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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Anastasios Papagiannis" <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/7] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:25:02 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831102503.4CC8C1F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831092305.42062-4-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Use-After-Free of `bprm->file` via eBPF kfuncs due to dangling trusted pointer.
--

commit ac94f9ff4f270354d3714d4162d6adfa946a8fdf
Author: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>

exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference

This commit clears bprm->mm before calling mmput() in free_bprm().
This ensures that eBPF programs cannot access a dangling mm_struct
pointer when hooking into execution paths.

> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index a14f28b15607a..4b4d8f0627a7c 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1453,9 +1453,12 @@ void bprm_drop_loader(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  
>  static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
> -	if (bprm->mm) {
> +	struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm;
> +
> +	if (mm) {
>  		acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
> -		mmput(bprm->mm);
> +		bprm->mm = NULL;
> +		mmput(mm);
>  	}
>  	if (bprm->user_ns)
>  		put_user_ns(bprm->user_ns);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since this patch addresses dangling
pointers in free_bprm() for eBPF, does bprm->file need similar handling?

Further down in free_bprm(), the code drops the file reference and then
calls a hookable function:

	do_close_execat(bprm->file);
	/* An unconsumed PT_INTERP substitute from a binfmt_misc loader entry. */
	bprm_drop_loader(bprm);

When kernel_execve() fails in a kernel thread, free_bprm() is called.
The do_close_execat() call drops the final reference to the file.
Because this executes in a kernel thread (PF_KTHREAD), fput() queues
the file for asynchronous freeing via delayed_fput_work.

Right after this, bprm_drop_loader() is called. If an eBPF fentry program
is attached to bprm_drop_loader, it receives the bprm argument.

Because the BPF verifier defines the file pointer within linux_binprm as
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED, the verifier trusts the pointer. The eBPF program
can read bprm->file and pass it to a kfunc like bpf_get_file_xattr().

Could this result in a use-after-free if the kfunc dereferences the file
pointer concurrently while the workqueue frees it?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831092305.42062-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-31 10:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-31  9:22 [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31  9:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 1/7] mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str() Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:01   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 10:43   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/7] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:25   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-31 10:30   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-01  3:19   ` sun jian
2026-09-01  8:56   ` sun jian
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 4/7] bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 5/7] selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-31 10:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 6/7] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-08-31 10:43   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-01  3:50   ` sun jian
2026-08-31  9:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 7/7] selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm Anastasios Papagiannis

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