From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: eddyz87@gmail.com
Cc: memxor@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for pointer type merge at a shared load
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 22:40:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260813204032.644949-4-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260813204032.644949-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cover the ways in which the type recorded for a shared load used to lose
the BPF_PROBE_MEM rewrite. All four reach the same load with a PTR_TO_MEM
on one verification path and take a NULL deref on the other:
- mixed_mem_untrusted_btf_id_type: pairs with PTR_TO_BTF_ID |
PTR_UNTRUSTED from bpf_rdonly_cast() which is merged into
PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_UNTRUSTED
- mixed_mem_btf_id_type: pairs with bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID from
a pointer walk which gets merged into a bare PTR_TO_MEM
- mixed_rdonly_mem_btf_id_type: same, but with a PTR_TO_MEM |
MEM_RDONLY from bpf_dynptr_slice() which is merged into
PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY
- mixed_mem_mem_type: pairs PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF with the
PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED of bpf_rdonly_cast()
which was not merged at all
bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites none of these, so the NULL deref
on the second path panicked rather than returning 0. Assert that this
is not the case with the fix anymore.
# LDLIBS=-static PKG_CONFIG='pkg-config --static' ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t mem_rdonly_untrusted
[...]
#238/1 mem_rdonly_untrusted/btf_id_to_ptr_mem:OK
#238/2 mem_rdonly_untrusted/ldx_is_ok_bad_addr:OK
#238/3 mem_rdonly_untrusted/ldx_is_ok_good_addr:OK
#238/4 mem_rdonly_untrusted/offset_not_tracked:OK
#238/5 mem_rdonly_untrusted/stx_not_ok:OK
#238/6 mem_rdonly_untrusted/atomic_not_ok:OK
#238/7 mem_rdonly_untrusted/atomic_rmw_not_ok:OK
#238/8 mem_rdonly_untrusted/kfunc_param_not_ok:OK
#238/9 mem_rdonly_untrusted/mixed_mem_type:OK
#238/10 mem_rdonly_untrusted/mixed_mem_untrusted_btf_id_type:OK
#238/11 mem_rdonly_untrusted/mixed_mem_btf_id_type:OK
#238/12 mem_rdonly_untrusted/mixed_rdonly_mem_btf_id_type:OK
#238/13 mem_rdonly_untrusted/mixed_mem_mem_type:OK
#238/14 mem_rdonly_untrusted/diff_size_access:OK
#238/15 mem_rdonly_untrusted/misaligned_access:OK
#238/16 mem_rdonly_untrusted/null_check:OK
#238/17 mem_rdonly_untrusted/ldx_is_ok_commuted_addr:OK
#238/18 mem_rdonly_untrusted/helper_param_not_ok:OK
#238 mem_rdonly_untrusted:OK
Summary: 1/18 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0/0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
.../bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 183 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
index b91271d4caa4..127b745bb0b7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <vmlinux.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
#include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
@@ -164,6 +165,188 @@ int mixed_mem_type(void *ctx)
return *p;
}
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF);
+ __uint(max_entries, 4096);
+} ringbuf SEC(".maps");
+
+int zero;
+
+static __noinline u64 *get_mem_or_untrusted_addr(u64 *mem)
+{
+ /*
+ * Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using
+ * __noinline func.
+ */
+ if (zero)
+ return mem;
+ else
+ return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, bpf_core_type_id_kernel(struct sock));
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("= *(u64 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=untrusted_ptr_sock")
+__msg("= *(u64 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=ringbuf_mem")
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_untrusted_btf_id_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ u64 *p, v;
+
+ p = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, sizeof(*p), 0);
+ if (!p)
+ return 1;
+ *p = 42;
+ /*
+ * The load below is reached with PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF on one
+ * path and with PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED on the other. The
+ * merged type has to keep the BPF_PROBE_MEM rewrite, otherwise
+ * the NULL deref taken at runtime panics the kernel instead of
+ * returning 0.
+ */
+ v = *get_mem_or_untrusted_addr(p);
+ bpf_ringbuf_discard(p, 0);
+ return v;
+}
+
+static __noinline u32 *get_mem_or_btf_id_addr(u32 *mem)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using
+ * __noinline func.
+ */
+ if (zero)
+ return mem;
+
+ task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+ /*
+ * A plain BTF pointer walk yields a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and
+ * task->nameidata is NULL unless the task currently is in the
+ * middle of a path lookup.
+ */
+ return (u32 *)&task->nameidata->flags;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("= *(u32 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=ptr_nameidata")
+__msg("= *(u32 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=ringbuf_mem")
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_btf_id_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ u32 *p, v;
+
+ p = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, sizeof(*p), 0);
+ if (!p)
+ return 1;
+ *p = 42;
+ /*
+ * Same as above, except that the other path yields a bare
+ * PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Merging it with PTR_TO_MEM used to drop the
+ * BPF_PROBE_MEM rewrite the bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID would have
+ * gotten on its own.
+ */
+ v = *get_mem_or_btf_id_addr(p);
+ bpf_ringbuf_discard(p, 0);
+ return v;
+}
+
+char dynptr_data[8];
+
+static __noinline u32 *get_rdonly_mem_or_btf_id_addr(u32 *mem)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using
+ * __noinline func.
+ */
+ if (zero)
+ return mem;
+
+ task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+ return (u32 *)&task->nameidata->flags;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0){{.*}}R7=ptr_nameidata")
+__msg("r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0){{.*}}R7=rdonly_mem")
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_rdonly_mem_btf_id_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr dptr;
+ char buf[sizeof(u32)];
+ u32 *p;
+ u64 v;
+
+ if (bpf_dynptr_from_mem(dynptr_data, sizeof(dynptr_data), 0, &dptr))
+ return 1;
+ p = bpf_dynptr_slice(&dptr, 0, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!p)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * Same as above, except that the PTR_TO_MEM side already carries
+ * MEM_RDONLY. Merging it with a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID used to yield
+ * PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY, which is not rewritten either since
+ * only its PTR_UNTRUSTED variant is.
+ */
+ p = get_rdonly_mem_or_btf_id_addr(p);
+ /* asm block to have reliable match target for __msg. */
+ asm volatile (
+ "r7 = %[p];"
+ "r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 + 0);"
+ "%[v] = r8;"
+ : [v]"=r"(v)
+ : [p]"r"(p)
+ : "r7", "r8");
+ return v;
+}
+
+static __noinline u64 *get_mem_or_rdonly_untrusted_mem_addr(u64 *mem)
+{
+ u64 *p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Hoist the cast above the branch so that the PTR_TO_MEM |
+ * MEM_RINGBUF path is verified first and thus gets its type
+ * recorded first.
+ */
+ if (zero == 0)
+ return p;
+ return mem;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("= *(u64 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=ringbuf_mem")
+__msg("= *(u64 *)(r{{[0-9]}} +0){{.*}}=rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_mem_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ u64 *p, v;
+
+ p = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(&ringbuf, sizeof(*p), 0);
+ if (!p)
+ return 1;
+ *p = 42;
+ /*
+ * Both paths are PTR_TO_MEM based, so they do not trip the type
+ * mismatch check and used to skip the merge altogether, leaving
+ * the insn with the PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF recorded first and
+ * hence without the BPF_PROBE_MEM rewrite the other path needs.
+ */
+ v = *get_mem_or_rdonly_untrusted_mem_addr(p);
+ bpf_ringbuf_discard(p, 0);
+ return v;
+}
+
__attribute__((__aligned__(8)))
u8 global[] = {
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44,
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-13 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-13 20:40 [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 20:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Merge pointer types also when both are PTR_TO_MEM Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 21:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-13 21:52 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 0:14 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 1:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 20:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Keep untrusted PTR_TO_MEM read-only on RCU invalidation Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-13 21:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 0:10 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-13 20:40 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2026-08-13 21:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for pointer type merge at a shared load bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-13 21:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 0:08 ` Eduard Zingerman
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