is called with
qsort(NULL, 0, ...). This results in undefined behavior, as UBSan
reports:

net.c:827:2: runtime error: null pointer passed as argument 1, which is declared to never be null

Although the C standard does not explicitly state whether calling qsort
with a NULL pointer when the size is 0 constitutes undefined behavior,
Section 7.1.4 of the C standard (Use of library functions) mentions:

"Each of the following statements applies unless explicitly stated
otherwise in the detailed descriptions that follow: If an argument to a
function has an invalid value (such as a value outside the domain of
the function, or a pointer outside the address space of the program, or
a null pointer, or a pointer to non-modifiable storage when the
corresponding parameter is not const-qualified) or a type (after
promotion) not expected by a function with variable number of
arguments, the behavior is undefined."

To avoid this, add an early return when nf_link_info is NULL to prevent
calling qsort with a NULL pointer.

Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240910150207.3179306-1-visitorckw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
index ad2ea6cf2db11..0f2106218e1f0 100644
--- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
+++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/net.c
@@ -824,6 +824,9 @@ static void show_link_netfilter(void)
 		nf_link_count++;
 	}
 
+	if (!nf_link_info)
+		return;
+
 	qsort(nf_link_info, nf_link_count, sizeof(*nf_link_info), netfilter_link_compar);
 
 	for (id = 0; id < nf_link_count; id++) {
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.11 244/244] bpf: Fix a sdiv overflow issue

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit 7dd34d7b7dcf9309fc6224caf4dd5b35bedddcb7 ]

Zac Ecob reported a problem where a bpf program may cause kernel crash due
to the following error:
  Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI

The failure is due to the below signed divide:
  LLONG_MIN/-1 where LLONG_MIN equals to -9,223,372,036,854,775,808.
LLONG_MIN/-1 is supposed to give a positive number 9,223,372,036,854,775,808,
but it is impossible since for 64-bit system, the maximum positive
number is 9,223,372,036,854,775,807. On x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 will
cause a kernel exception. On arm64, the result for LLONG_MIN/-1 is
LLONG_MIN.

Further investigation found all the following sdiv/smod cases may trigger
an exception when bpf program is running on x86_64 platform:
  - LLONG_MIN/-1 for 64bit operation
  - INT_MIN/-1 for 32bit operation
  - LLONG_MIN%-1 for 64bit operation
  - INT_MIN%-1 for 32bit operation
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.

On arm64, there are no exceptions:
  - LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN
  - INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN
  - LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0
  - INT_MIN%-1 = 0
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.

Insn patching is needed to handle the above cases and the patched codes
produced results aligned with above arm64 result. The below are pseudo
codes to handle sdiv/smod exceptions including both divisor -1 and divisor 0
and the divisor is stored in a register.

sdiv:
      tmp = rX
      tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
      if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L2
      if tmp == 0 goto L1
      rY = 0
  L1:
      rY = -rY;
      goto L3
  L2:
      rY /= rX
  L3:

smod:
      tmp = rX
      tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
      if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L1
      if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3)
      rY = 0;
      goto L2
  L1:
      rY %= rX
  L2:
      goto L4  // only when !is64
  L3:
      wY = wY  // only when !is64
  L4:

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/

Reported-by: Zac Ecob <zacecob@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913150326.1187788-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3b20c3e614e19..f2dd3fda40848 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -19929,13 +19929,46 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			/* Convert BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 to 32-bit ALU */
 			insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(insn->code) | BPF_SRC(insn->code);
 
-		/* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
+		/* Make sdiv/smod divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */
+		if ((insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) ||
+		     insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K) ||
+		     insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) ||
+		     insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K)) &&
+		    insn->off == 1 && insn->imm == -1) {
+			bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
+			bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
+			struct bpf_insn *patchlet;
+			struct bpf_insn chk_and_sdiv[] = {
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
+					     BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
+					     0, 0, 0),
+			};
+			struct bpf_insn chk_and_smod[] = {
+				BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0),
+			};
+
+			patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_sdiv : chk_and_smod;
+			cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_sdiv) : ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_smod);
+
+			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt);
+			if (!new_prog)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			delta    += cnt - 1;
+			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+			goto next_insn;
+		}
+
+		/* Make divide-by-zero and divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */
 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) {
 			bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
 			bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
+			bool is_sdiv = isdiv && insn->off == 1;
+			bool is_smod = !isdiv && insn->off == 1;
 			struct bpf_insn *patchlet;
 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = {
 				/* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */
@@ -19955,10 +19988,62 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
 				BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
 			};
+			struct bpf_insn chk_and_sdiv[] = {
+				/* [R,W]x sdiv 0 -> 0
+				 * LLONG_MIN sdiv -1 -> LLONG_MIN
+				 * INT_MIN sdiv -1 -> INT_MIN
+				 */
+				BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
+					     BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 0, 1),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
+					     BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 4, 1),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
+					     BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 1, 0),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
+					     BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
+					     0, 0, 0),
+				/* BPF_NEG(LLONG_MIN) == -LLONG_MIN == LLONG_MIN */
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
+					     BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
+					     0, 0, 0),
+				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
+				*insn,
+			};
+			struct bpf_insn chk_and_smod[] = {
+				/* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
+				/* [R,W]x mod -1 -> 0 */
+				BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
+					     BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 0, 1),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
+					     BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 3, 1),
+				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
+					     BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
+					     0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1),
+				BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0),
+				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
+				*insn,
+				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
+				BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
+			};
 
-			patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod;
-			cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) :
-				      ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
+			if (is_sdiv) {
+				patchlet = chk_and_sdiv;
+				cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_sdiv);
+			} else if (is_smod) {
+				patchlet = chk_and_smod;
+				cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_smod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
+			} else {
+				patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod;
+				cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) :
+					      ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
+			}
 
 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt);
 			if (!new_prog)
-- 
2.43.0