From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Anastasios Papagiannis" <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:01:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831100153.60EF21F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831092305.42062-3-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The `dst` arguments in `bpf_copy_from_user_mm` and `bpf_copy_from_user_mm_str` lack the `__uninit` suffix, causing the verifier to reject uninitialized stack memory and forcing unnecessary zero-initialization.
--
commit 064bec09b54d9a7638a0865baa943bd0e6467f30
Author: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
This commit adds bpf_copy_from_user_mm() and bpf_copy_from_user_mm_str()
kfuncs to allow BPF programs to access trusted address spaces not associated
with a task_struct. It also updates existing task-based user memory access
helpers to use these new functions.
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> index b3cc5c8fc8756..19c01aa734ae1 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
[ ... ]
> +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_mm(void *dst, u32 dst__sz,
> + const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign,
> + struct mm_struct *mm, u64 flags)
> +{
[Severity: Low]
Should the dst parameter be named dst__uninit here?
Without the __uninit suffix, the BPF verifier natively treats void pointer
kfunc parameters as ARG_PTR_TO_MEM. This forces BPF programs to redundantly
zero-initialize their buffers before calling these sleepable kfuncs, degrading
usability and performance compared to the older bpf_copy_from_user_task helper.
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (unlikely(flags))
> + return -EINVAL;
[Severity: Low]
If the __uninit suffix is added, the verifier will assume the buffer is
initialized upon return. Without clearing the buffer on this early path,
could this allow a BPF program to read uninitialized kernel stack memory?
[ ... ]
> +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_mm_str(void *dst, u32 dst__sz,
> + const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign,
> + struct mm_struct *mm, u64 flags)
> {
> int ret;
[Severity: Low]
Similar to bpf_copy_from_user_mm above, does this dst parameter also need the
__uninit suffix to avoid forcing BPF programs to pre-initialize the memory?
If it does, the early flags check in this function would also need to zero
the buffer before returning -EINVAL to avoid leaking uninitialized memory.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831092305.42062-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 10:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 9:22 [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 9:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 1/7] mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str() Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:01 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-31 10:43 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/7] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 10:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-01 3:19 ` sun jian
2026-09-01 8:56 ` sun jian
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 4/7] bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 5/7] selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31 10:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 6/7] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-01 3:50 ` sun jian
2026-08-31 9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 7/7] selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm Anastasios Papagiannis
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260831100153.60EF21F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox