From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: eddyz87@gmail.com
Cc: memxor@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Keep untrusted PTR_TO_MEM read-only on RCU invalidation
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 22:40:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260813204032.644949-3-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260813204032.644949-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
invalidate_rcu_protected_refs() turns MEM_RCU pointers into PTR_UNTRUSTED
ones once the RCU read-side critical section ends.
For a PTR_TO_BTF_ID base that is fine, but for a PTR_TO_MEM base the
result has to carry MEM_RDONLY as well, since the rest of the verifier
relies on the two coming as a pair (e.g. bpf_convert_ctx_accesses()).
A writable untrusted PTR_TO_MEM would otherwise end up as a plain load
or store to memory without fault protection. No in-tree kfunc produces
the combination today, thus this is mainly hardening.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8ef9418733ca..0c0dd53118d5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -9054,6 +9054,9 @@ static void invalidate_rcu_protected_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+ /* An untrusted PTR_TO_MEM has to be MEM_RDONLY. */
+ if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM)
+ reg->type |= MEM_RDONLY;
}
}));
}
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-13 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-13 20:40 [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 20:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Merge pointer types also when both are PTR_TO_MEM Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 21:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-13 21:52 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 0:14 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 8:10 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 1:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 20:40 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2026-08-13 21:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Keep untrusted PTR_TO_MEM read-only on RCU invalidation bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 0:10 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-13 20:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for pointer type merge at a shared load Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 21:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-13 21:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 0:08 ` Eduard Zingerman
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