From: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2] bpf: fix crash in bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr for negative dentries
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 07:38:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260430073836.2894001-1-mattbobrowski@google.com> (raw)
bpf_set_dentry_xattr and bpf_remove_dentry_xattr BPF kfuncs attempt to
lock the inode of the supplied dentry without checking if it is
NULL. If a negative dentry is passed (e.g. from
security_inode_create), d_inode(dentry) returns NULL, and
inode_lock(inode) will cause a NULL pointer dereference.
Trivially fix this by adding a NULL check for inode before attempting
to lock it, returning -EINVAL if it is NULL.
Additionally, drop WARN_ON(!inode) in bpf_xattr_read_permission() and
bpf_xattr_write_permission(). These warnings could be triggered by
passing a negative dentry to bpf_get_dentry_xattr() or the _locked
variants of the xattr kfuncs, potentially causing a Denial of Service
on systems with panic_on_warn enabled. Instead, simply return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1587cbf4-1293-4e25-ad24-c970836a1686@std.uestc.edu.cn/
Fixes: 56467292794b ("bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
---
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 9d27be058494..8642a754b37d 100644
--- a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static bool match_security_bpf_prefix(const char *name__str)
static int bpf_xattr_read_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
{
- if (WARN_ON(!inode))
+ if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
/* Allow reading xattr with user. and security.bpf. prefix */
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
static int bpf_xattr_write_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
{
- if (WARN_ON(!inode))
+ if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
/* Only allow setting and removing security.bpf. xattrs */
@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__st
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int ret;
+ if (!inode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
inode_lock(inode);
ret = bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(dentry, name__str, value_p, flags);
inode_unlock(inode);
@@ -314,6 +317,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name_
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int ret;
+ if (!inode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
inode_lock(inode);
ret = bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(dentry, name__str);
inode_unlock(inode);
--
2.54.0.545.g6539524ca2-goog
next reply other threads:[~2026-04-30 7:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-30 7:38 Matt Bobrowski [this message]
2026-04-30 8:14 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2] bpf: fix crash in bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr for negative dentries bot+bpf-ci
2026-05-03 20:26 ` Matt Bobrowski
2026-05-11 9:23 ` Christian Brauner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260430073836.2894001-1-mattbobrowski@google.com \
--to=mattbobrowski@google.com \
--cc=2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox